

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

March 31, 2003

Mr. James F. Klapproth, Manager
Engineering & Technology
GE Nuclear Energy
175 Curtner Avenue
San Jose, CA 95125

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF GE NUCLEAR ENERGY LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT,
NEDC-33004P, REVISION 3, "CONSTANT PRESSURE POWER UPRATE"
(TAC NO. MB2510)

Dear Mr. Klapproth:

By letter dated February 6, 2003, which incorporates Errata and Addenda 1, GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) provided a revised Constant Pressure Power Uprate (CPPU) licensing topical report (LTR) documenting the basis for the approach to be used for GE-prepared BWR constant pressure power uprate safety analysis reports. The revision addresses NRC's concerns stated in a letter dated August 12, 2002, withdrawing our safety evaluation (SE) approving the use of the CLTR. The NRC has considered this request and with the exception of the proposed elimination of large transient testing, has approved the use of this LTR. The staff intends to issue a supplement to the SE when the large transient testing guidance is available.

Licensees proposing to reference the CPPU LTR as a basis for a power uprate license amendment request and proposing to obtain a license amendment to incorporate one or more of the plant changes mentioned in the seven restrictions applicable to the CPPU LTR must first request and obtain a license amendment for the associated change in accordance with the CPPU LTR. The one exception is with regards to a source term methodology change. A licensee may submit and the NRC staff will review a source term methodology change, in lieu of the analysis in Section 9.2 of the CPPU LTR, concurrent with the power uprate request, if the source term submittal supports operation at the uprated power level. Licensees proposing to utilize fuel designs other than GE fuel, up through GE 14 fuel, may not reference the CPPU LTR as a basis for their power uprate since the CPPU LTR process applies only to GE fuel and GE accident analysis methods. However, such licensees may reference the CPPU LTR for areas other than those involving reactor systems and fuel issues which are not impacted by the fuel design. Licensees should afford the staff sufficient time to complete its review of all associated licensing basis changes prior to submittal or request for the implementation of the power uprate when referencing the CPPU LTR.

The staff finds that the subject topical report is acceptable for referencing in licensing applications to the extent specified under the limitations delineated in the report and in the associated NRC safety evaluation. The enclosed safety evaluation defines the basis for acceptance of the CPPU LTR. As discussed in Section 10.5 of the safety evaluation, the staff is preparing guidance to generically address the requirement for conducting large transient tests in conjunction with power uprates. Therefore, the staff is not prepared to accept, on a

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J. Klapproth

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March 31, 2003

generic basis, the proposed elimination of these tests. The staff intends to issue a supplement to this safety evaluation when the guidance is available.

We do not intend to repeat our review of the matters described in the subject report, and found acceptable, when the report appears as a reference in license applications, except to ensure that the material presented applies to the specific plant involved. Our acceptance applies only to matters approved in the report.

In accordance with the guidance provided on the NRC website, we request that GENE publish an accepted version within three months of receipt of this letter. The accepted version shall incorporate (1) this letter and the enclosed SE between the title page and the abstract, and (2) a "-A" (designating "accepted") following the report identification symbol.

If the NRC's criteria or regulations change so that its conclusion in this letter that the topical report is acceptable is invalidated, GENE and/or the applicant referencing the topical report will be expected to revise and resubmit its respective documentation, or submit justification for the continued applicability of the topical report without revision of the respective documentation.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790, we have determined that the safety evaluation provided as Enclosure 1 contains proprietary information. Proprietary information contained in Enclosure 1 is indicated by double underlines. We have prepared a non-proprietary version of the safety evaluation (Enclosure 2) that we have determined does not contain proprietary information. However, we will delay placing Enclosure 2 in the public document room for a period of ten (10) working days from the date of this letter to provide you with the opportunity to comment on the proprietary aspects only. If you believe that any information in Enclosure 2 is proprietary, please identify such information line by line and define the basis pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 2.790.

