

EPA STD COMM PAPER

- 1 -

OCT 23 1989

Mr. Ralph Stein, Associate Director
for Systems Integration and Regulations
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
U. S. Department of Energy, RW 30
Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Stein:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF STAFF PAPER ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL STANDARDS

Enclosed for your information is a copy of SECY 89-319, a recent staff paper on the implementation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) High-Level Waste Disposal Standards. This paper requests Commission approval of staff plans to pursue a continuing evaluation of the EPA standards by way of rulemakings and interactions with the EPA's staff. A public meeting has been scheduled for November 21, 1989 to brief the Commission on this paper.

Any questions that you may have on this paper should be directed to Ken Kalman, of my staff. He can be contacted by telephone on (301) 492-0428.

Sincerely

15/

Robert E. Browning, Director
Division of High-Level Waste Management

Enclosure: As stated

in pocket

cc: R. Loux, State of Nevada
C. Gertz, DOE/NV
S. Bradhurst, Nye County
M. Baughman, Lincoln County
D. Bechtel, Clark County
K. Turner, GAO

DISTRIBUTION

Central File	B.J. Youngblood	R.E. Browning	J. Bunting
LSS	J. Linehan	R. Ballard	On-Site Reps
CNWSA	NMSS R/F	HLPD R/F	K. Kalman
LPDR	ACNW	PDR	

OFC :HLPD	:HLPD	:HLPD	:HLPD	:	:
NAME:KKalman/wd:JHolenrich:JLinehan:RBrowning:	:	:	:	:	:
DATE:10/23/89	:10/23/89	:10/23/89	:10/23/89	:	:

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

8910240247 891023
PDR WASTE
WM-1 PDC

109
NH16
WM-1



Received w/Ltr Dated

10/23/89

POLICY ISSUE

(Notation Vote)

SECY-89-319

October 17, 1989

For:

The Commissioners

From:

James M. Taylor
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

Subject:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY'S HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL STANDARDS

Purpose:

In response to Staff Requirements Memoranda M890711A of July 21 and M890726B of August 8, 1989, this paper informs the Commission of: (1) the status of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) high-level waste (HLW) disposal standards development; (2) the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's reevaluation of its views on implementation of probabilistic standards; and (3) the status of the staff's reevaluation of the use of such quantitative standards by development of procedures and rules that are needed for implementing the standards.

- To request Commission approval of staff plans to pursue a continuing evaluation of the EPA standards by way of rulemakings and interactions with EPA's staff.

Summary:

EPA, pursuant to the provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (Pub. L. 97-425), is responsible for development of environmental radiation protection standards for disposal of HLW. NRC is responsible for licensing the disposal repository, but its licensing judgment must be based on compliance with the EPA standards. EPA promulgated its standards in 1985, but the standards were vacated in 1987 by the U. S. Court of Appeals. They are expected to be reissued for public comment in late 1989, and some parts of the standards are expected to remain unchanged from those promulgated earlier. Specifically, the probabilistic nature of the "containment requirements" section, which was initially opposed by the Commission, is expected to be retained. The staff's reevaluation of its views on implementation of probabilistic standards in a HLW repository licensing review and the basis for the staff's

CONTACT:

Daniel Fehringer, NMSS
492-0426

FULL TEXT ASCII SCAN

FULL TEXT ASCII SCAN

109

8910230141

views are presented in this paper. This paper also discusses U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) plans for demonstrating compliance with the standards and the NRC staff's plans for rulemakings related to implementation of the standards.

Before EPA issues revised standards for public comment, the staff will provide the Commission an evaluation of the technical basis from which the revised standards were derived, and any comments the staff considers should be provided to EPA before publication of those standards.

Background:

HLW (including spent nuclear fuel) is highly radiotoxic and will remain hazardous for thousands of years. Projecting the performance of the natural and man-made components of a repository over such a long time will involve uncertainties that may be unprecedented in engineering and risk assessment practice. The challenge facing NRC and EPA is to develop a regulatory approach that will accommodate these uncertainties. Such a regulatory approach should allow licensing decisions to be reached on acceptance of suitable sites and designs and rejection of unsuitable ones, while avoiding reliance on overly conservative approaches that would excessively increase disposal costs or might eliminate suitable repositories from consideration.

