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Millstone Power Station Unit No. 2

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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5	In the Matter of:
6	DOMINION NUCLEAR Docket No.
7	CONNECTICUT, INC. 50-336-OLA-2
8	(Millstone Power Station,
9	Unit No. 2)
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12	Thursday
13	June 5, 2003
14	Best Western Hotel
15	9 Whitehall Avenue
16	Mystic, Connecticut 06355
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18	BEFORE: ADMIN. JUDGE ANN MARSHALL YOUNG, Chairman
19	ADMIN. JUDGE THOMAS ELLEMAN
20	ADMIN. JUDGE RICHARD COLE
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13	Clarence Reynolds
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1	I-N-D-E-X
2	WITNESS
3	Nancy Burton, CCAM, page 8
4	David Repka, Dominion, page 45
5	Ann Hodgdon, NRC, page 93
6	Nancy Burton, CCAM, page 145
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

8:58 a.m.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: My name is Ann Marshall Young. I'm the chair of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and I'm going to ask each of my colleagues to introduce themselves and then I'd like to have all the counsel and parties introduce yourselves starting from the right. Judge Elleman.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Thank you. Good morning. My name is Thomas Elleman. My education is in physical chemistry, but I've spent most of my career in the nuclear power field. I've worked at Batel Memorial Institute and at Progress Energy Corporation. Most of my life was as a professor and department head in nuclear engineering at North Carolina State University. At the time of my retirement, I was a certified health physicist, that is, certified by the American Board of Health Physics.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: My name is Richard F.

Cole. I'm an environmental technical member of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. I have a

Ph.D. in environmental engineering.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Burton.

MS. BURTON: Yes. Good morning. I'm Nancy Burton. I represent the Connecticut Coalition

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Against Millstone. Seated to my left is Clarence O. Reynolds, otherwise known as Pete Reynolds, a member of the Coalition and a former employee at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station from 1980 to 1994 when he was fired in retaliation for whistle blowing activities. His experience includes extensive work in fuel movement at Unit 1 as well as close familiarity with fuel and reactor issues at Millstone Unit 2.

We are also joined this morning by Mr. Joseph H. Basaid, who's operating a video camera to my right. Mr. Basaid is also a member of the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone and also formally employed at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Joe has permitted me to advise this panel and the parties, many of whom are familiar with Joe who has been so conscientious over the recent years in his activities concerning Millstone. He's slowed down a bit. He's been diagnosed with cancer. He's in some pain this morning, and we are very deeply appreciative of his presence here today and his participation.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Hodgdon.

MS. HODGDON: I'm Ann Hodgdon, NRC staff counsel, and with me today I have Shelly Cole. She's not related to Judge Cole on the Licensing Board. Also with me I have Stephen LaVie, who is a health

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physicist in the plant -- well, anyway, he's a technical reviewer. He is the author of one of the regulations that we're dealing with here today, 5067, accident source term. Also I have Rick Ennis, who's the project manager for Millstone 2. Those are the people sitting at the table.

Also with us today and sitting behind us is Jim Clifford, who's the section chief or branch chief -- section chief in projects. We have also Max Schneider. He's the head resident inspector at Millstone.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Repka.

MR. REPKA: My name is David Repka and I'm counsel for Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. On my right is my colleague, Ms. Brooke Poole, and on my left is my technical support here today, Mr. William Eakin. Mr. Eakin is a supervisor of radiological engineering employed by Dominion Resources. Also with me today, and I'll refrain from introducing all the individuals from Millstone but I will point out that my co-counsel from Dominion, Ms. Lillian Cuoco, is sitting in the first row behind me.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: You can feel free to introduce everyone if you like.

MR. REPKA: I'll attempt to do it. From

left to right, Mr. Claude Fleury from Millstone, Mr. Mohammed M. Mogabi and to his left sitting next to Ms. Cuoco is Mr. Ravi Joshi.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: We'll begin in a few minutes hearing argument from Ms. Burton for CCAM. We'd like to ask that you direct your comments as much as possible not merely to repeating what you said and what's been filed but to responding to the arguments made by the staff and by Dominion. We may interrupt with questions as we go. We'll try not to do that too much and save them to the end, but if there are questions that arise that could be cleared up, we may interrupt you as we go.

I don't know that we need to set any strict time lines because we're not pressed for time that much. But we'll try to move along as efficiently as we can.

Are there any preliminary matters before we start the oral argument?

MR. REPKA: Judge, I would like to note for the record that I did distribute to the Board and parties on Monday a copy of our response to NRC staff request for additional information related to this particular license amendment application, and I just wanted to assure that everybody received that.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: We did. Did all the parties.

MS. HODGDON: Yes, we did.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Burton.

MS. BURTON: Good morning, Judge Young, members of the panel. Nancy Burton here representing the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone in support of our contention in this matter which arises from the application of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. to amend its license in a manner which, it is our position, will diminish safeguards for the community in terms of protection against releases of radiation during a postulated spent fuel movement accident event at Unit 2.

We are very familiar with the answers and the objections of the staff and Dominion to our contention, but we believe that we have properly submitted a contention and that we are entitled to further proceedings in this matter.

Essentially, our position is that this license amendment application is at once counter to the purpose of the NRC in establishing the alternate source term approach that has been followed by Dominion in this matter. As the Board is aware, the derivation of this approach arises from a concern on

the part of the NRC about essentially saving costs for the licensees. That is the statement, that is the assessment that appears in all the pertinent NRC documents that are referenced, both by Dominion and by the staff.

Thus, licensees are permitted to come up with approaches that would waive requirements that presently been under which involve thev have protections against releases of radiation to the environment. We believe that the amendment on its face violates the standards and the policy behind enactment of this rule because the NRC, of course, is principally concerned, and should be, with the consequences of an accident upon the local community and the site and, in fact, I reference a statement that appears attached to Mr. William D. Travers's final amendment to 10 CFR, parts 2150 and 54, Availability of Public Comment for Draft Regulatory Guide DG1081 and Draft Standard Review Plan, Section 15.0.1 Regarding Use of Alternative Source Terms at Operating Reactors. This is SECY 99-240.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: It might be helpful, if you make references to documents, to give page numbers.

MS. BURTON: Yes. I'm reading from a

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printout from the NRC web page which appears at page 14 of 30, but it might be more helpful --

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Actually, I was trying to get to, you said you made a reference in your pleading and I was trying to --

MS. BURTON: No. There's no reference in our pleading to this specific document but I am here trying to respond to references to this document that have been made by Dominion and the staff, and this is one of the documents that was referenced and I wanted to quote one paragraph from page 14 of this document. I don't know if that is a helpful reference to the Board in terms of the page number, but it appears under the Regulatory Analysis Attachment 4 at page 9 of that attachment from the printout from the NRC web site.

This is what it says, quote. "The NRC does not intend to approve any source term that is not of the same level of quality as the source terms in the Reg 1465 or that has not had the extensive peer review, as did NUREG 1465. The draft regulatory guide contains guidance on acceptable ASTs." That is alternate source terms. "Any AST is expected to provide the same level of protection as does the source terms in NUREG 1465."

1 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Tell me again just 2 what's the name of the document that you're reading 3 from? This is SECY 99-240 dated 4 MS. BURTON: October 5, 1999 and it is a memo to the Commissioners 5 6

from William D. Travers, Executive Director for if I referenced what Operations. Perhaps referenced by Dominion, that might be more helpful.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Footnote 11?

MS. BURTON: That's right. Footnote 11 is the reference.

> ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Thanks.

MS. BURTON: It is very clear to the Coalition that this amendment does not provide the same level of protection as the current standards and, in very simple terms, our grave concern with this application is that it permits a waiver of very many standards that are in place to guard the community against releases of radiation in an accident during fuel handling activities. We don't believe that Dominion has adequately analyzed these conditions and that by seeking to, for instance, forego the requirement of maintaining the mechanical ability to automatically shut doors to containment in the event of a fuel handling accident and replace that barrier

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with an administrative control which, at the same time, it seeks to be excused from in its sole discretion and its sole determination that there is too high a level of radiation being released to enable it to properly assign somebody to the task of shutting that door.

We believe that that sets a pattern of activity that is far outside the NRC's intention in permitting licensees to file applications under this approach. In fact, the response that Mr. Repka had referenced to a moment ago in the request for additional information seems to state better than just about anything else in the papers that are pertinent to these proceedings why this application does not comply with the NRC policy.

There, I have referenced to the exhibit that Mr. Repka circulated to the Board and the parties this week dated June 2, 2003, Attachment 1, page 1. If I could read into the record the pertinent parts of this, I think it would be helpful. This is a response by Dominion to a question by the NRC requesting further information with respect to this license application. The first question has reference to this business of Dominion seeking to be excused from a requirement of stationing an employee to shut the door

but to have that requirement to be waived in the event Dominion determines that there would be a significant radiological hazard and, therefore, it seeks to be excused from that requirement.

In this document, the NRC asked Dominion auote, "clarify what is meant by, 'significant radiological hazard, unquote, describe specific criteria that will the be incorporated into the administrative controls determine whether to forego closure of the affected penetrations."

And here is the response of Dominion.

"The proposed basis for technical specification 3.9.4,
page B3/4 and 9-1A state that all containment
penetrations will be closed within 30 minutes of a
fuel handling accident inside containment unless it is
determined that such closure would represent a
significant radiological hazard to the personnel
involved." This represents a prudent qualification on
the intended actions given that analysis of the design
basis fuel handling accident shows that closure is not
required to assure that doses are within applicable
limits.

Specifically, the radiological analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment did not credit

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containment closure within 30 minutes. For analysis purposes, all available radioactivity is assumed to escape to the environment over a two hour period. The doses from a fuel handling accident are less than those specified in 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 for the exclusion area boundary EAB low population zone LPZ and control room without closure of containment.

The Design Basis Fuel Handling Accident Analysis also showed that the accident does not result in dose rates that would preclude the closing of all containment penetrations within 30 minutes of a fuel handling accident. Here's the key. Nonetheless, on implementation, the shift manager with assistance from health physics personnel will assess localized radiological conditions to determine if a significant radiological hazard exists to on-site personnel due to an unexpected condition. Let me repeat that. Due to an expected condition.

There, we believe therein lies the key to our objection to this license amendment application and represents Dominion's recognition that the public will suffer from a loss of protection because it hasn't considered unextracted conditions. And we believe that this runs counter to the NRC's policy on

requirement that protection not be diminished by implementation of this new source term rule.

We have taken consideration of memorandum and order that this Board issued with respect to the ruling on standing, and we are in agreement that it appears to be obvious that in the event of a fuel handling accident which could involve the release of radiation, if there is a door that is designed to be shut to serve as a barrier from release of the radiation to the environment and that door is not there or it is not operating or it is left open, it seems to us to defy logic not to accept that there thereby exists great potential to allow the release of radiation to the site, to beyond the site, to the community at levels which are very likely to be far beyond the standards that Dominion has apparently applied in its purported analysis supporting this application.

I have, with the assistance of Mr. Reynolds, thought it prudent and useful to point out that in a fuel handling accident whereby a rod might be removed from the water where it belongs, there will be unquestionably a potential for a very, very high release of radiation to the environment and it would seem that that release is contemplated under the

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present requirements to be confined by the operation of the penetration doors and the technical specifications that are presently in effect. It defies common sense and logic, at least as they are perceived by the Coalition, that the NRC could contemplate allowing the utility not to stand by those requirements which are so critical to the protection safeguarding of the public from accidental releases of radiation which are not necessary.

It seems that the NRC staff has merely accepted the analysis that has been submitted by essentially Dominion and that it has done so unquestioningly. This is what the NRC staff concluded without offering its own independent analysis in its "The Commission's Quote. answer to this petition. regulations allow the NRC to issue license amendment authorizing use of an alternative source term only if the applicant's analysis demonstrates with reasonable assurance that, even in a postulated accident, certain dose criteria will be met, both off-site and for control room personnel." 10 CFR 50.67.

Dominion specifically states that the proposed license amendment will comply with 50.67. The staff answer does not go beyond that to look at the information submitted by Dominion in support of

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the application. It is our contention that the information is insufficient and does not look at the full scope of what is required in order to be able to be entitled to this amendment and also to meet the NRC policy statement that it not diminish the level of protection, as does the current status.

Again, the derivation of the ultimate source term rule gives us cause for concern. It appears from the documents that we have referenced to, that the staff and Dominion have referenced to, agree that the ultimate source term rule derived from information that was assessed following the Three Mile Island accident in the 1970s and that that information led the NRC to assume that in the event of an accident there would be a release of radiation at a different rate and in different manners involving different chemistry than what had been assumed prior to that accident.

But what we don't believe can be reconciled with this rule and its application in this amendment is that in the intervening time there has been no credible scientific development of any theory that would support that radiation released in an accident from a nuclear reactor is not harmful. In other words, I think we are all aware today that

radiation releases do involve biological harm and of a more serious degree than we knew before and that in recognition of that, the Commission should be most reluctant to approve an amendment such as this which allows for potentially uncontrolled releases of radiation in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The staff has stated in its answer that NUREG 1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, February 2001, is not relevant to these proceedings because it examines severe spent fuel pool accidents which are not design basis accidents. This is a report that is no longer available on the NRC web It was taken down, I believe, after the site. September 11 events but we do maintain that it is relevant to these proceedings because the information the Coalition's understanding that accident involving mishandling of fuel at Unit 2 could cause far greater releases of radiation than Dominion has accounted for in its analysis and, therefore, the analysis should be rejected.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What about the argument that Dominion and the staff make about that report not dealing with design basis accidents?

MS. BURTON: Well, we have some questions

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1	about design basis accidents. We understand that the
2	NRC is actually revising its standards and
3	requirements with regard to design basis accidents in
4	light of the September 11 events. We are not aware
5	that Dominion or the staff have undertaken an analysis
6	in support of this license amendment that satisfy
7	these new requirements and standards which clearly,
8	although the information has been excluded from the
9	public, do address the potential for very serious
10	accidents that would involve potentially catastrophic
11	releases of radiation to the environment far beyond
12	levels that are permitted by the NRC under its present
13	rules.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Just a couple of
15	questions here. Could you give me a cite for the new
16	requirements that we're talking about?
17	MS. BURTON: I have reference to a
18	document entitled Safeguards Information, April 29,
19	2003.
20	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. If you're
21	talking about safeguards information, you probably
22	need to stop before you
23	MS. COLE: She wouldn't have it if it were
24	not given to the public.
25	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. In other

words, something would have been attached. So you 1 don't have in your hands any safeguards information 2 Since you said safeguards information, somehow? 3 that's what made me ask. 4 MR. REPKA: Perhaps Ms. Hodgdon, who has 5 safeguards clearance, could look at the document. 6 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: That might be a good 7 idea. 8 MS. HODGDON: I would be happy to do that. 9 I don't believe Ms. Burton would have access to a 10 safeguards document, being a member of the public as 11 12 she is, that would have safeguards information. I don't know where she would have gotten. We hope we 13 would be better protected. 14 If I may respond to that. 15 MS. BURTON: This is a document that I received as a member of the 16 There's a whole list of public from the NRC. 17 individuals on that list and it references an order, 18 19 and I'm quite sure that I'm not in a position here to be revealing anything that was improper. 20 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: The only reason I 21 stopped you is because you started reading and you 22 said safeguards information. So I just want to make 23 sure that we all know what it is and that we are sure 24

that we're not talking about something that should be

1 kept within security requirements. Do you want to 2 show it to Ms. Hodgdon? 3 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Ms. Burton. the 4 document that you have might refer to safequards 5 information that are not attached. Is that correct? 6 MS. BURTON: That's my understanding, and 7 it is an order -- part of this is an order -- what I 8 was reading from was the title Safequards Information 9 which doesn't necessarily mean that it has safequards 10 information. It references an order modifying 11 licenses issued to all operating power reactor 12 licenses by the NRC effective immediately dated April 13 29, 2003. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Is there any question 14 15 that needs to be resolved about this? Will you have 16 to look at the document, Ms. Hodgdon? 17 MS. HODGDON: I saw it and I've seen it 18 before and the document that you're talking about is 19 not attached. 20 MS. BURTON: So when I was saying that I 21 was referencing information that was not available to 22 the public, I was suggesting that there are new 23 requirements addressed to, for instance, the risk of terror attack on nuclear power plants which presumably 24 addressed to the heightened risk of 25 would be

1 radiological release to a catastrophic degree to 2 members of the public. 3 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Are you talking -- is 4 the document that you're referring to, does that refer 5 to the order with regard to interim compensatory Is that what you're talking about? 6 measures? 7 I'd be happy to show --MS. BURTON: 8 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I just want to make 9 sure if you're referring to something that we know 10 what it is so we can --MS. BURTON: I'll be happy to show to you. 11 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Show it to counsel 12 13 first. MS. BURTON: Could I identify it? 14 15 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Sure. The title is Safeguards 16 MS. HODGDON: 17 Information. It's EA03086, April 29, 2003. The 18 subject is issuance of order requiring compliance with 19 revised design basis threat for operating power 20 reactors and it says notice here in block on the front page. Attachment to the order, revised design basis 21 22 contains safeguard information. threat, Upon separation from Attachment 2 to the order, this letter 23 and enclosed order and Attachment 1 to the order of 24

addressee list are decontrolled. " And that's what she

has. As I said before, she does not have the safeguarding information which concerns, as the title suggests, the design basis threat and not design basis accidents.

