

# Final Submittal

(Blue Paper)

1. Final ~~RO~~/SRO Written Examination References

**WATTS BAR EXAM 2003-301  
50-390/2003-301**

**MAY 15, 2003**

Date \_\_\_\_\_


INITIALS

## APPENDIX AD


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## VACUUM vs. RCS TEMPERATURE / RHR FLOWRATE

Allowable Vacuum vs RHR Flow and RCS Temperature  
Allowable Region Is Below And To The Left Of The Applicable RHR Flow Curve



APPENDIX AE  
Page 1 of 1  
EVACUATION TIME



**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT**

**EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING  
PROCEDURES**

**EPIP-1**

**EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART**

Revision 21

Unit 0

**NON-QUALITY RELATED**

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SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emergency Planning

APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 03/03/2003

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

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## REVISION LOG

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Description of Revision	
0	04/13/90	New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1.	
1	02/04/91	Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.	
2	11/28/91	Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.	
3	03/04/92	Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.	
4	02/10/93	Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.	
5	09/15/93	Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.	
6	01/01/94	Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.	
7	05/27/94	Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.	
8	01/10/95	FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.	
9	4/28/98	Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following: System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.	
Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
CN-1	09/28/95	10, 14, 26	The following non-intent enhancements were made: (CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA), to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.
CN-2	11/10/95	3, 6, 34	The following non-intent enhancements were made: Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.

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### REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
CN-3	05/24/96	8, 11, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34	The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPI-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.
10	3/15/99	All	The following non-intent enhancement were made: Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.
11	4/15/99	2, 34	Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.
11A	7/1/99	3,26	Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.
12	9/30/99	All	Non intent change. Minor editorial/format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.
13	12/08/99	All	Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.
14	04/10/00	All (Pg.4 & 45)	Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.
15	08/17/00	All (Pg. 4, 11A & B)	Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

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### REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision Number	Implementation Date	Pages Affected	Description of Revision
16	3/30/01	All (Pg. 11 & 14)	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology. Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.
17	09/25//01	All Page 6, 11B	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change. Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.
18	02/15/02	All 2, 11B, 44	Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP: Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing $\beta$ - $\gamma$ to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.
19	06/05/02	All 4, 7 & 30	Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat. Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL. This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis. Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.
20	07/09/02	ALL, pg. 2, 10, 13, 15, 20, 24, 30, 32, 39, 43	Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAL 1(a) revised to correspond to levels in AOI-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.
21	03/03/2003	2, 15	Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. Non-intent change: Deleted reference to table which was deleted from AOI-28, Ref. WBPOR 03-004004-000.

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## 1.0 PURPOSE<sup>4</sup>

This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

## 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY<sup>2,4</sup>

The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

## 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS<sup>4, ~</sup>

3.1 The criteria in WBN EP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

### 3.3 Classification Determination

3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.



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### 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

- 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.
- 3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred **SHALL** be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.
- 3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition **CAN NOT** be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered **MET** and the SM/SED **SHALL** follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
- 3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.
- 3.3.8 The **ACCEPTABLE** time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

### 4.0 RECORDS

#### 4.1 Non-QA Records

None

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## 5.0 REFERENCES

### 5.1 Interfacing References

BP-236, *Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis*

SPP 3.5, *Regulatory Reporting Requirements*

WBN-EPIP-2, *Unusual Event*

WBN-EPIP-3, *Alert*

WBN-EPIP-4, *Site Area Emergency*

WBN-EPIP-5, *General Emergency*

WBN-EPIP-9, *Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)*

WBN-EPIP-13, *Termination of the Emergency and Recovery*

WBN-EPIP-14, *Radiological Control Response*

WBN-EPIP-16, *Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies*

CECC-EPIP-9, *Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures*

SI-4.04, *Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System*

### 5.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50, *Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities*

10 CFR 20, *Standards for Protection From Radiation*

REG GUIDE-1.101, *Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.*

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual

EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions

EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

**EMERGENCY  
PLAN  
CLASSIFICATION  
FLOWCHART <sup>1,3,4,5</sup>**

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

4

## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                         |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake          | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado             | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Crash                   | Figure 5-A           |
| Table 5-1               |                      |

5

## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

## DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4.7).

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

## 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier

### 1. Critical Safety Function Status

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Core Cooling Red	Core Cooling Orange <u>OR</u> Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