If you have any questions, please contact Alan Wang, GENE Project Manager, at (301) 415-1445.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William H. Ruland, Director
Project Directorate III
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Project No. 710

Enclosures: 1. Proprietary Safety Evaluation
2. Non-Proprietary Safety Evaluation

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC	- alternating current
ACP	- activated corrosion products
ADS	- automatic depressurization system
ALARA	- as low as is reasonably achievable
ANSI	- American National Standards Institute
AOO	- anticipated operational occurrence
AOP	- abnormal operating procedure
APRM	- average power range monitor
ARI	- alternate rod insertion
ART	- adjusted reference temperature
ASME	- American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AST	- alternate source term
ATWS	- anticipated transient without scram
AV	- allowable value
BOP	- balance of plant
BHP	- brake horse power
BWR	- boiling water reactor
BWRVIP	- Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project
CCW	- component cooling water
CDF	- core damage frequency
CFDS	- condensate filtration and demineralization system
CGCS	- combustible gas control system
COLR	- Core Operating Limits Report
CPPU	- constant pressure power uprate
CRD	- control rod drive
CRDA	- control rod drop accident
CRDM	- control rod drive mechanism
CS	- containment spray
CSC	- containment spray cooling
CST	- condensate storage tank
DBA	- design-basis accident
DC	- direct current
ECCS	- emergency core cooling system
EMA	- equivalent margins analysis
EOP	- emergency operating procedure
EPU	- extended power uprate
EQ	- environmental qualification
ESFAS	- engineered safety feature actuation system
FAC	- flow accelerated corrosion
FHA	- fuel handling accident
FIV	- flow induced vibration
FW	- feedwater
GDC	- general design criteria
GENE	- GE Nuclear Energy
GESTAR II	- General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel
GL	- generic letter

GNF	- Global Nuclear Fuel
HCU	- hydraulic control unit
HELB	- high energy line break
HPCI	- high pressure coolant injection
HPCS	- high pressure core spray
HWC	- hydrogen water chemistry
IASCC	- irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking
ICA	- interim corrective action
ILBA	- instrument line break accident
IORV	- inadvertent opening of a relief valve
IPE	- individual plant examination
IPEEE	- individual plant examination of external events
LTR	- licensing topical report
LHGR	- linear heat generation rate
LOCA	- loss of coolant accident
LTS	- long term solution
LOFW	- loss of feedwater
LOFWF	- loss of feedwater flow
LPCI	- low pressure coolant injection
LPCS	- low pressure core spray
LERF	- large early release frequency
LOOP	- loss of offsite power
MELLLA	- maximum extended load limit line analysis
MEOD	- maximum extended operating domain
MCPR	- minimum critical power ratio
MAPLHGR	- maximum average planar linear heat generation rate
MSLBA	- main steam line break accident
MSIV	- main steam isolation valve
MVAR	- reactive power
MOS	- main offgas system
NSSS	- nuclear steam supply system
NPSH	- net positive suction head
NMIP	- noble metals injection process
OLTP	- original licensed thermal power
OLMCPR	- operating limit minimum critical power ratio
OPRM	- oscillation power range monitor
PUSAR	- power uprate safety analysis report
PRFO	- pressure regulatory failure to open
P-T	- pressure temperature
PCT	- peak cladding temperature
PRA	- probabilistic risk assessment
RPT	- reactor pressure temperature
RHR	- residual heat removal
RCS	- reactor coolant system
RIPD	- reactor internal pressure differences
RPV	- reactor pressure vessel
RCPB	- reactor coolant pressure boundary
RCIC	- reactor core isolation cooling
RWCU	- reactor water cleanup

RCIS	- rod control and information system
RTP	- rated thermal power
RWL	- rod withdrawal limiter
RPS	- reactor protection system
SE	- safety evaluation
SRLR	- Supplemental Reload Licensing Report
SAFDL	- specified acceptable fuel design limit
SLMCPR	- safety limit minimum critical power ratio
SBO	- station blackout
SRV	- safety relief valve
SRP	- Standard Review Plan
SCCR	- spent condensate cleanup resins
SLC	- standby liquid control
SPC	- suppression pool cooling
SDC	- shutdown cooling
SGTS	- standby gas treatment system
STS	- standard technical specifications
TAF	- top-of-active fuel
TTNBP	- turbine trip no bypass
TCV	- turbine control valve
TS	- technical specification
UFSAR	- updated final safety analysis report
USE	- upper shelf energy

