

NRC-03-051

10 CFR 50, App. E

May 9, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET 50-305
LICENSE No. DPR-43
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, attached is the latest revisions to the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures (EIPs). These revised procedures supersede the previously submitted procedures.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4, two additional copies of this letter and attachment are hereby submitted to the Regional Administrator, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, Lisle, Illinois. As required, one copy of this letter and attachment is also submitted to the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector.



Thomas Coutu
Site Vice-President, Kewaunee Plant

SLC

Attachment

cc US NRC Senior Resident Inspector, w/attach.
US NRC, Region III (2 copies), w/attach.
Electric Division, PSCW, w/o attach.
QA Vault, w/o attach.

ADPS

DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

FROM: DIANE FENCL - KNPP

TRANSMITTAL DATE 05-05-2003

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TRANSMITTAL FORM

OUTSIDE AGENCY COPIES (1-20)

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S. Campion - State of Wisconsin (5)*

S. Campion - KNPP QA Vault (NRC Letter & Memo Only) (15)*

Krista Kappelman - PBNP - EP (10)*

Craig Weiss - Alliant Energy (11)*

Jill Stern - Nuclear Management Company (12)*

Chuck Zoia - NRC Region III (13)*

PERSONAL COPIES (21-40) These copies are for the personal use of the listed individuals for reference or emergency response.

J. Bennett (33)

W. Bartelme (24)

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T. Coutu (28)

REFERENCE COPIES - CUSTODIAN (41-100) These copies are for general reference by anyone. They are distributed throughout the plant and corporate offices. The named individual is the responsible custodian for the procedures and shall insure they are properly maintained.

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C. Sternitzky - ATF-2 (44)

M. Daron - Security Building (46)

C. Grant - EOF (81)

C. Grant - OSF (52)

LOREB - STF (62, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74)

STF Library (43)

Resource Center - Training (82)

D. Krall - CR/SS Office (51, 56)

C. Grant - TSC (50)

W. Galarneau - RAF (53)

W. Galarneau - SBF/EMT (54)

W. Galarneau - RPO (55)

STF (86, 87, 88)

WORKING COPIES (101-199) These copies of procedures are kept in the areas designated for use in response to an emergency.

W. Galarneau - RAF/RPO (106, 107)(Partial Distribution)

W. Galarneau - SBF/ENV (108, 109)(Partial Distribution)

W. Galarneau - SBF/EM Team (110, 111, 111A)(Partial Distribution)

W. Flint - Cold Chem/HR Sample Room (113)

S. Zutz - SBF/SEC (114)

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S. Zutz - Security Building (120)

Ops Admin. (126)

C. Grant - TSC Response Binder (Partial Distribution)

C. Grant - EOF Response Binder (Partial Distribution)

D. Krall - CR Response Binder (Partial Distribution)

K. Stangel - SCR Response Binder (Partial Distribution)

D. Krall - CR Tag Desk (Partial Distribution)

K. Stangel - SCR Tag Desk (Partial Distribution)

Originals to KNPP QA Vault

Please follow the directions when updating your EPIP Manual. **WATCH FOR DELETIONS!!!** These are controlled procedures and random checks may be made to ensure the manuals are kept up-to-date.

***THIS IS NOT A CONTROLLED COPY. IT IS A COPY FOR INFORMATION ONLY.**

**KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
REVISION OF EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
May 05, 2003**

Please follow the directions listed below.

EPIP Index, dated 05-05-2003.

REMOVE		INSERT	
PROCEDURE	REV.	PROCEDURE	REV.
EPIP-AD-02	AF	EPIP-AD-02	AG
EPIP-TSC-03	V	EPIP-TSC-03	W
EPIP-TSC-09A	J	EPIP-TSC-09A	K
Form EPIPF-AD-07-01	U	Form EPIPF-AD-07-01	V
		Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-07	A

Return a signed and dated copy of this transmittal letter, within 10 days of transmittal date, to the sender. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Jerrie Morlino at 755-6557.

I CERTIFY Copy No. _____ (WPSC No.) of
the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant's EIPs has
been updated.

SIGNATURE

DATE

Please return this sheet to *DIANE FENCL*.

Diane Fencl
Enclosure

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EPIP-AD-01	Personnel Response to the Plant Emergency Siren	K	11-26-2002
EPIP-AD-02	Emergency Class Determination	AG	05-05-2003
EPIP-AD-03	KNPP Response to an Unusual Event	AH	03-18-2003
EPIP-AD-04	KNPP Response to Alert or Higher	AM	03-18-2003
EP-AD-5	Site Emergency	Deleted	04-27-87
EPIP-AD-05	Emergency Response Organization Shift Relief Guideline	E	02-18-2003
EP-AD-6	General Emergency	Deleted	04-24-87
EPIP-AD-07	Initial Emergency Notifications	AT	03-18-2003
EP-AD-8	Notification of Alert or Higher	Deleted	02-26-96
EP-AD-9	Notification of Site Emergency	Deleted	04-27-87
EP-AD-10	Notification of General Emergency	Deleted	04-27-87
EPIP-AD-11	Emergency Radiation Controls	S	12-19-2002
EP-AD-12	Personnel Assembly and Accountability	Deleted	03-26-94
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EP-AD-13A	Limited Area Evacuation	Deleted	03-01-83
EP-AD-13B	Emergency Assembly/Evacuation	Deleted	03-01-83
EP-AD-13C	Site Evacuation	Deleted	03-01-83
EP-AD-14	Search and Rescue	Deleted	05-25-94
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EPIP-AD-20	KNPP Response to a Security Threat	D	01-20-2003
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EPIP-ENV-03C	Dose Projection Using RASCAL Version 2.2 Software	W	08-20-2002
EP-ENV-3D	Revision and Control of ISODOSE II	Deleted	02-14-95
EP-ENV-3E	Manual Determination of X/Q	Deleted	04-24-87
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EP-ENV-3G	Manual Dose Projection Calculation	Deleted	06-02-89
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EPIP-ENV-04A	Portable Survey Instrument Use	T	08-20-2002
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EP-ENV-4C	Environmental Monitoring Teams	Deleted	04-13-90
EPIP-ENV-04C	Ground Deposition Sampling and Analysis	X	08-20-2002
EPIP-ENV-04D	Plume Tracking for Environmental Monitoring Teams	O	08-20-2002
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EP-ENV-5C	SAM II Operation	Deleted	04-14-86
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EP-ENV-7	Site Access Facility Communications	Deleted	09-26-84
EP-ENV-8	Total Population Dose Estimate Calculations	Deleted	04-14-86
EP-EOF			
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EP-EOF-8	Relocation of EOF	Deleted	03-01-83
EPIP-EOF-08	Continuing Emergency Notifications	Z	01-28-2003
EP-EOF-9	Interface with Support Organizations	Deleted	03-05-84
EP-EOF-9	Notification of Site Emergency	Deleted	04-24-87
EP-EOF-10	Notification of General Emergency	Deleted	04-24-87
EPIP-EOF-11	Internal Communication and Documentation Flow	V	11-07-2002
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EP-OP-2	Emergency Control Room Activation for Emergency Response	Deleted	04-24-87
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EPIP-OSF-02	Operational Support Facility Operations	V	11-26-2002
EPIP-OSF-03	Work Orders During an Emergency	P	05-09-2002
EP-OSF-4	Operational Support Facility Communications	Deleted	04-24-87
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EP-RET-2C	Containment Air Sampling and Analysis	Deleted	03-01-83
EPIP-RET-02D	Emergency Radiation Entry Controls and Implementation	M	06-12-2001
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EP-RET-4C	Site Radiological Monitoring	Deleted	07-12-94
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EPIP-RET-09	Post-Accident Population Dose	M	04-29-2003
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EP-SEC-2A	Manual Activation of Emergency Sirens	Deleted	04-16-82
EPIP-SEC-03	Personnel Assembly and Accountability	AF	11-26-2002
EPIP-SEC-04	Security Force Actions for Dosimetry Issue	P	10-02-2001