-OR-

### 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level

LOSS	Potential LOSS
RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 $\mu$ Ci/gm dose equivalent iodine-131	Not applicable

-OR-

### 3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Greater Than 1200°F	Greater Than 727°F

-OR-

### 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Not Applicable	VALID RVLIS level <33% (No RCP running)

-OR-

### 5. Containment Radiation Monitors

LOSS	Potential LOSS
VALID reading increase of Greater Than:  74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 <u>OR</u> 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274	Not Applicable

-OR-

### 6. Site Emergency Director Judgment

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

## 1.2 RCS Barrier

### 1. Critical Safety Function Status

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Not Applicable	Pressurized Thermal Shock Red <u>OR</u> Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)

-OR-

### 2. RCS Leakage/LOCA

LOSS	Potential LOSS
RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling (<65°F Indicated), [85°F ADV]	Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of One Charging Pump (CCP) In the Normal Charging Alignment. <u>OR</u> RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1

-OR-

### 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture

LOSS	Potential LOSS
SGTR that results in a safety injection actuation <u>OR</u> Entry into E-3	Not Applicable

-OR-

### 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

LOSS	Potential LOSS
VALID RVLIS level <33% (No RCP Running)	Not Applicable

-OR-

### 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

INSTRUCTIONS

NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within 1 to 2 hours, in the absence of a viable success path). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET. Circle these CONDITIONS.
2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.
3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.
4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.

EVENTS

UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT
Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier	Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier
	OR
	Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier
SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers	LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier

1.3 CNTMT Barrier

1. Critical Safety Function Status

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Not Applicable	Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE

-OR-

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Rapid unexplained decrease following initial increase OR Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with LOCA in progress)	Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume OR Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of Containment spray

-OR-

3. Containment Isolation Status

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Containment Isolation is Incomplete (when required) AND a Release Path to the nvironment Exists	Not Applicable

-OR-

4. Containment Bypass

LOSS	Potential LOSS
RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT OR Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits	Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress)

-OR-

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment

LOSS	Potential LOSS
Not Applicable	VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:  108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1-RE-90-272 OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274

-OR-

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment

condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad  
1.2 RCS  
1.3 Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation  
2.2 Loss of Function/Communication  
2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  
2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation  
2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage

2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  
2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  
2.8 Turbine Failure  
2.9 Technical Specification  
2.10 Safety Limit

2

LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)  
3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)  
3.3 Loss of DC

3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- 4.1 Fire  
4.2 Explosion  
Table 4-1  
Figure 4-A

4.3 Flammable Gas  
4.4 Toxic Gas  
Table 4-2  
Figure 4-B

4.5 Control Room Evacuation  
4.6 Security  
4.7 SED Judgment  
Table 4-3

4

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- 5.1 Earthquake  
5.2 Tornado  
5.3 Aircraft/Projectile  
Crash  
Table 5-1

5.4 River Level High  
5.5 River Level Low  
5.6 Watercraft Crash  
Figure 5-A

5

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems  
6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)  
6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)  
6.4 Fuel Handling

6

RADIOLOGICAL

- 7.1 Gaseous Effluent  
7.2 Liquid Effluent  
Table 7-1  
Figure 7-A

7.3 Radiation Levels  
7.4 Fuel Handling  
Table 7-2

7



## DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4.7).

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

2.1 Loss of Instrumentation			2.2 Loss of Function		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition		Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL  SITE   ALERT   UNUSUAL  EVENT		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)			Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	1,2 3,4	Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)  1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications  2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress  3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS  4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:  Sub-criticality                      PTS Core Cooling                      Containment Heat Sink                      Inventory		1,2 3,4	Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)  1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red  2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)  Note: Also Refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	1,2 3,4	UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)  1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.  2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)  3. (a or b) a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress b. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS		4	Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3)  1. Shutdown is required  2. Loss of RHR capability  3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser
	1,2 3,4	UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)  1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.  2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)  3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested.		ALL	A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)  1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios  or  B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)  1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones 2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies 3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system 4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines 5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system