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

GE NUCLEAR ENERGY LICENSING TOPICAL REPORT

NEDC-33004P, REVISION 1

"CONSTANT PRESSURE POWER UPRATE"

PROJECT NO. 710

1.0 OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction

By letter dated March 19, 2001 (Reference 1), GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) submitted Licensing Topical Report (LTR) NEDC-33004P, "Constant Pressure Power Uprate" (CPPU) for NRC review and approval. The CPPU LTR proposes a simplified process for achieving extended power uprates (EPU). Following meetings with the NRC staff on June 13, 2001, and July 17, 2001, GENE submitted Revision 1 of the CPPU LTR by letter dated July 26, 2001 (Reference 2). After initial staff review, a meeting was held on September 26, 2001, to discuss staff questions. The staff review of the CPPU LTR was performed in conjunction with ongoing reviews and audits of recent EPU requests that used elements of the constant pressure uprate approach. GENE submitted responses to the staff's request for additional information (RAI) on December 3, 18, and 21, 2001 (References 3, 4, and 5). GENE also submitted an update (errata and Addenda 1) to the CPPU LTR on December 21, 2001 (Reference 6) to provide consistency with the RAI responses and to provide additional improvements and corrections which summarized discussions with the NRC staff. The CPPU LTR submittal and the supplemental supporting documentation regarding the revised constant pressure EPU approach have been reviewed by the staff. A portion of the staff's review was performed during on-site audits of the GENE/Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) safety analyses performed for power uprate safety analysis reports (PUSAR) supporting recent licensee EPU amendment requests.

On June 20, 2002, the staff issued its safety evaluation (SE) regarding NEDC-33004P, Revision 1 to GENE with a 10-day hold before release to the public. We informed you that this was to provide GENE an opportunity to comment on the proprietary aspects before making the SE public. In subsequent calls with your staff, GENE informed the NRC staff that they had substantive concerns regarding the content of the SE. By letter dated July 18, 2002, GENE formally documented their comments regarding the proprietary and technical content of the SE.

During a meeting with the Browns Ferry licensee on July 10, 2002, the staff learned that GENE and TVA intended to apply the CPPU LTR in a way that did not reflect the NRC staff's understanding and basis for the acceptability of the topical report for licensing applications. In telephone discussions with GENE on July 15 and 22, 2002, the staff confirmed that our understanding about the manner in which the CPPU topical report could be applied and the restrictions on the use of the CPPU topical report is significantly different from GENE's.

The nature of the misunderstanding involved the degree to which a licensee can pursue changes to the licensing basis in parallel with a power uprate. To achieve this goal, the report describes, on page 1-1, a number of changes to a plant's licensing basis which are excluded from consideration as part of the CPPU process. However, this list is preceded by a sentence which GENE believes allows those changes to be reviewed and implemented, in parallel with the CPPU process, as separate licensing actions.

The NRC staff did not agree with this interpretation. The exclusions listed on page 1-1 of NEDC-33004P, Revision 1, are integral to the staff's technical basis for approving the topical report. These exclusions provided the basis to allow the CPPU review to focus on issues that relate only to the power uprate itself. On August 12, 2002, we withdrew our SE that found the proposed approach in NEDC-33004P, Revision 1, to be acceptable for referencing in licensing applications. In our August 12, 2002, letter we noted that we believed that your position would have significantly reduce the efficiency gains of applying this topical report by requiring the staff to conduct extensive plant-specific analyses of the CPPU uprate along with the reload analysis. In addition, we stated that we believed that the CPPU process is viable but that GENE needed to revise and resubmit the topical report to remove the described ambiguities.

