

May 5, 2003

MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2 /RA/
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3, FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION, DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(RAI) TO BE DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL
(TAC NOS. MB6944)

The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on May 5, 2003, to Mr. Ravi Joshi, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (licensee). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate the technical review being conducted by NRR and to support a conference call with the licensee to discuss the RAI. The RAI was related to the licensee's submittal dated December 11, 2002, concerning the elimination of N-1 loop operation from the technical specifications. Review of the RAI would allow the licensee to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey or represent an NRC staff position regarding the licensee's request.

Docket No. 50-423

Attachment: Draft RAI

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DATE	5/5/03	5/2/03	5/3/03

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DRAFT

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
ELIMINATION OF N-1 LOOP OPERATION FROM THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC
MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3
DOCKET NO. 50-423
(TAC NO. MB6944)

1. On page 2 of its application, the licensee states “Additionally, since the capability to operate the plant in the ‘N-1’ loop, or three loop operation is being removed, except for the mitigation of an emergency or abnormal event, specific references to four (4) loop operation, which are only used to distinguish from ‘N-1’ loop operation, are also being eliminated.” Any operator action to mitigate an emergency or abnormal event would not normally be specified in technical specification. Provide clarification of what is meant by the statement “except for the mitigation of an emergency or abnormal event” with regards to the changes being made to the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specifications.
2. Table 3.3.1 Functional Unit 12.b (page 3/4 3-3) does not proposed to remove the phrase ‘in two operating loops’ in Channels to Trip. Provide an explanation as to why 12.b is not being changed for Channels to Trip whereas 12.a and 13 are being modified to delete the phrase.
3. FSAR Section 15.4.1 describes the assumption made for the uncontrolled rod withdrawal from subcritical. For this event, three loops are assumed in operation with all of the loop stop valves open in Mode 3. Please provide justification on how this safety analysis will bound the potential plant operation at Mode 3 with four loops in operation.