

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

March 26, 1991

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-24: RECENT OPERATING EXPERIENCE INVOLVING REACTOR OPERATION WITHOUT A LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR OR SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR PRESENT IN THE CONTROL ROOM

Addressees:

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power, test, and research reactors, and all Part 55 licensed operators.

Purpose:

This information notice is provided to alert addressees to recent operating experience involving reactor operation without a licensed reactor operator or senior reactor operator present in the control room. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

On January 22, 1991, the Pennsylvania State University (PSU) 1 MW TRIGA research reactor was operating at 1 MW (rated thermal power). During this operational period, the reactor operator left the control room briefly to provide University personnel access to the reactor bay area through a locked door. The reactor operator was the only person present in the control room and adjoining reactor bay area before the University personnel were admitted. The reactor operator then returned to the control room once the University personnel were admitted. No other operational occurrences were associated with the event.

On December 20, 1990, General Public Utilities (GPU), the licensee, was operating the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant at power. The Group Operating Supervisor (GOS) and the Group Shift Supervisor (GSS) were the licensed senior reactor operators present in the control room. During this operational period, the GSS left the control room, leaving the GOS as the only SRO present. While the GSS was absent, the GOS left the control room without realizing that he had been the only SRO present. Both the GSS and the GOS returned when informed that there were no SROs present in the control room.

9103200131

2A

IDAR-11c

Discussion:

At PSU, the licensee's management learned of this event through the reported observation by another staff member. When the licensed reactor operator was interviewed by the facility director, the operator stated he did not know that leaving the control room unattended (with the reactor unsecured) was a violation of the reactor facility's technical specifications. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee has implemented a training procedure explaining this event and the importance of adhering to the technical specifications.

At the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee stated that the reason an SRO was not present in the control room at all times was because the GOS had failed to follow the guidance on shift turnovers in the administrative procedures. This guidance was prepared as a result of a similar event that occurred at Oyster Creek on October 5, 1989. The GOS involved in this event had been in training for his SRO license when the October 1989 event occurred and had not been made aware of the subsequent guidance on the control room staffing requirements.

Facility licensees are expected to be familiar with the minimum staffing levels for reactor operation specified in the technical specifications for their respective nuclear facilities or as stated in Section 50.54 (k) and (m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as appropriate. These requirements apply to non-power and power nuclear reactor facilities.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171

Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date of Issuance	Issued to
91-23	Accidental Radiation Over-exposures to Personnel Due to Industrial Radiography Accessory Equipment Malfunctions	03/26/91	All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees authorized to use sealed sources for industrial radiography.
91-22	Four Plant Outage Events Involving Loss of AC Power or Coolant Spills	03/19/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
91-21	Inadequate Quality Assurance Program of Vendor Supplying Safety-Related Equipment	03/19/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all recipients of NUREG-00 "Licensee Contractor Vendor Inspection Status Report" (White Book).
91-20	Electrical Wire Insulation Degradation Caused Failure in A Safety-Related Motor Control Center	03/19/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
90-43, Supp. 1	Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers	03/13/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
91-19	Steam Generator Feedwater Distribution Piping Damage	03/12/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
91-18	High-Energy Piping Failures Caused by Wall Thinning	03/12/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
90-25, Supp. 1	Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up	03/11/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
91-17	Fire Safety of Temporary Installations or Services	03/11/91	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.

OL = Operating License
 CP = Construction Permit

Discussion:

At PSU, the licensee's management learned of this event through the reported observation by another staff member. When the licensed reactor operator was interviewed by the facility director, the operator stated he did not know that leaving the control room unattended (with the reactor unsecured) was a violation of the reactor facility's technical specifications. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee has implemented a training procedure explaining this event and the importance of adhering to the technical specifications.

At the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee stated that the reason an SRO was not present in the control room at all times was because the GOS had failed to follow the guidance on shift turnovers in the administrative procedures. This guidance was prepared as a result of a similar event that occurred at Oyster Creek on October 5, 1989. The GOS involved in this event had been in training for his SRO license when the October 1989 event occurred and had not been made aware of the subsequent guidance on the control room staffing requirements.

Facility licensees are expected to be familiar with the minimum staffing levels for reactor operation specified in the technical specifications for their respective nuclear facilities or as stated in Section 50.54 (k) and (m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as appropriate. These requirements apply to non-power and power nuclear reactor facilities.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Original Signed by
Charles E. Rossi

Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171

Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

***SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES**

*EAB:NRR JThompson 3/12/91	*PDNP:NRR AAdams 3/14/91	*LOLB:NRR BGallo 3/15/91	*DFIPS:ADM JMain 3/11/91	*SC:EAB:NRR DFischer 03/14/91	*C:EAB:NRR AChaffee 03/14/91
*D:DLPQ:NRR JRoe 03/14/91	*D:OGCG:NRR CBerlinger 03/15/91	D:DOEA:NRR CRossi 03/20/91			

Discussion:

At PSU, the licensee's management learned of this event through the reported observation by another staff member. When the licensed reactor operator was interviewed by the facility director, the operator stated he did not know that leaving the control room unattended (with the reactor unsecured) was a violation of the reactor facility's technical specifications. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee has implemented a training procedure explaining this event and the importance of adhering to the technical specifications.