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EPIP-TSC-03	Plant Status Procedure	W	05-05-2003
EPIP-TSC-04	Emergency Modifications	O	04-29-2003
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* EP-TSC-8B was totally deleted; therefore, EP-TSC-8C was changed to EP-TSC-8B			
EP-TSC-9	Core Damage Assessment Using Released Radionuclides	Deleted	09-30-86
EPIP-TSC-09A*	Core Damage Assessment	K	05-05-2003
EPIP-TSC-09B*	CORE Computer Program	Deleted	05-16-2002
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* EP-TSC-9A, Rev. D was totally deleted; therefore, EP-TSC-9B became EP-TSC-9A. EP-TSC-9B was previously EP-TSC-9C.			
EPIP-TSC-10	Technical Support for IPEOPs	K	05-09-2002

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EPIP-AD-19	EP-FIG-014	AD-19-01	Population Distribution by Geographical Sub-Areas (with sectors)	A	10-31-2000
EPIP-APPX-A-06	EP-FIG-022	APPX-A-06-04	EOF - WPSC D2-3 Floor Plan	D	04-29-2003
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EPIP-OSF-02	EP-FIG-039	OSF-02-01	High Priority Work	A	10-02-2001
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EPIP-APPX-A-03	Off-Site Telephone Numbers	Deleted	02-06-2002
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AD-11-01	Emergency Radiation Work Permit	H	12-19-2002
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EOF-04-01	SRCL Initial Action Checklist	D	01-20-2003
EOF-04-02	Telephone Communications Log Sheet	A	12-14-2001
EOF-08-03	Fax for Emergency Declaration or Status Updates	H	01-20-2003
EOF-08-05	Plant Emergency Status Report	A	11-27-2001
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EP-OSF			
OSF 2.2	Maintenance Work in Progress	Deleted	07-08-98
OSF-03-01	Operational Support Facility Team Briefing	C	12-04-2001
EP-RET			
RET-02A-02	Emergency Sample Worksheet	E	06-05-2001
RET-02B-01	Containment Stack Release (Grab Sample)	D	08-06-2002
RET-02B-02	Auxiliary Building Stack (Grab Sample)	D	08-06-2002
RET-02B-03	Auxiliary Building Stack (Sping Reading)	D	08-06-2002
RET-02B-04	Containment Stack (Sping Reading)	C	08-06-2002
RET-02B-05	Steam Release	D	08-06-2002
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RET-04-01	SAM-2 Counting Equipment Worksheet	E	06-12-2001
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RET 8.4	Hospital Survey 2	Deleted	07-25-97
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TSC-02-02	TSC Ventilation Checklist	I	01-20-2003
TSC-02-03	Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Link Initiation Checklist	H	01-20-2003
TSC-02-04	TSC Chart Recorder Operation Checklist	E	01-20-2003
TSC-02-05	TSC and OSF De-Activation Checklist	C	01-28-2003
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TSC-03-02	Plant Equipment Status	L	06-12-2001
TSC-03-03	Environmental Status Board	J	06-12-2001
TSC-03-04	Radiation Monitors	I	01-08-2002
TSC-04-01	Emergency Modification Request	H	04-29-2003
TSC-04-02	Emergency Physical Change Safety Review	Deleted	05-09-2002
TSC-04-03	Emergency Modification Index	G	04-29-2003
TSC-07-01	Head Venting Calculation	G	06-20-2002
TSC-08A-01	Steam Release Data Sheet (Energy Balance)	H	12-14-2001
TSC-08A-02	Steam Release Calculation Sheet (Energy Balance)	G	12-14-2001
TSC-08A-03	Steam Release Data/Calculation Sheet (Open Valve)	E	12-14-2001
TSC-08A-04	Steam Release Data/Calculation Sheet (STMRLS Program)	D	12-14-2001
TSC-09A-01	Core Exit Thermocouple Data	D	05-16-2002
TSC-09A-02	Fuel Rod Clad Damage Estimate	D	05-16-2002
TSC-09A-03	Fuel Rod Overtemperature Damage Estimate	E	05-16-2002
TSC 9A.4	Core Damage Based on Activity Ratios	Deleted	05-16-2002
TSC-09A-05	Core Damage Assessment (Monitoring Data)	E	05-16-2002
TSC 9A.6	Core Damage Summary	Deleted	05-16-2002
TSC-09A-07	Core Damage Assessment Results	A	05-05-2003

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>		No. EPIP-AD-02	Rev. AG
		Title Emergency Class Determination	
		Date MAY 5 2003	Page 1 of 21
Reviewed By Dave Mielke		Approved By Jerrie Morlino	
Nuclear Safety Related	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	PORC Review Required	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
		SRO Approval Of Temporary Changes Required	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

1.0 Purpose

- 1.1 This procedure provides instruction for determining proper emergency classification listed in order to activate the appropriate level of response from the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) emergency response organization and off-site response organization.

2.0 General Notes

- 2.1 None

3.0 Precautions and Limitations

- 3.1 Plant monitors used to determine whether emergency classification levels are being exceeded should be checked for accuracy prior to declaring an emergency class (e.g., compare against redundant channels, determine if consistent with system status, or verification by sample analysis when required by Chart A(1)).
- 3.2 This procedure is not written to facilitate de-escalation. Therefore, any decision to de-escalate must be based on a thorough review of procedures and plant conditions. If appropriate, it is preferable to terminate or enter recovery. However, there may be occasions where it is appropriate to de-escalate.
- 3.3 Once indication is available that an emergency action level has been exceeded, classification must be made as soon as possible and must not exceed 15 minutes. Once a classification has been declared, notification must be initiated and in progress to the State and County agencies within 15 minutes of event classification using "Event Notice," Form EPIPF-AD-07-01. During the initial 15-minute classification assessment, there may be rapidly changing conditions. Classification during this initial period should be based on currently available plant status.

4.0 Initial Conditions

- 4.1 This procedure applies during any plant evolution that may result in an emergency declaration.

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5.0 Procedure

- 5.1 Determine if a plant emergency exists during abnormal plant conditions by referring to Table 2-1, Emergency Action Level Charts.
- 5.2 IF a plant emergency exists, THEN perform the required actions of the appropriate emergency procedure listed below:
 - 5.2.1 EPIP-AD-03, "KNPP Response to an Unusual Event"
 - 5.2.2 EPIP-AD-04, "KNPP Response to Alert or Higher"
- 5.3 As plant conditions change, continue referring to the Emergency Action Level Charts.
- 5.4 Determine if the emergency should be reclassified.
- 5.5 IF the event is reclassified, THEN return to Step 5.2.
- 5.6 IF Final Conditions (Section 6.0) are not met, THEN return to Step 5.3.
- 5.7 IF Final Conditions (Section 6.0) are met, THEN use of this procedure may be suspended.

6.0 Final Conditions

- 6.1 Plant Emergency has been Terminated or Recovery actions have begun and the Responsible Director has suspended the use of EIPs.

7.0 References

- 7.1 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan
- 7.2 EPIP-AD-01, Personnel Response to the Plant Emergency Siren
- 7.3 EPIP-AD-03, KNPP Response to an Unusual Event
- 7.4 EPIP-AD-04, KNPP Response to Alert or Higher
- 7.5 COMTRAK 89-001, NRC Inspection Report 88-11, Improve Guidance for Fires Chart G
- 7.6 OEA 87-246, Report OE 2265, Improve Description of Unusual Aircraft Activity Chart P
- 7.7 NRC Letter 07-11-94, Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations to NUREG-0654
- 7.8 OEA 96-083, NRC IN 1997-045 Chart A(2)

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8.0 Records

8.1 The following QA records and non-QA records are identified in this directive/procedure and are listed on the KNPP Records Retention Schedule. These records shall be maintained according to the KNPP Records Management Program.

8.1.1 QA Records

None

8.1.2 Non-QA Records

None

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CHARTS

The following charts are separated into different abnormal operating conditions which may, depending upon their severity, be classified as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, or General Emergency.