GENERAL SITE ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT

SYSTEM DEGRADATION U 1

## 2.3 Failure of Rx Protection

Mode	Initiating/Condition
1,2	<p>Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals did <u>not</u> result in a reduction of Rx power to &lt;5% and decreasing (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red</li> <li>CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red</li> </ol> </li> <li>FR-S.1 entered <u>and</u> subsequent actions <u>Did Not</u> result in a Rx Power of &lt;5% and decreasing</li> </ol>
1,2	<p>Rx power <u>Not</u> &lt;5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required</li> <li>Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was <u>Not</u> successful.</li> <li>FR-S.1 has been entered.</li> </ol>
1,2	<p>Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required</li> <li>Manual Rx Trip from the MCR <u>was</u> successful and power is &lt;5% and decreasing.</li> </ol>
	Not Applicable

## 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
1,2, 3,4, 5	<p>Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dose equivalent Iodine (I-131) &gt;0.265 <math>\mu\text{Ci/gm}</math> for &gt;48 Hours or &gt;21 <math>\mu\text{Ci/gm}</math>.</li> <li>Specific activity &gt;100/E <math>\mu\text{Ci/gm}</math></li> </ol> </li> </ol>

2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage			2.6 RCS Identified Leakage		
GENERAL SITE  ALERT  UNUSUAL EVENT	Mode	Initiating/Condition	Mode	Initiating/Condition	
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"	
	1,2 3,4, *5	<p><b>Unidentified <u>or</u> pressure boundary RCS leakage &gt;10 GPM</b></p> <p>1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) &gt;10 GPM as indicated below (a or b)</p> <p>a. 1-SI-68-32 results</p> <p>b. With RCS Temperature <u>and</u> PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate &gt;10 GPM</p> <p><i>*Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized</i></p>	1,2, 3,4, *5	<p><b>Identified RCS leakage &gt;25 GPM</b></p> <p>1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) &gt;25 GPM (a or b)</p> <p>a. 1-SI-68-32 results</p> <p>b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank</p> <p><i>*Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized</i></p>	

GENERAL  
SITE  
EVENT  
UNUSUAL  
EVENT

## 2.7 Uncontrolled Cooldown

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
1,2,3	<b>UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown <u>and</u> Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2)</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System (&lt;675 psig)</li> <li>2. Safety Injection has initiated <u>or</u> is required</li> </ol>

## 2.8 Turbine Failure

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
1,2,3	<b>Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause <u>VISIBLE DAMAGE</u> to any area containing Safety Related equipment</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b> in any of the following areas: <div> <div>Control Building</div> <div>Auxiliary Building</div> <div>Unit #1 Containment</div> <div>Diesel Generator Bldg.</div> <div>RWST</div> <div>Intake Pumping Station</div> <div>CST</div> </div> </li> </ol>
1,2,3	<b>Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing <u>or</u> Damage to Main Generator Seals</li> </ol>

SYSTEM  
DEGRADATION  
U1

## 2.9 Technical Specification

GENERAL SITE ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Not Applicable
		Not Applicable
		Not Applicable
	1,2 3,4	<b>Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Spec. limits (1 and 2)</b> 1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered 2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement

## 2.10 Safety Limit

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
1,2, 3,4, 5	<b>Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)</b> 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits" 2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

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## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

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## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

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## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

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## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

4

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## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake                | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado                   | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Table 5-1                     | Figure 5-A           |

5

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## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

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## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

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**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

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**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.



3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL	1,2,3,4	<b>Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (1 and 2)</b> 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes 2. (a or b) a. Core Cooling Red or Orange b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours of loss.
	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power &gt; 15 minutes</b> 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes
SITE	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available
	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
ALERT	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
UNUSUAL	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
EVENT	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
	1,2,3,4	<b>Loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board

3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)	
Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
5,6, or De-fuel	<b>UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for &gt;15 minutes</b> 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes  <i>Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)</i>
5,6, or De-fuel	<b>UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</b> 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board

### 3.3 Loss of DC Power

GENERAL SITE ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)
	1,2,3,4	<p><b>Loss of All Vital DC Power for &gt;15 minutes</b></p> <p>1. Voltage &lt;105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I <u>and</u> 1-II <u>and</u> 1-III <u>and</u> 1-IV for &gt;15 minutes</p> <p>Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)</p>
		<p>Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)</p>
	5,6, or De-fuel	<p><b>UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for &gt;15 minutes (1 or 2)</b></p> <p>1. Voltage &lt;105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I <u>and</u> 1-III for &gt;15 minutes</p> <p>2. Voltage &lt;105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II <u>and</u> 1-IV for &gt;15 minutes</p>

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## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

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## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

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## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

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## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

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## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake                | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado                   | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Table 5-1                     | Figure 5-A           |

5

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## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

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## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

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## DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4.7).