In the late 1970's, EPA began development of environmental radiation protection standards for disposal of HLW. As the benchmark for overall repository system safety, those standards address: (1) the time period after disposal for which repository performance must be projected (at least 10,000 years); (2) the conditions for which performance is to be assessed (both expected performance and performance following reasonably foreseeable disruptive processes and events); and (3) the maximum allowable contamination of groundwaters, doses to individuals, and population impacts. The standards reflect an unprecedented societal concern over the perceived long-term hazards of HLW, and an apparent societal willingness to bear the cost of implementing the safest disposal technology that is reasonably achievable.

On December 29, 1982, EPA published its proposed standards (40 CFR Part 191, 47 FR 58196) and solicited public comment on them. Of particular note was the probabilistic nature of the standards, which endorsed a non-linear, inverse relationship between the allowable size of a release and the likelihood that a release would occur. NRC's comments

(dated May 10 and 11, 1983) objected to the probabilistic nature of the standards, stating, in part, that "[t]he numerical probabilities in [the standards] would require a degree of precision which is unlikely to be achievable in evaluating a real waste disposal system." The NRC comment went on to explain that "...identification of the relevant processes and events affecting a particular site will require considerable judgment and will not be amenable to accurate quantification, by statistical analysis, of their probability of occurrence."

EPA retained its numerical standard, but in response to NRC's comments, EPA added wording to the final standards which was virtually identical to the wording of Section 101 of 10 CFR Part 60. This text recognized the long time involved and the associated substantial uncertainties in projecting HLW repository performance, and emphasized that a "reasonable expectation," rather than absolute proof, is to be the test of compliance with the standard.

In an additional attempt to provide flexibility for implementation of the standards, EPA also provided that quantitative predictions of releases from a repository were to be incorporated into an overall probability distribution only "to the extent practicable." This phrase appears to allow at least some additional discretion for NRC to incorporate qualitative considerations into its decision-making, rather than placing sole reliance on numerical projections of repository performance.

Based on these changes in EPA's standards, the NRC staff withdrew its objection to the standards. In SECY-85-272, dated October, 1985, the staff informed the Commission that "[a]lthough the staff continues to believe that the probabilistic nature of the standards will pose a significant challenge, the staff considers that the standards, in the current form, can be implemented in a licensing review." The Commission did not disagree with the staff's assessment and, on September 19, 1985, EPA promulgated final environmental radiation protection standards for disposal of HLW (50 FR 38066). The final standards (40 CFR Part 191) included provisions for (1) groundwater protection; (2) individual protection; and (3) total release of radioactive material to the environment for 10,000 years after waste disposal. The latter requirement, the "containment requirements," retained its probabilistic format, imposing more restrictive release limits for relatively likely releases than for those less likely to occur. Included in the containment requirements was the

qualifying wording referred to previously, recognizing the need for non-quantitative considerations when evaluating compliance with the probabilistic standards. The requirements for groundwater and individual protection were much less encompassing, being limited to "undisturbed performance" for only the first 1,000 years after waste disposal.

A 1987 Federal court decision remanded these standards for further consideration by EPA. The basis for the remand involved the procedures used to issue the groundwater and individual protection requirements and inconsistencies between those requirements and other EPA standards. The probabilistic containment requirements were not found to be defective. A recent internal EPA (working) draft of the revised EPA standards indicates that most, but not all, changes under consideration are related to the court decision, and that the probabilistic portion of the standards is likely to be retained largely unchanged.¹

EPA's pending revision and reissuance of its HLW standards has provided an opportunity for the NRC staff to reexamine its earlier views on implementation of those standards. In particular, the additional experience acquired by the staff since 1985 in probabilistic risk assessments for power plants and application of NRC's safety goals will be drawn on to determine whether the staff still retains its confidence that probabilistic standards can be implemented in an NRC licensing review.

Discussion:

EPA developed its standards by evaluating the performance of several hypothetical repositories and by considering the costs and benefits associated with alternatives such as improved engineered barriers. In describing the standards, EPA stated that "... the Agency [EPA] has been able to develop standards for the management and disposal of these wastes that are both reasonably achievable - with little, if any, effort beyond that already planned for commercial wastes - and that limit risks to levels that the Agency believes are clearly acceptably small" (50FR38070, September 19, 1985). EPA's standards are thus more a generic quantification of "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) than a safety limit based solely on consideration of acceptable levels of risk.

¹ A second working draft is expected later this fall. The staff plans to provide specific written comments to EPA on the second working draft. The staff will inform the Commission of any problems and the staff's recommendations for resolving them prior to providing the comments to EPA.