MR. REPKA: Judge Young, may I say something at this point about that document? Ιt sounds to me like it is as you described, the interim compensatory measures related to security. Perhaps we could cut through a lot of this discussion, and Ms. Hodgdon perhaps can confirm this. If that document, that order, relates to the design basis security threat and interim compensatory security measures, it doesn't change in any way design basis fuel handling And so I think we're going off on a tangent here.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What we're doing right now is just making sure we know what it is and making sure that everyone has a chance to look at it. You can make your argument about it further.

MS. HODGDON: Mr. Clifford has just reminded me and, of course, I know anyway, there are several of these orders and this one is not the interim one. This one is later than that. This one is April 29, '03, and I think there are three or four of them in all. You perhaps recall that. It doesn't

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really make any difference. The point that Mr. Repka made is that this is about security matters and it's about design basis threats. It's not about licensing matters. It's not about design basis accidents. And so I do believe that the Board did rule at that part of the standing application where reference was made to this sort of thing and it's available for consideration in this proceeding.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I thank everyone for

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I thank everyone for clarifying that.

Go ahead.

MS. BURTON: Is there a further question with regard to the issue, design basis accident?

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: To whatever degree you want to address the arguments of both the staff and Dominion about the report that you referenced in your contention relating to non-design basis accidents.

MS. BURTON: I believe that this really relates to the issue involving the application of physical barriers to confined radiation releases in the event of a fuel handling accident with respect to the issue of the potential consequences because I don't believe that the licensee has adequately assessed potential consequences and, in fact, in its

own submission in response to the RAI, concedes that there could be unexpected conditions that would arise, that might arise, that would make it impossible for the plant personnel to close the door to confine the release of radiation from the facility. And without being able to assure the NRC that it has adequately assessed the potential that is to occur, it, I believe, has ended up an inadequate analysis and by simply saying that the analysis that it has done establishes that there will not be in exceedance of the standards that presently exist under the narrow scope of what the licensee has analyzed, I believe that is wholly inadequate.

Another argument that's been made by Dominion staff is that you have not alleged a violation of a regulation or a substantial safety issue where there's a regulatory gap.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Would you like to address that argument?

MS. BURTON: Yes, I believe that relates to what I was just discussing, that in this apparently very narrow, under-inclusive analysis Dominion has determined that even in the event of a fuel handling accident, a release of radiation would not exceed levels that are permissible. We believe that that is

wholly inadequate to a consideration of the likelihood of the level of the radiation release in the event of a fuel handling accident which, I think we can all agree, could be very serious and could be catastrophic.

It seems that -- is it 30 years ago or 40 years ago that the licensee was required to establish to the satisfaction of the NRC that in the event of a fuel handling accident, it would be able to maintain the ability to shut the door in the appropriate locations to prevent the unnecessary release of radiation into the environment. At that time when the NRC found that acceptable, it would seem to have been based on a consideration that it would be necessary to shut the door to stop radiation from being released to confine it to the site of the accident. The licensee hasn't demonstrated any good cause here why shouldn't have to still meet that same requirement or that not meeting it would be consistent with the NRC policy statement that I referred to, the OIA, that the NRC does not intend to approve any source term that is not of the same level of quality as the source terms in NUREG 1465 or that has not had the extensive peer review as did NUREG 1465 and, by the way, I'm not sure that the application has established the extensive

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1	period for this amendment application that the NRC
2	contemplated would be necessary before it could
3	consider granting this kind of application.
4	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Did you give us a
5	cite for that one before also? I can't remember.
6	MS. POOLE: Yes. That's footnote 11 in
7	the Dominion response.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: That's the one we
9	talked about before.
10	MS. BURTON: Right.
11	MS. HODGDON: Excuse me. Could I just ask
12	a question because I'm very confused. What is being
13	referred to here as a policy statement, is that the
14	SECY paper or I don't have some of those documents
15	with me but I do have I've read them so I think I
16	could recognize it. I don't understand what's being
17	called a policy statement. The thing you were just
18	reading from is the thing that's referenced in
19	Dominion's footnote 11. Is that what you said?
20	MS. BURTON: That's right.
21	MS. HODGDON: And that's the only document
22	that's been read from. Is that correct?
23	MS. BURTON: I wasn't referring to policy
24	statement in capitals, if that's what Attorney Hodgdon
25	is concerned about. Not a formal, quote, "policy

statement," unquote, but it is a statement of NRC policy certainly.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Are you finished?
MS. BURTON: No.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Oh, okay. Go ahead.

I'll save my question.

I just wanted to inject a MS. BURTON: point here. We have concern about the motivation on the part of the licensee to apply for this amendment. Clearly, it's not deriving from a motivation to enhance protections of the public from unnecessary, potentially catastrophic releases of radiation. quite to the contrary. It does seem to be directed to a cost saving motivation and it's my understanding, based on discussion with Mr. Reynolds here who has close familiarity with the activities that it's in fuel movement, that involved potentially time-consuming process that is involved in adhering to the present requirements. easier to keep the door open. Things can happen much faster.

The process that he's familiar with when he was at Millstone was far more time-consuming and it certainly did slow the progress of fuel movements. We don't believe that a cost item -- that a motivation

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here to save money and at the same time expose the public so significantly to a greater risk of radiation is consistent with what I was calling the NRC policy statement.

I also wanted to say a word about the derivation, the genesis of this rule. From NRC documents themselves, there are statements that if this rule is applied by the licensee, they will have the opportunity to reduce radiation exposures to their workers and on the face of that, that sounds very positive and a very good step, until you read on to the next passage in these documents where the NRC states that workers will be protected from radiation doses because they won't be doing the jobs any more that they used to be doing which were intended to protect the public from unnecessary radiation doses.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: You're making reference to a document that I don't think you've identified unless you're talking about the same one.

MS. BURTON: This is Attachment 7 to that document which is in footnote 11 and this would be page 13 of 30 from the NRC web site where it says, quote, "Reductions in occupational exposures may be realized through reductions in maintenance efforts associated with maintaining unnecessarily limiting

leakage, timing or filtration requirements." In other words. workers who don't have to surveillances or maintenance operations won't exposed to the radiation they would otherwise be exposed to in requirements to protect the public from unnecessary radiation exposure. So it's not really the worker safety that seems to be the driving force It seems to be simply the reduction of costs here. and requirements, the waiver of necessary requirements, to protect the public health and safety. A byproduct would be the workers who don't have to do these dirty tasks will be better off.

That pretty much covers my points. I believe I was probably in error and had overlooked a rule regarding the safety hazards analysis. I would concede the argument that has been presented by Dominion and the staff on that point. Nevertheless, the contention that we have submitted in all respects meets the standards of the 10 CFR. I think that essentially is my argument.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I would like to ask you one more thing and then Judges Cole and Elleman may also. Both the staff and Dominion raise your FOIA to address 10 CFR Section 50.67. Would you care to address that?

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MS. BURTON: Yes. I don't agree with that. We have addressed 50.67 in the sense that it is our argument that Dominion has not performed adequate analysis to justify a conclusion that it complies with 50.67. We believe that Dominion has conceded that point, recognizing in its response to that it hasn't looked into unexpected RAI conditions that could result in violation of the standards of radiation exposure in accordance with 50.67.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Am I correct in understanding that your argument is essentially that because there might be unexpected occurrences, that it's implicit that there would be a possibility of violating the dose standard set out in 50.67?

Yes, that is correct, and I MS. BURTON: that helps to explain why Dominion's think that response was -- we would characterize their response as evasive. The NRC asked Dominion to clarify what was meant by significant radiological hazard and criteria will be describe the specific that incorporated into the administrative controls determine whether to forego closure of the affected There is no specificity in Dominion's penetration. response and in terms of clarifying what is meant by

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32 significant radiological hazard, it's left very vaque and wide open and we believe that is because Dominion has not adequately assessed the consequences, the radiological consequences, of its fuel handling accidents to support this extraordinary license amendment application. Ms. Burton, do you ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: agree that the use of the ultimate source term provides us with a better estimate of something closer truth with respect to the radioactive

discharges that might come of an accident out scenario?

MS. BURTON: No, I don't agree with that.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I believe the NRC staff said based upon the information that they have collected from accident information that the alternate source term provides something closer to the truth with respect to discharges. Do you agree or disagree with that?

MS. BURTON: Generally, I would tend to disagree with that. I think that the conclusions of the NRC have to be looked at with some skepticism based on what we know about what happened at Three Mile Island and what we know about it, we know about it based in large part on not being very familiar with

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how the accident could have been assessed adequately.

In other words, information about radiation releases
during that accident is very problematical.

In fact, it was after that accident, in recognition of the fact that so little was known about how the radiation was spreading, that the NRC required all licensees in this country to establish independent radiation monitors in order to be in a position to better inform the community about radiation releases in the event of an accident so that they could consider what to do, including when and where to evacuate to. I think that is a recognition by the NRC that the information it had available to assess the radiation releases from the Three Mile Island accident lead to our inability today to accept that the NRC adequately had adequate information before it to assess the consequences of that accident and use that information to completely run -- the regulations that would require a licensee to, for instance, keep the door shut to confine the radiation in the event of a fuel handling accident.

We also know that the NRC has historically credited information that would support ongoing operations of its nuclear facilities and has been criticized for excluding information which is critical

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which stands on the other side of the argument. It seems that the ultimate source term rules were adopted with the knowledge that the licensees would benefit economically, and I don't believe that economic benefit is necessarily correlated properly with a recognition of the harm to the public from waiving standards such as confining radiation.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Do you think that they had proposed these changes because they thought that this would be a big benefit to the operators of nuclear power plants and not just because it's closer to what they -- a better estimate than the previous source term?

MS. BURTON: In answer to that, Doctor Cole, to your thoughtful question, I could recite passages from the documents that are referenced here that on their face do not emphasize any benefit to the public but emphasize a cost benefit to the licensees through implementation of this rule or instance.

In the same document referenced in footnote 11 of Dominion's response, Doctor Travers states, quote, states implementing these ultimate source rule, quote, "would allow interested licensees to pursue cost beneficial licensing actions to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden without compromising the

margin of safety of the facility." Unquote.

So we can see from that passage what is important here, the pursuit of cost beneficial licensing actions to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, hopefully without compromising the margin of safety. But it certainly isn't toward enhancing the margin of safety that seems to be the driving force here.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I understand your position.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Yes. I think some of my questions perhaps parallel Judge Cole's. Ms. Burton, I have the impression this morning that you and your associates are concerned both about the application of the alternate source term and the changes in the tech specs that could allow more radioactivity to leave the site. Am I correct in that impression?

MS. BURTON: That is correct, but our concern generically for the ultimate source term I don't think should be understood as forming one of our contentions. We are critical of it, but we're not saying that as part of our contention the NRC shouldn't apply these any more.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Okay. So you are

1 not challenging the use of the alternative source term then in making those calculations, are you? 2 We are challenging the BURTON: 3 MS. application of that term by Dominion in this present 4 5 application. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: So because it has 6 7 not been as well substantiated as you perceive the earlier source term to be? 8 MS. BURTON: We are not conceding that the 9 10 earlier source term was adequately documented at that What we are contending here is that time at all. 11 before waiving those requirements, there should be 12 adequate analysis by Dominion that the public health 13 and safety will not be compromised. The margin of 14 safety will not be compromised at the facility. 15 read your ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: 16 in your original submission as mainly 17 comments expressing concern about the tech spec changes, and I 18 19 guess I did not read them as expressing concern about the alternative source term. Did I miss that in your 20 submission or is that not in what you submitted? 21 MS. BURTON: I did not mean not to include 22 Certainly, the deletion of the tech spec it. 23 requirements that are itemized in this application 24 constitute deletions which we find to be unacceptable 25

and inconsistent with the NRC policy and definitely in the spirit of compromising the margin of safety of the facility.

ADMIN. JUDGE **ELLEMAN:** Ι qot the impression in listening this morning that a lot of your concern lies in unexpected things happening that could produce exposures to the public that were in excess of what the licensee has calculated in their model evaluations. Ιf convincing evidence were gave you confidence available that that those calculations are reasonable calculations and even though they show a higher dose than the old tech spec operating procedures, that dose is below what is a license limit. Are you comfortable with that result? I didn't perhaps say that very well. Let me try again.

Would you be comfortable with an analysis that you believe to be a correct analysis that there's a result below the licensed administrative dose limit, even though that result is higher than the older calculation using older tech spec requirements?

MS. BURTON: If there has been a proper and adequate analysis that truly does establish compliance with legal requirements, then we would be beyond the scope of what we can be properly submitting

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here in terms of a contention. But what we're concerned about is so often what happens which is unexpected and only recently at Unit 2, March 7 of this year, was an unexpected event that cascaded into other unexpected events and then other unexpected events, some of them seeming to be linked historically to prior mechanical problems that perhaps weren't adequately addressed at the facility, and we had concern about that particular event because it did involve the release of radiation into the environment. And when we attempted to determine at a public forum from the licensee and NRC representatives as to more specific information about the radiation releases, we weren't given very much help and we weren't given to understand that there was any adequate consideration of the weather conditions at that time. We were led believe that the radiation releases were not serious based on what was assessed at certain ground level locations at the facility and, of course, that wouldn't be realistic if in fact there were weather conditions that would cause radiation to be airborne at higher levels.

That was an unexpected event at Millstone
Unit 2. It was an event that caused an emergency
alarm to activate the emergency response people in the

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1 community and we don't today know the full scope of 2 what happened and I understand it's still subject to some investigation. 3 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Please don't let me 4 put words in your mouth here, but let me repeat back 5 what I think I'm hearing. I think I'm hearing you say 6 7 that you could accept a change in tech specs that 8 produced an increase in dose to the public if that 9 calculation were correct and your concern lies with the potential for it being incorrect. Is that proper 10 or have I not judged your --11 MS. BURTON: No. I didn't think I meant to 12 13 give you that impression. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: You did not mean 14 15 to. Okay. I'm sorry then. 16 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to 17 clarify what impression you did want to give? MS. BURTON: I think the question was 18 19 would we agree that it would not be unacceptable for there to be a change in the tech specs that would 20 allow an increased dose to the public. 21 ADMIN. JUDGE **ELLEMAN:** I had the 22 23 impression that if you really believed the methodology to be accurate that your concerns might disappear, 24 even though the calculated dose result is now higher 25

as a result of the tech spec changes than it was under the old tech specs.

MS. BURTON: Well, as I understand it from the notice that appeared in the Federal Register, in fact, in some cases, if this amendment were to be approved, there would result in increase in dose at the site boundary or to control room personnel. Reading from the Federal Register notice that appeared regarding this amendment request of September 26, 2002. So it does appear that that is what is contemplated in part by this application. We don't find that acceptable.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Okay. You have clarified the point I wanted clarified.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Suppose, added to that question posed by Doctor Elleman, you say the latter dose associated with the implementation of the tech specs still resulted in doses to the public below applicable regulatory standards?

MS. BURTON: That is the whole point of Dominion's rationalization in its answer that it has examined the alternate source term it wishes to apply and, in fact, that would be the result, that there will not be a change in the dose at the boundaries indicated in 1567. What our concern about that is

that they haven't adequately examined what needs to be examined in order to establish that the public will not be exposed to an enhanced risk and compromised safety if these technical specifications are allowed to be deleted and it just simply boggles the mind to imagine that they would be permitted to keep doors open to allow the release of radiation in an accident condition based on their postulation of events that don't include the kinds of events that could be very serious and catastrophic. It seems that the barriers are required to

quard against what is expected as well as what is unexpected as a safeguard in the spirit of not compromising safety.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: All right. Thank you. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: So let me see if I understand. I may be repeating things that have been said before but let me just get to it. You're not challenging the rule. You recognize that that's not within what we can rule on. Correct?

MS. BURTON: That is correct.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: And so assuming that calculations could be done that would show with assurance that there would be no doses in violation of the rule, that would satisfy you. Correct?

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1 MS. BURTON: Under conditions including 2 the unexpected questions. 3 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Assuming that 4 that could be assured, that would satisfy you. Ιf 5 they were within the rule, even though there were 6 increases, you're not challenging the increase where 7 there were hypothetical assurance that there would be no releases that would exceed the standards of the 8 9 rule. 10 BURTON: Yes. I think that MS. However, it seems that the applicant, the 11 accurate. 12 licensee, acknowledges that its analysis doesn't go 13 that far. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: And so that's the 14 15 next point I wanted to make. What you're challenging 16 is whether there is an assurance --17 MS. BURTON: I'm sorry. Pardon me? ADMIN. JUDGE you're 18 YOUNG: What 19 challenging is whether there is in fact an assurance 20 that the dose standards will be complied with and 21 you're challenging that on the basis of the 22 possibility of unexpected occurrences and the basis 23 for the challenge is not any particular calculations 24 but what you see as being the obvious potential for 25 unexpected occurrences which would lead to releases

that would violate the rules. Am I understanding that 1 2 correctly? MS. BURTON: Assuming the waiver, which I 3 think all specifications have. 4 5 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. 6 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Suppose the expected 7 doses to the public associated with design basis accidents and under the alternate source term 8 9 demonstrated that those associated doses were within 10 applicable regulatory limits, do you have a problem with that? 11 12 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Would you mind 13 repeating that, Doctor Cole? ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Using the alternate 14 source term and the discharges expected or calculated 15 with design basis accidents and the associated doses 16 to the public with that and with the tech spec changes 17 in operation, the doses to the public were still less 18 19 than applicable regulatory dose limits. 20 MS. BURTON: We certainly would not agree 21 with that because it just runs counter to what we must 22 assume the NRC intended by allowing the licensee to kind of amendment waive 23 apply for this to implementation of such obvious barriers to the release 24 It could not reasonably, rationally 25 of radiation.