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.


4.1 FIRE		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL SITE		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
ALERT	All	<p><b>FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>FIRE</b> in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1</li> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b> to permanent structure <u>or</u> Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the <b>FIRE</b></li> <li>Control Room indication of degraded Safety System <u>or</u> component response due to the <b>FIRE</b></li> </ol> </li> </ol>
	All	<p><b>FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is <u>Not</u> extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification <u>or</u> verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)</b></p>
UNUSUAL EVENT		

4.2 Explosions		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	All	<p><b>EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>EXPLOSION</b> in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1</li> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An <b>EXPLOSION</b> has caused <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b> to Safety Related equipment</li> <li>Control Room indication of degraded Safety System <u>or</u> component response due to the <b>EXPLOSION</b></li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>Refer to "Security" (4.6)</p>
	All	<p><b>UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure <u>or</u> equipment (Figure 4-A)</b></p> <p>Refer to "Security" (4.6)</p>

**TABLE 4-1**  
**PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS**

Unit #1 Reactor Building	Additional Diesel Generator Building
Auxiliary Building	Intake Pumping Station
Control Building	Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2)
Diesel Generator Building	RWST
CST	

**Figure 4-A**  
**PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER**



H  
A  
Z  
A  
R  
D  
S  
/  
S  
E  
D  
  
J  
U  
D  
G  
M  
E  
N  
T  
  
U  
1

4.3 Flammable Gas		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL SITE		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT	All	<p>UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment <u>or</u> associated with Power production</p> <p>1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft triangular Area is &gt;25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2.</p>
	All	<p>A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER</p> <p>1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft Triangular Area is &gt;25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>B. Confirmed report by Local, County, <u>or</u> State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations &gt;25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)</p>


4.4 Toxic Gas	
	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
All	<p>Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish <u>or</u> maintain Cold S/D (1 and 2 and 3)</p> <p>1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2</p> <p>2. (a or b)</p> <p>a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)</p> <p>b. Sampling indications &gt; (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit</p> <p>3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.</p>
All	<p>A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>B. Confirmed report by Local, County, <u>or</u> State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations &gt;than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)</p>

**TABLE 4-2**  
**Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs**

Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings  
Auxiliary Building  
Control Building  
Diesel Generator Building

Additional Diesel Generator Building  
Intake Pumping Station  
Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)  
CDWE Building  
Turbine Building

**Figure 4-B**  
**ONE MILE RADIUS/SITE PERIMETER**





GENERAL  
SITE  
ERT  
UNUSUAL  
EVENT

## 4.5 Control Room Evacuation

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
All	<p>Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated <u>and</u> Control of all necessary equipment <u>Has Not</u> been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered</li> <li>AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered</li> </ol> </li> <li>SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation</li> <li>Control has <u>Not</u> been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L11B</li> </ol>
All	<p>Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AOI-30.2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered</li> <li>AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered</li> </ol> </li> <li>SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation</li> </ol>
	Not Applicable

## 4.6 Security

Mode	Initiating/Condition
All	<p>Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, Control Room, <u>or</u> Remote shutdown capability</li> </ol>
All	<p>Security Event has <u>or</u> is occurring which results in Actual <u>or</u> Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>VITAL AREA</b>, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force</li> </ol>
All	<p>Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual <u>or</u> Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>BOMB</b> discovered within a <b>VITAL AREA</b></li> <li><b>CIVIL DISTURBANCE</b> ongoing within the <b>PROTECTED AREA</b></li> <li><b>PROTECTED AREA</b> has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force</li> </ol> <p>Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area and Site Perimeter</p>
All	<p>Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>BOMB</b> discovered within the <b>PROTECTED AREA</b></li> <li>Security Shift Supervisor reports one <u>or</u> more of the events listed in Table 4-3</li> </ol>

#### 4.7 Emergency Director Judgment

Mode	Initiating/Condition
All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Imminent Substantial Core Degradation <u>or</u> Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.
All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.
All	Events are in progress <u>or</u> have occurred which involve Actual <u>or</u> Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.
All	Unusual Events are in Progress <u>or</u> have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response <u>or</u> Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

### Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS

- a. **SABOTAGE/INTRUSION** has occurred or is occurring within the **PROTECTED AREA**
- b. **HOSTAGE/EXTORTION** Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations
- c. **CIVIL DISTURBANCE** ongoing between the **SITE PERIMETER** and **PROTECTED AREA**
- d. Hostile **STRIKE ACTION** within the **PROTECTED AREA** which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received)
- e. A **CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** security threat notification.

