

Plant Performance Update Meeting



April 29, 2003


Agenda

- Generation Trending Status Dhiaa Jamil
- Nuclear Excellence Review Board Dhiaa Jamil
- Equipment Reliability / Plant Health Teams Jack Peele
- Human Performance Tom Harrall
- Security Bryan Dolan





Generation Trending Status

Unit 1 Power History Curve



Unit 2 Power History Curve





Nuclear Excellence Review Board

Nuclear Excellence Review Board


- Identify and oversee key drivers for successful operation
 - Members
 - Dhiaa Jamil
 - Tom Harrall
 - Jack Peele
 - Key Drivers
 - Self assessment
 - Corrective action
 - Emergency planning
 - Security
 - Environmental
 - Regulatory health
 - Industrial safety
 - Radiological safety
 - Equipment reliability

- Jack Boyle
- Bryan Dolan
- External member
- Configuration management
- Budget
- Human performance
- Training
- Work management
- Outage
- Supervisory/management development
- Workforce planning
- Community relations

Nuclear Excellence Review Board

2003 Initiative

- Determine for each one of the key drivers the answer to two questions:
 - How do you know the health of program/process? (How do you know you're looking at the right stuff?)
 - What is the health?



Equipment Reliability / Plant Health Teams


Challenge

- Equipment performance was not meeting our expectations during 2002 and early 2003:
 - Upward trend in actual generation losses
 - Frequent unplanned challenges to generation
 - Resources often pulled from prevention to reactive duties

Response

- Create a short-term recovery strategy
- Promote shared site-wide focus like a refueling outage
- Charter team leaders via formal pre-job briefing
- Enlist entire workforce via written "time-out"
- Maintain a sense of urgency, "something is different"
- Identify equipment reliability concerns that could lead to unit trip or power reduction
- During the recovery strategy, preserve and continue the established equipment reliability program

Structure



Plant Health Teams (8)

- Each co-chaired by engineering and station division managers, staffed by subject matter experts
- Reviewed known open challenges such as significant corrective actions, corrective maintenance tasks, tech spec items, operator workarounds, single point vulnerabilities, recurring plant action register items, etc.
- Surveyed site teammates to probe for challenges not previously documented
- Sorted the challenges into five action item categories
 (1 = most urgent)
- Reported weekly to Plant Health Committee and to each other


Implementation Team

- Staffed by managers of work execution processes
- Collected input from Plant Health Teams
- Confirmed priorities of action items and performed review for consistency
- Entered the most urgent action items into the appropriate work process and began tracking to completion
- Reported results to Plant Health Committee

Cause Analysis Team

- Staffed by Safety Review Group and Outage Manager
- Searched problem reports for events on highest risk category systems (Apr 02 – Feb 03), selecting approximately 200 for trending
- Screened 11 of 200 events for more comprehensive review
- Performed common cause analysis
- Presented results to Plant Health Committee and CARB

Timeline



Action Category 1 Activities

- Main feedwater pump trip solenoid valves
- Control Room chiller refrigerant low temperature switch
- Auxiliary Feedwater System isolation valve operator limit and torque switches
- SG Blowdown demineralizer resin loading area, threat to main generator stator cooling control panel
- ECCS motor start time extensions
- Turbine valve movement test difficulties

Cause Analysis Team Areas for Improvement

- Comprehensiveness of health reports need improvement
- Over-reliance on equip failures to effect changes rather than proactive efforts
- Input from plant-side groups could more effectively be utilized
- Programs may be too rigid to effect timely resolutions
- Over-reliance on programmatic structure vs. mentoring / experience
- Declining vendor support

Long-Term Transition

- PHT's will be part of the trimester system health reporting cycles
- Will provide cross-organizational input concerning reliability concerns and system health "color"
- Plant Health Committee will provide oversight

Additional Comments

Nuclear Safety System <u>availability</u> has remained high


HPI

RHR

Aux Feed

Emergency AC


- For fourth quarter 2002, all these systems on both units were in second quartile
- Emergency Diesel / Generator system performance 1995-2002 was subject of special NRC inspection in December 2002, with no findings of significance identified



Human Performance

McGuire Nuclear Station Human Performance

- McGuire continues to focus on human performance
- Foundation is "6 Tools for Event Free Human Performance"



HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODEL

McGuire Nuclear Station Human Performance

- Created a structure to manage/oversee site human performance
 - HPRB senior site management oversight
 - HPRC each group chaired by group management
 - HPRC Lead each group represented by a group coordinator
 - OPI Manager site lead

Human Performance Site Focus

- Initial Training (1993 current)
 - Human error reduction training for workers and supervisors (8 hours)
- Continuing Training
 - Bhopal 1998/99 "6 tools reinforced"
 - Titanic 2000/01 the 5 INPO principles
 - Communications Competence 2001/02 site trend
 - Summit Fever 2001/02 reinforce conservative decision making
 - Bringing Out the Best in People 2002 reinforcing correct behaviors


Human Performance Group Focus

- Each group develops focus areas based on trends/issues/events
- Examples
 - MNT correct component verification (CCV)
 - OPS supervisory involvement/oversight
 - CHEM removing distractions

Success Stories

- Correct Component Verification (CCV)
 - MNT CCV focus prior to implementation (July 2000 to February 2002)
 - 5 events (including a reactor trip)
 - MNT CCV Focus following implementation (February 2002 to current)
 - Two minor incidents

Successes – CCV/Mispositionings




2003 Focus for McGuire


- Formality in human performance
 - Improve rigor in execution of processes

Human Performance Measures

- Human performance error rate (new in 2003)
 - Currently 5.12 errors per 10000 work-hours
- Average number of days between human performance events
 - Currently 30.4 days



Security



Questions