1	have been contemplated by the NRC that a licensee
2	would apply to waive these technical specifications.
3	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: So your objection is
4	any additional radiological insult to the public
5	associated with their operations.
6	MS. BURTON: I'm sorry? I don't think I
7	understood that question.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Your objection is to
9	any additional radiological dose associated with this
10	operation, this proposed operation.
11	MS. BURTON: Any additional dose that
12	could be
13	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Even associated with
14	design basis access.
15	MS. BURTON: that could be obviated if
16	the requirements in the technical specifications were
17	maintained.
18	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: So it makes no
19	difference that the doses are less than the applicable
20	regulatory limits. It's the increase that you're
21	objecting to.
22	MS. BURTON: It's the increase and it's
23	the removal of a barrier that logic dictates should
24	not be removed.
25	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I understand. Thank

|| you.

answer to Ms. Young's question. I think we now understand. It's any increase in the calculated dose as well as the potential for unexpected events that is the basis for your concern.

MS. BURTON: Yes. That is correct.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Okay.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Shall we take a five minute break and come back and hear from Dominion and then the staff.

(Off the record for an 11 minute break at 0:24 a.m.)

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Repka.

MR. REPKA: Thank you, Judge Young. As you know from our papers, it's Dominion's position that the proposed contention is not admissible because it doesn't meet the NRC's requirements for an admissible contention. Specifically, it does not meet the petitioner's obligation at this point to provide a basis sufficient to demonstrate that there's a genuine dispute with respect to a material issue of law or fact.

In addition, absent any real dispute with the technical conclusions of the amendment application and the analysis contained therein, the relief that it seeks some further restrictions with respect to the containment penetrations can not be granted, that that relief would be inconsistent with the NRC's alternative source term rule.

The core proposition of the proposed contention is that the amendment will diminish protection of the public, that it will lead to some increased off-site dose consequences or at least to off-site doses that would be of harm to the public surrounding the plant. There simply is no basis presented in the contention for that conclusion. Therefore, it's precisely the type of contention that the NRC's rules adopted in 1989 were intended to exclude for hearing.

the is in the The fact of matter application materials, Dominion has supplied to the NRC its analysis and conclusions that demonstrate that source term with applying the alternative the assumptions regarding the status of certain equipment and the status of certain containment and boundary penetrations, there will be no doses in excess of NRC requirements. Therefore, you simply can't get to the

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relief that the petitioners seek consistent with the NRC's rules and, in fact, the obligation at this point, in order to demonstrate a genuine issue and dispute would be to show that somehow the Dominion analysis is inaccurate, incomplete or in any other way in error, and that simply is not presented in the proposed contention. The proposition is one of increased consequences that lacks any support whatsoever.

There's been much discussion this morning and assertions by the petitioner that the proposal runs counter to the purpose of the NRC in adopting the alternative source term rule. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, and we cite this in the NRC statement our papers, that in considerations issued on December 23, 1999 adopting the alternative source term rule 10 CFR 50.67, and this can be found in 64 Federal Register 71990 at page 71992, column one, the Commission stated, and I'll read it, quote, "The NRC concluded that some licensees may wish to use an alternative source term in analyses to support operational flexibility and cost beneficial licensing actions in that some of these applications could provide concomitant improvements in overall safety and in reduced occupational exposure." End

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The fact of the matter is the Commission fully contemplated that the advances inherent in the alternative source term rule could lead to operational changes in the design and licensing basis in the would involve technical specifications that operational flexibility and cost beneficial licensing actions. Therefore, the assertions this morning with respect to the motivation of this proposed change, the assertions that this might have some economic or plant operational benefit, are simply no basis and no support for their contention. The motivation is not in any way disqualifying and the motivation doesn't establish that there's any inconsistency with either NRC regulations or public health and safety.

The fact of the matter again is the application is fully supported by an analysis that shows that there are no significant increases in offsite dose consequences.

One of the fundamental misunderstandings that seems to be involved here is the notion that common sense would somehow indicate that the application involves greater releases because containment penetrations that might have been closed before might now be open. However, it's our view, as

discussed in our paper, that that view is a very narrow-minded view of the application. It looks at only one half of the proposal. The complete proposal takes credit for not only changes in assumptions with respect to equipment availability and the status of containment and boundary penetrations but also the alternative source term itself and the alternative source term that's being utilized is one that reflects the substantial advances in the state of the art since the original source terms used in licensing the plant in the 1970s.

So when looked at in conjunction, which is the basis of the application, using both the alternative source term and the revisions in the assumptions about what equipment is credited leads to the conclusion that the postulated releases from design basis fuel handling accidents would not be in excess of NRC requirements.

Again, it's precisely that conclusion that must be challenged in order to support a sufficient admissible contention, and that's now what we have here today. Sometimes what may be perceived as obvious or common sense in fact in the face of the analysis is simply not true. So here we do have an analysis and there is no support, there's no expert

opinion, there's nothing that's being cited in the proposed contention that would suggest that we have a litigable issue related to the adequacy of the analysis.

One of the points made this morning referring to a staff SECY paper that was issued in conjunction with the alternative source term rule was a discussion of what alternative source terms could be used in a proposal, a license amendment based upon alternative source term. Counsel for the petitioner read a passage which I'll paraphrase related generally to the idea that the NRC does not intend to approve any source term not of a quality of NUREG 1465. I need to respond to that because NUREG 1465 is the basis for the alterative source term that's also reflected in implementing Regulatory Guide 1.183.

That is the alternative source term that's utilized in the Dominion application. Dominion is not proposing a different alternative source term of the type that the NRC was discussing in the SECY paper. Therefore, the concept alluded to there of sufficient peer review or to assure it's of sufficient quality that it's consistent with the NRC's alternative source term is simply not applicable to what's going on here, and that's the alternative source term that's being

used, the fact that it complies with Reg Guide 1.183 and NUREG 1465 is very clear from the face of the application and there's simply no basis provided to suggest that that's not what's happening.

The next thing I want to respond to because much is being made of it is the RAI response that was submitted to the NRC on June 2 and forwarded to the Board and services that same day. That RAI aspect of the proposed response relates to an administrative controls, the proposed license amendment, that really goes beyond design basis. What's happening in this proposed amendment, and I think we tried to explain this in our papers, is if you apply the alternative source term and you take no credit whatsoever in either the containment or the spent fuel area or spent fuel building for containment closure or for spent fuel area boundary closure, you assume the entire source term of the design basis fuel handling event is released to the public.

In that event, those releases at the low population zone boundary at the exclusion boundary are within NRC requirements. That's the basis of the analysis. Then the next step in the application was consistent with the NRC Reg Guide 1.183 was to say we can adopt additional administrative controls to keep

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those doses even lower. Therefore, Dominion has proposed a tech spec on containment that would call for administrative controls to be in place with respect to any containment penetration opening during fuel handling to assure that that penetration is closed within 30 minutes. Therefore, the release that's assumed in the analysis of two hours, if that administrative control is implemented in 30 minutes, the release will actually be significantly less than what was calculated.

So these administrative controls that are being proposed are a defense in depth beyond what's required by the NRC's regulations to meet the off-site dose consequences of the regulations. So they're an added protection for public safety.

response. Part of those administrative controls said that if implementing those controls in order to have somebody designated to close the penetration would represent a significant radiological harm to occupational exposure to those individuals, then it would not be implemented. It would not implemented because it would not be necessary to assure that offsite doses are maintained below NRC requirements. So it in that sense reflects a prudent qualification on

the administrative control. We don't need to do this and cause somebody undue harm because it's not necessary to protect public health and safety.

In fact, as explained in the RAI response, the design basis analysis using the alternative source term shows that there will be no off-site consequences and nor would there be any radiological situation that would lead to harm in implementing these administrative controls. So simply alternative source and term the design basis conditions, this is a qualifier that should never need to be applied. The administrative control could always be implemented.

However, to answer the question, Dominion went on to say that certain criteria would be applied in order to implement that qualification. Counsel for petitioner talks about unexpected conditions, and in the reference to unexpected conditions Dominion is not conceding in any way -- and this is what's been said several times this morning, that Dominion is conceding that certain unexpected conditions could occur. Dominion did not concede that some conditions could occur that would lead to occupational exposures in excess of what's safe under these circumstances and implementing administrative control.

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However, in recognition that beyond design basis things are at least a hypothetical possibility, that qualifier is placed in the administrative control.

The fact that the argument that some unexpected conditions could make this application deficient is not a sufficient basis for a proposed contention because: A) there's no specificity with respect as to what those unexpected conditions might be, B) based upon the application materials, one would conclude that the only unexpected conditions that could lead to a problem with the proposal would be beyond design basis and therefore are not conditions that need to be credited in a licensing analysis, and C) there's no documented basis for any assertion of any such unexpected conditions that might apply to this particular amendment.

So we have, in a sense, again, a contention that's postulating greater increases but has no neither specificity nor support for how that might occur.

A reference was made this morning to an event at Unit 2 in the recent past. Without getting into a full discussion, a factual discussion, of what that event was, suffice it to say there was a charging

pump issue leading to a release of a pressure relief valve and a very small release. However, that release was well within NRC Regulatory limits, operating normal release limits, and therefore is not in any sense significant.

In addition, it has no bearing whatsoever on this particular application because it did not involve a fuel handling event and that's, of course, what we're here talking about today are design basis fuel handling events which are the only events that are being re-analyzed at this time using the alternative source term.

There was a discussion this morning about the NRC staff's answer to the proposed contention and reference made to the fact that somehow if the staff answer doesn't go beyond the compliance with 10 CFR 50.67, it doesn't look at what's required to protect public health and safety. Two responses.

First is, and I'm sure the NRC staff can protect itself, but the NRC staff's answer to the proposed contention, much like Dominion's answer, is addressed at this point only to the question of admissability of the proposed contention. Therefore, the issue before the staff and Dominion and the Board at this point is is there any basis to conclude that

there's a litigable issue here, a genuine dispute, and the answer is they're not. The staff at this point does not need to make their safety finding with respect to the merits of the proposed amendment. They haven't done that yet and they presumably will do that at the appropriate time when they've completed their review.

But in any event, the operative standard for that review remains the NRC's alternative source term rule 10 CFR 50.67 as well as 10 CFR Part 100 and the NRC's own implementing guidance. Our position is that the application meets all of those requirements and regulatory guidance documents and the proposed contention doesn't in any way identify how that's not so or provide the support, the facts, and expert opinion that would be required by the NRC's rule to support inadmissable contention.

The idea that somehow the NRC staff in reviewing this application or this Board in this particular matter needs somehow to look beyond 10 CFR 50.67 NRC requirements is on its face a challenge to the NRC's alternative source term rule and therefore a challenge to the NRC's regulations and therefore inadmissable in this particular proceeding.

The petitioners brought up again this

morning the document NUREG 1738 which was а decommissioning risk study. We did address that in our papers. As we stated there, that document really has no bearing whatsoever on what's being discussed in this proposed amendment. This amendment again re-analysis of the consequences postulated design basis fuel handling accidents. That's a fuel handling accident inside containment and a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel area.

Those design basis accidents are not what's addressed in NUREG 1738. That document addressed design basis scenarios involving drain down of the spent fuel pool and possible zircaloy fire and consequences related to that simply has no -- it's all beyond design basis and has no bearing on what we're talking about today.

There was a reference made to if a spent fuel rod were somehow released. Again, that's simply a beyond design basis scenario because a design basis fuel handling accident would involve an accident that's under water in either the reactor core or the cavity to the spent fuel pool. All that fuel handling is performed under water and so the postulated scenario that was brought up this morning is simply one that's inadequate.

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Likewise, a reference was made to the interim compensatory measures as well as the security order, the recent security order which was beyond the related to the interim compensatory measures consequences of a terrorist attack and the design basis security threat. Without getting safeguards matters, the issue raised in that document, again, as I said earlier, relates to the design basis security threat, what kinds of barriers need to be in place to protect against would be terrorists or other attackers on a nuclear plant, that really doesn't affect in any way the spent fuel or the fuel handling accidents that are relevant to this particular application.

I return again to the point about the motivation of the licensee to save money. inconsistent in way with NRC that's not any requirements. It's consistent with -- if there's some operational flexibility to be gained here, that's entirely consistent with the rule. It's also consistent with a philosophy that NRC Chairman Diaz recently described in a speech as he used the term realistic conservatism and that in fact I think the alterative source term is a good example of his philosophy of realistic conservatism.

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In other words, we take advantage of the recent advances in technology and state of the art with respect to the source term to recognize what operational controls, what administrative controls or technical specifications are no longer necessary to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. This amendment, I think, falls squarely within that philosophy.

I do want to make another point to just clarify, too, what this amendment does and does not do. With respect to containment. I think it's not necessary to point out but I think it's interesting to point out that currently, under the current administrative controls and technical specifications and using the old source term, the containment personnel hatch can be opened during fuel handling under administrative control to be closed within 10 minutes in the event of a fuel handling accident.

So with respect to the personnel hatch, the change here is hatch open, closed within 10 minutes under control, 2) hatch may be opened during fuel handling but to be closed within 30 minutes. So the idea that, at least with respect to the personnel air lock that doors were previously closed and now they're going to be opened is not entirely true.

There are, of course, additional changes in technical specifications but I think it's important to point out that particular change.

In the end, under the NRC's rule with respect to admissability of a contention, we did cite the decision of the Licensing Board in the private fuel storage case. In that case, the Licensing Board thought that safety contentions, quote, "Must either allege with particularity that an applicant is not complying with a specified safety regulation or allege with particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are silent. That's what the proposed contention needs to allege and it needs to do that with some basis.

Our argument is not that the proposed contention didn't necessarily cite 10 CFR 50.67, which it did not, but more fundamentally it didn't provide any support for a conclusion that 10 CFR 50.67 would not be met. In that sense, it's making an argument in essence that's challenging the regulations and it's doing so without any basis and without engaging in any way the analysis that's in front of us.

With respect to the idea that there's a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are somehow silent, that simply doesn't apply here because

1	the regulations are not silent. The regulations
2	provide specific criteria to be met for an analysis of
3	design basis fuel handling events and the application
4	shows that those criteria have been met. Again,
5	absent any technical basis, any support to show that
6	they're not, there's no relief that can be granted in
7	this proceeding.
8	If the Board has any questions, I'd be
9	happy to take those questions.
10	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Mr. Repka, is it
11	Millstone's position that or Dominion, excuse me.
12	MR. REPKA: It's okay. We understand.
13	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: the position that
14	the best estimate of the consequences of design basis
15	accidents are a result of using the ultimate source
16	term as compared to the old source term that was used?
17	MR. REPKA: That would absolutely be
18	correct.
19	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Did Dominion calculate
20	the off-site releases and dose consequences to the
21	public using the alternate source term without the
22	tech spec changes that are proposed in this
23	application?
24	MR. REPKA: The answer is no. And let me

make a point about that because I think you're fishing

for a benchmark of comparison.

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ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Yes, sir.

MR. REPKA: The point would be is there any common basis to compare before or after, and our view is that the only comparison that's necessary is the comparison of what we're proposing against the regulations and what we're proposing, the analysis shows that it's well within the regulatory limits and therefore the amendment is appropriate. And we don't know it but it certainly may be possible that if you did an analysis with alternative source term and imposed more restrictive controls on containment openings, doses might be somewhat reduced. We don't know. or may not be. But if they were, that's again unimportant because the regulation inherently incorporates the concept that doses that we have are sufficiently low to protect the public health and safety. So that's the comparison we need to make. The alternative source term rule and requirements are not for as low as reasonably achievable.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Do you agree that the difference between the off-site doses associated with and without these tech spec changes herein proposed would summarize the real consequences of the tech spec changes?