# H A Z A R D S / S E E J U D G M E N T U 1

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## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

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## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

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## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

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## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

4

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## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake                | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado                   | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Table 5-1                     | Figure 5-A           |

5

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## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

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## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

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## DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

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**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

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**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

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**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

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**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

5.1 Earthquake		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
SITE		
ALERT	All	<p>Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a and b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ann.166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded"</li> <li>Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated"</li> </ol> </li> <li>(a or b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel</li> <li>National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
	All	<p>Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ann. 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated"</li> <li>(a or b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel</li> <li>National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
UNUSUAL EVENT		

5.2 Tornado	
	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
All	<p>Tornado <u>or</u> High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b> (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tornado or High Winds (Sustained &gt;80 mph &gt; one minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1</li> <li>(a or b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Confirmed report of any <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b></li> <li>Control Room indications of degraded Safety System <u>or</u> component response due to event</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p><i>Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at &gt;100 mph. National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.</i></p>
All	<p><b>Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the <b>SITE PERIMETER</b> (Refer to Figure 5-A)</li> </ol>

### 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash

GENERAL SITE ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	All	<p>Aircraft <u>or</u> PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b> (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plant personnel report aircraft <u>or</u> PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1</li> <li>(a or b) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Confirmed report of any <b>VISIBLE DAMAGE</b></li> <li>Control Room indications of degraded Safety System <u>or</u> component response due to the event within the specified areas</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
	All	<p>Aircraft crash <u>or</u> PROJECTILE impact within the <b>SITE PERIMETER</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash <u>or</u> PROJECTILE impact within the <b>SITE PERIMETER</b> (Refer to Figure 5-A)</li> </ol>

**Table 5-1**  
**Plant Structures Associated With**  
**Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs**

Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings  
Auxiliary Building  
Control Building  
Diesel Generator Building  
Additional Diesel Generator Building  
Intake Pumping Station  
Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)  
CDWE Building  
Turbine Building  
RWST  
CST

D  
E  
S  
T  
R  
U  
C  
T  
I  
V  
E  
  
P  
H  
E  
N  
O  
M  
E  
N  
O  
N  
  
U  
1

5.4 River Level HIGH		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL SITE		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT	All	<p>River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning (1 or 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. River Reservoir level &gt;727 Ft</li> <li>2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations</li> </ol>
	All	<p>River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. River Reservoir level &gt;726.5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30</li> <li>2. River Reservoir level &gt;714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15</li> <li>3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations</li> </ol>

5.5 River Level LOW		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	All	<p>River Reservoir level is &lt;668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations</p>
	All	<p>River Reservoir level is ≤673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations</p>

## 5.6 Watercraft Crash


GENERAL  
SITE  
ALERT  
UNUSUAL  
EVENT

Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
	Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
All	<p><b>Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW) (1 and 2)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station</li> <li>(a or b or c) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is &lt;15 psig</li> <li>ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is &lt;15 psig</li> <li>RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is &lt;15 psig</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

DESTRUCTIVE  
PHENOMENON  
U1



Figure 5-A  
PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER



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## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

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## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

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## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

---

## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

4

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## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake                | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado                   | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Table 5-1                     | Figure 5-A           |

5

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## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

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## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

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## DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4.7).

