

Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC

May 6, 2003

10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT
DOCKET 50-255
LICENSE NO. DPR-20
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 03-002, INCOMPLETE SURVEILLANCE OF FUEL
HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM

Licensee Event Report (LER) 03-002 is attached. The LER describes the discovery that prior to the 2001 refueling outage, the fuel handling area ventilation system had not been tested in full accordance with the requirements of the ventilation filter testing program. This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Douglas E. Cooper

Site Vice-President, Palisades

CC

Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region III

Project Manager, USNRC, NRR NRC Resident Inspector – Palisades

Attachment

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APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 **EXPIRES 7-31-2004** NRC FORM 366 **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY** Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear (7-2001) COMMISSION Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bist @nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to Impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 1 of 3 INCOMPLETE SURVEILLANCE OF FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED **FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER** SEQUENTIAL YEAR МО DAY YEAR MO DAY YEAR **FACILITY NAME** DOCKET NUMBER 03 11 2003 2003 - 002 - 00 05 06 2003 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 3: (Check all that apply) 9. OPERATING 1 MODE 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2201(d) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10. POWER 100 LEVEL 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Barb Dotson, Regulatory Analyst (269) 764-2265

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT REPORTABLE TO EPIX MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX MANU-CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) DATE

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 11, 2003, in conjunction with performance of fuel handling area ventilation system (FHAVS) [VG] surveillance testing prior to the 2003 refueling outage, it was determined that the FHAVS was not being tested in full accordance with the ventilation filter testing program specified by Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.10.

Review of the previous three years revealed that surveillance testing of the FHAVS specified by TS SR 3.7.12.1 had not fully met the ventilation filter testing program when the FHAVS was required to be operable during the April-May 2001 refueling outage. Pursuant to TS SR 3.0.1, failure to have met TS SR 3.7.12.1 is a failure to have met TS LCO 3.7.12 requirements for an operable FHAVS for core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies that occurred during the 2001 refueling outage. This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The surveillance procedure was revised and the surveillance requirements successfully completed prior to entering the applicable conditions of TS LCO 3.7.12 for the 2003 refueling outage in March 2003.

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NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE		
}		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT	05000255	2003	- 001 -	00	2	OF	3

^{17.} NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 11, 2003, in conjunction with performance of fuel handling area ventilation system (FHAVS) [VG] surveillance testing prior to the 2003 refueling outage, it was determined that the FHAVS was not being tested in full accordance with the ventilation filter testing program specified by Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.10.

Review of the previous three years revealed that surveillance testing of the FHAVS specified by TS SR 3.7.12.1 had not fully met the ventilation filter testing program when the FHAVS was required to be operable during the April-May 2001 refueling outage. Pursuant to TS SR 3.0.1, failure to have met TS SR 3.7.12.1 is a failure to have met TS LCO 3.7.12 requirements for an operable FHAVS for core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies that occurred during the 2001 refueling outage.

This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Additionally, breaches in the FHAVS ductwork were identified that may have existed prior to the 2001 refueling outage. The ductwork breaches could also have rendered the FHAVS inoperable.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The FHAVS surveillance procedure did not adequately implement the ventilation filter testing program of TS 5.5.10.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Modifications were made to the FHAVS to facilitate testing in accordance with TS 5.5.10. The surveillance procedure was revised and the surveillance requirements successfully completed prior to entering the applicable conditions of TS LCO 3.7.12 for the 2003 refueling outage in March 2003.

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Operation of the FHAVS is not necessary in order to maintain offsite doses within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 following a postulated fuel handling accident. Therefore, a total system failure would not impact the margin of safety as described in the safety analysis. However, analysis has shown that post-accident filtration by the FHAVS provides significant reduction in offsite doses by limiting the release of airborne radioactivity.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None