1	MR. REPKA: I'm sorry. You'll have to
2	repeat that for me.
3	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: If you agree that the
4	use of the alternate source term is the best estimate
5	of off-site dose
6	MR. REPKA: Yes, sir.
7	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: under accident
8	conditions, design basis accident conditions. Now,
9	you're using the alternate source term and now you're
10	proposing to change certain things, make tech spec
11	changes, and those are going to cause some difference.
12	Do you agree that the real consequence of this
13	proposal is the difference between the doses
14	associated with the tech spec changes and without the
15	tech spec changes?
16	MR. REPKA: That would be true, as opposed
17	to looking at the original source term.
18	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Right. The original
19	source term is not the best estimate. You said that.
20	MR. REPKA: That would be true.
21	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: You're not even
22	considering the old design.
23	MR. REPKA: That would be true, but that's
24	a comparison we don't have.
25	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: All right, sir. But

1	do you agree that that comparison would be helpful for
2	purposes of demonstrating the real benefits of this?
3	Take a look at what the consequences are before and
4	after these tech spec changes are effectuated and then
5	make a listing of what are the benefits of this? Will
6	you get increased operational flexibility? Will you
7	get this? Will you get that? Will you get this? And
8	that is a real comparison that should be made to
9	justify this action. Do you agree with that, sir?
10	MR. REPKA: No, I don't agree. I don't
11	agree that that comparison is necessary. Again, the
12	only comparison we believe necessary is what's being
13	proposed versus the regulations.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: You mentioned ALARA.
15	Why doesn't ALARA apply here?
16	MR. REPKA: Because the specific
17	requirements of 10 CFR 50.67 and Part 100 apply.
18	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Well, couldn't ALARA
19	also apply or shouldn't ALARA also apply?
20	MR. REPKA: We believe that ALARA in this
21	context is meeting the limit.
22	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I'm sorry. Would you
23	repeat that?
24	MR. REPKA: My comment before which is the
25	requirement is not to see how far below the limit we

1	can go. That's clearly not the intent of the
2	regulation. The regulation is meet the limit. But
3	the concept of as low as reasonably achievable, I
4	think meeting a limit in this context is consistent
5	with that, that not only are we at the limit, we're
6	below the limit and that's as low as is reasonably
7	achievable.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: So you're saying that
9	the doses associated with the proposed mode of
10	operation using the alternative source term is in
11	compliance with ALARA. Have you made that
12	demonstration?
13	MR. REPKA: We believe as long as we've
14	met the limit, we've met ALARA and the intent of it.
15	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: All right, sir.
16	MR. REPKA: And I would say that the doses
17	that are calculated are a fraction of the limit.
18	I heard that, Ms. Hodgdon. It's not a
19	fraction.
20	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: Do you agree that had
21	you proposed the use of the ultimate source term with
22	the original application, there would have been no
23	consideration of non-compliance because you've been
24	below appropriate or applicable regulatory limits and
25	standards?

66 1 MR. REPKA: Your idea there being if 2 alternative source term had been used in conjunction 3 with the original tech specs? ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: 4 Yes. 5 MR. REPKA: There would be no issue. 6 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: But see, now you're 7 changing something at some time later and you know 8 that if the tech specs is not removed, you would 9 likely have a dose to the public less than with the 10 tech specs removed, but you haven't made that 11 It just seems logical that there would calculation. 12 be a difference. That's correct, but again, 13 MR. REPKA: 14 it's not a significant or meaningful comparison 15 because what we have done shows that we are within a small fractional limit and, of course, what we're here 16 17 today to argue about is is there basis for a 18 contention that says that we're going to be in excess 19 of the regulatory limits and, of course, there is no 20 basis for that. 21 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: So you do not believe that there should be some additional justification for 22

any additional dose associated with the application of

the technical specifications such as the kind of

benefits that are mentioned in some of the NRC

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1 writings as operational flexibility, possible reduced 2 occupational dose, speed of operation, economic 3 considerations. 4 MR. REPKA: None of that is necessary at 5 this point. I think those kinds of justifications are 6 inherent in the rule making that led to establishing 7 the limit. 8 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: All right, sir. All 9 I understand your position. Thank you. 10 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Mr. Repka, I think 11 I misunderstood an early statement that you made early 12 in your presentation. I thought I heard you say you 13 could not go back to the old tech specs because they would be inconsistent with the use of the alternative 14 source term. I'm sure I mis-heard there. What were 15 16 you saying? 17 MR. REPKA: What I'm trying to say, Doctor Elleman, and I'm not surprised if I confused you. 18 19 have that effect on people sometimes. But what I'm 20 trying to say is that, given an analysis that's 21 unchallenged that shows that with the revised technical specifications but within the criteria of 22

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inconsistent with the rule to somehow require or

the alternative source term rule,

impose greater administrative controls.

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it would

In other words, the rule says that if you can show by analysis that if you meet these regulatory limits, then you can make the related operational changes to achieve cost beneficial licensing actions, and we have shown that. And without a challenge to that analysis, the relief of further controls can not be granted. That would be inconsistent with the rule and, therefore, there's no relief that can be granted in the proceeding.

In other words, if we show by analysis again that's unchallenged -- let's just say the criteria is X and we show by analysis that we're at consequences of X over two. Then with the revised administrative controls. Okav. Fine. We meet the rule and, therefore, the administrative controls are To then say I have nothing to support my valid. conclusion that X over 2 is wrong, but I think that if you should impose greater controls, that would be inconsistent with the alternative source term rule that says if you meet X, you can make these changes. That's the point I was trying to make. Is that any clearer?

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: That helps. Yes.

Thank you. Would you agree that using the old source

term and the old tech specs leads to a lower projected

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1 dose to members of the general public than using the 2 new source term and the new tech specs using a 3 consistent dose calculation basis, the TEDE, total effective dose equivalent, basis for calculating? 4 5 I think that there's some MR. REPKA: discussion of that in the Federal Register notice. 6 7 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Yes, that's where I noticed it. 8 MR. REPKA: And, again, the two analyses. 9 10 One is that TEDE or total effective dose equivalent 11 and the original used whole body and other, so they're 12 not consistent. But it said that if they're a consistent basis, the TEDE were used, some doses would 13 14 be slightly increased and others would be lowered. 15 Again, that's a rough calculation but all of them 16 would be within the regulatory limit. In fact, I 17 think most of the increases were in the area of the control room, not necessarily off-site. 18 My technical support explains that the 19 exclusionary boundary doses were actually lower. 20 low population zone boundary doses may have been a 21 22 little higher and control room a little higher. But again, a fraction of the regulatory limit. 23 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Sure. But you do 24 not increase the doses to the public by making these 25

1	changes and using the new source term? That's the
2	statement, I guess.
3	MR. REPKA: At the exclusionary boundary,
4	if you
5	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: At the exclusionary
6	boundary?
7	MR. REPKA: That's correct.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Is there any
9	possibility we could get access to those data and see
10	those numbers?
11	MR. REPKA: Actually, the old numbers are
12	presented in the application itself, but they're not
13	expressed in terms of TEDE doses.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Right. The
15	confusing issue, as you have stated, is the fact that
16	there is indeed a different basis for calculating the
17	dose. You had internal and external doses separate
18	under the old procedure. You have them integrated
19	under TEDE. So we keep comparing apples and oranges.
20	It would be awfully nice to be able to compare apples
21	with apples.
22	MR. REPKA: Yes, and I think that would be
23	a nice and interesting comparison but, again, it's one
24	I don't think is necessary to meet the regulations and
25	it's not a required comparison. The only comparison

1 relevance here is does the TEDE doses we've 2 calculated meet the alternative source term in Part 3 100 and Reg Guide limits expressed in those terms? 4 And they patently do. Again, that conclusion is not 5 challenged. 6 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: But you have made 7 those calculations, I gather from what you've just 8 said. REPKA: 9 I would characterize the MR. 10 calculations that have been done using this comparison 11 of old versus new with an equivalent TEDE terms as 12 being back and -- I don't think these are calculations 13 that have been performed in any vigorous way and they 14 certainly haven't been submitted to the NRC. But I'm 15 told here, Mr. Eakin points out he's just redone that 16 comparison and says the doses look approximately 17 equivalent, something like 1.17 to 1.2 and that's --ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: That's interesting. 18 19 Okay. 20 MR. REPKA: But again, all of the numbers 21 in the original format are actually presented in the 22 application, again, the original not in TEDE terms. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I understand. 23 24 you used the old source term and the new technical 25 specifications, would you not still be below the

1	regulatory dose limits for off-site?
2	MR. REPKA: Old source term?
3	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Old source term,
4	new tech specs. Wouldn't you not still be below the
5	reg limit?
6	MR. REPKA: It's difficult to answer that
7	question because there are other advances in state of
8	the art such as dose conversion calculations.
9	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Use the TEDE
10	methodology. Would not both of them
11	MR. REPKA: I'll let Mr. Eakin answer
12	that. It's probably easier. Are you being able to
13	address the new advances in dose conversion factors?
14	MR. EAKIN: Yes.
15	MR. REPKA: Like the old analysis used
16	probably the old Reg Guide 1.109 and 0472 dose
17	conversion factors for whole body and thyroid. Now
18	we're up to the federal guidance report 11 and 12.
19	They are significantly different. So there you gain
20	some benefits in calculating like the effects to the
21	thyroid.
22	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Yes, but I think
23	the things you're talking about are not we're
24	talking changing the nodes a little bit. I suspect in
25	looking at the alternative source term that it does

indeed make a difference but some of the differences increase the dose, some of them decrease the dose. My guess is you're still below the regulatory limits had you also used the old source term and the new tech specs and, if that is true, then why now to make these changes? Why didn't you do them years and years ago?

MR. REPKA: Mr. Eakin said -- that probably didn't come through -- he doesn't believe that's correct. That's why the original tech spec had to close the personnel hatch in 10 minutes.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: So you believe you could not meet the regulatory guidelines using the old source term and the new tech specs.

MR. REPKA: That's my belief.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: All right. Mr. Repka, I believe I heard you say and I tried to write down what you said, that there would not be releases that would lead to harm under the new proposals. Can we agree that the regulatory guides that are in existence are not radiological safety-based guides? They are regulatory guides. They are numbers that have been adopted by the government as appropriate numbers for safety and if one does indeed expose a sufficient number of people to levels below those levels, you can indeed produce harm and you can indeed

produce consequential radiation effects. Would you agree with that statement?

MR. REPKA: My point is that if these passe releases from accident conditions meet the federal guidelines, which they do, then there's no basis to argue here that there will be releases somehow that are greater than NRC requirements that would lead to greater health consequences. Certainly the issue of the health consequences of releases at an allowed level is not a litigable issue in an NRC license proceeding, and that's really the point I was trying to lead up to.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I guess where I was heading here is I get the very strong impressionis your written submission and in what you said today that as long as you stay below a regulatory limit, whatever you want to do is okay and you ought to be allowed to go ahead and do that. Is that an inappropriate statement of the corporate position?

MR. REPKA: Well, certainly in the context of alternative source term, that the operational changes across beneficial licensing actions that might be proposed are things, if they are within the regulatory limits, then they should be acceptable.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I think we said the

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same thing.

MR. REPKA: That doesn't mean that the company is going to apply for every operational change or flexibility that they might be able to conceive of, that might come within a limit. It doesn't mean that the philosophy exists throughout, pushing everything to the margins of the envelope. That's simply not what I'm arguing. What I'm arguing is in a specific context of alternative source term, the criteria that we have to meet is the regulatory limit and we've done that with margin.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: In deciding to request these changes in tech spec limits, did you within the company make an evaluation of the benefits that would accrue to you by making the changes as opposed to increases in doses that would accrue from the changes and decide a balance between the risk versus the benefit in this calculation?

MR. REPKA: The company has made an internal evaluation of the operational benefits, the economic benefits but hasn't in any vigorous way tried to make a comparison of the type that you're referring to. Suffice it to say that the proposed changes do have some value in running an outage and planning an outage and running an outage, so that benefit can be

1 quantified. And again, the consequences, there are no 2 significant consequences. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Because the doses 3 4 are changed only marginally? MR. REPKA: Correct, and well within NRC 5 limits. 6 7 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I have presumed in reading the submissions that the reason we want to do 8 9 this is it affords you greater convenience of moving 10 things in and out of containment. By having the door 11 open, you can speed up operations and that your 12 reasons for shutting down the filter trains and other things simply aren't relevant if you've got the door 13 14 Is opening the door the reason to -- the open. 15 opening to containment, is that really what you're wanting to seek here in these changes? 16 17 MR. REPKA: Ι think the convenience 18 generally is in terms of having containment and 19 equipment penetrations open during fuel movement. They're open for most of the outage right now but need 20 fuel 21 to be closed when is moved or under 22 administrative control to be closed within 10 minutes in the case of personnel hatch. So the convenience is 23 that while fuel is being moved, with these proposed 24

changes you could still move things in and out of

containment. You could still work on other electrical 1 2 or piping penetrations that would require them to be 3 So there is some operational benefit in that. The fact is now, however, just to put a 4 5 little context in it, you can do work in containment while fuel is being moved now if you can get your 6 7 equipment in and out before you do that. So there's 8 a staging issue now that might be removed, as one example of a convenience. 9 I think that answers your 10 question.

> I think you reminded me of a point I heard earlier this morning that somehow this was being done to speed up fuel handling, and that's not the case at all. This doesn't affect how fast fuel is moved. That's not what's involved here.

> ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: The other tech spec changes appear to be really changes that reflect the fact they're no longer relevant if the door is left open, the containment penetration is open, and that they're just really not needed in the new environment you envision. Is that substantially right?

> think that's a fair MR. REPKA: Ι For example, the one tech spec that's being deleted related to keeping the boundaries, the doors closed in the spent fuel area, and that's simply

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not needed under the analysis. Again, the application shows that it doesn't meet the criteria of 5036 for what needs to be in a technical specification. that would be one example of something that's simply not -- the tech spec is not needed. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I guess that's all my questions.

I would dearly love to see those back of the envelope calculations that show that there is no or is only small increase in exposure to the general public as a result of the changes.

If that's something that the MR. REPKA: Board would like to see, we can certainly submit something to the Board if it's necessary for their conclusion.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: The basis for the concern appears to me to be that the public is being exposed to additional harm, to additional radiation exposure, as a result of these changes. If you have calculations that show that is not correct, I think it would be extremely relevant to us and to the petitioners in this proceeding.

MR. REPKA: I think the comparison you're getting at, I understand, but I will say we do have calculations that show there's no increased harm. That's the calculation that's in the application

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itself that show that the releases from these postulated events are well within regulatory criteria. That calculation in and of itself supports the conclusion that you just articulated, that there's no harm off-site to the public.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I think maybe we're getting a little bit into a semantics issue. If I change something -- if I have a new understanding of what a source term is, that hasn't changed the real harm. The real harm is still whatever it is. It's just I have a better understanding of what it is. And so to make a change that really increases the release -- well, to make a change and then simultaneously apply a new model, what really is happening hasn't changed. It's just the perception of what has changed.

MR. REPKA: What's really happening, if you want that kind of comparison -- and again, I'll say it again, I don't think it's necessary -- but if you want that kind of comparison, the comparison of what's really happening would be revised source term and old tech specs versus revised source term new tech spec.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: That would be extremely helpful.

1 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I fail to see why the old source term gets into this at all. 2 3 If I said that, I'm wrong. MR. REPKA: 4 What I meant to say was revised source term, old tech 5 specs, revised source term, new tech specs. The old source term does not and should not come into it at 6 7 It's not meaningful. It never existed. In the 8 cosmic -- it never existed. 9 ADMIN, JUDGE COLE: Isn't the revised 10 source term and old tech spec versus revised source 11 term and new tech specs the real difference associated with this application? 12 MR. REPKA: Again, that's the one that I 13 14 said before. We have not evaluated it. We haven't done that evaluation. We did reference -- in the --15 hazards, there's a reference to -- now I'm completely 16 17 confused, but it's common basis of comparison, old 18 source term versus new source term. ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: If the old source term 19 is not the best estimate of what the doses are under 20 21 whatever conditions you're operating under, then the 22 impact of this application should be the application 23 of a best estimate of the discharges with and without 24 the proposed operating technical specifications. That shows exactly what this application will change.

1 MR. REPKA: We could do that comparison if 2 you'd like. It's not something we could do this 3 morning. ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: 4 It would be very 5 helpful to me. 6 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: It. would be 7 personally helpful to us a great deal to see that. MR. REPKA: We'll do it. 8 9 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: With regard to that 10 earlier comparison, you indicated that the 11 requirements do not include ALARA. Judge Cole asked 12 you about that and I think you said in response to his 13 questioning that you were not saying that the ALARA 14 requirement no longer applies. 15 MR. REPKA: That's correct, and I probably 16 was the source of some confusion. What I want to say 17 is the rule doesn't require the doses to be as low as 18 possible but in compliance with the rule in this case 19 inherently involves doses as reasonably low as 20 achievable. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: My question is this. 21 22 If your comparison between doses end of the revised source term with and without and the new technical 23 24 specifications the proposed technical or

specifications, if that comparison produced some

difference, wouldn't the lower figures be more accurately as low as reasonably achievable or are you saying that not doing the technical specification changes would not allow for reasonableness?

MR. REPKA: The latter is what I was saying but -- Yes, and Mr. Eakin points out that the concept of the alternative source term rule is to allow changes to technical specifications and if the requirement were to force you to keep the old technical specifications and control in place because that would achieve lower doses than with the revised technical specifications, then you could not make any changes and it would defeat the very purpose of the alternative source term rule. So, therefore, the answer to your question is that compliance with the rule constitutes as low as reasonably achievable in this context.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: So in other words, if when you do the comparison that Judge Cole and Judge Elleman have been discussing with you, if there are lower figures applying the revised source term out the new technical specifications, you're saying that while that might have been ALARA in the past, it's no longer ALARA because your argument is the change is inherently reasonable. Is that what you're saying?