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL	5,6	<p>Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs</p> <p>Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)</p>
	5,6	<p>Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Loss of RHR capability</li> <li>2. Rx vessel water level &lt; el. 718'</li> <li>3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. &gt;200° F</li> <li>4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT</li> <li>5. CNTMT closure is established</li> </ol> <p>Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)</p>
SITE	5,6	<p>Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2 and 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. RHR capability is <u>not</u> available for RCS Cooling</li> <li>2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. &gt;200° F</li> <li>3. CNTMT closure is established</li> </ol>
ALERT	5,6	
UNUSUAL EVENT	5,6	<p>Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs</p>

6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)	
Mode	Initiating/Condition
	Not Applicable
	Not Applicable
5,6 or De-Fuel	<p>UNPLANNED loss of Offsite <u>and</u> Onsite AC Power for &gt;15 minutes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 1A <u>and</u> 1B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for &gt;15 minutes</li> </ol>
5,6 or De-Fuel	<p>UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. C <u>and</u> D CSSTS not available For &gt;15 minutes.</li> <li>2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board</li> </ol>

GENERAL

SITE

# ALERT

UNUSUAL  
EVENT

	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL SITE ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT		Not Applicable
		Not Applicable
		Not Applicable
	5,6 or De-fuel	<b>UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for &gt;15 minutes (1 or 2)</b>  1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I <u>and</u> 1-III for >15 minutes  2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II <u>and</u> 1-IV for >15 minutes.

### Initiating/Condition

Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

**Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)**

1. **VALID** alarm on O-RE-90-101 or  
O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or  
1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112  
or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400
2. (a or b)
  - a. Plant personnel report damage of  
Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture  
Fuel Rods
  - b. Plant personnel report water level drop  
has or will exceed makeup capability  
such that Irradiated Fuel will be  
uncovered

All

**UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)**

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal
2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60
3. Fuel remains covered with water

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## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

- 1.1 Fuel Clad
- 1.2 RCS
- 1.3 Containment

1

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## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- |                                    |                             |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation        | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage  |
| 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication | 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down  |
| 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection  | 2.8 Turbine Failure         |
| 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation          | 2.9 Technical Specification |
| 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage       | 2.10 Safety Limit           |

2

---

## LOSS OF POWER

- 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
- 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 3.3 Loss of DC

3

---

## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

- |               |                   |                             |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Fire      | 4.3 Flammable Gas | 4.5 Control Room Evacuation |
| 4.2 Explosion | 4.4 Toxic Gas     | 4.6 Security                |
| Table 4-1     | Table 4-2         | 4.7 SED Judgment            |
| Figure 4-A    | Figure 4-B        | Table 4-3                   |

4

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## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 5.1 Earthquake                | 5.4 River Level High |
| 5.2 Tornado                   | 5.5 River Level Low  |
| 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash | 5.6 Watercraft Crash |
| Table 5-1                     | Figure 5-A           |

5

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## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

- 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
- 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
- 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
- 6.4 Fuel Handling

6

---

## RADIOLOGICAL

- |                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| 7.1 Gaseous Effluent | 7.3 Radiation Levels |
| 7.2 Liquid Effluent  | 7.4 Fuel Handling    |
| Table 7-1            | Table 7-2            |
| Figure 7-A           |                      |

7

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**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

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**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

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**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

## 7.1 Gaseous Effluents

	Mode	Initiating/Condition
<b>GENERAL</b>	All	EAB dose resulting from an actual <u>or</u> imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded. 2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr gamma <u>or</u> an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 $\mu$ Ci/cc at SP 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1000 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
	All	EAB dose resulting from an actual <u>or</u> imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded 2. Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma <u>or</u> an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 $\mu$ Ci/cc at SP 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE <u>or</u> >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual <u>or</u> projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
	All	Any <b>UNPLANNED</b> release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded 2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
	All	Any <b>UNPLANNED</b> release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded 2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
<b>SITE</b>		
<b>ALERT</b>		
<b>UNUSUAL EVENT</b>		

## 7.2 Liquid Effluents

	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Not Applicable
		Not Applicable
	All	Any <b>UNPLANNED</b> release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or 2) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded. 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration
	All	Any <b>UNPLANNED</b> release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2) 1. A <b>VALID</b> rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the <b>Criterion</b> is <u>Not</u> exceeded. 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration



**TABLE 7-1  
EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS<sup>(1)</sup>**

**NOTE:** The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the **VALID** reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.


