

From: Robert Haag, EDO
To: Joelle Starefos; Russ Bywater
Date: 8/12/02 12:14PM
Subject: more interview forms

O/S
EX-6

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Act, exemptions 6 AND OUTSIDE SCOPE
FOIA- 2003-0018

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1. Recollections from Fall 2001 timeframe regarding DB outage deferral and videotapes:

██████████ recalled the Nov 2001 meeting, chaired by Brian Sheron, where a vote was taken regarding whether the staff had "serious reservations" with DB continuing to operate beyond Dec 31, 2001. ██████████ confirmed that he did have serious reservations and was actually in favor of the plant coming down much sooner to address potential VHP cracking. His rationale was that all other B&W units had experienced cracking, DB would be the last one to inspect and they had the hottest head temperature among B&W units - hence cracking was very likely. ██████████ confirmed that ██████████ and ██████████ also had reservations. He also recalled a follow-up phone call from Sam Collins, who wanted to make sure he understood the concerns accurately.

EWL

Similar to ██████████ and ██████████ recalled seeing videotapes of DB head cleaning operations and tapes showing a "clean" head during this timeframe (Fall 2001). His recollections were very similar to and supported those of ██████████ although his recollections were not as detailed.

2. For the ROP ██████████ noted (as others have), that the cladding is not structural and the evaluation should consider that all of the safety margins had been eroded. ██████████ was also aware of international activities, particularly wrt the French program. He was part of a delegation that discussed CRDM cracking w/the French in 1995 and recalled that there was an "intent" to issue a GL on the issue as early as that timeframe. As to why we didn't focus more on the issue he cited that the pilot experience in the U.S. (Oconee, Point Beach and Cook), had not flagged up evidence of significant cracking and it was not considered highly safety significant. ██████████ considered that the "culture" at NRC is also at fault in that we are not questioning and following-through. For the future, he cited a specific concern with possibilities for circ. cracking in piping, particularly with regard to the pressurizer/surge line nozzle connection - hottest point, cast SS and welds, very difficult to inspect.

EWL

**NRC DAVIS-BESSE LLTF
RECORD OF INTERVIEW FORM (RIF)**

NRC PREDECISIONAL

DATE: 7/15/02
RIF NO. INTERNAL RIF NO. 3040
TEAM MEMBER: Ed Hackett
INTERVIEWEE - INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL NAME/TITLE/ORGANIZATION: Jack Strosnider, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research - formerly Division Director of NRR/DE during timeframe for Bulletins 2001-01 and 2002-02
Indicate section of Report Outline (In evaluation plan) in right margin.
Narrative should properly characterize licensee's or NRC's staff prior knowledge of issue. Refer to Interview Checklist.

1. 1993 OG Evaluations Submitted to NRC via NUMARC

Jack recalled that general BA corrosion (wastage) of CS was addressed in submittals and in the subsequent SE (we have confirmed this). However, his recollection were that: high temps would provide a dry environment on top of the head and that corrosion would not take place or be very slow to progress, even if there was attack, it would take a long time to progress to a significant stage and that visual observation of leakage would be evident long before significant degradation of margins. This is the story that is recounted in the 1993 B&WOG submittal and accepted by the staff in the SE (11/19/93). Jack also recalled that he didn't like the initial version of the staff SE and wanted additional evaluation added regarding the need for separate assessment of circ. cracking and the need to inspect and verify findings.

2. Recollections from Fall/2001 Regarding Davis-Besse

Jack remembered that FENOC was attempting to do a PRA on DB wrt the potential for and progression of cracking. He recalled that they were attempting to build on a relatively simplistic model from Dr. Bill Shack at ANL. However, due to lack of appropriate staff review of Dr. Shack's analysis, Jack did not approve initial release of the details at that time (September/October, 2001). He recalled that were meeting w/NRR/EMCB to attempt to obtain "credit" for inspections, but that EMCB did not find their evidence (photos, videotape) to be persuasive. This is consistent with recollections from ██████████ in this subject. Jack also mentioned that Guy Campbell of FENOC was particularly aggressive in trying to convince himself and NRR/DE staff of the "credit" they should get for previous inspections of the head. His recollections regarding the outage deferral decision are consistent with those from Brian Sheron. EX 6

3. Risk-Informing (in general)

Jack used the DB experience to focus on the importance of qualitative aspects of risk assessment in addition to quantitative analysis. He stated that this is how uncertainties that do lend themselves to quantification (e.g., aging degradation of passive components) get captured. Therefore any quantitative assessment of an issue that is "on the line" should not on it's own, be the basis for determination of regulatory action.

4. International Activities