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MR. REPKA: Our point is the comparison of 1 relevance is does it meet the alternative source term 2 3 rule, and the rule --ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: But what I'm asking 4 5 is to address the concept of ALARA before and after. 6 I think I hear you saying that the concept of ALARA 7 changes. 8 The concept of ALARA is MR. REPKA: No. 9 that it meets the alternative source term rule. 10 Doesn't change. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: But if without the 11 12 new technical specifications you have lower numbers, 13 then those would be as low as reasonably achievable. 14 Correct? 15 They would not be. It would MR. REPKA: be beyond what's reasonably achievable. May I have a 16 17 minute? And that is our position is if you meet 18 19 the rule, you're by definition as low as what's needed 20 and reasonably achievable. But there's a fundamental 21 point here I want to get to which is the concept of ALARA is not really applicable here at all because 22 23 it's an occupational safety and exposure concept. We're talking about design basis accidents and there's 24

no requirement to keep design basis accident doses as

low as reasonably achievable.

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ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: So you are saying that ALARA does not apply.

MR. REPKA: That's correct.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I think we need to hear from the staff.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: THEre was one more question I had for you and I don't think either of you discussed it but you mentioned in your response that on page 15 CCAM incorrectly asserts that the proposed administrative controls unsubmitted and are unreviewed. When I was re-reading these, I reading them in light of your new submission this week and I noticed in there that you refer to procedural controls would be in place and a closure plan would be used for each containment opening. I don't think you specified but are -- I'm sorry. At the end of that paragraph you do say, "These administrative controls are described in more detail on pages 7 and 8." that also refer to the procedural concurrence?

MR. REPKA: Yes, it did. With respect to the inside containment fuel handling accident, the administrative control is the proposed tech spec itself and the proposed tech spec, 3.9.4, is included in the application and it says essentially that

penetrations may be kept open under control that be caused within 30 minutes. So that proposed tech spec is in fact included. Then in Attachment 2, I believe it's pages 7 and 8 and then a little later on, there's more detail described about implementation of those controls. So it talks about how a person would be designated prior to the opening who would have more responsibility and a plan would be drawn up in order to remove any hoses or other things that might be in the way. So all of that is described.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. You said a plan would be drawn up or a plan was included there?

For each opening under MR. REPKA: No. the given circumstances of that opening at the tine, depending upon what work is being done, a plan would be drawn up. In other words, there would be a closure plan, something that would be a document that would be created and then those specific procedures are not specific procedures included but those are implementing procedures that are of the type that would never be subject to a staff review and they're not subject to really beyond the scope of what needs to be reviewed for this application.

And I think the last point I would make about that is the idea that they're unsubmitted and

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1	unreviewed is really misleading with respect to what's
2	really here but, in addition, it doesn't say what's
3	wrong with what's here. The argument being made is
4	that none of these administrative controls are any
5	good because there's going to be excess doses and so
6	the deficiency is not with the administrative control.
7	It's with the concept of the administrative controls
8	and, of course, our application shows that there's no
9	basis for that.
10	ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: You're saying that
11	those types of administrative controls don't reach the
12	level of making review necessary.
13	MR. REPKA: The implementing procedures.
14	That's correct. And they're certainly of the type
15	that would never be part of an application of this
16	nature.
17	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I just want to ask
18	one more question and I want to make sure about that
19	before I say one. Two actually. In places where you
20	say there will not be any increase, what you're saying
21	is there will not be any increase that would be
22	significant in terms of violating the limits. Right?
23	MR. REPKA: That's correct.
24	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: The second question
25	is just to ask you if you want to define for us in

more detail what you mean when you talk about the difference between the standard for ruling on standing and whether contention is admissible. Obviously there's a difference. I want to give you this opportunity to go into a little bit more detail with regard to the case law that says that there can be -- I believe the language is expert opinion or documented facts or at least a fact-based argument.

From one standpoint, it might be said that CCAM has made a fact-based argument and, again, we may be getting into semantics there but when you compare these things and you look at the term fact-based argument, it may be a matter of line drawing or degree but I want to give you the opportunity to speak to that before moving on to the staff.

MR. REPKA: Okay. Let me try to address that briefly. First with respect to standing. It's at least arguable that in that context the Board can make certain presumptions without looking at the facts at all, and I think did so in this case. We didn't necessarily agree with that but certainly the Board did that. But in the context of proposed contention, it's very clear that the standard is different and that's the difference we did allude to in our filing with respect to the proposed contention.

The NRC's regulation on admissible contention requires a basis sufficient to demonstrate that there's a genuine issue with respect to a material issue of law or fact. I think the intent of that regulation was quite clear in the 1989 rule making that adopted it. The Commission is trying to get to a standard to place the burden on the petitioner at the front end to show that there is a real issue, a real basis to litigate something.

What we have here is a proposition from the petitioner, a proposition that doses will be in excess of regulatory limits, they'll be harmful to the public. It's therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to have some support for that proposition, some facts or some expert opinion, and that's what's missing here. There is an application and analysis that shows that the proposition is not correct, that comes to the opposite conclusion.

In the proposed contention, there's absolutely nothing contrary to that. Again, it's just a repeated over and over and over again proposition that they will be greater, that there will be harm. There are no facts that support that. There's no allusion to a report that's been prepared by anybody. There's no allusion to an expert that could be called

upon, a paper, a document, particular facts. For example, if this were a case where the NRC had maybe reviewed something similar and denied it. Those kind of facts are not presented.

So regardless of whatever the standard, whatever the level of expert opinion or fact-based document, what we have here might be satisfactory to meet the rule. What we have here is essentially a null set. There's nothing presented. So therefore, I think it fails to show that if we were to have an admitted contention, there would be nothing to litigate. We would put on our analysis and there would be nothing opposed to that analysis. So there's no genuine issue.

MS. HODGDON: Let me see if I understand, just sort of applying what you said. CCAM has argued that if there were a fuel handling accident, which is, I think -- in rebuttal if you want to correct me, Ms. Burton, you can -- but that that would be the type of unexpected thing which you may be also referring to in your response to the RAI -- that if there were such an occurrence, you're saying you have already anticipated that and done the calculations for that and, as you said earlier, I think, even without the administrative controls, you've demonstrated that were that to occur,

you'd still be within the limits of the rule. Am I
understanding that correctly?

MR. REPKA: That's correct. The expected
conditions -- in fact, the very unexpected conditions
because you don't expect fuel handling accidents to

6 occur. In fact, their design basis conditions, which 7 is the fuel handling accident, that's precisely what's The assumptions of that analysis are that 8 addressed. administrative controls 9 there are no to cause penetrations and that everything goes out the door. 10

The source term from a fuel handling accident goes out
the door and the consequences are still a fraction of

13 | regulatory limits.

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So that's what's in the application and there's nothing presented to meaningfully engage that conclusion. Certainly nothing to dispute that conclusion. The controls then are added on top of that to limit that release to no more than 30 minutes so that the actual releases would be even less than what's been calculated or shown on the application.

MS. HODGDON: So you're not saying that there would not be an increase. You're saying that any increase would be within the limits.

MR. REPKA: That's correct.

MS. HODGDON: Just to sort of cover

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1	everything that I'm thinking of at this point, if the
2	unexpected condition occurred that you describe in
3	your response to question #1 such that the requirement
4	to close the door within 30 minutes were not complied
5	with, your requirement to close the door within 30
6	minutes were not complied with, I think I understood
7	you to say earlier that even without that occurring,
8	you're saying that your calculations show that the
9	release from fuel handling accident and whatever
10	unexpected condition caused the personnel to decide
11	that they couldn't close the door within 30 minutes,
12	that the release would still be within regulatory
13	limits.
14	MR. REPKA: Yes. The unexpected
15	conditions would be beyond design basis, beyond the
16	assumptions of the analysis, but the analysis in the
17	application is premised on no controls. Everything
18	goes out. So if the control is not implemented, the
19	conclusion would be the release would be what's
20	calculated in the application.
21	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: For a design basis
22	accident.
23	MR. REPKA: For a design basis accident.
24	MS. HODGDON: Including fuel handling
25	accidents?

1 MR. REPKA: Well, that's the design basis 2 accident we're talking about. It's 3 containment, fuel handling in a spent fuel area. 4 accident analysis. 5 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Shall we take a short 6 break and go to the staff or do you want to go 7 straight? Are you ready? 8 MS. BURTON: I wonder about a short break 9 because I have to get myself together here to reply to 10 both these. I was going to suggest that maybe we do 11 it after lunch. It's about 25 to 12. By the time we 12 come back -- I don't know what's contemplated for the 13 rest of the day but it'll take me 10 or 15 minutes to 14 prepare. 15 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: We'll take 15 minute 16 sand then try to finish up. How much time do you 17 think you're going to need? 18 MS. BURTON: I'm going to try to figure 19 out in my 15 minutes how much time I'm going to need 20 but it depends on the questions. There are a few 21 things that I need to address. So I'd say 20 minutes 22 to half an hour. 23 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So I don't 24 expect there'd be too much rebuttal argument. Do you 25 need a half hour? Would that be helpful to you or how

much time do you need?

MS. BURTON: A half an hour now or a half
an hour to respond?

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Half an hour now to

MS. BURTON: Fifteen minutes. I meant that I would take a half na hour to present the staff's argument after I had taken the 15 minutes to decide what the staff is going to say.

Do you need that much time?

(Off the record for a break at 11:37 a.m.)

MS. HODGDON: This, I'm afraid, is going to be something of a hodge-podge because I'm answering various arguments made by counsel to the petitioner and also questions that were asked to counsel for the licensee. But in order to make it less of a hodge-podge, I'm not going to talk about the long argument that was made regarding footnote 11 in the licensee's response that regards the attachments to the SECY paper.

I will note that what was cited there was a regulatory analysis and not a staff policy and what we're here about is something different because even though we might be bound to follow Commission policy statements here as well as regulations, there's no such thing involved here, and so I don't think that's

get ready.

an issue of whether there's a staff policy here regarding these matters because I believe that they're well-reflected in the regulations and we'd do better to look at those than to deal with so-called policy which isn't even a policy.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Before you go to that, let me ask you. You wouldn't disagree that any staff document like that could be used for guidance, would you?

MS. HODGDON: I think that you might rely on it for some purposes but I've said that I think that any reliance on the parts of the document that were cited to for the purpose that they were cited to had so little value that it doesn't need to be answered. So as a general proposition, I would think that, as I said, the Commission policy would be something this Board and the staff would need to follow. But what's being talked about here was a regulatory analysis which really didn't amount to that. Therefore, I don't know -- the argument was a long argument made about that second paper and that's been sort of overtaken by events and we now have a regulation coming out of that and that regulation is 5067 and we have the Req Guide 1183 which I think is the year 2000, so we have all of these things, all of

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which better reflect those papers that were attached to the SECY paper.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Assuming -- well, let's not assume. Are you saying that the subsequent documents in the regulations and so forth are inconsistent with what the SECY document says?

MS. HODGDON: No, I'm not saying that.

I'm just saying that that SECY paper had various documents attached to it and that some of them were read from. That was the regulatory analysis on the rule, I believe.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Right, and what I'm asking is are you saying that the portions that Ms. Burton relied on are inconsistent with the regulation and other documents that were subsequently produced?

MS. HODGDON: No, I don't believe that they're inconsistent. I think that what we have is something of a refinement now, if that's the right word. No. I think that Ms. Burton was using them to prove her point that the policy of Doctor Travers -- as expressed in the document, that she attributed it to Doctor Travers, I think he probably signed this paper, he being the EDO -- that was cost saving and that that was the paramount purpose of the Commission in adopting this rule and so it's not -- well, I mean

it's inconsistent with the purpose, the real purpose of adopting this rule, the cost saving. It was improvement of the regulations. Allowing regulatory flexibility was what it said in other places. Certainly cost saving is a part of that and there's nothing that's necessarily nefarious about saving money.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I think that she quoted from -- the reason I'm asking these questions now is because you gave the signal that you were going to quickly move on and talk about other things. I believe that Ms. Burton quoted from that document early on in her argument to the effect that the NRC would not be adopting a rule that would allow -- Ms. Burton, do you know what I'm referring to? The early point that you made. Not on cost savings but indicating that the NRC would interpret the rule in a way that would protect the public.

MS. BURTON: Right. That was the NRC does not intend to approve any source term that is not of the same level of quality as the source terms in the reg. I was in error in citing that, as Mr. Repka pointed out, for the way in which I cited it and for relying on it. I believe Mystic made a mistake.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What is the cite?

1 MS. BURTON: No, the cite is correct but 2 the reference to NUREG 1465, if in fact Mr. Repka is correct, and I think he probably is, that that is the 3 4 new source rule NUREG, then I was in error in relying 5 on that reference as I did as standing for NRC policy 6 as I was relying on it. So I don't think Ms. Hodgdon 7 really needs to devote any more time to that issue. 8 MS. HODGDON: I was actually starting out 9 by saying what I wasn't going to talk about, and that 10 was one of the --11 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: And you proceeded to talk about it. 12 MS. HODGDON: Well, I was asked questions 13 14 about it, but I wasn't going to talk about it with 15 regard to something else in that SECY paper but also 16 the 1465 because it's now generally acknowledged 1465 17 was indeed peer review and the licensee did in fact 18 use that source term and it's only if you want to use 19 something else that you need to have it peer reviewed, which they did not do and, therefore, this is not in 20 21 any way relevant here. 22 The other thing I'm not going to talk about involves Ms. Burton's statement which I wrote 23 24 down here perhaps incorrectly that she concedes the safety hazards analysis argument. 25

MS. BURTON: Significant hazards, I meant.

MS. HODGDON: She said safety but she might have meant significant. I don't know the extent of that because that's in fact her contention, so I want to know, if I may before I continue, what the contention would be when that argument is conceded.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Burton.

MS. BURTON: By conceding that point, I don't believe the entire contention is conceded. That was only part of the contention. It was the tail end of it and so the contention stands as is absent that assertion that the amendment does involve a significant hazards consideration. I think it does but I don't think that this Board is authorized to address that issue.

MS. HODGDON: I don't think it's the tail end. I think it's the front end which is why I was making the point about it. The contention as stated is the amendment involves the potential significant increase in the amounts of radiological effluence that may be raised off site unless the amendment involves an adverse impact on the public health and safety and does involve a significant hazards consideration. That is the contention and, if that is withdrawn, then why are we here today?

1	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: So can we cross off
2	the "and does involve a significant hazards
3	consideration" and consider that what remains is the
4	contention, Ms. Burton?
5	MS. BURTON: Indeed.
6	MS. HODGDON: I would suggest that perhaps
7	we might cross off also the front end that involves
8	"the potential significant increase in the amounts of
9	radiological effluence that may be released off site."
10	That's also a direct quote from the no significant
11	hazards consideration finding.
12	MS. BURTON: That we do not agree to
13	delete. That forms the basis of our contention. That
14	stands.
15	MS. HODGDON: So we do not withdraw then
16	our objection to the contention based on the fact that
17	it is an attack on the no significant hazards
18	consideration determination which the Commission's
19	regulations do not allow.
20	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just ask you
21	a question since this is one of the things you're not
22	going to talk about.
23	MS. HODGDON: Yes. Right.
24	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I think everyone
25	agrees at this point that this Board does not have the

authority to make a determination on whether there is a significant hazards consideration or whether there is not. Are you saying that the concept of the potential of significant increase in amounts of radiological effluence that may be released off-site is something that the Board can not consider also that concept?

MS. HODGDON: No, I'm not saying that.

I'm saying that those words are words that actually come from the categoric exclusion in 5122C9 and they come from -- okay. "Involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated." Ms. Cole is showing me 592 but those exact words are in --

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Even assuming they were in that rule, if the Board does not undertake to make any ruling on whether or not there's a significant hazards consideration, even if the words were the same, are you arguing that the concept that they describe can not be considered by the Board in ruling on the admissability of the contention?

MS. HODGDON: No. It's not the concept that I'm objecting to. I think elsewhere -- and I would have to take another look at it and I'll get back to it in a minute because I don't want to spend

so much time on things I'm not going to talk about. I just wanted to tailor my argument to what was really at issue and so in order to save time. If somebody could just point me to that, please. I had it here a minute ago and now I can't find the piece of paper. I'll get back to it but elsewhere the petitioner makes the statement that it objects to whatever that statement is but doesn't pursue the contention. the language of 5122C9, categoric exclusion from environmental, and so that's a combination of that. That is what it is. The Board can take it into account if it has a proper basis, which it does not, as we've already arqued and I'm not going to repeat that argument.

But insofar as some part of the no significant hazards argument does remain, I would recommend the statement consideration on the finding procedures and standards on no significant hazards consideration March 6, 1986. That's 51 Federal Register 7744 final rule. The statement made there that it's important to bear in mind that there is no intrinsic safety significance to the no significant hazards consideration standard, neither as a NODA standard nor as a standard about when a hearing may be held does it have a substantive safety significance.

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Whether or not an action requires prior notice or prior hearing, no license and no amendment may be issued unless the Commission concludes that it provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be endangered and that the action will not be amenable to the common defense and security of the health and safety of the public.

And so I think with that point I'll skip to another point that Ms. Burton, another argument that she made regarding the staff's response in which she said that the staff didn't do any review -- I'll look at my notes and see what she in fact said. She accused the staff of not having done the review regarding these matters. The fact is that contentions must be based on the licensee's application and not on the staff's review of them. The staff in fact has not completed its review and the staff's paper does not reflect, nor do staff's papers ever reflect at this point in the proceedings, the review of the licensee's application.