The probabilistic portion of the EPA HLW standards was derived so that population impacts would be restricted to 1000 premature cancer deaths over 10,000 years for a repository inventory of 100,000 metric tonnes of spent fuel (the approximate inventory to be generated by all currently operating power plants in the U.S.). This average population risk ($10^{-1}/\text{yr}$) is intermediate between the population risk typically posed by a single commercial nuclear power plant ($10^{-2}/\text{yr}$) and that represented by all commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. ($10^0/\text{yr}$). Thus, although the standards represent something of a generic quantification of ALARA, the level of impacts allowed by the standards does not appear to be significantly different from that currently presented by operating nuclear power plants.

However, it is important to recognize that the achievability of this risk level by a real repository has not yet been tested by analysis and thus achievability by a real repository is uncertain. DOE's current efforts in developing performance assessment capabilities for the civilian repository program may provide significant insights, as will DOE's experience in developing performance assessments for the proposed repository for defense transuranic wastes, i.e., the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The EPA has proposed that the DOE publish the performance assessments for WIPP in a supplement to the Environmental Impact Statement for that facility, where all can see and comment on it.

An effort by a team of staff from the Offices of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards and Nuclear Regulatory Research to conduct preliminary analyses of repository performance will be a further step in answering this question. Meanwhile, the staff intends to give substantial attention to the proposed revisions of the EPA HLW standards. Prior to publication of EPA's revised standards, the staff will provide the Commission an evaluation of the technical basis from which those standards were derived, and any comments the staff considers should be provided to EPA before public comments are requested.

The Nature of the Problem

Differing views on implementation of the EPA HLW standards ultimately derive from different perceptions of the statistical rigor required for estimates of the probabilities of potentially disruptive events such as fault movement, volcanic activity and climate change.

A rigorous application of EPA's numerical standards would require estimates of the probabilities of potentially disruptive events that are derived from a statistical data base of previous occurrences of those events at the repository site. Some of the events of interest may be relatively rare compared to the length of the geologic record for a repository site. A recent National Research Council report² dealing with probabilistic seismic hazard analysis noted that the relatively short historical record of seismic activity requires reliance on other techniques when projecting seismic activity for thousands of years into the future. Moreover, some potential events may not even be evidenced in the geologic record (e.g., human-initiated events). Therefore, a rigorous application of the EPA standards would lead to the conclusion that the standards cannot be implemented in a licensing review. Indeed, this interpretation was exactly NRC's view of the standards when EPA proposed them for public comment in 1982.

EPA retained the numerical standard, but in response to NRC's concerns, EPA added text (previously mentioned), to its probabilistic containment requirements, recognizing the uncertainties involved in projecting repository performance over long time periods. Specifically, EPA stated that "[p]roof of the future performance of a disposal system is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word in situations that deal with much shorter time frames. Instead, what is required is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of the record before the implementing agency, that compliance . . . will be achieved." In Appendix B of the standards, EPA elaborated on its views on implementation of the standards. There, EPA stated:

Determining compliance with [the standards] will also involve predicting the likelihood of events and processes that may disturb the disposal system. In making these various predictions, it will be appropriate for the implementing agencies to make use of rather complex computational models, analytical theories, and prevalent expert judgment relevant to the numerical predictions. Substantial uncertainties are likely to be encountered in making these

² Panel on Seismic Hazard Analysis, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1988.

predictions. In fact, sole reliance on these numerical predictions to determine compliance may not be appropriate; the implementing agencies may choose to supplement such predictions with qualitative judgments as well.

This text indicates that EPA did not intend to require that HLW repository licensing decisions be based solely on numerical probability estimates. Rather, EPA recognized that other, more qualitative considerations, such as the multiple-barrier, defense-in-depth concept imbedded in Part 60, would play a major role in evaluating the safety of a proposed repository. Although these statements by EPA characterize the use of non-quantitative factors as "supplemental to" the numerical standard and discuss flexibility in terms of treating uncertainties, the determination that must be made under EPA regulation is that there is a "reasonable expectation" that repository performance will comply with the numerical standard. Thus, while the language added by EPA to the rule and in the Supplementary Information tends to recognize qualitative considerations, an acceptable approach to implementation is still ambiguous and the governing standard is still the probabilistic numerical standard.