On September 10, 2002, the staff met with GENE. During this meeting GENE agreed to revise the CPPU LTR to address the use of fuel manufactured by other vendors. GENE submitted an update (errata and Addenda 2) to the CPPU LTR on October 7, 2002 (Reference 16). This submittal proposed six scenarios for the application of the CPPU LTR. On October 7, 2002, the staff had a conference call to discuss the proprietary aspects of the CPPU LTR. GENE agreed that revised CPPU LTR was needed to address the proprietary issues and several open technical issues. The staff has also had numerous technical conference calls regarding the CPPU LTR. By letter dated November 15, 2002, GENE withdrew all previous versions of the CPPU LTR and their request for proprietary protection. In addition, Revision 2 of the CPPU LTR, in a redacted form, was attached to this letter. Subsequently, the staff had a call with GENE on January 17, 2003, to discuss the November 15, 2002, revision. While it did provide some additional clarity to GENE's CPPU approach, the staff could not come to agreement with GENE on their approach. The staff stated that licensees proposing to reference this LTR as a basis for a power uprate license amendment request, and also, proposing to obtain a license amendment to incorporate one or more of the plant changes listed below must first request and obtain a license amendment for the associated change prior to the start of the staff review of the power uprate request that references this topical report. GENE requested a meeting to discuss the basis for this restriction and how the LTR would need to be revised to reflect this. On January 22, 2003, GENE met with the staff. GENE revised the LTR to reflect an approach that would provide the staff reasonable assurance that the CPPU LTR could be used as a reference for future licensing activities. By letter dated February 6, 2003, GENE submitted Revision 3 of the CPPU LTR (Reference 17).

1.2 Background

An increase in the electrical output of a boiling water reactor (BWR) is accomplished primarily by supplying a higher steam flow to the turbine generator. Most GE BWRs, as originally built and licensed, have as-designed equipment and system capability to accommodate steam flow rates at least 5 percent above the original rated power. In addition, improved analytical techniques and computer codes, plant operating experience, and improved fuel designs have resulted in a significant increase in the design and operating margins between the results of the

safety analysis calculations and the licensing limits. The increased margins combined with the as-designed excess equipment, system, and component capabilities have allowed many BWRs to increase their thermal power ratings by 5 percent (stretch uprate) without modifying any nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) hardware and to increase power by up to 20 percent (extended power uprate) with some hardware modifications.

1.2.1 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Approach

The EPU LTR (Reference 7), known as ELTR1, contains a set of generic guidelines to be met and a general approach to be followed for plants that planned extended reactor thermal power uprates of up to 120 percent of their original licensed thermal power (OLTP). These guidelines and the subsequent ELTR2 submittal (Reference 8) of generic evaluations had been developed based on the expectation that the maximum reactor operating pressure would also need to be increased to achieve the extended power uprate. These generic guidelines and generic evaluations, together with the associated NRC staff position paper and safety evaluation (SE) [incorporated in ELTR1 and ELTR2 (References 9 and 10)] have been applied to all extended power uprate submittals since their NRC review and acceptance or endorsement for referencing.

The approach to achieving an EPU consists of:

- an increase in the core thermal power with a more uniform power distribution achieved by better fuel management techniques to create increased steam flow,
- a corresponding increase in the feedwater system flow,
- no increase in maximum core flow, and
- reactor operation primarily along the maximum extended load line limit analysis (MELLLA) or maximum extended operating domain (MEOD) rod/flow lines.

The ELTR2 generic evaluations assume:

- a 20 percent increase in the thermal power,
- an increase in operating dome pressure up to 1,095 psia,
- a reactor coolant temperature increase to 556°F, and
- a steam and feedwater flow increase of about 24 percent.

For some CPPU evaluations, bounding analyses and evaluations provided in ELTR2 will be cited; however, there are restrictions on plant changes that are allowed under CPPU, most notably, that the existing maximum plant operating pressure must be maintained.

In general, the generic system and equipment performance analyses and the generic transient and accident analyses documented in ELTR1 and ELTR2 are applicable to the CPPU approach. Exceptions and deviations to generic ELTR1 and ELTR2 conclusions are identified in individual sections of the CPPU LTR and are evaluated in the corresponding sections of this SE.