So when Ms. Burton quoted the staff as saying this and that, the staff is merely quoting from what the licensee said and not endorsing it through review because the review had not at that time taken place.

1 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I think there's 2 probably also no dispute that we're not here to make any ruling on what the staff has done. 3 4 MS. HODGDON: That's right. In the 5 environmental context, that would be different but here there are no environmental contentions and so 6 7 this is purely what the licensee has done in its 8 application. 9 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Right. I think 10 there's no dispute on that. MS. HODGDON: Well, I do believe that Ms. 11 Burton suggested that the staff had not done what it 12 13 should have done. The staff did exactly what it always does is my point. There's nothing different 14 15 here. It's the licensee's application that's at issue and not the staff's review of it. 16 17 Then regarding the response to the RAIs which did seem to be where most of the interest lay 18 19 and that was about closing the containment hatch. 20 Moving fuel in the containment with the containment 21 hatch open and then in the event of a fuel handling 22 accident in containment, closing those doors within 23 half an hour, and the RAIs relating to that question, response relating to that question and particularly to 24

the related issue of whether they might have to

2 workers that are closing the doors. 3 I think there are several issues that are related to that and some of them have been answered. 4 That is that the dose from this fuel handling accident 5 is a very small fraction of the dose limits in 5067 6 7 for this accident and that the dose limit, the TEDE, is 6.3 and the accident is 1.2 which is a very small 8 9 fraction of that. And also that you might also look for some guidance regarding that to Appendix B of the 10 Reg Guide at 1.183 and that is the assumptions for 11 12 evaluating radiological consequences of handling accident and here, although the petitioner's 13 counsel suggested that this was an unheard of thing to 14 move fuel with the doors open, the Reg Guide makes 15 perfectly clear that that's not so. On page B-2 under 16 17 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: B-2? 18 MS. HODGDON: B-2 of the Appendix B as in 19 20 boy. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: B as in boy? 21 B as in boy. MS. HODGDON: Yes. In 22 Appendix B on page B-2, fuel handling accidents within 23 containment. You look at 5.2, it says "If 24 containment is open during fuel handling operations 25

abandon that effort in order to save dose to the

but designed to automatically isolate" -- I'm not going to read the rest of that. You go on to the next page, B-3, and it says, "If the containment is open during fuel handling operations, for example, personnel air lock or equipment hatch is open, the radioactive material that escapes from the reactor cavity pool to the containment is released to the environment over a two hour time period." That's one of the assumptions for the accident.

But you'll notice that the footnote says, "The staff will generally require the technical specifications allowing such operations including administrative controls to close the air lock hatch or penetrations within 30 minutes. Such open administrative controls will generally require that a dedicated individual be present with necessary equipment available to restore containment closure should a fuel handling accident occur. Radiological analyses should generally not credit this manual isolation."

The licensee -- I'm not a reviewer so I can't tell you what the staff is going to do with this, but I will say that the staff exactly followed this Reg Guide -- I mean the licensee, excuse me -- exactly followed this Reg Guide, did all those things

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and that's where this commitment that's in the footnote comes from.

The point I wanted to make there is that moving fuel with the containment hatch open has been done for quite some time and even before the ultimate source term. Judge Elleman asked a question that was somewhat related to that. What could you do with the old source term? And the answer is you maybe could move fuel, irradiated fuel, with the containment open—excuse me—with the containment hatch open if you could meet that 6.3 number and everybody knows where that comes from, doesn't everybody, the 6.3? The regulation says 25 for accidents but for fuel handling accidents, because they're not accidents, they're not LOCOs, they're not accidents at operation, you use a fraction of that. The fraction is a quarter and that's 6.25 rounded up to 6.3.

Also I wanted to say that although there's nothing in that Reg Guide about saving dose in the event the personnel at the door are receiving dose that would exceed guidelines, we do have other regulations that would cover that and I think, for example -- and I'm not saying that this is strictly applicable -- you could invoke in such a situation and other licensees could. This licensee didn't and has

already written it into its request, but other licensees could invoke 50.54X which says, "A licensee may take reasonable action that departs from the license condition or technical specification contained in a license issued under this part" -- that would be part 50 -- "in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can equivalent protection is provide adequate or immediately apparent."

So this would be done to protect the public health and safety, of course, and that's why we have the limits on control room exposure in GDC 19 and in this reg 5067. Of course it protects the works, but it also protects the public because the public interest is in having the workers able to do their jobs and not to be injured by continuing to try to close the door in the event that there's a heavy dose there.

And that brings me to the next matter which is this intervening something or other. So you drop the assembly there in containment and, as soon as you drop the assembly, you're no longer in this world of postulated accidents. You're in a real accident.

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So once you have a real accident, you have to start trying to save dose which is why we try and get the doors closed.

I was going to talk a little bit about the design basis accident and particularly with 5067. 5067 has an interesting footnote and that will bring me to ALARA, I think. 5067 states applicability and then it states requirements and that's that the dose is a certain number and that it should be TEDE, should be a TEDE dose. Both footnotes are interesting but the first one says, "The fission product release assumed for these calculations should be based upon a major accident hypothesized for purposes of design analyses or postulated from considerations of possible accidental events that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident considered credible."

That will take me to ALARA and to realism, but I'm going to just pass over that for now and get to the end of this.

So that's what the dose analysis has to be. It has to be done in such a way that no accident considered credible could exceed it. "Such accidents have generally been assumed to result in substantial melt down of the core with subsequent release of

appreciable quantity sufficient products." Now, here they're talking about accidents while the plant is in operation and that's LOCA and things like that where you get the full dose. Twenty five REM is the unit for that, 25 REM TEDE.

Then it goes on to say, "The use of 25 REM TEDE is not intended to imply that this value constitutes an acceptable limit for emergency doses to the public under accident conditions. Rather, this 25 REM TEDE value has been stated in the section as a reference value which can be used in the evaluation of proposed design basis changes with respect to potential reactor accidents of exceedingly low probability of occurrence and low risk of public exposure to radiation."

In other words, the Commission protects the public only indirectly through this regulation. This is something that the plant has to be designed against, so a plant has to be designed so that it can not have an accident in excess of these numbers and that's just it. Protecting the public, we go to part 20 and that also deals with occupational doses. I do not believe that ALARA is defined in part 50 because accident doses do not have to be ALARA. In fact, they couldn't be because -- well, I'll read the ALARA

definition so as to distinguish that from the kind of doses we're talking about here. I've been handed a copy. It's 20.1003.

It says "ALARA, acronym for as low as is reasonably achievable, means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits in this part as is practical, consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity is undertaken." Accidents are not a licensed activity and, therefore, they're -- that's -- anyway, the licensed activity is what we're talking about here. Taking into account the state of technology, the economics and so forth, I won't go on with the rest of this, but the ALARA definition always occurs in part 20. It does not appear for accident doses in part 50.

Now I was going to get to realism, the question about realism. Is this new accident source term, 5067 source term, realistic? Well, it's more realistic than the old one is the answer. But this accident -- and I just read you the footnote to 5067-- this is not a realistic accident. It's beyond worst case. I mean it's the worst, what the Commission said, accidents, you couldn't have worst one. So anyway, if you look at it, you will see what they put

on -- I'm looking at Attachment 1, page eight, comparison to an FHA inside containment analysis to the AST analysis.

made in here. I think most of them are articulated. This accident fuel decay time, the AST value is 72 hours and that's what they used here for their accident source time, but actually you see that the current value is 150 and they have a spec that doesn't allow them to move this fuel in containment at 72 anyway. So that's way conservative in this accident analysis. The peaking factor is the same. Lots of other things are the same. You notice one thing that is very much changed is the decontamination factor which is 200 here and it's 100 in the old source term.

The reason for that is that after the accident at Three Mile Island and the research that was done on that, it was found that the guesswork that had been done before there were any such accidents with regard to that was way conservative and didn't have the right idea about what kind of iodines were involved and so forth.

So actually, the assumptions they make here are that -- this is in, I believe, the Reg Guide -- where in Appendix B again under water depth it

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says, "If the depth of the water above the damaged fuel is 23 feet or greater, the decontamination factors for the elemental and organic species are 501 respectively giving an overall effective decontamination factor of 200, that is 99.5 percent of the total iodine released from the damaged rods is retained by the water." And so that's probably realistic. That's probably the most realistic thing here.

MS. BURTON: I don't mean to interrupt but
I just wonder if Ms. Hodgdon could tell us what page
she's referring to.

MS. HODGDON: I said I'm on Appendix B. It's page B-1 of the Reg Guide, Reg Guide 1.183. But the other assumptions with regard to this accident were nowhere near so realistic but, as we said, they're supposed to be -- they don't need to be realistic. But you assume that it was the highest power level assembly that you dropped because that's worst case. And you also assumed that it was the first one moved because otherwise, the decay time So if you use decay time of 72, would be greater. they're not actually using that. They're using 150. So here I'm doing my accident analysis based on 72 hours decay and I dropped the worst -- that is, the

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most reactive assembly in the reactor. So the rest of it is fairly easy to follow because then you go on. You multiply this number of factors.

I started to say that the tech spec will have the decay time that you use in this accident and also the amount of water. You have to have 23 feet in order to have that to take advantage of that number of 200. And then, of course, you assume an instantaneous release of all the gap gases and that, too, is not That's before it filtered out through the probable. That may or may not be -- it's not really. water. You have to assume that everything available to be released that possibly could have been released, that is the gases, is released immediately through the water and so you had to break up and open the whole assembly when you dropped it. So it needed to hit something that broke it open. So this is not realistic. It's a worst case.

I could go on about this, but I won't. I just wanted to make the point that it goes in the direction of realism and it certainly is an improvement over the old way but nobody intended that it be actually realistic. I mean once you drop that assembly, that's when you are realistic. I mean that's a real accident. Assemblies have been dropped

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but they've never had any considerable consequences to date and so this -- anyway, so much for the realism.

Now, what else do I have? I did 1465 and I did -- let me confer for a minute and see if I omitted anything. Ms. Cole is pointing me to Judge Cole's question regarding whether a factual basis would be adequate support for a contention, and this was from citing to some decision. I can't remember Anyway, she's pointing to the exact which one. language of the regulation which says in 2.714B22, "Basis consisting of a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention upon which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing, together with references to those specific sources and documents which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion."

Just as regards this matter, the reference has been made intervenors say they rely on NUREG 1738 and they say that it's non-doable. I got somebody to check this and I got different answers. I think that it's back in the public domain again. I think that Mr. Repka gave an adequate explanation of what that NUREG is. It investigates the consequences or

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possible consequences of a zirc fire which might take place. This is about decommissioning plants and so presumably if you don't have the number of people working in the plant and you went away and left the spent fuel pool unattended and you lost all the water, the zircaloy, trade name, the zircaloy clanning would flash, would get hot enough to burn in some assemblies that were not so old, not so recently off-loaded, and that that fire would propagate to other assemblies and maybe catch the whole thing. This is the worst case also.

But the only point that needs to be made here is that that has absolutely nothing to do with the dropping of assembly which is the only thing that's been done here. Actually, there are three accidents involved here. One is dropping the assembly in the containment, the other one is dropping the assembly in the pool, and the third one is dropping a cast, a spent fuel cast, but since the consequences of that was less and nobody challenged it, I don't think that we need to address it.

I believe that concludes the staff's argument. We rely, of course, on our response, most of which wasn't addressed in the remarks that were made today. We could answer questions.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What about the discussion we were having earlier about the comparison between the doses using the revised source term in both cases, with and without the new proposed technical specifications?

MS. HODGDON: The staff would not be interested in that and does not require it and doesn't go anywhere regarding the regulations because the regulations say that you can go the old way and TID -that's 1.414844. That meant the whole body and thyroid dose or you could go the 5067 rate with the same numbers but the dose computed TEDE. That's all I mean that's the comparison. Staff makes it says. no such comparison with the -- it's just not there. I mean if you meet that dose, that's all that you need to do in dose requirements.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: I don't think that really answers the question. Do you agree that using similar bases, TEDE or the whole body dose and iodine thyroid, but using the same basis for all of your calculations and comparing the new source term and with and without the technical specifications, do you agree that that would then generate the real difference between the operation associated with this proposal before and after?

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1 MS. HODGDON: Well, no. No, we don't 2 regulate to that delta at all. I mean we don't --3 it's not part of that --I didn't say you 4 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: 5 regulate to the delta. Do you agree that that would be an estimate of the real consequences of the 6 7 proposal? 8 No, I would not because I MS. HODGDON: 9 just already said and I spent some time saying that 10 this accident source term is very conservative and it 11 assumes a lot of conditions that are not, in fact, 12 realistic and so I think that the changes, some of the 13 changes that are proposed are changes that are 14 proposed because they were conditions of this accident 15 and some of those changes are not proposed, even 16 though they are initial conditions of the accident. 17 So I don't agree regarding -- the relationship between 18 the changes that are being made and the accident are 19 much more complicated or much more -- they're not as 20 simple as the question that's being asked about it. 21 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: But the ultimate 22 source term is supposed to be our best estimate of the 23 consequences of the proposed accident. 24 MS. HODGDON: No, it isn't. It's not

supposed --

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: It's not?

MS. **HODGDON:** No. It's not a best estimate. This is not a best estimate rule. It's supposed to be an improvement over the old source term in terms of the realism that was brought to bear from studying the accident at Three Mile Island and what the actual consequences were, what happened and what radionuclides were given off in what way and how they behaved and so forth. So it's a scientific look at data that we never had before and so the old source term was based on the most sophisticated guesswork of its time and the new source term is based on some science. But it's not a best estimate.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Isn't the real change that we're looking at here that's being raised by this contention the change between performing the fuel handling, fuel movements, with and without these proposed new technical specifications or deleted modified technical specifications? Isn't that the real change we're looking at?

MS. HODGDON: Well, one of the changes that's proposed is that fuel could be moved -- I used to say with the doors closed, with the hatch doors closed, and maybe it's secured with four bolts. But anyway, now it says the proposal would say closed or

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1 capable of being closed under administrative controls. 2 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Right, and that's the 3 significant change. 4 MS. HODGDON: And that is one of the 5 changes and that is why when this analysis was done it was done as if those doors were wide open and never 6 7 were closed and so you get the 1.2 dose by assuming that the doors are open and that they're never closed. 8 9 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: All right. From what you're saying, it sounds as though you're saying that 10 11 there never really was any need to have those 12 technical specifications there in the first place. 13 MS. HODGDON: That may or may not be true. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: But whether it is or 14 not, there's a proposed change and the comparison that 15 Judge Cole had talked about earlier and Judge Elleman 16 17 and that I asked questions about was the comparison 18 using -- since we're talking about a new source term--19 using the same source term with and without the 20 proposed -- excuse me -- changes in the technical 21 specifications. The proposed source term 22 MS. HODGDON: 23 with the doors closed -- is that right? -- as opposed 24 to the proposed source term with the doors -- the staff has always required that this accident be done 25

without taking credit for containment. So it's never been --

It's too complicated to explain but I would just explain it this way, just to make it short. We have allowed other licensees to move fuel with the doors open under the old source term, but you don't necessarily have to have a new source term. Ιt depends on the design of the plant and various other things and, of course, how long you're going to let it decay because the decay time is important to this and so I just saw one the other day where under the old source term the -- it went to the old source term. other words, wanting to leave the doors open under the old source term but if you don't want to move fuel for a while, you can always make that number because this is a factor of the decay time and so you can always increase that factor long enough. Supposing I said I wasn't going to move fuel for 10 days. Then with the old source term, that would be fine and I could get that accident dose way down.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: You make the same assumptions when you're going to make a comparison.

MS. HODGDON: I'm sorry.

ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: If you're going to assume you're not going to move fuel until it's at

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least so old, you use the same assumption with and without the tech spec changes so that you get a comparison of the effect of the technical specifications change. You state your assumption to be consistent.

MS. HODGDON: I wasn't arguing with you. I'm saying that the staff is just not interested in that because that's not the way the staff does it. It's not what the rule contemplates. The rule says you can use either this old source term or you can use this new source term and what you have to meet by way of dose is numerically the same but they're treated differently, the one being whole body thyroid, the other being TEDE, and that's all it is and that's what the staff does when it does its review and it doesn't ask questions about the difference between the old source term and new source term.