NRC Licensing Requirements

Part 60 currently contains language in Section 60.101 recognizing that "reasonable assurance" must have a somewhat different interpretation in repository licensing than it has in other NRC licensing decisions dealing with much shorter time periods. However, Part 60 does not now directly address implementation of the EPA standards, because those standards had not yet been developed when Part 60 was published. After promulgation of the EPA standards in 1985, the NRC published proposed "conforming amendments" to incorporate those standards into NRC's regulations (51 FR 22288, June 19, 1986). Those proposed amendments, which were withdrawn when the Court of Appeals remanded the EPA standard, would have added, to Part 60, text nearly identical to that cited from EPA's Appendix B, previously mentioned. In addition, a lengthy exposition on implementation of the EPA standards was presented in the Supplementary Information for the proposed amendments. The conforming amendments were intended to establish, through rulemaking, the regulatory basis to ensure that the EPA standards could be implemented in a workable manner in NRC's licensing process. As will be discussed later in this paper, the staff anticipates reinitiation of the

conforming amendments rulemaking (and initiation of one or more additional implementation rulemakings) when the EPA standards are reissued. The staff believes that the conduct of these rulemakings can and will ensure that the application of probabilistic analyses in NRC's licensing process will remain carefully judgmental, as intended by EPA and NRC.

Probability Estimates

As discussed previously, numerical probability estimates are not intended to be the sole basis for repository licensing decisions. However, neither are purely qualitative considerations. In the NRC staff's view, the EPA standards require a combination of the two types of information to be weighed when evaluating repository safety. Thus, the question still remains as to whether probability estimates for very unlikely events can be derived in any meaningful way.

The staff view is that probability estimates can be developed that are reasonably defensible -- at least for sites that are not unusually complex or geologically active. (Current information is not adequate to determine whether the Yucca Mountain, Nevada site is so geologically complex and active as to preclude meaningful probability estimates. This is a major issue to be resolved as soon as practicable during site characterization.) The basis for this view consists, in part, of an important distinction between the probability of occurrence of a potentially disruptive event and the probability that a release of radioactive material to the accessible environment will occur within the 10,000-year regulatory period addressed by the EPA standards. The very low probability contained in the standards -- one chance in 1,000, over 10,000 years -- refers to a release to the accessible environment rather than the occurrence of an event that might lead to the release. The probabilities of events and releases can be quite different because of three factors, referred to here as the resiliency, geometric, and time factors.

Resiliency factor. The nature of an HLW repository is such that it may be partially or totally resistant to some types of events. As an example, vibratory ground motion associated with fault movement is likely to be relatively unimportant because for most repository designs there are no components whose integrity is sensitive to vibratory ground motion. Similarly, drilling into a repository during the first 300 to 1000 years, when waste canisters

are required to be substantially intact, or drilling into an unsaturated zone repository, may cause little or no release unless the drilling directly strikes a canister. If a repository site were found with a groundwater travel time between the repository and the accessible environment approaching 10,000 years, that site would be resistant to most events other than those that could substantially shorten the groundwater travel time. The staff anticipates that, for some events, there will be no need for probability estimates, when it can be shown that the repository system is resistant to the disruptive effects of the events.

Geometric factor. Generally, the NRC and EPA regulations presume that a repository would be located within a larger, relatively homogeneous geologic setting. The geologic record of this larger area can provide the basis for estimating quite small probabilities of occurrence at the repository site. Consider, for example, a 10 km² repository site located within a 10,000 km² geologic setting. Events distributed randomly within the geologic setting, and with a recurrence interval of 10,000 years, would have a probability of occurrence at the repository site of only 10⁻⁷ per year. To the extent that potentially disruptive events can be considered random, the staff anticipates that this type of geometric consideration will be very significant in developing probability estimates.

Time factor. The time at which an event is postulated to occur is very important in evaluating its significance. First, radioactive decay rapidly reduces the radioactive inventory of some of the shorter-lived constituents of HLW. For events that disrupt only a very small fraction of a repository (e.g., drilling that strikes a waste canister) releases may not be significant unless the event occurs within the first few hundred years after repository closure. Second, the time lapse between the occurrence of an event and any resulting release may be quite long for a well-designed and sited repository. If, for example, the time for transport of released waste through the geosphere to the environment is 9000 years, only those events that occur within the first 1000 years after repository closure would be of regulatory significance in applying a 10,000-year standard. In both cases, the staff expects estimates of event probabilities to be more meaningful over these shorter time periods than they would be for 10,000 years.