	CHART	PAGE
Abnormal Radiological Effluent	A (1)	5
Gaseous Effluent Action Levels	A (2)	6 - 8
Fuel Damage Indication	B	9
Primary Leak to LOCA	C	10
Primary to Secondary Leak	D	11
Loss of Power	E	12
Engineered Safety Feature Anomaly	F	13
Loss of Indication	G	14
DELETED	H	14
Secondary Side Anomaly	I	15
Miscellaneous Abnormal Plant Conditions	J	16
Fire and Fire Protection	K	17
DELETED	L	17
Earthquake	M	18
High Winds or Tornado	N	18
Flood, Low Water, or Seiche	O	19
External Events and Chemical Spills	P	20
Security Contingency	Q	21

**CHART A(1)
ABNORMAL RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT**

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
SEE CHART A(2)	Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 1 rem/hr whole body or 5 rem/hr thyroid at the site boundary under " <u>actual meteorological</u> " conditions.	GENERAL EMERGENCY
Projected or measured dose rates to be provided by the Radiological Protection Director or Environmental Monitoring Teams.	Projected or measured in the environs dose rates greater than 1 rem/hr whole body or 5 rem/hr thyroid at the site boundary.	GENERAL EMERGENCY
SEE CHART A(2)	Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mr/hr for ½ hour <u>OR</u> greater than 500 mr/hr for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) <u>OR</u> for "adverse meteorology."	SITE EMERGENCY
Projected or measured dose rates to be provided by the Radiological Protection Director or Environmental Monitoring Teams.	At the site boundary, projected or measured dose rates greater than 50 mr/hr for ½ hours <u>OR</u> greater than 500 mr/hr for two minutes (or five times these levels to the thyroid) or EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded outside the site boundary.	SITE EMERGENCY
SEE CHART A(2)	Radiological effluents greater than 10 times ODCM instantaneous limits.	ALERT
a. Containment R-2 OR R-7 $\geq 1.0E+4$ mr/hr, <u>OR</u> b. Charging Area R-4 $\geq 1.0E+4$ mr/hr, <u>OR</u> c. SFP Area R-5 $\geq 1.0E+4$ mr/hr, <u>OR</u> d. Plant area air sample indicates airborne contamination > 1,000 times the occupational DAC values.	Radiation levels or airborne contamination which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., radiation levels suddenly increase by a factor of 1,000).	ALERT
(1) <u>Gaseous Releases</u> : See Chart A(2)	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual limits exceeded.	UNUSUAL EVENT
(2) <u>Liquid Releases</u> : Notification by the Rad-Chem Group of violating ODCM 3.3.1 limits.		

CHART A(2) GASEOUS EFFLUENT ACTION LEVELS

1. AUX BUILDING VENT RELEASES - WITH SIGNIFICANT CORE DAMAGE

Instrument readings assuming a post accident gas release AND Containment High Range Radiation Monitors 42599 (R-40) and 42600 (R-41) reads 1000 R/hr for > 2 minutes within one-half hour of the accident.

NOTE: Use adverse meteorology conditions (ADV MET) only when, 10m and 60m wind speed < 5mph AND Delta-T > +2.4 degrees F or Sigma Theta is < 3.01 degrees. All other cases are average meteorology (AVG MET).

NOTE: R-13 and R-14 are expected to be off scale high during all events on this page.

SV & SFP FANS	AUX BLDG SPING MONITORS				AUX BLDG STACK MONITORS				EMERG. CLASS.
	MID RANGE CPM (01-07) PPCS PT G9086G		HIGH RANGE CPM (01-09) PPCS PT G9088G		R-35 MR/HR		R-36 R/HR		
TOTAL NUMBER RUNNING	AVG MET	ADV MET	AVG MET	ADV MET	AVG MET	ADV MET	AVG MET	ADV MET	
1	**	1.1E+4	6.5E+1	*	**	7.9E+2	1.27E+2	7.9E-1	GENERAL EMERG.
2	8.8E+5	5.5E+3	3.25E+1	*	**	3.9E+2	6.35E+1	4.0E-1	
3	5.9E+5	3.7E+3	2.16E+1	*	**	2.6E+2	4.2E+1	2.6E-1	
4	4.4E+5	2.7E+3	1.62E+1	*	**	2.0E+2	3.175E+1	2.0E-1	

1	8.8E+4	5.5E+2	3.0E+0	*	6.3E+3	3.9E+1	6.3E+0	*	SITE EMERG.
2	4.4E+4	2.7E+2	1.5E+0	*	3.1E+3	1.9E+1	3.1E+0	*	
3	2.9E+4	1.8E+2	1.0E+0	*	2.1E+3	1.3E+1	2.1E+0	*	
4	2.2E+4	1.3E+2	*	*	1.5E+3	9.5E+0	1.5E+0	*	

1	1.0E+3	6.2E+0	*	*	7.0E+1	*	*	*	ALERT
2	5.0E+2	3.1E+0	*	*	3.5E+1	*	*	*	
3	3.3E+2	2.0E+0	*	*	2.3E+1	*	*	*	
4	2.5E+2	1.5E+0	*	*	1.75E+1	*	*	*	

1	1.0E+2	6.2E-1	*	*	7.0E+0	*	*	*	UNUSUAL EVENT
2	5.0E+1	3.1E-1	*	*	3.5E+0	*	*	*	
3	3.3E+1	2.0E-1	*	*	2.3E+0	*	*	*	
4	2.5E+1	1.5E-1	*	*	1.7E+0	*	*	*	

* Offscale Low

** Offscale High (Confirmation Only)

CHART A(2) GASEOUS EFFLUENT ACTION LEVELS continued

2. AUX BUILDING VENT RELEASES WITHOUT CORE DAMAGE

NOTE: Use adverse meteorology conditions (ADV MET) only when, 10m and 60m wind speed < 5mph AND Delta-T > +2.4 degrees F or Sigma Theta is < 3.01 degrees. All other cases are average meteorology (AVG MET).

NOTE: R-13 and R-14 are expected to be off scale high during all events on this page.

SV & SFP FANS	AUX BLDG SPING MONITORS				EMERG. CLASS.
	MID RANGE CPM (01-07) PPCS PT G9086G		HIGH RANGE CPM (01-09) PPCS PT G9088G		
	AVG MET	ADV MET	AVG MET	ADV MET	
1	**	9.4E+4	1.6E+4	1.0E+2	GENERAL EMERG.
2	**	4.7E+4	8.0E+3	5.0E+1	
3	**	3.1E+4	5.3E+3	3.3E+1	
4	**	2.3E+4	4.0E+3	2.5+1	

1	7.5E+5	4.6E+3	8.0E+2	5.0E+0	SITE EMERG.
2	3.7E+5	2.3E+3	4.0E+2	2.5E+0	
3	2.5E+5	1.5E+3	2.6E+2	1.6E+0	
4	1.8E+5	1.1E+3	2.0E+2	1.2E+0	

SV & SFP FANS TOTAL NUMBER RUNNING	AUX BLDG SPING MONITORS		EMERG. CLASS.
	LOW RANGE Ci/cc (01-05) PPCS PT G9084G	MID RANGE CPM (01-07) PPCS PT 9086G	
1	**	8.6E+3	ALERT
2	**	4.3E+3	
3	**	2.8E+3	
4	**	2.1E+3	

1	6.3E-2	8.6E+2	UNUSUAL EVENT
2	3.1E-2	4.3E+2	
3	2.1E-2	2.8E+2	
4	1.5E-2	2.1E+2	

** Offscale High (Confirmation Only)

CHART A(2)
GASEOUS EFFLUENT ACTION LEVELS continued

3. STEAM LINE RELEASE WITH SIGNIFICANT CORE DAMAGE

Instrument readings assuming radioactive steam is releasing at a total of 1.4E+5 pounds per hour to the atmosphere AND Containment High Range Radiation Monitor 42599 (R-40) or 42600 (R-41) reads 1000 R/hr for > 2 minutes within one-half hour of the accident.

