

From: Robert Haag , EDO
To: Joelle Starefos; Russ Bywater
Date: 8/12/02 12:17PM
Subject: more interview forms

O/S
EY. 6

information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b AND
FOIA- OUTSIDE SCOPE 2003-0018

2/11

NRC Exp: Joined NRC in 1987. Has been in risk assessment for most of the time.

History: Last fall, [redacted] worked with [redacted] on assessing nozzle cracking. They didn't know enough to be developing a credible risk model: the number they were working on was being developed for the average plant. Licensees were focusing on CRDM ejection, and they did not consider wastage. [redacted] focused on reviewing the adequacy of licensee risk assessment justifying conclusions.

During the meetings on DB in late 2001 [redacted] was one of [redacted] who were in favor of issuing an order to DB. [redacted] and Barrett ended up supporting no order. There was an initial characterization that the decision was risk-informed. [redacted] flatly stated that the decision was not risk informed. [redacted] stated that the NRC often does this, i.e., make decisions and label them as risk informed, even though they are not.) Licensee risk assessment of 11/1/01 said that the center nozzles were not susceptible to cracking; then, on 11/12/01, Oconee reported the nozzle #2 circumferential crack; DB nozzles same heat as Oconee's. NRC management didn't follow the risk-informed process per RG 1.174.

Response/assessment of DB event: [redacted] stated that the information of BA coming out of the weep holes and the changing of filters in containment did not make it to NRC headquarters until after the hole was discovered in the RV head.

Risk Informed Regulation: Use of risk assessment to reduce regulatory requirements has been oversold. In some cases, we've backed off of requirements without adequate NRC review. Also, we have had trouble getting industry to give us good, unbiased data.

In PRAs, a rate of pressure boundary failure is generally cranked into assumptions for initiating event frequencies. Wastage from outside wasn't considered in developing PRAs.

ROP: SDP needs to be refined. Some folks in NRC are using SDP results to "write off" issues. [redacted] commented that he has heard from his branch chief that upper management in the agency is nervous about the DB risk assessment because of the implications for the November 2001 decision to let DB operate past 12/31/01 (this is especially true with respect to the fact that the sophistication of analyses has improved such that we can better understand the range of uncertainties for plant specific results, and we have developed some better information on DB in recent months).

[redacted] gave Castleman a sheet describing his views on this matter in greater detail at the close of the interview. Castleman passed this sheet on to Hackett.

EX 6

EX 6