In summary, there may be a difference of orders of magnitude between the probability that an event will occur and the probability that a release will result. Thus, in order to demonstrate that a release has a probability less than 1 chance in 1,000 over 10,000 years, it might only be necessary to show that the probability of an initiating event is less than 1 chance in 100,000 per year -- a short enough recurrence interval so that the geologic record should provide useful information. The predominant staff view is that meaningful, although not necessarily statistically rigorous, probability estimates can be made for repositories located at well-chosen sites -- i.e., sites that are not unusually complex or geologically active. In fact, the ability to develop the required probability estimates is a de-facto siting criterion for evaluating how well the site is understood and thus, how confident one can be of its future performance as part of a repository. As an example, the staffs of both DOE and NRC have been working to develop methods for predicting the probability of future volcanic activity at the Yucca Mountain, Nevada site, based on studies of the record of past volcanism near the site. These methods have been used to develop numerical estimates of site performance. The uncertainties in the probability estimates reflect technical concerns with the site which must be resolved before licensing, regardless of the standard which must be implemented to evaluate the site, rather than concerns with the ability to develop these numerical values. The NRC staff expressed its views in its comments on DOE's Site Characterization Plan (SCP), and additional discussions are planned for future meetings with DOE.

It is also possible to interpret the EPA standards to require a more rigorous statistical basis, in analyses incorporating significant conservatisms, for licensing. The only way to produce the required probability estimates would be to have available a site-specific geologic record approaching the age of the earth, and since such lengthy geologic records can seldom be found, rigid implementation of the EPA standards is likely to prove impossible. Also, the principal discussion has focused on geological examples. However, the EPA standard is not limited to geologic events but an entire spectrum of events that have the requisite likelihood. It can be extremely difficult to deal with the tail of a probability distribution of very large events with mean probabilities on the order of 10^{-7} to 10^{-8} /year. In the context of the EPA standard, it may also be difficult to deal with such things as climatic changes caused or affected by human activity over thousands

or years (e.g., greenhouse effect concerns resulting from increased fossil fuel use in recent decades).

Where from Here?

While the basic principles reflected in the EPA 1985 changes which recognized uncertainties and the need for non-quantifiable technical judgments in assuring repository performance remain valuable and important, additional clarification and guidance is required in order to deal with these issues. Specifically, additional clarification and guidance is needed to come to grips with how non-quantifiable technical judgments are to be used in assessing "reasonable expectation" of compliance with the governing numerical standard. The NRC staff has identified two basic courses of action available to the Commission -- (a) reaffirm its earlier acceptance of the probabilistic nature of the EPA standards provided that clarification of the treatment of key problem areas can be worked out (in this connection the staff will work closely with EPA to develop wording which could be used in either revised EPA standards or in NRC regulations, as appropriate, to minimize potential implementation problems and will remain alert to developments that could potentially alter this acceptance) or, (b) if the standards are now or subsequently judged not to be implementable, petition EPA to reissue the standards in an altered or non-probabilistic format. Combining these two basic courses of action with the prospect of developing implementing amendments to Part 60 has led the staff to identify the following four alternatives.

Alternative 1 -- Current EPA Standards and Part 60. In this alternative, the probabilistic portion of the EPA standards would be reissued with the same format as in 1985. The specific wording of the standards and of Part 60 would be revised only as necessary to resolve potential implementation problems and to ensure consistency between the two regulations. The main advantage of this alternative is that a complete set of regulatory standards could be established quickly, providing guidance to DOE for its repository development program. The main disadvantage of this alternative is that it might leave many contentious issues, such as acceptable methods for estimating the probabilities of disruptive events, to be resolved during a licensing review. The absence of clarification may make it virtually impossible to resolve difficult licensing issues within the three-year statutory time frame.

Alternative 2 -- Revised EPA Standards and Current Part 60
Several possible revisions to the EPA standards have been considered as ways to make the standards easier to implement. These include substitution of qualitative terms (likely, unlikely, etc.) for the numerical probabilities in the standards, restating the numerical probabilities in a less precise way (e.g., combining the numerical probabilities with modifiers such as "on the order of"), and making the standards consequence-based rather than risk-based (i.e., completely removing all probabilistic aspects of the standards). Amendments of these types might allow more flexibility for implementation of the EPA standards, but would be accompanied by significant uncertainties about interpretation of the standards. These greater uncertainties raise a different obstacle for the licensing process, namely, the lack of a clear standard of acceptability. The predominant view of the staff is that the current wording of the EPA standards represents a reasonable compromise between the goal of precise statement of the regulatory requirements of the standards and the desire for flexibility in implementing the standards. But, as discussed above, additional clarification and guidance is needed to address more clearly how non-quantifiable technical judgment may be used in lieu of or to fulfill the numerical standard. Since the fundamental issue is one of clarifying the EPA standard, this should be the responsibility of EPA, with substantial input from NRC concerning the specific nature of such clarification.