1.2.2 CPPU Approach

As a result of experience in implementing EPU and licensee feedback, GENE developed a simplified approach to achieving uprated reactor power. This approach maintains the current

plant maximum reactor operating pressure, and has other significant restrictions on plant changes. Extended power uprates without a reactor pressure increase have now been reviewed, approved and utilized at several plants. This CPPU approach is expected to be used by GENE as the primary basis for the majority of future extended power uprate applications. The GENE current experience base with power uprates is provided in Table 1-1 of the CPPU LTR. By achieving a power uprate without a reactor pressure increase, there can be a significant reduction in calculations and effort required compared to the EPU safety analysis and system performance evaluations. This constant pressure constraint, along with other required limitations and restrictions discussed in the CPPU LTR, allows a simplified approach to power uprate analyses and evaluations.

The method for achieving higher power at GE BWRs is to retain the MELLLA or MEOD power/flow map, and to increase core flow (and power) along the existing flow control rod line. The proposed CPPU approach will not increase the reactor operating pressure or the current licensed maximum core flow. CPPU operation will not require an increase in reactor vessel dome pressure because the plant will make modifications to the power generation equipment, pressure controls and turbine flow capabilities to control the pressure at the turbine inlet.

The CPPU LTR documents the approach to be followed to provide the basis for future CPPU applications. The overall evaluation and analyses approach has been simplified to take advantage of the constant pressure assumption. In addition, further experience with previous extended power uprate applications, more recent generic evaluations, and the use of approved reload core analysis and a standard reload licensing process are cited by GENE. These factors have been incorporated into the overall approach to simplify the required plant-specific documentation while maintaining a systematic licensing and safety evaluation process. Further, the focus of the evaluation has been placed on the safety evaluations required for CPPU alone, without changes to maximum core flow, [

] to allow for a comprehensive but more streamlined NRC staff review process.

A consequence of the simplified CPPU approach to evaluation of power uprate is the removal of some analyses normally included in the power uprate license amendment application to documents associated with core reload analyses. The reload analysis results are documented in the Supplemental Reload Licensing Report (SRLR), and the applicable core operating limits are documented in the plant- and cycle-specific Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). Although these documents are available for staff inspection, they are not submitted with the power uprate application and are not normally submitted for NRC staff review and approval.

For the CPPU LTR, it is assumed that the only change to the plant licensing and design basis is an increase of up to 20 percent over the 100 percent Original Licensed Thermal Power (OLTP). The CPPU approach generically disposes, defers to the standard reload or fuel introduction process, simplifies, or limits some of the safety analyses and system performance evaluations used to support operation at the higher power level. Licensees proposing to reference this LTR as a basis for a power uprate license amendment request, and also, proposing to obtain a license amendment to incorporate one or more of the plant changes listed below must first request and obtain a license amendment for the associated change prior to the start of the staff review of the power uprate request that references this LTR.

- No increase in maximum normal operating reactor dome pressure

- No increase to maximum licensed core flow
- No increase to currently licensed MELLLA or MEOD upper boundaries

[

]

The one exception is with regards to a source term methodology change. A licensee may submit and the NRC staff will review a source term methodology change, in lieu of the analysis in Section 9.2 of the CPPU LTR, concurrent with the power uprate request, if the source term submittal supports operation at the uprated power level. Licensees proposing to utilize fuel designs other than GE fuel, up through GE 14 fuel, may not reference the CPPU LTR as a basis for their power uprate since the CPPU LTR process applies only to GE fuel and GE accident analysis methods. However, such licensees may reference the CPPU LTR for areas other than those involving reactor systems and fuel issues which are not impacted by the fuel design.

The CPPU power/flow operating map is an extension of the current MELLLA or MEOD operating map. Therefore, the CPPU LTR and the safety evaluation are applicable only to plants that are currently licensed to operate with the MELLLA or the MEOD operational margin improvement option. A typical power/flow map showing the CPPU change in allowable operating conditions is shown on Figure 1-1 of the LTR.