R-15 (cpm)	"A" Steam Line Monitors		"B" Steam Line Monitors		Emergency Classification
	R-31 (mR/hr)	R-32 (R/hr)	R-33 (mR/hr)	R-34 (R/hr)	
**	1.3E+3	1.3E+0	1.3E+03	1.3E+0	General Emergency
**	6.0E+1	--	6.0E+1	--	Site Emergency
**	1.5E-1	--	1.5E-1	--	Alert
2.0E+05	--	--	--	--	Unusual Event

** Offscale High (Confirmation Only)

4. SHIELD BUILDING STACK RELEASE

Instrument readings assuming SBV System is operating in the recirculation mode.

Reactor Bldg. Discharge Vent SPING		Emergency Classification
PPCS PT G9077G (02-07) Mid Range (cpm)	PPCS PT G9079G (02-09) High Range (cpm)	
1.3E+05	1.5E+2	General Emergency
6.7E+03	7.0E+0	Site Emergency
1.5E+1	--	Alert
--	--	Unusual Event

CHART B FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) <u>CET > 1,200 Degrees for greater than 15 minutes, OR</u> (2) <u>R40 or R41 > 1,000 R/hr, OR</u> (3) <u>SACRG-1, Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response has been implemented.</u>	Plant conditions exist that make the release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible.	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(Major damage is more than one spent fuel element damaged.) (1) <u>Fuel Handling accident in Containment</u> a. Alarm on R-11 <u>OR</u> R-12, <u>AND</u> b. Dropped spent fuel assembly, <u>OR</u> c. Report of a large object dropped in Rx core, <u>OR</u> (2) <u>Fuel Handling Accident in Auxiliary Bldg.</u> a. Alarm on R-13 or R-14, <u>AND</u> b. A large object dropped in spent fuel pool, <u>OR</u> c. A dropped spent fuel assembly, <u>OR</u> d. A loss of water level below spent fuel.	Major damage to spent fuel in containment or auxiliary building.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) R-9 indication is offscale high, <u>AND</u> (2) Laboratory analysis confirms RCS activity levels comparable to USAR Appendix D, Table D.4-1.	<u>Severe loss of fuel cladding</u> a. Very high coolant activity sample b. Failed fuel monitor indicates greater than 1% fuel failures within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failures.	ALERT
(1) <u>Fuel Handling Accident in Containment</u> a. A confirming report, <u>AND</u> b. Alarm on R-11 <u>OR</u> R-12, <u>OR</u> (2) <u>Fuel Handling Accident in Auxiliary Bldg.</u> a. A confirming report, <u>AND</u> b. Alarm on R-13 <u>OR</u> R-14.	Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or auxiliary building.	ALERT
(1) With RCS Temperature > 500°F, a. > 1.0 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gram}$ DOSE Equivalent I-131 for 48 hours, <u>OR</u> . b. Exceeding 60 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gram}$ for Dose Equivalent I-131, <u>OR</u> c. > 91/ \bar{E} $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$ As determined by SP-37-065 (from T.S. 3.1.c)	High reactor coolant activity sample.	UNUSUAL EVENT
(1) R-9 is greater than 5.0 R/hr, <u>AND</u> (2) Verified by RCS chemistry sample analysis.	Failed fuel monitor indicates greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes.	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART C PRIMARY LEAK TO LOCA

NOTE: This chart does not apply when leakage from the Reactor Coolant System is caused by a Steam Generator tube rupture.

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) <u>LOCA</u> is verified per IPEOP E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," <u>AND</u> (2) ECCS failure is indicated by: a. SI and RHR pumps not running, <u>OR</u> b. Verification of no flow to the reactor vessel, <u>OR</u> c. Core exit thermocouples indicate greater than 1,200°F, <u>AND</u> (3) Failure or potential failure of containment is indicated by: a. Physical evidence of containment structure damage, <u>OR</u> b. Containment Pressure is > 23 PSIG and loss of all containment fan coil units and both trains of ICS, <u>OR</u> c. Containment hydrogen monitor indicates ≥ 10% hydrogen concentration, <u>OR</u> d. Containment pressure exceeds 46 psig.	(1) Loss of coolant accident, <u>AND</u> (2) Initial or subsequent failure of ECCS, <u>AND</u> (3) Containment failure or potential failure exists (loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier).	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(1) SI System is activated and RCS leakage exceeds charging system capacity as verified by Control Room indications or IPEOPs.	Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than make-up pump capacity.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Charging flow verses letdown flow indicates an unisolable RCS leak > 50 gpm.	Reactor Coolant System leak rate greater than 50 GPM.	ALERT
(1) Initiation of reactor shutdown <u>required</u> by Technical Specification, Section T.S. 3.1.d. Indicated leakage may be determined using Reactor Coolant System mass balance calculations performed by SP-36-082.	Exceeding Reactor Coolant System leak rate, Technical Specifications, requiring reactor shutdown.	UNUSUAL EVENT

**CHART D
PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK**

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Entry into IPEOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," is expected or has occurred, <u>AND</u> (2) Primary-to-secondary flow > 800 GPM OR RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably, <u>AND</u> (3) All three transformers Main Aux., Reserve Aux., and Tertiary Aux., are de-energized.	Rapid failure of steam generator tubes with loss of off-site power.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Entry into IPEOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," is expected or has occurred, <u>AND</u> (2) Primary-to-secondary leak rate > 400 GPM, <u>AND</u> (3) All three transformers: Main Aux., Reserve Aux., and Tertiary Aux., are de-energized.	Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of off-site power.	ALERT
(1) Entry into IPEOP E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," is expected or has occurred, <u>AND</u> (2) Primary-to-secondary leak rate greater than 800 GPM indicated by SI flow <u>OR</u> RWST level change.	Rapid failure of multiple steam generator tubes.	ALERT
(1) Primary-to-secondary leakage > 150 gallons per day for more than 4 hours (TS 3.1.d.2). (Do not delay declaration if leakage suddenly increases above 150 gallons per day <u>AND</u> plant shutdown actions are initiated.)	Exceeding Primary-to-Secondary leak rate Technical Specification.	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART E LOSS OF POWER

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) RCS is $\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$, <u>AND</u> (2) Buses 1 through 6 are de-energized including the D/G supplies to buses 5 and 6, <u>AND</u> (3) Loss of the turbine driven AFW pump, <u>AND</u> (4) Conditions exist for greater than 2 hours.	Failure of off-site and on-site AC power, <u>AND</u> Total loss of auxiliary feedwater makeup capability for greater than 2 hours. (Loss of power plus loss of all AFW would lead to clad failure and potential containment failure.)	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(1) Buses 1 through 6 are de-energized including the D/G supplies to buses 5 and 6 for longer than 15 minutes. (Does not apply when core is unloaded or cavity is flooded with internals removed.)	Loss of off-site power, <u>AND</u> Loss of on-site AC power (for more than 15 minutes).	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Low voltage lockout <u>OR</u> de-energized condition on all safeguards DC distribution cabinets for greater than 15 minutes. a. BRA 102 and BRB 102, <u>OR</u> b. BRA 104 and BRB 104, <u>OR</u> c. BRA 102 and BRB 104, <u>OR</u> d. BRB 102 and BRA 104 (Does not apply when core is unloaded or cavity is flooded with internals removed.)	Loss of all vital on-site DC power (for more than 15 minutes).	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Low voltage lockout <u>OR</u> de-energized condition on all safeguards DC distribution cabinets for less than 15 minutes. a. BRA 102 and BRB 102, <u>OR</u> b. BRA 104 and BRB 104, <u>OR</u> c. BRA 102 and BRB 104, <u>OR</u> d. BRB 102 and BRA 104 (Does not apply when core is unloaded or cavity is flooded with internals removed.)	Loss of all vital on-site DC power (for less than 15 minutes).	ALERT
(1) Buses 1 through 6 are de-energized, <u>AND</u> (2) The D/G supplies to buses 5 and 6 do not respond as designed. AC power is restored to bus 5 or 6 within 15 minutes. (Does not apply when core is unloaded or cavity is flooded with internals removed.)	Loss of off-site power, <u>AND</u> Loss of on-site AC power (for less than 15 minutes.)	ALERT
(1) With the Reactor Coolant System above cold shutdown condition: a. All three transformers: Main Aux., Reserve Aux., and Tertiary are de-energized, <u>OR</u> b. Both D/Gs unavailable (unable to supply bus 5 or 6 by any means).	Loss of off-site power, <u>OR</u> Loss of on-site power capability.	UNUSUAL EVENT
(1) Core is unloaded or reactor cavity is flooded with internals removed, <u>AND</u> (2) Buses 1 through 6 are de-energized including the D/G supplies to buses 5 and 6 for longer than 15 minutes.	Loss of off-site power, <u>AND</u> Loss of on-site AC power (for more than 15 minutes).	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART F ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ANOMALY