Alternative 3 -- Current or Revised EPA Standards and Revised Part 60. This alternative, which is currently being pursued by the staff, involves two phases. First, the staff will pursue an aggressive interaction with EPA during reissuance of its standards aimed at identification and resolution of potential implementation problems. To the extent possible the staff seeks to have EPA expand on its interpretation of the EPA standard. Second, the staff will amend Part 60 before a licensing review so as to resolve, where practicable, any remaining potentially contentious issues on implementation.³ The staff currently plans three rulemakings related to implementation of the EPA HLW standards (see SECY-88-285, October 5, 1988). One will provide the basis for making site-specific determinations on the potentially disruptive events and

³ Development of technical positions or regulatory guides, and interlocutory review by a licensing board for resolution of issues, are variations of this alternative.

processes that will need to be considered in developing HLW release scenarios. It will revise the current definitions of "anticipated" and "unanticipated" processes and events in Part 60. The revisions will specify a non-probabilistic method to be used for categorizing processes and events as "anticipated" or "unanticipated." The staff proposes this method because of its view that categorization on the basis of numerical probability estimates would be too uncertain to use as the primary basis for preliminary screening of events and processes.

A second rulemaking, referred to as the "conforming amendments," will incorporate directly into Part 60 all the substantive provisions of the EPA standards and will adopt any changes in terminology necessary for conformance between the two regulations. An earlier conforming rulemaking, previously discussed, was terminated when the EPA HLW standards were remanded by a decision of a Federal Appeals Court. The amendments currently contemplated will serve the same purpose as those previously initiated -- i.e., to reproduce within Part 60 all of the substantive requirements of the EPA standards and to eliminate any differences in terminology that might otherwise cause confusion during a licensing review.

As discussed earlier, it is the staff's intention to work closely with EPA during reissuance of its standards to reduce or eliminate, to the extent practicable, potential sources of confusion or contention about acceptable means for implementing the EPA standards. Nevertheless, the staff recognizes that it likely will not be possible for EPA to resolve all issues regarding the standards, and that an additional initiative by the NRC may be necessary. Thus, the staff is planning to pursue a third rulemaking, called the "implementing amendments," which is now only in the initial scoping phase. Possible topics to be addressed by this rulemaking include:

- 1) identification of acceptable methods for validation of the models and computer codes to be used for projecting repository performance;
- 2) specification of acceptable methods for estimating the likelihood of potentially disruptive processes and events, either generically or on a site-specific basis;

- 3) further elaboration, beyond that currently provided in Part 60, of the conditions for evaluating potential human-induced disruptions of a repository and of the need for incorporation of human-initiated releases into an overall probabilistic distribution of releases from a repository;
- 4) endorsement of an acceptable method for identifying potentially disruptive scenarios for analysis, and specification of criteria for screening out scenarios with low likelihood or consequences; and
- 5) elaboration on the meaning of the Section 60.122 requirements for evaluation of "favorable" and "potentially adverse" conditions -- especially the requirement to show that a potentially adverse condition does not compromise the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The advantage of this alternative is that it permits resolution of certain potentially contentious issues before a licensing review, so that those issues will not delay or prevent a licensing decision on repository acceptability. The disadvantage of this alternative is the significant amount of time and staff resources required to develop and promulgate the necessary amendments to Part 60. Since the purpose and effect of these NRC rules is the implementation of the EPA standards, EPA endorsement of such NRC implementation would minimize the potential for protracted litigation over whether such NRC rules are consistent with NRC's statutory obligation to be consistent with EPA standards. Preferably, EPA should clarify its standards or amplify the Supplementary Information accompanying its regulation in a manner consistent with the thrust of NRC's "implementing regulations."

Alternative 4 -- No EPA Standards and Current or Revised Part 60. This alternative is included because of the possibility that EPA might be significantly delayed in reissuing its standards, or that the standards might again be found legally inadequate by a court. If there should be no EPA HLW standards in place at the time a repository license application is received, NRC could still carry out its licensing review, relying on Sections 60.31 and 60.41 as the criterion for overall system performance (no unreasonable risk to public health and safety). Doing so would, however, inject a significant uncertainty concerning the level of risk that would be considered "unreasonable."