At the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee stated that the reason an SRO was not present in the control room at all times was because the GOS had failed to follow the guidance on shift turnovers in the administrative procedures. This guidance was prepared as a result of a similar event that occurred at Oyster Creek on October 5, 1989. The GOS involved in this event had been in training for his SRO licensee when the October 1989 event occurred and had not been made aware of the subsequent guidance on the control room staffing requirements. As a result, the GOS was not included in the required reading list describing the 1989 event and was not made aware of any corrective action taken by the licensee.

Facility licensees are expected to be familiar with the minimum staffing levels for reactor operation specified in the technical specifications for their respective nuclear facilities. However, some licensees (and operators) may be unaware that these requirements are stated in Section 50.54 (k) and (m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and that these requirements apply to non-power and power nuclear reactor facilities.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171

Attachment:

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

*EAB:NRR
JThompson
3/12/91

*PDNP:NRR *LOLB:NRR *DFIPS:ADM
AAdams BGallo JMain
3/14/91 3/15/91 3/11/91

for
SC:EAB:NRR
DFischer
7/14/91

acch
C:EAB:NRR
AChaffee
3/14/91

D:DLPO:NRR
JRoe
3/14/91

D:OGCG:NRR
CBerlinger
1/91

~~D:DOEA:NRR
CRossi
3/20/91~~

Discussion:

At PSU, the licensee's management learned of this event through the reported observation by another staff member. When the licensed reactor operator was interviewed by the facility director, the operator stated he did not know that leaving the control room unattended (with the reactor unsecured) was a violation of the reactor facility's technical specifications. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee has implemented a training procedure explaining this event and the importance of adhering to the technical specifications.

At the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee stated that the reason an SRO was not present in the control room at all times was because the GOS had failed to follow the guidance on shift turnovers in the administrative procedures. This guidance was prepared as a result of a similar event that occurred at Oyster Creek on October 5, 1989. The GOS involved in this event had been in training for his SRO licensee when the October 1989 event occurred and had not been made aware of the subsequent guidance on the control room staffing requirements. As a result, the GOS was not included in the required reading list describing the 1989 event and was not made aware of any corrective action taken by the licensee.

Facility licensees are expected to be familiar with the minimum staffing levels for reactor operation specified in the technical specifications for their respective nuclear facilities or as stated in Section 50.54 (k) and (m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations as appropriate. These requirements apply to non-power and power nuclear reactor facilities.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171

Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

*EAB:NRR JThompson 3/12/91	*PDNP:NRR AAdams 3/14/91	*LOLB:NRR BGallo 3/15/91	*DFIPS:ADM JMain 3/11/91	<i>See previous concurrance</i> SC:EAB:NRR DFischer 3/14/91	*C:EAB:NRR AChaffee 3/14/91
*D:DLPQ:NRR JRoe 3/4/91	<i>CHB</i> D:OGCG:NRR CBerlinger 3/15/91	D:DOEA:NRR CRossi / /91			

Discussion:

At PSU, the licensee's management learned of this event through the reported observation by another staff member. When the licensed reactor operator was interviewed by the facility director, the operator stated he did not know that leaving the control room unattended (with the reactor unsecured) was a violation of the reactor facility's technical specifications. To prevent reoccurrence, the licensee has implemented a training procedure explaining this event and the importance of adhering to the technical specifications.

At the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee stated that the reason an SRO was not present in the control room at all times was because the GOS had failed to follow the guidance on shift turnovers in the administrative procedures. This guidance was prepared as a result of a similar event that occurred at Oyster Creek on October 5, 1989. The GOS involved in this event had been in training for his SRO licensee when the October 1989 event occurred and had not been made aware of the subsequent guidance on the control room staffing requirements. As a result, the GOS was not included in the required reading list describing the 1989 event and was not made aware of any corrective action taken by the licensee.

Facility licensees are expected to be familiar with the minimum staffing levels for reactor operation specified in the technical specifications for their respective nuclear facilities. However, some licensees (and operators) may be unaware that these requirements are stated in Section 50.54 (k) and (m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and that these requirements apply to power and non-power nuclear reactor facilities.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact: John Thompson, NRR
(301) 492-1171

Attachment:

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

D: DLPG: NRR

EAB: NRR
JThompson
3/12/91

PDNP: NRR
AAdams
3/14/91

LOLB: NRR
BGallo
3/15/91

DFIR: NRR
JMain
3/11/91

SC: EAB: NRR
DFischer
3/14/91

C: EAB: NRR
AChaffee
3/14/91

JRoE
3/14/91

D: OGCG: NRR
CBerlinger
/ /91

D: DOEA: NRR
CRossi
/ /91