As I just read you, the Reg Guide says yes, you should close the doors, but that's a different matter. That is a mitigation of a real accident. That is defense in depth. Once you drop that assembly, you're talking about safety. Otherwise, it's just a hypothetical accident. It's an accident against which the plant is designed.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Let's assume for a

minute that the change in the source term is allowed. 1 2 MS. HODGDON: Yes. 3 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Now, if we assume 4 that the issue is should these changes in technical 5 specifications be allowed period, you're saying that 6 the comparison between operating without the technical 7 specification changes and with the technical 8 specification changes, that that comparison is not 9 relevant to anything in terms of whether or not to 10 approve the technical specification changes? 11 MS. HODGDON: I think that's pretty much 12 so. I just read you this Reg Guide of what licensees 13 have to do and it says quite clearly that the staff thinks that you can move fuel with the containment 14 15 doors open provided that you'll be able to -- okay. 16 I think we put this in one of our responses but it 17 says the NRC --18 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What are you reading 19 from? 20 MS. HODGDON: I'm reading Accident Source 21 Term, 5067. "The NRC may issue the amendment only if 22 the applicant's analysis demonstrates with reasonable 23 assurance that and then it tells you an individual 24 located at any point on the boundary of the EAB for 25 two hours following onset did not receive a radiation

dose in excess of 25 REM total effective dose 1 equivalent, that is TEDE, except for any individual 2 with the LPZ" --3 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: That's in order to 4 allow the change in the source term. 5 MS. HODGDON: Yes, that is in order to--6 7 yes. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: And my question was 8 let's assume that the source term has changed and that 9 that's been approved and separate issue was a proposed 10 11 change in technical specifications. What do you look at in determining whether to approve the change in 12 13 technical specifications? MS. HODGDON: I can tell you because we've 14 done quite a few of those recently and the answer is 15 you look back at your approval of the alternative 16 17 source term and you see that they met the dose. So once the source ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: 18 term has been changed and approved, then are there any 19 criteria for evaluating whether or not to approve 20 subsequent technical specification changes? 21 MS. HODGDON: Yes. We look at 5036 and 22 see what they can take out of tech specs. Criterion 23 I can't remember the number for that, 24 to the LCOs. 25 but it's 2C2.

So then you look ta

the criteria for changing technical specifications. 2 MS. HODGDON: Okay. And then you look at 3 that and you see that -- let's see where I am. Okay. 4 5 Under LCOs criterion 2, B2. What has to stay in tech Certain limiting conditions for operation. 6 process variable, designed feature 7 B2. operating restriction that is an initial condition of 8 the design basis accident or transcene analysis that 9 either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge 10 to the integrity of the fish and product barrier." 11 So that means that the decay time has got 12 13 to stay in tech specs. So I have to state the decay time, and it also means that my 23 feet of water over 14 the top of the fuel has got to stay because I'm using 15 both of those in my accident. Mr. LaVie is telling me 16 17 that this hatch doesn't have to stay open. MR. LaVIE: It doesn't have to be closed. 18 19 MS. HODGDON: It doesn't have to stay Right. It doesn't have to be closed because 20 closed. it's not needed in order to -- it's not one of those 21 things. We're not taking the doors out of tech specs. 22 The licensee is not proposing to take the doors out of 23 the tech specs. They're just saying that instead of 24 saying the door is closed, it can say the door is 25

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG:

closed but capable of being closed under administrative controls and the Reg Guide says as I know the Reg Guides are not regulations but nevertheless, that is the way the Reg Guide tells licensees to do it and how the staff tells licensees You can do it other ways but it's a lot to do it. more trouble. If you can do it by the Reg Guide, that's an approved way of doing it and the staff has granted certain exceptions to those Reg Guides but here this licensing followed this Reg Guide completely in its application. It just ticks right off the Reg Guide. Its accident is more conservative, as I said, than in fact its operation would be. But that's just extra conservatism and I address that in answering the concern about realism.

I have a note here if I may take a moment to read it.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Ms. Hodgdon, I believe I heard you say that -- well, a day or so before we came up here, we were sent answers to two questions that the NRC had posed and the licensee had responded to, and I believe you said your evaluations are still ongoing so is it correct you have not reached a decision on the merit of the tech spec changes?

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1 MS. HODGDON: The staff has not put its 2 SER together yet. The staff has certain input. I mean 3 there are certain technical review branches that do 4 participate in this. For example, Mr. LaVie does 5 dose. Somebody else might do anything else that might 6 be involved here. So we might have two or three 7 technical branches and so the SER is not put together 8 yet. 9 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Do you have any 10 idea when the NRC will reach its final resolution of 11 this issue and be stating what that resolution is? MS. HODGDON: I believe that the licensee 12 13 asked for this before -- generally we pay some 14 attention to this -- before its next outage which is 15 probably next fall and so I should think that we would 16 get this out this summer. The project manager is 17 going to give me a schedule. So I'm just speculating 18 and now I'm going to get hard facts maybe. 19 the end of July. 20 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: End of July. And 21 prior to you reaching this resolution, the old tech 22 spec requirements would be in effect and applicable at 23 the plant site. 24 MS. HODGDON: They wouldn't have an outage

so it doesn't make a difference.

1	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: So it's irrelevant.
2	MS. HODGDON: It's irrelevant. They need
3	time to change those and to do the drills that they
4	would have to do in order to use these specs and also
5	to write such other refinements to the administrative
6	procedures that they would agree to, so that's why
7	they want it in July, to get them I don't know how
8	much time to implement it. But generally our changes
9	are effective immediately but to be implemented with
10	X number of days. I should think that would probably
11	be 60 or 90. Ninety days. To be implemented within
12	90 days. And so it doesn't have any applicability
13	now. Nothing would be changed except conditions that
14	are applicable when moving fuel in an outage.
15	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I believe I also
16	heard you say that because your review is still
17	continuing that your responses tend to reflect the
18	views of the licensee on the issues. No?
19	MS. HODGDON: No, I didn't say that. No.
20	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I'll listen
21	carefully.
22	MS. HODGDON: I said that this is true
23	always with regard to staff responses and not just
24	this one. The licensee's application is what's at
25	issue here and contentions must be based on the

licensee's application. The staff is interested in seeing that contentions comply with the standards that are set forth by the Commission in 2714. That's all the staff is interested in at this time and so the staff's review did not come into play. That comes into play only with regard to whether or not we issue the amendment. I read you this part from the no significant hazards consideration where it says you don't go to safety there. Safety is what you find when you issue the -- you find reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. That's what you find when you issue the amendment and so they're not there now, at least I'm not, the people that are doing this are. We don't project any view of whether found this particular application we acceptable but we do project a view of what the requirements are.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: The NRC response on page 15 about two-thirds of the way down contains the following sentence. I don't know if you need to hunt for it or not. It's very short. What it says is, to summarize, "The harms alleged by both Mr. Basaid and Ms. Googliamo through their respective affidavits are without bases because the proposed changes, 1) do not impact routine releases or worker occupational

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1 exposure and 2) will not result in any significant 2 increased doses to the public should a fuel handling 3 accident occur." Is that Part 2, is that an NRC conclusion 4 5 that have reached or is that just 6 reflecting what the licensee is --7 MS. HODGDON: That was written in response 8 -- we hadn't found that yet. It's in here some place. 9 That's in response to the petition. You've already 10 ruled on the petition and so I wasn't really prepared 11 to argue it, but I'll be happy to as soon as we find 12 it. 13 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I guess the part I'm focusing on --14 15 MS. HODGDON: This says that they don't 16 have standing. This is a paper that says that they 17 have not shown standing, not that they don't have it. 18 "Do not impact routine releases or worker occupational 19 exposure." They had argued that it did and so we say 20 There's nothing here that has it doesn't. anything to do with routine releases or worker 21 22 occupational exposure and we've said up front why 23 "2) will not result in a significant that's so. 24 increase" -- that should say doses -- "to the public

should a fuel handling accident occur."

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: That's the one I'm 1 focused on. 2 3 MS. HODGDON: Well, significant is defined there in terms. I could read you the rest of this no 4 consideration. It's not 5 significant hazards 6 significant if it meets the regulatory requirements. 7 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: If you stay below 8 the reg limits. So that's the basis you would use in 9 making that statement. It's below what is the reg 10 limit. MS. HODGDON: That's not just what I would 11 12 do or what the staff would do. It's what this 13 document that I cited you to would -- or that's with regard to no significant hazards consideration. 14 15 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I heard Mr. Repka say, I believe, in the discussion we had earlier that 16 17 the alternative source term plus the reg limits have 18 built into them the concept of ALARA and as long as 19 the licensee meets the criteria represented therein, 20 that they can modify pretty much whatever operating 21 procedures they wish to modify or make whatever changes they wish to make so long as they're below 22 23 that limit. I think in what I've heard you say, you're saying the NRC concurs with this, 24

accidents are not reviewed in the light of ALARA

1	criteria and that, therefore, a licensee doesn't have
2	to do reasonable things that they might otherwise do
3	to lower the potential consequential dose to a member
4	of the general public.
5	MS. HODGDON: I think I spoke about that
6	at some length.
7	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I'm just trying to
8	see if I am fairly representing what I heard you say.
9	MS. HODGDON: No, you're not. Mr. Repka
10	did say that at one point, but he withdrew that when
11	he saw the error of his ways.
12	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Oh, he did?
13	MS. HODGDON: Yes.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: You saw the error
15	of your ways, Mr. Repka?
16	MR. REPKA: That's correct. I agree with
17	that. I did see the error of my ways.
18	MS. HODGDON: He no longer maintains that
19	accident doses must be ALARA. Accident doses can not
20	possibly be ALARA. ALARA isn't in part 58. It's a
21	part 20 concept. It's occupational doses and
22	individual doses to the public. Under part 20, that
23	must be ALARA, not accident doses. But you attributed
24	to the staff something else that the staff doesn't
25	believe and I can't remember what it was. But no, we

do not believe that and we do not believe that you can recklessly what? You can pursue a course of -- a reckless course here. What?

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Moving closer to the envelope?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, right. We don't believe that. I mean this does have to be reasonable, even though it's not ALARA. It has to meet the regulation and the regulation in part 50 proceed from some place else. They're really about designing, operating a plant. Part 50 is about plant and it does not directly protect the public. It protects it indirectly through the design of the plant and these are design basis accidents. These are accidents that the licensee -- not the licensee -- the applicant for a license came in with in their preliminary SAR and we approved them in our SER on the construction and subsequently the operation of the plant and so now a lot of time has gone by and we have improved means of assessing the dose effects of accidents and so they can use that if they want to and the Commission did consider getting rid of the old source term entirely but they decided a lot of people wouldn't want to do They'd think it was too much trouble and so they said you can choose between these two things.

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ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Sure.

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MS. HODGDON: And so that's what happened.

admin. Judge Elleman: I don't want to get into the alternative source term discussion. I think we've gone over it ad nauseam. I think now what I've heard in your answer is that you would expect a licensee to do reasonable things that they might consider to mitigate the effect of a serious accident in your review of a tech spec change.

I did read that footnote MS. HODGDON: from the Reg Guide that said if you're moving fuel in a containment with the hatch door open and, in fact, drop an assembly, then you've got to close those doors within half an hour. I mean that's a footnote that says the staff thinks you ought to do this because the staff does think you ought to do this and the staff-it would not seem to be a hard requirement because this licensee had shown if its calculations are correct and no one challenges them. I mean the staff will look at them but the petitioners don't challenge If their calculations are correct, they've them. shown that they meet a dose of a very small fraction of the dose limit, even if their doors remain open and they don't get them closed.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: WE're not arguing

As you can probably tell from our questions, 1 that. 2 we're trying to get a handle on how much the 3 calculated dose to the general public is being increased by the proposed actions. It's been a little 4 difficult to negotiate our way through that kind of 5 discussion here today. 6 7 You could look at the MS. HODGDON: accident analysis to determine that. 8 9 ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Ah, and we have those and we looked at them but we're faced with this 10 difficulty that one uses the old basis for separating 11 12 internal dose from external dose calculations and the new approach uses the total affected dose equivalent 13 approach and so you're comparing unlike things and 14 trying to make that determination. 15 Supposing I told you that MS. HODGDON: 16 the Commission left those numbers the same, the top 17 100 numbers, and the 50, 60, 70 numbers, they're 18 exactly the same. It's 25 REM. But yet they put 19 whole body thyroid on the one and they put TEDE on the 20 other one and so they're seeming to say that they 21 don't find that distinction anything that anybody 22 23 ought to pursue. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: But the distinction, 24 I think, that we're trying to get, and I think we're 25

going to get there from Mr. Repka, but the question that I'm asking now is once we get the comparison, using only the new source term with and without the proposed changes to the technical specifications, then you'll have a real comparison and then the question becomes what is the significance of the difference and I think what we're asking you to address is is there any significance? If so, what? Or are you saying that there is no significance to any difference between those two figures?

MS. HODGDON: There's no significance to

MS. HODGDON: There's no significance to the staff in its evaluation of such amendment requests as this one.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: One thing that's confusing me is if you're saying that reasonable measures should be taken, you're sort of already assuming that the difference is going to be so small that there's no difference in the measures that would be taken in one situation as opposed to another. Does that make sense?

MS. HODGDON: I believe I said before that this would be mitigation and this would be -- yes, I have the Reg Guide. This would be mitigation or defense in depth and, as I said before, this would be mitigating a real accident. One you drop that

1	assembly, it's a real accident and we've got to try to
2	mitigate it and so you want to close the doors.
3	MR. LaVIE: This is the answer we're
4	trying to get at.
5	MS. HODGDON: What are we in? The Reg
6	Guide?
7	MR. LaVIE: This is the Reg Guide.
8	MS. HODGDON: This is from the Reg Guide
9	but I've been reading from before the Appendix B and
10	now I'm on page four of the tech development guide.
11	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: It is 4 of the text?
12	MS. HODGDON: Yes. It's under regulatory
13	position. I think Mr. LaVie wrote this Reg Guide.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: You're talking about
15	183. Right?
16	MS. HODGDON: Yes. He wrote this Reg
17	Guide so he's very familiar with it and pointed me to
18	this. It's 11834, regulatory position C under defense
19	in depth where it says "The proposed uses of an AST
20	and the associated proposed facility modifications and
21	changes to procedures should be evaluated to determine
22	whether the proposed changes are consistent with the
23	principle that adequate defense in depth is maintained
24	to compensate for uncertainties and accident

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progression in analysis data.

1	Consistency with the terms in depth
2	philosophy is maintained if system redundancy,
3	independence and diversity are preserved commensurate
4	with the expected frequency, consequences of
5	challenges to the system and uncertainties. In all
6	cases, compliance with the general design criteria in
7	Appendix A, 10 CFR, part 50, is essential.
8	Modifications proposed for the facility generally
9	should not create a need for compensatory programmatic
10	activities such as reliance on manual operator
11	accidents."
12	So anyway, do you want me to read the rest
13	of that?
14	MR. LaVIE: That's it. That's the
15	reasonable actions.
16	MS. HODGDON: This is the reasonable
L7	actions to be taken and that's why we have the
LB	footnote down there in the Reg Guide that says that if
ا وا	you do in fact drop an assembly, you should close the
20	doors within half an hour.
21	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Where is that?
22	MS. HODGDON: The footnote is on B I
23	lost my place. It's B3. B3. It's footnote B, B3.
24	I'm just going to say that we do look at the general
25	design criteria to see that they're not compromised

because the plant is designed to those general design criteria. Of course, they are general and they are designed and they are designed and so they're kind of vague. They're quite general. But we do look at designs that would seem to be -- I think this one would be 61. And so we could look at 61 and see whether or not it's compromised. That's Appendix A, criterion 61. We see here fuel storage and handling and radioactivity control, criterion 61.

"The fuel storage and handling radioactive waste and other systems which may contain radioactivity shall be designed to assure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. These systems shall be designed, 1) with a capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components important to safety, 2) with suitable shielding for radiation protection, 3) with appropriate containment confinement and filtering systems, 4) with a residual heat removal capability having reliability and testability that reflects the importance to safety" --

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. I don't know how long you're going. Can you just tel me where you're reading from?

MS. HODGDON: I did tell you. I said I

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1	was reading criterion 61.
2	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Right. And I'm not
3	finding criterion 61.
4	MS. HODGDON: It just comes after 60. You
5	just keep going.
6	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: What page is it on?
7	MS. HODGDON: It's Appendix A to part 50.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I thought you were
9	talking about Appendix A to this.
10	MS. HODGDON: No. A, A, A. I'm sorry.
11	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: We'll find it.
12	MS. HODGDON: I'm sorry. I'm not going to
13	read it again. People can read it for themselves.
14	But maybe I should read the last sentence which is
15	need to have in the plant and so you always come to a
16	question how you use them when you get to license
17	amendments and here you look at this and you say, the
18	licensee doesn't need these things in order to meet
19	the dose limit in 5067.
20	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: There's one more
21	paragraph in the defense in depth section of the
22	regulation you referred to.
23	MS. HODGDON: I didn't read that because
24	Mr. LaVie told me I read enough, but I would be happy
25	to look at it.

	ADMIN. JODGE TOONG: My quescion is it
2	talks about proposed modifications that "seek to
3	downgrade or remove required engineered safeguards.
4	Equipment should be evaluated to be sure that the
5	modification does not invalidate assumptions made in
6	facility PRAs and does not adversely impact the
7	facility's severe accident management program." I
8	don't know technically whether this would fall within
9	that but these are quite general. These are things
10	that you need to have in the plant so you always come
11	to a question
12	MS. HODGDON: No, we're talking about
13	accidents and adverse impact.
14	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. You were the
15	one who pointed us to that section. That's why I'm
16	asking about it.
17	MS. HODGDON: Yes. I didn't read that
18	because I didn't think it was relevant because it
19	talked about the severe accident management program.
20	This is not a severe accident. So they could do that.
21	They're not removing the required engineered
22	safeguards equipment anyway. They're merely changing
23	the use of it. It's not that they're taking out the
24	doors. They're just operating or moving fuel within

closed or capable of being closed. So there's no

removal involved here.