The guidelines in ELTR1 and ELTR2 are also generally followed for CPPU evaluations. However, the CPPU safety analysis deviates from the ELTR1 and ELTR2 guidelines in the stability analyses and in the LOCA and transient analyses. Deviations and exceptions are noted in the following areas:

- Stability []
- Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance []
- Anticipated operating occurrences (AOO) []
- Testing []

The analyses and evaluations listed above would be performed in accordance with the proposed, more simplified CPPU approach. In the CPPU approach, [

.]

Changes to the licensing and design basis necessary to support the licensing of power uprate at a plant will be reported and justified in a plant-specific power uprate licensing submittal. The plant-specific submittal will include and justify any proposed changes to the analysis basis methodology identified in ELTR1 and ELTR2, unless this methodology is revised by review and acceptance of the CPPU LTR. Applicable new methods that are reviewed and approved by the NRC independently of the CPPU LTR may be used after the approval is received and the methods are incorporated into the General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR-II) (Reference 11). Any new methods that a licensee wishes to have reviewed or implemented concurrent with the CPPU approach may cause the NRC staff, at their sole discretion, to determine that the generic disposition of any analysis or evaluation in this LTR is

no longer valid, or that the scope of the submitted plant specific evaluations is inadequate, and may require the submittal of substantial additional supporting analyses and evaluations during the review of that application, which may substantially extend the review scope and schedule.

Due to the effect of the CPPU process on simplifying many of the safety evaluations, a number of generic evaluations are cited by GENE to support the plant-specific submittals. In addition, some generic assessments from the ELTR1 and ELTR2 references can be utilized if they are shown to properly bound the effects from the CPPU approach. The CPPU LTR cites and summarizes results of these generic evaluations, generic assessments, and generic dispositions for NRC review and approval, and these may simplify the plant-specific NRC review required for future CPPU submittals.

To simplify future licensee amendment requests and to support NRC reviews of plant-specific CPPU submittals, the format of the PUSAR to be used for each plant-specific CPPU submittal will be based on the format of the CPPU LTR. The PUSAR is based on the above assumptions and includes consideration of the generic and plant-specific evaluations, assessments, and dispositions discussed in the CPPU LTR and the safety evaluation. Deviations from the generic bases and evaluations provided in the report will be included and justified in the plant-specific submittal. The level of information to be provided for each plant-specific submittal and the format for providing that information will still be consistent with past extended power uprate submittals. For those analyses and evaluations that are generically dispositioned in the CPPU LTR, the plant-specific PUSAR is required to list and to provide the basis for the generic dispositions and to confirm the applicability of these generic dispositions for the specific plant application. For any plant that seeks concurrent review or implementation of a power uprate and any of the excluded plant changes listed above, the NRC staff may, at their sole discretion, determine that the generic disposition of any analysis or evaluation in this LTR is no longer valid, and may require the submittal of substantial additional supporting analyses and evaluations during the review of that application.

The sections in this topical report that are related to reactor systems and fuel performance are not applicable to, and cannot be referenced by, any plant that (1) is not operating with GE fuel up through GE 14 fuel, or (2) does not intend to use approved GE analytical methods to perform the reload analyses-of-record supporting plant operation at the uprated power level.

Limited technical specification (TS) setpoint changes are required as a result of the CPPU. Typically, setpoint changes are limited to the neutron monitoring system, main steamline high flow, and turbine first-stage pressure.

1.3 CPPU LTR Structure

The report section numbers and titles generally correspond to those used for previous plant-specific, extended power uprate submittals. Each of the evaluations included in those submittals were reviewed and assigned one of the two disposition categories:

- Generic assessment
- Plant-specific evaluation

Each primary section of the CPPU LTR begins with a table providing summary disposition for the principal evaluations included in the section. A principal evaluation is a thermal-hydraulic, nuclear, mechanical (e.g., vessel integrity), or system design (e.g., ECCS) analysis or evaluation that is judged to be potentially limiting with respect to safety analyses relative to the power uprate. Each principal evaluation is then included in a separate subsection, which includes a table with the following information:

- Evaluation topic
- Primary effect of CPPU on topic
- Disposition category for the assessment

The justification of the disposition category is included after the table. This justification may include current experience with extended power uprates and the basis for the disposition, as applicable.