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
<p>(1) RCS > 200°F with a loss of cooling capability or inventory control:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Loss of negative reactivity control, <u>OR</u> b. Steam dump, S/G safeties, and power operating reliefs not operable (> 350°F), <u>OR</u> c. Inability to feed S/Gs (No AFW or Main Feedwater/Condensate Flow), <u>OR</u> d. Loss of RCS inventory control, <u>OR</u> e. Loss of both trains of RHR, <u>AND</u> the inability to sustain either natural <u>OR</u> forced circulation with the steam generators ($\leq 350^\circ\text{F}$). <p>(A Site Emergency should be declared upon the initiation of bleed and feed per FR H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.")</p>	Complete loss of any function needed when RCS > 200°F.	SITE EMERGENCY
<p>(Apply this criteria when the RCS is $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$.)</p> <p>(1) Loss of both trains of RHR</p> <p>(Does not apply when core is unloaded <u>OR</u> cavity is flooded with internals removed.)</p>	Complete loss of any function needed when RCS $\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$.	ALERT
<p>(1) Failure of both Rx trip breakers to open upon receipt of a valid signal. Applies even if IPEOP FR S.1 is not entered.</p>	Failure of the Reactor Protection System to initiate and complete a reactor trip which brings the reactor subcritical.	ALERT
<p>(1) Loss of ESF function, required support function or required Tech Spec instruments <u>OR</u> Exceeding Tech Spec Safety Limits, <u>AND</u></p> <p>(2) upon discovery, inability or failure to take required shutdown or mode change actions within the required time.</p> <p>(Total loss of AFW system when required (FR-H.1 implemented) should be declared a UE regardless of Tech Spec action compliance.)</p>	Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech Spec limits	UNUSUAL EVENT

**CHART G
LOSS OF INDICATION**

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Total loss of Annunciator System computer alarms, and sequence of events recorder for greater than 15 minutes, <u>AND</u> (2) Uncontrolled plant transient in progress or initiated during the loss.	Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost and a plant transient initiated or in progress.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Total loss of Annunciator System, computer alarms, and sequence of events recorder. (Not applicable when plant is at or below cold shutdown.)	Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost.	ALERT
(1) Significant loss of ESF or Rx Protection instrumentation. An Unusual Event should <u>NOT</u> be declared for a non-emergency Tech Spec backdown, when the affected parameter remains monitorable. (Not applicable when plant is at or below cold shutdown.)	Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment capability.	UNUSUAL EVENT

**CHART H
(DELETED)**

CHART I SECONDARY SIDE ANOMALY

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Main steam line break that results in a SI actuation, <u>AND</u> (2) a. R-15 or R-19 reads offscale high with confirmation by chemistry analysis, <u>OR</u> b. Primary-to-secondary leakage > 50 gpm, <u>AND</u> (3) a. R-9 or CNTMT high range rad monitors (42599, 42600) indicate > 10 R/hr, <u>OR</u> b. CNTMT hydrogen monitor indicates > 1% hydrogen concentration.	Steam line break, <u>AND</u> Primary-to-secondary leak > 50 GPM, <u>AND</u> Indication of Fuel Damage.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Main steam line break that results in a SI actuation, <u>AND</u> a. R-15 <u>OR</u> R-19 reads a factor of 1000 above normal, <u>OR</u> b. Primary-to-secondary leakage > 10 gpm.	Steam line break with significant (greater than 10 GPM) primary-to-secondary leakage. (Applies even if events occur in opposite steam generators.)	ALERT
(1) Turbine trip and observation of penetration of casing.	Turbine rotating component failure causing rapid plant shutdown.	UNUSUAL EVENT
(1) The uncontrolled depressurization of the secondary system that results in an SI actuation.	Rapid depressurization of the secondary side.	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART J
MISCELLANEOUS ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIONS

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
<p>(1) Containment boundary failure or potential failure:</p> <p>a. Containment pressure > 46 psig, <u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Loss of all containment fan coil units and both trains of ICS, <u>OR</u></p> <p>c. Containment hydrogen monitor \geq 10% hydrogen concentration, <u>AND</u></p> <p>(2) Loss of core cooling capability:</p> <p>a. Loss of SI and RHR flow, <u>AND</u></p> <p>(3) Failure of shutdown system when required:</p> <p>a. Entry into IPEOP FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," <u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Loss of AFW for greater than 30 minutes with loss of main FW and condensate.</p>	<p>Other plant conditions that make a release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible; e.g., any core melt situation.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Failure of main FW and AFW systems for greater than 30 minutes without Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal flow. Plus a containment failure is imminent. - Transient requiring the operation of shutdown systems with a failure of these shutdown systems. In addition, failure of SI and RHR and containment failure is imminent. 	<p style="text-align: center;">GENERAL EMERGENCY</p>
<p>(1) Evacuation of Control Room (E-O-06 event).</p>	<p>Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems required from local stations.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SITE EMERGENCY</p>
<p>(1) Conditions that warrant increased awareness on part of the plant staff will be evaluated by the Plant Manager or his designate. This is to determine if conditions are applicable for activating the E.P.</p> <p><u>Example:</u> Loss of AFW system when required, validated upon implementation of FR H.1 "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."</p>	<p>Other plant conditions that warrant increased awareness on the part of plant staff or state and/or local authorities.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">UNUSUAL EVENT</p>

**CHART K
FIRE AND FIRE PROTECTION**

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) A fire within the Auxiliary Building, Technical Support Center, safeguards alley, D/G rooms, Battery Rooms, or screenhouse that defeats redundant safety trains of ESF equipment causing the required ESF system to be inoperable.	A fire compromising the functions of safety systems.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) A fire within the Auxiliary Building, Technical Support Center, safeguards alley, D/G rooms, Battery Rooms, or screenhouse that lasts more than 10 minutes OR causes a single train of required ESF equipment to be inoperable.	A fire potentially affecting safety systems.	ALERT
(1) Any fire within the protected area lasting more than 10 minutes.	A fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes.	UNUSUAL EVENT

**CHART L
(DELETED)**

CHART M EARTHQUAKE

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Activation of seismic recorder with TRIGGER, OBE, and DBE lights lit in relay room on RR159, <u>AND</u> (2) Verification of a seismic event by physical experience or from U. of W. - Milwaukee Seismic Center.	An earthquake greater than Design Basis Earthquake (DBE).	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Activation of seismic recorder with TRIGGER, and OBE lights lit in relay room on RR159, <u>AND</u> (2) Verification of a seismic event by physical experience or from U. of W. - Milwaukee Seismic Center.	An earthquake greater than Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE).	ALERT
(1) Activation of seismic recorder with TRIGGER light lit in relay room on RR159, <u>OR</u> (2) An earthquake felt in the Plant*. (*Should be confirmed by evidence of physical damage or verification from University of Wisconsin Seismic Center.)	An earthquake felt in plant or detected on station seismic instrumentation.	UNUSUAL EVENT

- NOTE:**
- 1.) Telephone numbers for U of W - Milwaukee Seismic Center are in the KPB Emergency Telephone Directory, ETD 02.
 - 2.) The Point Beach Seismic Monitor may be used if the KNPP Monitor is out of service.