To prevent this from occurring, NRC could add to Part 60 a more precise criterion for overall system performance. The staff does not now favor this alternative, and assumes that the EPA standards will be available when they are needed. The staff will monitor EPA's progress in reissuing its standards and, if significant delays become evident, will reevaluate the desirability of pursuing this alternative. The staff will also keep abreast of developments regarding implementation of the EPA standards for DOE's WIPP as part of its continuing evaluation of the standards.⁴

Evaluation of Alternatives

As previously discussed, the EPA standards already contain wording allowing considerable flexibility for implementation. Alternatives that further increase flexibility suffer from a lack of precision in their statements of the safety levels to be achieved (e.g., replacing numerical probabilities with "likely," "unlikely," or "credible"). Additional flexibility might prove counterproductive because a licensing review would need to interpret the meaning of the standards as well as consider whether compliance with the standards has been achieved. What is needed is clarification of how the flexibility provided by some of the wording in the rule and in the Supplementary Information accompanying the 1985 revision may be used in satisfying the governing numerical standard. Rather than petition EPA for major revisions to the probabilistic format, the staff recommends an aggressive effort to work closely with EPA to identify potential implementation problems in the standards and to develop solutions to those problems which can be incorporated by EPA in the standards when they are reissued. To the extent that this strategy is successful, the breadth of issues needing NRC resolution as discussed in Alternative 3, above, will be minimized.

⁴ The EPA standards also apply to facilities used for disposal of transuranic wastes -- the type of wastes to be emplaced at WIPP -- and DOE must prepare probabilistic analyses to demonstrate compliance of WIPP with the standards. EPA's comments on a draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for WIPP urge DOE to publish an additional supplemental EIS or similar compliance document for public review and comment after the planned five-year test phase and before initiation of the final disposal phase of operations. NRC staff review of DOE's iterative performance assessments for WIPP, which will be necessary to support the compliance document, could provide additional valuable insights into the implementability of the EPA standards.

The NRC staff recommends continued pursuit of Alternative 3, and approval of this recommendation is requested.

DOE's Plans

The SCP for the Yucca Mountain site, recently reviewed by NRC staff, describes in general terms DOE's plans for implementing the EPA standards. These plans involve identification of potentially disruptive processes and events (several dozen are described in the SCP), grouping these into scenarios or "scenario classes," evaluating radionuclide releases to the environment for each scenario or scenario class, and combination of the resulting information into a "complementary cumulative distribution function" (CCDF), for evaluation of compliance with the EPA standards. DOE's plans correspond well with the staff's views of the requirements of the EPA standards. It should be noted that the Technical Review Board's (TRB) Subcommittee on Performance Assessment is reviewing DOE's plans for implementing the EPA standards.

If the Standards Are Not Implementable

Although EPA considers its standards to be implementable, EPA recognizes that doubts continue to remain about implementation of the EPA standard. As a result, provisions for development of alternative standards have been incorporated. The Federal Register text (50 FR 38074, September 19, 1985) describing the alternative standards provision, stated:

There are several areas of uncertainty the Agency [EPA] is aware of that might cause suggested modifications of the standards in the future. One of these concerns implementation of the containment requirements for mined geologic repositories. This will require collection of a great deal of data during site characterization, resolution of the inevitable uncertainties in such information, and adaptation of this information into probabilistic risk assessments. Although the Agency is currently confident that this will be successfully accomplished, such projections over thousands of years to determine compliance with an environmental regulation are unprecedented. If -- after substantial experience with these analyses is acquired -- disposal systems that clearly provide good isolation cannot reasonably be shown to comply with the containment requirements, the Agency would

consider whether modifications to [the standards] were appropriate.

Any NRC staff position that the EPA standards can be implemented depends upon the flexibility for NRC to develop and apply non-probabilistic criteria consistent with the Commission's traditional multiple-barrier, defense-in-depth licensing philosophy, and the ability to work with EPA to identify and resolve potential issues regarding implementation. The staff anticipates that this resolution will consist of modifications to the EPA standards and NRC rulemakings. However, if this strategy should fail to resolve open issues and if implementation of the EPA standards should prove unworkable for a repository that otherwise appears suitable, EPA appears to be committed to reexamine its standards and, presumably, to modify those standards as needed to allow a reasoned licensing decision to be reached. Application of the standards to WIPP will be an additional test of the standards and should help to resolve questions about the standards, independent of a formal NRC licensing review.

Conclusions:

The predominant view of the staff is that the technical scope of a repository licensing review will be the same regardless of the way in which the EPA standards are formulated. If one is to reevaluate the use of quantitative licensing standards for the HLW repository, such a reevaluation cannot be done separately, but only by a thorough evaluation of the procedures and controls for use of such standards in the regulatory process. Thus, it is the further view of the staff that resolution of implementation concerns through close interaction with EPA during reissuance of its standards, followed by the technical development and rulemaking process described in SECY 88-285 is the essential path of such reevaluation.