Monitor	ICS Screen	Units	UE	Alert	Site	General
Total Site	EFF1	μCi/s <sup>(2)</sup>	1.5E+05	1.5E+07	2.5E+08	2.5E+09
U1 Shield Building 1-RE-90-400	EFF1	μCi/s	6.7E+04	6.7E+06	1.0E+08	1.0E+09
U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400	EFF1	μCi/s	1.5E+04	1.5E+06	2.5E+07	2.6E+08
Auxiliary Building 0-RE-90-101B	4RM1	cpm	1.2E+04	1.2E+06	***** (1)	***** (1)
Service Building 0-RE-90-132B	4RM1	cpm	4.3E+03	4.3E+05	9.8E+06	***** (1)
U1 Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 1-RE-90-404A	3PAM	μCi/cc <sup>(3)</sup>	5.5E-02	5.5E+00	8.83E+01	8.83E+02
1-RE-90-404B	3PAM	μCi/cc	5.5E-02	5.5E+00	8.83E+01	8.83E+02
S/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90-421 thru 424 (B)	4RM2	mR/hr <sup>(4)</sup>	NA	3.5E+02	3.5E+03	3.5E+04
Liquid Monitors 0-RE-90-122	n/a	μCi/ml <sup>(2)</sup>	1.8E-05	1.8E-03	N/A	N/A
1-RE-90-120,121	4RM2	cpm	1.1E+06	***** (1)	N/A	N/A
0-RE-90-225	4RM2	cpm	1.0E+06	***** (1)	N/A	N/A
0-RE-90-212	4RM2	cpm	9.2E+05	***** (1)	N/A	N/A
0-RE-90-212	4RM2	cpm	1.5E+04	1.5E+06	N/A	N/A
<b>RELEASE DURATION</b>		minutes	60	15	15	15
<b>ASSESSMENT METHOD:</b> ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary						

Note: (1) Table values are calculated values. The \*\*\*\*\* indicates the monitor is off scale.

- (2) These releases rate values in μCi/s and μCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the four emergency classifications.
- (3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the **MCR**. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates μCi/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02μCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.
- (4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 600°F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

**Figure 7-A**  
**EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER**

NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."



Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

7.3 Radiation Levels		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
GENERAL SITE		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
		Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
ALERT	All	<p>UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations <u>or</u> establishment <u>or</u> maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>VALID</b> area Radiation Monitor readings <u>or</u> survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room <u>or</u> CAS</li> <li>2. (a and b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <b>VALID</b> area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2</li> <li>b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation <u>or</u> the ability to establish Cold Shutdown</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below</p>
	All	<p>UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>VALID</b> area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels</li> </ol> <p>Note: In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIATING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).</p>
UNUSUAL EVENT		

7.4 Fuel Handling		
	Mode	Initiating/Condition
		Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
		Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
	All	<p>Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, <u>or</u> Loss of water level that has <u>or</u> will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>VALID</b> alarm on 0-RE-90-101 <u>or</u> 0-RE-90-102 <u>or</u> 0-RE-90-103 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-130/131 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-112 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-400 <u>or</u> 2-RE-90-400</li> <li>2. (a or b)               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods</li> <li>b. Plant personnel report water level drop has <u>or</u> will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
	All	<p>UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool <u>or</u> Reactor Cavity <u>or</u> Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, <u>or</u> Reactor Cavity, <u>or</u> Transfer Canal</li> <li>2. <b>VALID</b> alarm on 0-RE-90-102 <u>or</u> 0-RE-90-103 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-59 <u>or</u> 1-RE-90-60</li> <li>3. Fuel remains covered with water.</li> </ol>

Table 7-2

ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS

Monitor No.	Location Building and Elevation	Monitor Reading *
1&2 RE-90-1	Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool)	$2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1-RE-90-2	Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock)	$2.5 \times 10^0$ R/hr
0-RE-90-3	Auxiliary El. 729.0 (waste pac. area)	$2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-4	Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-5	Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1&2-RE-90-6	Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1&2-RE-90-7	Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room)	$2 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1&2-RE-90-8	Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux. feed pump area)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-9	Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1&2-RE-90-10	Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs area)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-11	Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
1-RE-90-61	Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)	$2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-230	Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr
0-RE-90-231	Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)	$1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr

Note: \*These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

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## SOURCE NOTES

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1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC-850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366. Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.
2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400 SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.
3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO-920030222 CNTMT Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications. Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).
4. ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI EIPs will contain the following elements.
5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 Chemistry detection of failed fuel.
6. EPPOS #2 Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.