CHART N HIGH WINDS OR TORNADO

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Winds in excess of 100 mph for greater than 1 hour, <u>AND</u> (2) Plant above cold shutdown condition.	Sustained winds in excess of design levels with plant not in cold shutdown.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) A tornado which strikes the facility, <u>AND</u> (2) Causes damage to render a single train of required ESF equipment to be inoperable.	Any tornado striking facility.	ALERT
(1) A tornado observed on-site causing significant damage to the facility.	Any tornado on-site.	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART O FLOOD, LOW WATER, OR SEICHE

KNPP INDICATION				EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
FOREBAY LEVEL Indicated for > 15 minutes				Flood, low water, or seiche near design levels.	ALERT
0 PUMPS	1 PUMP	2 PUMPS	CORRESPOND TO LAKE LEVEL		
NOTE 3	NOTE 1	≥ 94% *	≥ 588 ft.		
< 50% *	NOTE 5	NOTE 5	< 568.5 ft.		
OR Deep water Wave ≥ 22.5 ft.					
FOREBAY LEVEL Indicated for > 15 minutes				50-year flood, low water level or seiche	UNUSUAL EVENT
0 PUMPS	1 PUMP	2 PUMPS	CORRESPOND TO LAKE LEVEL		
NOTE 2	≥ 98% *	≥ 88% *	≥ 586 ft.		
< 53.1% *	< 46.9% * NOTE 4	NOTE 5	< 569.5 ft.		
OR Deep water wave ≥ 18 ft. (as confirmed by the U.S. Coast Guard, Two Rivers)					

NOTE 1: Above the bottom of bar No. 1 painted on the south wall of the forebay.

NOTE 2: Above the bottom of bar No. 2 painted on the south wall of the forebay.

NOTE 3: Above the bottom of bar No. 3 painted on the south wall of the forebay.

NOTE 4: Applies to an uncontrollable decrease (cannot be restored by operator action. If the water box inlet valves are throttled, use other means to determine lake level per E-CW-04, "Loss of Circulating Water.")

NOTE 5: The corresponding forebay level for the associated lake level is below the circulating water pump trip setpoint of 42%. Therefore, this criterion will not be reached.

* Computer point for forebay level is L09075A and should be used because of its greater accuracy. Plant elevations and lake elevations are referenced to International Great Lakes Datum (IGLD), 1955

(IGLD 1955 = IGLD 1985 - 0.7 FEET)

CHART P
EXTERNAL EVENTS AND CHEMICAL SPILLS

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) An aircraft crash into plant buildings which causes a complete loss of an ESF function.	Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact <u>OR</u> fire.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) A missile strikes plant buildings, <u>OR</u> (2) An explosion occurs within a plant building, which causes a complete loss of an ESF function.	Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Release of flammable or toxic gas from a ruptured container, which causes or is likely to cause evacuation of stations necessary to control shutdown systems, <u>AND</u> (2) Portable monitors indicate toxic or explosive concentrations of the gas at life threatening levels in those vital areas.	Uncontrolled release of toxic or flammable gas is confirmed within vital area.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) An aircraft crashes into plant buildings <u>AND</u> causes a single train of required ESF equipment to be inoperable.	Aircraft crash on facility.	ALERT
(1) A missile strikes the facility <u>AND</u> causes a single train of required ESF equipment to be inoperable.	Missile impact from whatever source on facility.	ALERT
(1) Release of toxic or flammable gas at life threatening levels from a ruptured container enter the protected area <u>AND</u> impacts safe operation of the plant.	Uncontrolled release of toxic or flammable gas is confirmed within the protected area.	ALERT
(1) Self-explanatory.	Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation.	ALERT
(1) An aircraft crash within the site boundary, <u>OR</u> (2) Unusual aircraft activity such as erratic flying, dropped unidentified object, or other hostile acts, which threaten the plant or plant personnel. (Any other persistent aircraft activity for which identification attempts through the FAA or other agencies have been unsuccessful.)	Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility.	UNUSUAL EVENT
(1) Release of toxic or flammable gas from a ruptured tank/truck on site, <u>AND</u> (2) Portable monitors indicate toxic or explosive concentrations at life threatening levels of the gas near the spill area.	Uncontrolled release of toxic or flammable gas is confirmed on site.	UNUSUAL EVENT

CHART Q SECURITY CONTINGENCY

KNPP INDICATION	EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA	CLASSIFICATION
(1) Physical attack on the plant that has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the control room or any other vital areas as described in the Security Plan.	Loss of physical control of the plant.	GENERAL EMERGENCY
(1) Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the control room, auxiliary shutdown panels, or other vital areas as defined by the Security Plan.	Imminent loss of physical control of the plant.	SITE EMERGENCY
(1) Security safeguards contingency event that results in a hostile force entering the protected area of the plant, but not gaining control over shutdown capability or of any vital areas as defined in the Security Plan, <u>OR</u> (2) Security safeguards contingency event that results in a site specific HI level CREDIBLE threat as defined in the Security Plan.	Ongoing security compromise.	ALERT
(1) Security safeguards contingency event that results in a site specific LO level CREDIBLE threat as defined in the Security Plan, <u>OR</u> (2) Security safeguards contingency event that results in a Bomb threat accompanied by interception of bomb materials, <u>OR</u> (3) Security safeguards contingency event that results in an attempted entry into the protected area of the plant by a hostile force, <u>OR</u> (4) Security safeguards contingency event that results in undetonated bomb found within the protected area.	Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.	UNUSUAL EVENT

NOTE: Security staff will NOT act as notifier during security events. Utilize Control Room staff for notifications.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant		No. EPIP-TSC-03	Rev. W
		Title Plant Status Procedure	
<i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>		Date MAY 5 2003	Page 1 of 4
		Reviewed By Jim Chadek	
		Approved By Jerrie Morlino	
Nuclear Safety Related	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	PORC Review Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
		SRO Approval Of Temporary Changes Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No

1.0 Purpose

- 1.1 This procedure provides instruction for the Data Coordinator or other Technical Support Center (TSC) staff members to maintain checklists for awareness of plant parameters, equipment availability, and radiological conditions.

2.0 General Notes

- 2.1 None

3.0 Precautions and Limitations

- 3.1 None

4.0 Initial Conditions

- 4.1 This procedure shall be implemented upon declaration of an **Alert, Site Emergency, General Emergency**, or when directed by the Shift Manager or Emergency Director.

5.0 Procedure

- 5.1 Start the trend recorders in the TSC (Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and meteorological) using instructions on Form EPIPF-TSC-02-04.
- 5.2 Ensure Technical Support Center (TSC) instrumentation and parameter displays are activated and functional.
- 5.2.1 IF a display is not functional, THEN contact the KNPP Computer Group.
- 5.3 Contact the Technical Support Center Director (TSCD) to determine if trends of critical parameters are needed.
- 5.4 If directed, initiate the following trends for the event in progress (i.e., LOCA: RWST Level versus Containment Sump Level):
- 5.4.1 Safety Assessment System
- 5.4.2 Digital Display (#3)
- 5.4.3 PPCS Computer Trend Recorders

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No.	EPIP-TSC-03	Rev.	W
	Title	Plant Status Procedure		
	Date	MAY 5 2003	Page 2 of 4	

5.5 Obtain Data from the Plant Process Computer.

5.5.1 Call up *Graphic Display #51*, Plant System Status (Form EPIPF-TSC-03-01) on the system.

5.5.2 Obtain a hard copy by pressing the *Print TSC Screen* function key.

5.5.3 Call up *Graphic Display #52*, Environmental Status Board (Form EPIPF-TSC-03-03) on the PPCS Computer system.

5.5.4 Obtain a hard copy by pressing the *Print TSC Screen* function key.

5.5.5 Call up *Group Outputs #45* and *#46*, Radiation Monitors on the System, and copy data onto Form EPIPF-TSC-03-04.

5.6 Direct the ERF Communicator - TSC to obtain the following information from the Control Room to complete Forms EPIPF-TSC-03-01 and EPIPF-TSC-03-02:

5.6.1 S/G PORV/STM Dump, A/B, Cond/ATM

5.6.2 SI Acc Level 1A/B

5.6.3 Containment Humidity

5.6.4 RXCP Status A/B

5.7 Coordinate with the ERF Communicator - TSC to determine plant equipment status and record on Form EPIPF-TSC-03-02.

5.8 Data not available on the SPDS for Environmental Status Board (Form EPIPF-TSC-03-03) should be obtained and filled in by hand using the following guidelines:

a. Meteorological

1. Meteorological strip chart printers in the TSC
2. Point Beach Control Room
3. National Weather Service

b. Radiological Release

1. Radiological Protection Director (RPD)
2. Environmental Protection Director (EPD)

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No.	EPIP-TSC-03	Rev.	W
	Title	Plant Status Procedure		
	Date	MAY 5 2003	Page 3 of 4	

c. Protective Action Recommendation

1. Emergency Director (ED)
2. Technical Support Center Director (TSCD)

5.9 Periodically update the status boards from the completed forms based upon:

- 5.9.1 The magnitude and pace of event.
- 5.9.2 When a significant change in parameters or equipment status occurs.
- 5.9.3 As a mean guide, update approximately every 15 minutes.

5.10 Review data for trends or significant changes.

5.11 Notify the ED or TSCD of any critical items.

5.12 Return to Step 5.4.

6.0 Final Conditions

6.1 Plant Emergency has been Terminated or Recovery actions have begun and the Emergency Response Manager has suspended the use of EIPs.

7.0 References

- 7.1 COMTRAK 84-177
- 7.2 COMTRAK 87-156
- 7.3 EPIP Appendix B, Forms

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No.	EPIP-TSC-03	Rev.	W
	Title	Plant Status Procedure		
	Date	MAY 5 2003	Page 4 of 4	

8.0 Records

8.1 The following QA records and non-QA records are identified in this directive/procedure and are listed on the KNPP Records Retention Schedule. These records shall be maintained according to the KNPP Records Management Program.

8.1.1 QA Records

- TSC Chart Recorder Operation Checklist, Form EPIPF-TSC-02-04
- Plant System Status, Form EPIPF-TSC-03-01
- Plant Equipment Status, Form EPIPF-TSC-03-02
- Environmental Status Board, Form EPIPF-TSC-03-03
- Radiation Monitors, Form EPIPF-TSC-03-04

8.1.2 Non-QA Records

None

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>		No.	EPIP-TSC-09A	Rev.	K		
		Title	Core Damage Assessment				
		Date	MAY 5 2003	Page 1 of 11			
Reviewed By		John Helfenberger		Approved By		Jerrie Morlino	
Nuclear Safety Related	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	PORC Review Required	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	SRO Approval Of Temporary Changes Required	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		

1.0 Purpose

1.1 This procedure provides instruction for assessing the degree of core damage during an accident. In addition, the guideline provides information for the assessment of the appropriate Emergency Action Level for off-site radiological protective actions based on the degree of core damage. Specifically, the information contained in this guideline relates to:

- Determination of the degree of damage to the fuel rod cladding that results in the release of the fission product inventory in the fuel rod gap space
- Determination of the degree of core overheating that results in the release of the fission product inventory in the fuel pellets
- Determination of the appropriate Emergency Action Level for off-site radiological protective actions based on the degree of damage to the reactor core

2.0 General Notes

2.1 None

3.0 Precautions and Limitations

3.1 None

4.0 Initial Conditions

4.1 This guideline is to be used when Technical Support Center is activated and a Core Damage Assessment is requested.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No. EPIP-TSC-09A	Rev. K
	Title Core Damage Assessment	
	Date MAY 5 2003	Page 2 of 11

5.0 Procedure

5.1 Identify Current Plant Status

- 5.1.1 Complete Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-05 except for the last column.
- 5.1.2 Using the table below, determine the possible status of the reactor core.
- 5.1.3 Record status on Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-05.
- 5.1.4 Go to the appropriate section of this guideline as indicated from the table.

High Level Core Damage Assessment	
Plant Status	Fuel Rod Fission Product Status
Core Exit Thermocouple Temperature LESS THAN 700°F, AND Containment Radiation Below Curve in Attachment A	No Core Damage Continue to Monitor Plant Parameters
Core Exit Thermocouple Temperature LESS THAN 1800°F, AND Containment Radiation Below Curve in Attachment B	Possible Fuel Rod Clad Damage Go to step 5.2
Core Exit Thermocouple Temperature GREATER THAN 1800°F, OR Containment Radiation Above Curve in Attachment B	Possible Fuel Overtemperature Damage Go to step 5.3

5.2 Estimate Fuel Rod Clad Damage

- 5.2.1 Estimate fuel rod clad damage based on containment radiation levels.
 - 5.2.1.1 Complete lines 1-4 of Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-02.
- 5.2.2 Estimate fuel rod clad damage based on core exit thermocouple readings.
 - 5.2.2.1 Complete lines 5-10 of Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-02.
- 5.2.3 Verify reasonableness of clad damage estimates.
 - 5.2.3.1 Complete lines 11-17 of Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-02.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No. EPIP-TSC-09A	Rev. K
	Title Core Damage Assessment	
	Date MAY 5 2003	Page 3 of 11

5.2.3.2 IF expected response is not obtained, THEN determine if the deviation can be explained

from the accident progression

- injection of water to the RCS
- bleed paths from the RCS
- direct radiation to the containment radiation monitors, OR

from conservatism in the predictive model

- fuel burnup
- fission product retention in the RCS
- fission product removal from containment

5.2.3.3 Record explanation of deviations on Form EPIP-TSC-09A-02.

5.2.4 Report Findings.

5.2.4.1 Fill out Form EPIP-TSC-09A-07 if level of damage has changed and give to Emergency Director.

5.2.5 Go to Step 5.1.

5.3 Estimate Fuel Overtemperature Damage

5.3.1 Estimate fuel overtemperature damage based on containment radiation levels.

5.3.1.1 Complete lines 1-4 of Form EPIP-TSC-09A-03.

5.3.2 Estimate fuel overtemperature damage based on core exit thermocouple readings.

5.3.2.1 Complete lines 5-7 of Form EPIP-TSC-09A-03.

5.3.3 Estimate fuel overtemperature damage based on hydrogen concentration.

5.3.3.1 Complete lines 8-11 of Form EPIP-TSC-09A-03.

5.3.4 Verify reasonableness of fuel overtemperature damage estimates.

5.3.4.1 Complete lines 12-18 of Form EPIP-TSC-09A-03.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No. EPIP-TSC-09A	Rev. K
	Title Core Damage Assessment	
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5.3.4.2 IF expected response is not obtained, THEN determine if the deviation can be explained

from the accident progression

- injection of water to the RCS
- bleed paths from the RCS
- direct radiation to the containment radiation monitors
- hydrogen burn in containment or operation of hydrogen igniters, OR

from conservatisms in the predictive model

- fuel burnup
- fission product retention in the RCS
- fission product removal form containment

5.3.4.3 Record explanations of deviations on Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-03.

5.3.5 Report findings.

5.3.5.1 Fill out Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-07 if level of damage has changed and give to Emergency Director.