Regarding potential releases from a repository, the fundamental purpose of the licensing review is to answer the questions:

- What can go wrong with a repository?
- What are the effects on public health and the environment if these things happen?
- How likely is it that they will occur?

The likelihood of potential repository disruptions must be evaluated in some manner, and EPA's approach of combining numerical probabilities with wording allowing substantial reliance on qualitative considerations appears to be workable in a licensing review. DOE bears the "burden of proof" of compliance with the standards. If NRC's or DOE's experience in attempting to implement EPA's standards demonstrates serious difficulties in implementing the standards, EPA appears to be committed to reexamine the standards and to modify them, as needed, to allow a reasoned licensing decision to be reached. NRC staff will ensure that EPA is promptly informed of any such difficulties based on NRC's experience.

Recommendation:

That the Commission approve staff plans to pursue a long-term, ongoing evaluation of the EPA standards by way of its implementing rulemakings and, as it does so, to maintain close contact with EPA to identify and resolve, within the EPA standards, potential implementation issues to the extent practical.

Coordination:

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research has also reviewed and concurred in this paper. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) and its predecessor, the Waste Management Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) have expressed reservations about the implementability and about the stringency of the EPA HLW standards. Pertinent correspondence is enclosed.



James M. Taylor
Acting Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosure:
ACRS and ACNW Correspondence Related
to EPA HLW Standards

Commissioners' comment or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Tuesday, October 31, 1989.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Tuesday, October 24, 1989, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners

OGC

OIG

LSS

GPA

REGIONAL OFFICES

EDO

ACRS

ACNW

ASLEP

ASLAP

SECY



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

WM

July 17, 1985

Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino
Chairman
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Dr. Palladino:

SUBJECT: ACRS COMMENTS ON EPA STANDARDS FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
DISPOSAL

During its 303rd meeting, July 11-13, 1985, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards discussed the proposed "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes" (40 CFR 191), being developed by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This was also the subject of a meeting of our Waste Management Subcommittee on June 18, 1985, during which discussions were held with staff members from both the EPA and the NRC. The Committee also had the benefit of the documents referenced.

Although we noted a number of questions relating to the proposed standards, a key issue pertains to the application of probabilistic conditions on the proposed radionuclide release limits. In this regard, we wish to call attention to a particular recommendation made by the High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcommittee of the EPA Science Advisory Board, namely:

"We recommend that use of a quantitative probabilistic condition on the modified Table 2 release limits be made dependent on EPA's ability to provide convincing evidence that such a condition is practical to meet and will not lead to serious impediments, legal or otherwise, to the licensing of high-level-waste geologic repositories. If such evidence cannot be provided, we recommend that EPA adopt qualitative criteria, such as those suggested by the NRC." (Reference 2)

It is our understanding that the NRC Staff has concurred with the proposed EPA standards, including the use of a probabilistic approach on radionuclide release limits. In view of the importance of the ability of the NRC to determine compliance with the EPA standards in licensing a high-level waste repository, we recommend that the Commission assure itself that the NRC Staff is correct in endorsing this approach. We believe that demonstration of such compliance will be extremely difficult and that the proposed standards are unduly restrictive.


Dr. David Okrent, ACRS member, and Drs. Konrad Krauskopf and Frank Parker, ACRS consultants, who participated in the ACRS discussions on this matter, were

8508010096 2 PP
XA

July 17, 1985

also involved in the review conducted by the EPA Science Advisory Board of an earlier version of the proposed standards.

Sincerely,



David A. Ward
Chairman

References:

1. EPA Working Draft No. 6 -- Final 40 CFR 191, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," dated June 15, 1985
2. Letter from H. E. Collier, Subcommittee Chairman, to W. D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, dated February 17, 1984 forwarding, "Report on the Review of Proposed Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR 191)" by the High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Subcommittee, Science Advisory Board, EPA, dated January 1984
3. SECY-84-320 for the Commissioners from W. J. Dircks, EDO, Subject: NRC Staff Comments to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the Science Advisory Board Report on Proposed EPA Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Waste (40 CFR Part 191), dated August 9, 1984
4. Letter from J. G. Davis, NRC Staff, to EPA, Subject: Response to EPA's request for comments on their proposed environmental standards for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes, dated May 10, 1983
5. Letter from N. J. Palladino, Chairman, NRC, to L. Verstandig, Acting Administrator, EPA, Subject: Commission's concerns about sections of the proposed standards that deal with means of implementation, dated May 11, 1983