The technical dispositions are contained in the CPPU LTR Sections 2 through 10. General information has also been provided in CPPU LTR Section 11 to support utility licensing documentation required for the plant-specific CPPU submittal. This general information provides a template to the utility for development of the environmental report, plant technical specification changes, and significant hazards assessment. This information is provided for use by the utility, and was not a focus of the NRC review. The utility may elect to reference some or all of the information given in Section 11 of the CPPU LTR in the documentation supporting the plant-specific licensing CPPU submittal.

1.3.1 Generic Assessments

Generic assessments are those safety evaluations that can be dispositioned for a group or for all BWR plants by:

- A bounding analysis for the limiting conditions,
- Demonstrating that there is a negligible effect due to CPPU, or
- Demonstrating that the required plant cycle specific reload analyses are sufficient and appropriate for establishing the CPPU licensing basis.

Bounding analyses may be based upon either a demonstration that the previous pressure increase power uprate assessments provided in ELTR-1 or ELTR-2 are bounding, or upon specific generic studies provided for the CPPU. For these bounding analyses, the current CPPU experience is provided along with the basis and results of the assessment. If the generic assessment is fuel design dependent, this assessment is applicable only to current GENE/GNF fuel designs up through GE 14, analyzed with standard NRC-approved GENE methodology. The effect of CPPU on future GENE/GNF fuel designs is to be addressed during the assessment of new fuel designs consistent with the requirements of the approved GESTAR-II. If another vendor fuel design is considered as part of the power uprate, fuel design dependent generic assessments will be separately evaluated and justified.

For those CPPU assessments judged to have a negligible effect, the current CPPU experience base plus a discussion of the evaluation of the event and justification for the assessment is provided in the CPPU LTR. ELTR-1 or ELTR-2 is referenced if the information in these reports

supports the conclusion of a negligible effect. Any plant system design that falls outside of the current experience base for a generic analysis will be addressed in the plant-specific submittal.

Some safety evaluations affected by CPPU are fuel- and operating-cycle-(reload) dependent. Reload-dependent evaluations require that the reload fuel design, the reload core loading pattern, and the cycle-specific operating plan be established so that analyses can be performed to establish core operating limits. The core reload analysis demonstrates that the core design for CPPU meets the applicable NRC evaluation criteria and limits documented in GESTAR-II. Due to the lead time required for licensee power uprate submittals, the cycle-specific reload fuel design and the core loading pattern for the initial fuel cycle operation at uprated power are not established at the time of the plant-specific power uprate submittal.

Previous power uprate experience supports the GENE contention that the CPPU approach has a relatively small effect on certain cycle-specific reload analysis results affecting the core operating limits. Therefore, the reload fuel design and core loading pattern dependent plant evaluations for CPPU operation will be performed with the cycle-specific reload analysis as part of the GE standard reload licensing process. A plant cannot implement a power uprate unless the appropriate reload core analysis is performed and all criteria and limits documented in GESTAR-II are satisfied. Otherwise, the plant would be in an unanalyzed condition.

The proposed generic dispositions for reload analysis assessments are described in the appropriate sections of the staff's safety evaluation. For each of these assessments, an event discussion of the effect of CPPU on the expected analysis results is provided along with the relative experience base and reference to supporting information provided by either ELTR1 or ELTR2.

The applicability of the generic assessments for a specific plant application will be evaluated for each power uprate application. The plant-specific submittal will either document the confirmation of the generic assessment or will provide a plant-specific evaluation, consistent with Section 1.1 of the CPPU LTR, if the generic applicability assessment is unconfirmed. For any plant that seeks concurrent review or implementation of a power uprate and any of the excluded plant changes described in Section 1.0 of the CPPU LTR, the NRC staff may, at their sole discretion, determine that the generic disposition of any analysis or evaluation in this LTR is no longer valid, and may require the submittal of substantial additional supporting analyses and evaluations during the review of that application.