5.3.6 Go to Step 5.1.

6.0 Final Conditions

6.1 None

7.0 References

- 7.1 WCAP-14696-A Revision 1, "Westinghouse Owners Group, Core Damage Assessment Guidance," November 1999
- 7.2 Letter from John G. Lamb (NRC) to Mark Reddemann (NMC) transmitting the NRC SER for Amendment 160 to the Operating License allowing removal of Post Accident Sampling System from Technical Specifications, Letter No. K-02-006, Dated January 16, 2002
- 7.3 COMTRAK's 89-026 and 89-027
- 7.4 Calculation C11403, Determination of Setpoints for EPIP-TSC-09A
- 7.5 EPIP-EOF-04, EOF Staff Action for Alert or Higher

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant <i>Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure</i>	No.	EPIP-TSC-09A	Rev.	K
	Title	Core Damage Assessment		
	Date	MAY 5 2003	Page 5 of 11	

8.0 Records

8.1 The following QA records and non-QA records are identified in this directive/procedure and are listed on the KNPP Records Retention Schedule. These records shall be maintained according to the KNPP Records Management Program.

8.1.1 QA Records

- Core Exit Thermocouple Data, Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-01
- Fuel Rod Clad Damage Estimate, Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-02
- Fuel Rod Overtemperature Damage Estimate, Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-03
- Core Damage Assessment (Monitoring Data), Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-05
- Core Damage Assessment Results, Form EPIPF-TSC-09A-07

8.1.2 Non-QA Records


None

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS/FORMS


ATTACHMENT	TITLE
Attachment A	Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for RCS Release
Attachment B	Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 1% Fuel Overtemperature Release
Attachment C	Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Clad Damage Release
Attachment D	Containment Radiation Level vs. Time for 100% Fuel Overtemperature Release
Attachment E	Hydrogen Concentration for 100% Core Overtemperature Damage

FORM	TITLE
Form EIPF-TSC-09A-01	Core Exit Thermocouple Data
Form EIPF-TSC-09A-02	Fuel Rod Clad Damage Estimate
Form EIPF-TSC-09A-03	Fuel Rod Overtemperature Damage Estimate
Form EIPF-TSC-09A-05	Core Damage Assessment (Monitoring Data)
Form EIPF-TSC-09A-07	Core Damage Assessment Results

CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL vs. TIME FOR RCS RELEASE




CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL vs. TIME FOR 1% FUEL OVERTEMPERATURE RELEASE




RCS Press < 1600 psig No ICS
 RCS Press < 1600 psig, ICS On
 RCS Press > 1600 psig No ICS
 RCS Press > 1600 psig, ICS On

CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL vs. TIME FOR 100% CLAD DAMAGE RELEASE



RCS Press < 1600 psig No ICS
 RCS Press < 1600 psig ICS On
 RCS Press > 1600 psig No ICS
 RCS Press > 1600 psig ICS On

CONTAINMENT RADIATION LEVEL vs. TIME FOR 100% FUEL OVERTEMPERATURE RELEASE




RCS Press < 1600 psig No ICS

 RCS Press < 1600 psig ICS On

 RCS Press > 1600 psig No ICS

 RCS Press > 1600 psig ICS On

HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION FOR 100% CORE OVERTEMPERATURE DAMAGE



- A RCS Pressure < 1050 psig, core recovered
- B RCS Pressure > 1050 psig, core recovered
- C Core not recovered

EVENT NOTICE

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM FORM (NARS)

NOTE: DO NOT FAX THIS PAGE TO STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

DIRECTIONS FOR FILLING OUT THE FORM

Box #1	Reason For Call: Check appropriate.
Box #2	Check appropriate status.
Box #3	Check affected plant and unit(s).
Box #4	Classification being declared. <u>IF</u> this is a PAR Change notification, <u>THEN</u> check the current classification.
Box #5	Check the applicable event(s) and fill in the time and date. If a classification, fill in EAL chart letter.
Box #6	Indicate whether a radioactive release is occurring. The definition of radioactive release is the release of radioactive material to the environment attributable to the emergency event. At a minimum, a potential radioactive release always exists at a SE and General Emergency because of the definition of SE and General Emergency.
Box #7	Indicate whether there is an airborne or liquid radioactive release in progress. <u>IF</u> there is no release in progress, <u>THEN</u> Check Not Applicable.
Box #8	Use the current Primary 10-meter 15-minute average MET DATA if reliable; <u>OTHERWISE</u> , use the backup 10 meter 15-minute average MET DATA or the Primary 60 meter 15-minute average MET DATA. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fill the blank indicating the "From" wind direction. 2. Circle the appropriate downwind affected sectors using guidance of Table 1.
Box #9	Use the current primary tower 10 meter 15-minute average MET DATA <u>IF</u> reliable; <u>OTHERWISE</u> , use the backup tower 10 meter, or primary tower 60 meter data. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fill the blank indicating the current wind speed. 2. <u>IF</u> available, Circle the appropriate stability class. Use Delta-T for stability class <u>IF</u> reliable, <u>OTHERWISE</u> Primary or Backup Sigma Theta for stability class. Stability class can be found on the Control Room ARTO screen. Click on the "met data" icon in the bottom right corner and the screen that pops up will have stability class.
Box #10	Indicate protective action recommendations. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For a General Emergency, indicate a PAR as directed by procedure EPIP-AD-03 or EPIP-AD-04 or EPIP-AD-19. 2. <u>IF</u> this is a PAR change, <u>THEN</u> include any previously chosen affected sectors to indicate all affected sectors.
Box #11	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>IF</u> classifying an event, <u>THEN</u> at a minimum describe the EAL being implemented. 2. <u>IF</u> making a PAR change, <u>THEN</u> write "None", "PAR Change" or other applicable information related to the PAR.

TABLE 1

WIND DIRECTION (FROM)	AFFECTED DOWNWIND SECTORS
For any wind direction, if adverse meteorology (Use for block 10 "PAR" only)	ALL
>350.5 -9	HJK
>9 -13	HJKL
>13 -31.5	JKL
>31.5 -35.5	JKLM
>35.5 -54	KLM
>54 -58	KLMN
>58 -76.5	LMN
>76.5 -80.5	LMNP
>80.5 -99	MNP
>99 -103	MNPQ
>103 -121.5	NPQ
>121.5 -125.5	NPQR
>125.5 -144	PQR
>144 - 148	PQRA
>148 - 166.5	QRA
>166.5 -170.5	QRAB
>170.5 -189	RAB
>189 - 193	RABC
>193 - 211.5	ABC
>211.5 -215.5	ABCD
>215.5 -234	BCD
>234 - 238	BCDE
>238 - 256.5	CDE
>256.5 - 260.5	CDEF
>260.5 -279	DEF
>279 - 283	DEFG
>283 - 301.5	EFG
>301.5 -305.5	EFGH
>305.5 -324	FGH
>324 - 328	FGHJ
>328 - 346.5	GHJ
>346.5 -350.5	GHJK

EVENT NOTICE
TABLE 2
CONVERSION OF DELTA T AND SIGMA THETA

STABILITY CLASSIFICATION	PASQUILL CATEGORIES	SIGMA THETA ($\sigma\theta$) (DEGREES)	60M – 10M DELTA T ($^{\circ}$ F/50M)
Extremely Unstable	A	$\sigma\theta \geq 22.5$	DELTA T ≤ -1.71
Moderately Unstable	B	$22.5 > \sigma\theta \geq 17.5$	$-1.71 < \text{DELTA T} \leq -1.53$
Slightly Unstable	C	$17.5 > \sigma\theta \geq 12.5$	$-1.53 < \text{DELTA T} \leq -1.35$
Neutral	D	$12.5 > \sigma\theta \geq 7.5$	$-1.35 < \text{DELTA T} \leq -0.45$
Slightly Stable	E	$7.5 > \sigma\theta \geq 3.8$	$-0.45 < \text{DELTA T} \leq 1.35$
Moderately Stable	F	$3.8 > \sigma\theta \geq 2.1$	$1.35 < \text{DELTA T} \leq 3.60$
Extremely Stable	G	$2.1 > \sigma\theta$	$3.60 < \text{DELTA T}$

CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RESULTS

- No Damage
- Fuel Rod Clad Damage: _____ %
- Fuel Rod Overtemperature Damage: _____ %

Comments: _____

Core Hydraulics Engineer Date