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I would like to say one thing. I think I did say that I thought this document was available. I'm sure that some of you have it. The Technical of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk Study of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants. I'm told by some of my colleagues that it was on the external web It was back on there. But I didn't have time site. to look for it and I didn't find it. So if anybody would like to see it, I have a copy. In fact, I have a copy -- although you probably do, too -- but these hard to obtain documents. I think I have them all here somewhere.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Does that complete your argument?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, I believe so.

ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I'm left with an overall impression, and it's always risky to summarize overall impressions, but I want to give you a chance to correct me if I'm in error. The impression I have is that when a technical specification change is requested, you will look to see if there are compromises to the defense in depth that the licensee has put in place, but your interest stops so long as the doses to the general public are below the Reg

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Guide limits. Once they meet that criterion, you have no further interest in making a further reduction in exposure to the populace. Now, that's the impression I have. I'm wrong? Well, in that case, I apologize. MS. HODGDON: It's wrong in a way because the example that we are working with here was one where they met a small fraction of the dose to the public but with the doors left open, they just walk away and leave them open, but nevertheless, they have a commitment or it's in their tech specs, they have a procedure whereby they close those doors within half an hour. I heard somebody something about increasing the dose. Well, obviously that would reduce the dose but what we're talking about is a real accident. mean they dropped the assembly and --ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I understand. MS. HODGDON: And so we're trying to mitigate it and we have to bring some depth here and 18 so they already made the dose. It's not to make the dose that they're doing that. They're doing that in order to save dose further, even though there's, of course, no ALARA requirement here. ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: You say it's a

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small fraction but if you look at the tabular data,

you're getting up in the range of 20 percent of

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1	allowed doses for the evaluated accidents.
2	MS. HODGDON: I thought a small fraction
3	was less than a half.
4	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Anything less than
5	half is what you would consider as small fraction.
6	MS. HODGDON: A small fraction. I went to
7	school in the south also.
8	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: I didn't. I don't
9	know what a small fraction is.
10	MS. HODGDON: A large fraction is greater
11	than one half.
12	ADMIN. JUDGE ELLEMAN: Greater than one
13	half. Thank you.
14	MR. REPKA: Judge, since some
15	representations were made in Ms. Hodgdon's
16	presentation about what my position is, could I have
17	just one minute to respond to state what I think our
18	position is?
19	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead, and then
20	we'll end up with you.
21	MR. REPKA: First, there should be no lack
22	of clarity. The ALARA concept does not apply to
23	design basis accident analysis. So that's #1. To the
24	extent I implied that earlier, that would not be
25	correct.

#2, and responding to something Judge Elleman said, my point was that the regulatory limit has already built into it the concept of adequate protection and that's the point I would emphasize. So the relevant comparison of any proposal is ultimately one of does it meet the regulatory limit or not? And beyond that, there's nothing in the alternative source term rule or anything that's applicable that would drive further improvements, further reductions.

earlier, and we'll do that. I don't think that comparison is necessary in order to establish that there's no basis for contention, but this is what I would propose to provide. First, essentially four data points. The new source term plus the old technical specifications and the consequences. Second would be the new source term and the new technical specifications. But second is really the analysis of record that's included in the application. I'm sorry. Second would be the new source term with the assumptions of the licensing analysis. That's what's in the application.

The third would be the new source term plus the new technical specifications. There is a difference between #2 and #3 because the accident

analysis of record doesn't assume closing the penetrations. It assumes an entire release over two hours. So in the third data point, if we assume the new tech specs, that would involve closing the doors at 30 minutes. So that would be a different number and that would represent a reduction relative to the licensing analysis that's in the application.

And then the fourth data point would be the regulatory limit, and I think again, the bottom line is the only thing that's really relevant is the comparison of the licensing analysis of record versus the regulatory limit. But for the information for the Board, we would provide those other data points. I just wanted to make that clear.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I had thought we might break for lunch but I don't mind just continuing. Since you said you would only take about 15 or 20 minutes, we'll go ahead and finish.

MS. BURTON: My terms of 15 minutes and other people's terms of 15 minutes -- I think we need to go back to look at the text of 10 CFR 50.67 because it may be that the scope of what is being considered here is too limited and that an analysis of the design basis accidents must be provided in the course of this application but it's not necessarily everything that

must be provided. And the NRC, I think the door is open to a further requirement to satisfy the NRC that this would be an appropriate license amendment to approve.

My basis for saying that is Section 50.67B2 under requirements previously quoted here. "The NRC may issue the amendment only if applicant's analysis demonstrates with reasonable assurance that" and then it goes on to discuss the doses. But given that the NRC has discretion to allow it or not I think opens the door to our reasonable understanding that there are issues that the NRC can and, in a case like this, I think should consider, and that would have to do with some of the uncertainties that have been brought to our attention -- for instance, in this discussion of defense in depth which Guide 1.183 at Section 1.1.2 -appears in Req because talks about compensating for that uncertainties in accident progression and analysis data, and we probably should all agree that there are uncertainties that are inextricably entangled with considerations of accidents that could occur from fuel handling incidents at Millstone Unit 2.

If the NRC is required to consider safety margins of 1.1.1 and defense in depth 1.1.2, then I

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think that the NRC needs to consider consequences from accidents that even go beyond a design basis in order to properly assess whether this amendment should be granted, and I think that is a reasonable interpretation of the language of these rules.

Further on that point, I would say that therefore there is a necessity and a burden on the part of the applicant for this request to establish other parameters of effect and dose on the public from accidents in the spent fuel pool. I have heard here and I have read that the ultimate source term rules derive from information that was assessed following the three Mile Island accident in 1979, but that accident, in my understanding, did not involve the fuel handling accident in containment or in the canal or in the spent fuel pool. It was something utterly different, and I haven't in any of these materials read of any accident in fuel handling that led to further research and insight into the behavior of the radioactive effluent in the event of one of those activities.

So I think that puts a little bit more question into these proceedings as far as the obligation of the licensee to establish compliance with the letter and spirit of Section 50.67. I don't

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think that they have satisfied it with their materials. I'm afraid I'm probably in the middle of and about to continue with a disjointed follow-up presentation, but I would like to quickly go through my notes and address some of these points that have been made by the others. They're not in any particular order. It's just as they occurred here in these proceedings.

The relief that will be available should we be successful in this petition should be self-evident. The relief would require the continuing maintenance of the technical specifications that are proposed to be deleted and that could occur whether or not the ultimate source rule were applied or not. As Judge Young pointed out, this application could be divided into its several parts. One of them is an application for approval of the ultimate source term. The other part of it has to do with the various technical specification deletion requests. We think it would be very important to obtain such relief in order to maintain the status quo.

Here I'll branch off for a moment into the ALARA discussion. I'm not absolutely well prepared to discuss whether or not ALARA would apply to an accident. I'm not sure about that. I would think

applies whereby even in accidents it wants to be sure that the public isn't hurt any worse than it needs to be. In fact, Attorney Hodgdon has been several times here saying that of course in the real world we're dealing with a real accident, of course you want to shut the door, of course you have to, that's what you have to do, and that is because it would be absolutely unreasonable not to try to shut the door in those circumstances.

So in some sense, I think that there has to be some understanding that the NRC could not be opposed to an application of applying a spirit of reasonableness in terms of reducing or mitigating the impact of radioactive releases during an accident. And I would even go so far as to say that there may be good cause to argue that ALARA does apply to these proceedings. I'm just not very well-equipped sitting here now to go any further on that point.

On the point of the administrative controls and the question as to whether as to whether or not they are yet written, we did assert that they are not yet written, they are not yet reviewed, and Mr. Repka I think disagreed with us to some extent on that, but I think that the issue is very pertinent

1	because the application does state that I believe
2	it's Appendix B, page 8, Attachment 2 of the
3	application. It discusses this business of the
4	significant radiological hazard to personnel and
5	whether the
6	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Let me find the page.
7	Where did you say? Page 8?
8	MS. BURTON: Attachment 2, page 8. And
9	the number at the top is B18763.
10	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Go ahead.
11	MS. BURTON: What I was reading from was
12	the statement, "However, if it is determined that
13	closure of all containment penetrations would
14	represent"
15	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry.
16	MS. BURTON: At the very top, second
17	sentence.
18	ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Thank you.
19	MS. BURTON: "However, if it is determined
20	that closure of all containment penetrations would
21	represent a significant radiological hazard to the
22	personnel involved, the decision may be made to forego
23	the closure of the affected penetrations.
24	Additionally, the equipment door can be closed without
25	electrical power or compressed air " Then it does on

to say, "D&C will establish these administrative controls." And then it goes on from there.

But apparently in the staff's review of this application, it did not consider that the administrative controls had been adequately established or, in fact, had even been submitted. We can conclude that because the staff issued the request for additional information and, in response to that, it was a very specific request for specificity as to the proposed administrative control and it was not answered.

But the licensee presented because something in response to it, I think runs counter or at least I think to some extent contradicts Mr. compilation Repka's statements that of an administrative control is not subject to NRC review and approval. I think that we disagree about that and it would seem that the NRC staff disagrees about that and that this issue is very pertinent to these proceedings because it would seem that the licensee has failed to provide adequate information in its application such that it can be properly reviewed, both by the staff and by the petitioner here. Without specificity as to what the licensee would do in terms of its administrative controls, we are really at a

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loss to be able to understand it and also to look at it from a critical standpoint. And this seems even more important than it did to me at the outset of these proceedings, given the repeated remarks of Attorney Hodgdon that of course it would be necessary in true life if there were an accident for somebody to get over there and shut that door.

On the issue of unexpected conditions. Mr. Repka would put the burden on the petitioner to specify unexpected conditions and that it is somehow the petitioner's responsibility to do that. I think he has it wrong in terms of the requirements of Reg Guide 1.183. I think this is information that should have been submitted as part of the application to satisfy the concern on the part of the NRC that uncertainties be adequately considered so that public health and safety will not be compromised.

There was a remark about the recent event at Millstone Unit 2 and that this was not relevant to these proceedings. I have reference to event #39644. As a matter of fact, the NRC issued a press release on March 12, 2003. The headline was "NRC special inspection team to review Millstone Unit 2 shutdown equipment problems." This was an unusual happenstance for the Commission to send a special inspection team

would assert that those problems are not necessarily unrelated to the issues that we present here. Of course, one of the factors that the NRC must consider in an application request is everything it already knows about the facility and the problems that it has already undergone. But I won't say anything further about that.

On the NUREG 1738, I'm not sure that it is publicly available now. I did check the web site yesterday and it was not there.

statement made about the was unlikelihood, I think, of fuel rods being removed from the water. I think Attorney Hodgdon made that She must not be aware of events that I don't have the exact date. It was in the occurred. 1970s at Millstone Unit 1 when apparently a fuel bundle was lifted out of the water, not once but there were consequences that twice. and considered to be related to this that involved the setting off of alarms as far away as at the electric boat facility located on the Thames River in New London which must be several miles away. So these things do happen, these things did happen, and these things may happen again and that is what helps to form

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the basis for particular concern on this particular application.

I think it's very important to understand the difference in dose between implementation of the present tech specs and waiver of those tech specs. Those questions have all been very thoughtfully addressed here by all the panel members. We believe, contrary to the licensee and the staff, that that information must be considered in order for there to be a proper understanding of what this license amendment actually will permit and, without that information, we're kind of in the dark.

I took down a statement from Mr. Repka, I hope I took it down accurately, that the licensee could not meet regulatory guidelines in terms of dose under the old source rule without relying on the technical specifications. Maybe I got that wrong, but if I got it right, then that just further supports the need for full analysis of the changes to be presented to the Board and we would request, of course, the opportunity to review whatever is submitted and I would hope that we would be able to have some expert assistance working with us to analyze that information so that we could share it with the Board.

I think I understood that the licensee has

not evaluated or has not shared with us the fruits of its evaluation of a comparison between the revised source term under the current technical specifications as opposed to the revised source term under new proposed technical specifications and we disagree that that is not relevant to these proceedings for the reasons that I've been discussing.

The comments by the staff attorney that were somewhat colloquial in terms of what the staff has or has not done in the past to approve the kinds of things that this licensee is applying for. It's very difficult to address those remarks here without any information, any identification of what those circumstances were. They could have been similar, they could have been very different, and we would hope that the Board wouldn't give any consideration at all to those remarks without the staff coming forward and helping us out a little bit with some specificity.

Attorney Hodgdon distinguished accidents from fuel movement in terms of the applicability of ALARA but, in fact, fuel movement is a licensed activity. So we would suggest, in her support of the applicability of ALARA, that ALARA would apply to fuel movement, even in the event of an accident, if there are no plans to automatically shut the doors or have

somebody standing there available to do that during ordinary routine operations, then that would not seem

to be consistent. I didn't say that very well.

ALARA does not apply to fuel movement accidents because to say that means that the facility does not need to have, for instance, the doors operable and I'm not sure I agree with the staff attorney that the second part of the defense in depth provision does not apply because there's no proposal here to remove required engineered safeguards. She said the door will still be there but, if the door is there and nobody is going to have to shut it, isn't that tantamount to removing the door? I think it is, and that is what is so wrong about this application and why defense in depth is being sacrificed.

Another comment was made by the staff attorney that fuel assemblies have been dropped but never to any great significance. I would ask that that comment be rejected without further submission of substantiation. The same with the comment that the staff has always not taken credit for doors not shutting, not being shut. No specifics were given to support that.

The rule that was cited and I'm referring

here to Reg Guide 1.183 under Appendix B, Section 5.2 and 5.3. The rule seems to be that if the containment is open during fuel handling operations, where it says E.G. personnel airlock or equipment hatch is open, this Reg Guide assumes the availability of the means to shut it and I believe that's contrary to how this provision was being read by the staff.

I think I've covered most of those things that I had intended to and I'd be happy to entertain any questions.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: I don't have any questions. Unless there's anything else, I think we're kind of close to concluding for today. Does anyone else have anything that you'd like to say and then I guess we need to address that Dominion's going to provide -- I was thinking, Ms. Hodgdon, you also said that there was something -- I can't recall though.

MS. HODGDON: I didn't make the statement regarding fuel rods removed from the water. I can't imagine that I said that anybody would have heard that fuel rods were removed from the water and I didn't even understand the reference that Ms. Burton used there. But I did omit to do one thing and that was unexpected conditions where Ms. Burton said that Mr.

2 to say what those were. 3 Insofar as the petitioner trying to raise the contention that depends on this unexpected 4 condition that is the initiator of an accident, she's 5 6 required by case law to specify the initiator and the 7 the accident. Otherwise, it's of progress 8 inadmissible. Judge Cole may recall that. 9 Vermont Yankee famous fuel cases. So I think that's 10 ALAB 869 or 919. I'm not sure. I don't have it on But anyway, it's easily found. 11 me. Famous appeal 12 board decision about what's required for contentions 13 about accidents. That's my statement. you 14 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Did 15 something that you wanted to provide us afterwards? I was thinking that you did. 16 17 MS. HODGDON: No. I volunteered to let 18 you have any of my documents that you might not have, 19 but I didn't want to provide anything specifically. 20 I do have a number of documents. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Is it 1738 --21 MS. HODGDON: That was 1738 and I do have 22 23 other documents that may be hard to obtain, but I don't think that any of the rest of them are even 24 25 mentioned. The rest of them are pretty easy.

Repka had said that the burden was on the petitioner

If we don't have it 1 ADMIN. JUDGE COLE: 2 and we think we need it, we'll call you or get it some 3 other way. Judge Hubbard gave me this 4 MS. HODGDON: 5 when he retired. I think I have another one somewhere 6 that I'll give you if I can find it. 7 MS. BURTON: May I just briefly respond to that comment? 8 9 ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: Just briefly. 10 MS. BURTON: Thank you. I had brought up the issue of the unexpected conditions, aware of the 11 12 case law and the burden of a petitioner, but this is 13 not on that point. I believe that Section 50.67 does 14 open the door to the NRC requiring an analysis of so-15 called unexpected conditions and uncertainties in 16 order to support its analysis before the NRC can even 17 really properly consider the application and I'm suggesting also that that would include unexpected 18 19 conditions that are other than design basis accidents. 20 And so on that point, I will stand by my 21 earlier that I believe the burden is on the applicant in its application to provide a full scope of analysis 22 23 as to unexpected conditions as well as design basis 24 accidents.

ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: All right. When do

1 you think you can get us the comparisons? 2 I was going to ask for two MR. REPKA: 3 weeks. Two weeks from tomorrow. If I did two weeks 4 from tomorrow, that would be Friday, the 20th. We can 5 do that. 6 Let me make one statement the record about 7 what we will provide, however. I think it's very 8 clear under the regulations and the case law that the 9 burden at this point to provide a basis for a 10 contention is on the petitioner. We're very happy to provide this information to the Board for its 11 information and background. However, we would object 12 13 to the concept of anything that we would provide would be used as a basis for a contention because I think 14 that clearly would be putting the burden in the wrong 15 16 place. So I just want to make that point. So we'll 17 provide the information that I described earlier by 18 the 20th of June. ADMIN. JUDGE YOUNG: All right. That will 19 20 conclude this proceeding today and look forward to 21 hearing from you and you will hear from us at some 22 point thereafter. (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded at 23

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1:55 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Dominion Nuclear

Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone power Station Unit

No. 2

Docket Number:

50-336-OLA-2

Location:

Mystic, Connecticut

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Marty Farley

Official Reporter

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