



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000

May 9, 2003

TVA-SQN-TS-01-09

10 CFR 50.90

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NO. 01-09, "OPERATIONS INVOLVING
POSITIVE REACTIVITY ADDITIONS" ADDITIONAL CHANGES

Reference: TVA letter to NRC dated July 10, 2002, "Sequoyah
Nuclear Plant (SQN) - Units 1 and 2 - Technical
Specification (TS) Change No. 01-09, 'Operations
Involving Positive Reactivity Additions' "

This letter provides revised proposed TS changes (enclosed)
for the subject change request. The NRC suggested this
revision to the previously approved wording in TS Task
Force 286, Revision 1; the staff indicated that it would no
longer be found acceptable. The revised language is
editorial in nature and does not change the "No Significant
Hazard Determination" contained in the referenced letter.

Addressed copy of this letter)
to the NRC) DOCKET NOS. 50-327
50-328

Respectfully,

Director

Enclosure
1
1


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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Page 2
May 9, 2003

This letter is being sent in accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05.
If you have any questions about this change, please telephone
me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed on this 9 day of May, 2003

Sincerely,



Pedro Salas
Manager of Licensing
and Industry Affairs

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Framatome ANP, Inc.
P. O. Box 10935
Lynchburg, Virginia 24506-0935
ATTN: Mr. Frank Masseth

Mr. Michael L. Marshall, Jr., Senior Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop O-8G9A
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

Mr. Lawrence E. Nanney, Director
Division of Radiological Health
Third Floor
L&C Annex
401 Church Street
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-1532

ENCLOSURE

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 327 AND 328

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NO. 01-09
REVISED MARKED-UP TS CHANGES

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM


3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE[#] with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5

ACTION:



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1%.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve of nominal operating temperature and pressure.

A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breach is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE# with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

MODE 4

ADD

Insert 1

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE residual heat removal loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

MODE 5

of coolant

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2 and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.


SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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
* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breach is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.


INSERT 1

suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, ~~coolant~~  of coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.1


INSERT 2

no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, ~~coolant~~  of coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.1,

INSERT 3

suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, ~~coolant~~  of coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2


INSERT 4

no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, ~~coolant~~  of coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet SDM of LCO 3.1.1.2,

INSERT 5

and suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required shutdown margin or boron concentration.

INSERT 6

and suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, ~~coolant~~  of coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet LCO 3.9.1.

INSERT 7

With the minimum required AC power sources not available, it is required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (Mode 5) or boron concentration (Mode 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than or equal to that required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.