



Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 U.S. Highway 61
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Tel 225 336 6225
Fax 225 635 5068

Rick J. King
Director
Nuclear Safety Assurance

May 6, 2003

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: River Bend Station
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47
Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 03-002-00

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-46119
RBF1-03-0075

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report.
There are no commitments in this document.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J. W. Leavins for".

RJK/dhw
enclosure

JEZ

Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 03-002-00
May 6, 2003
RBG-46119
Page 2 of 2

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1050
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
E-Mail

Mr. Jim Calloway
Public Utility Commission of Texas
1701 N. Congress Ave.
Austin, TX 78711-3326

Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury
Program Manager – Surveillance Division
Louisiana DEQ
Office of Radiological Emergency Planning and Response
P. O. Box 82215
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2215

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bis1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) River Bend Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050- 458	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
--	--------------------------------------	---------------------------

TITLE (4)
Secondary Containment Door Failure Due to Malfunction of Door Assist Device

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	07	2003	2003	002	00	05	06	2003		
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	87%	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)					
		20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)					
		20.2203(a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME J.W. Leavines, Manager - Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 225-381-4642

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	NF	DR	Overly Door Co.	YES					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 7, 2003, at approximately 2:31 p.m. CST, the door assist device (DAD) on a secondary containment door in the auxiliary building failed, blocking the door open for a period of 78 minutes. At the time, the reactor was operating at approximately 87 percent power in end-of-cycle coastdown. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment. The failure analysis of the DAD is still in progress. A full analysis and corrective action plan will be provided in a supplement to this LER. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public. Engineering evaluations have shown that, had a design basis accident occurred while the condition existed, the main control room, exclusion area boundary, and low population zone doses would have remained within the limits of 10CFR50.67.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
River Bend Station	050-458	2003	- 002	- 00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On March 7, 2003, at approximately 2:31 p.m. CST, the door assist device (DAD) on a secondary containment door in the auxiliary building failed, blocking the door (**DR**) open for a period of 78 minutes. At the time, the reactor was operating at approximately 87 percent power in end-of-cycle coastdown. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment.

INVESTIGATION and IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

Three secondary containment doors used for personnel access to the auxiliary building are equipped with assist devices that ease the opening of the door against differential pressure. The ventilation system draws a slight negative pressure in the building when operating normally, and in this condition, the doors may be opened manually without the use of the assist devices. When the standby gas treatment (GTS) system is operating, the differential pressure is greater, such that the doors are difficult to open. The assist device incorporates a gear-operated jack that opens the door far enough to break the differential pressure, allowing the door to be fully opened by hand.

At the time of the event, the GTS system was running for a surveillance test, causing the differential pressure across the doors to be higher than normal. At 2:31 p.m., the door was opened by a station employee using the assist device. An apparent internal failure of the assist device caused the jack to stick in the extended position. The jack could not be retracted, thus the door could not be fully closed. Approximately 78 minutes later, the assist device was removed, and the door was successfully closed. The assist device is not necessary for the safety function of the door, and it has not been re-installed pending completion of the failure analysis.

CAUSAL ANALYSIS

The failure analysis of the DAD is still in progress. A full analysis and corrective action plan will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE EVALUATION

A similar event occurred on August 8, 2000, as reported in LER 50-458/00-011-00. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken for that event will be provided in a supplement to this LER.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
River Bend Station	050-458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2003	- 002	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

During the time the door was blocked open, the plant continued to operate normally. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public. Engineering evaluations have shown that, had a design basis accident occurred while the condition existed, the main control room, exclusion area boundary, and low population zone doses would have remained within the limits of 10CFR50.67.

(NOTE: Energy Industry Component Identification codes are annotated as (**XX**).)