1.3.2 Plant-Specific Evaluation

Plant specific evaluations are assessments of the principal evaluations that are not addressed by the generic assessments described in Section 1.3.1 of the CPPU LTR. The relative effect of the CPPU approach on plant-specific evaluations and methods used for their performance are provided in the CPPU LTR. Where applicable, the assessment methodology is referenced. If a specific approved computer code is used, the name of this computer code is provided in the subsection. If the computer code has been identified as approved in ELTR1, ELTR2, or GESTAR-II, the appropriate sections of these documents may be referenced instead of the original code reference.

Plant-specific evaluations will be reported in the plant-specific submittal consistent with the level of detail of previous extended power uprate submittals, or as justified in this safety evaluation.

For any plant that seeks concurrent review or implementation of a power uprate and any of the excluded plant changes listed above, the NRC staff may, at their sole discretion, determine that the generic disposition of any analysis or evaluation in this LTR is no longer valid, or that the scope of the submitted plant specific evaluations is inadequate, and may require the submittal of substantial additional supporting analyses and evaluations during the review of that application.

1.3.3 Effect of CPPU

Operating Domain

The upper bound of the operating domain is defined by the current MELLLA/MEOD upper boundary. The current MELLLA/MEOD upper boundary remains unchanged with the CPPU approach in terms of absolute reactor power and reactor core flow, and the boundary is extended along the control rod line up to the uprated 10-percent core power value, as indicated on Figure 1-1 of the CPPU LTR. The effect of the CPPU on the other power flow map boundaries is provided in Table 1-2 of the CPPU LTR. Other changes in the plant operational flexibility or performance improvement options that affect the operating domain are not allowed, as noted in Section 1.0 of the CPPU LTR.

Nuclear and Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluations

An increase in the reactor power level affects the plant steady-state heat balance. The typical effect of a 20-percent increase in reactor power on plant operating parameters is shown in Table 1-3 of the CPPU LTR. This table shows the average change and range of heat balance parameter values for representative BWRs over the range of plant sizes and product lines. These results show the fairly uniform effect of a 20-percent increase in power with no reactor pressure increase across the BWR fleet. A plant-specific power uprate submittal will include a summary of steady-state parameters based on the plant-specific CPPU heat balance.

The CPPU approach can also affect the thermal-hydraulic safety analyses. In ELTR-1 and ELTR-2, the effect of an EPU was generally shown to be limited. The CPPU approach has a smaller effect than an EPU with a pressure increase because of the constant pressure limitation. [

.] Some thermal-hydraulic safety analyses can be performed on a generic basis, as documented in the CPPU LTR. The remaining thermal-hydraulic safety analyses require plant-specific evaluations. The plant-specific evaluation or generic applicability confirmation will be provided in the plant-specific submittal.

The nuclear evaluation requirements and acceptance criteria for the limits will not be changed as a result of the CPPU approach. Specifically, the minimum cold shutdown margin and hot excess reactivity requirements identified in GESTAR-II remain applicable. [

.] The additional energy requirements for power uprate can be met by an increase in bundle enrichment and burnable poison loading, an increase in reload batch size, and/or changes in the fuel core

loading pattern to achieve the required plant operating cycle length. The power distribution in the core is established to achieve the increased core power while satisfying the core operating limits. The required cycle specific nuclear analyses are performed as part of the standard reload analysis. The plant radiological analyses are more dependent upon power and are to be included in plant-specific submittals.

1.4 Regulatory Evaluation Summary

The staff evaluated the CPPU LTR for conformance with the generic BWR EPU program as defined in ELTR1 and ELTR2. The CPPU approach takes certain exceptions to certain previously approved generic positions in these topical reports. The staff reviewed the exceptions and the conclusions about their acceptability are given in the applicable sections of this evaluation.

The staff review of the CPPU approach used applicable rules, Regulatory Guides (RGs), Standard Review Plan (SRP) sections, and NRC staff positions on the topics being evaluated.

In the area of reactor core and fuel performance the staff applied: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" (or GDC); 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptable criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power plants;" SRP Sections 4.2, "Fuel System Design," and 4.3, "Nuclear Design."

In the area of reactor coolant system and connected systems the staff applied: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements;" Regulatory Guide 1.99, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials;" 10 CFR 50.60, "Acceptance criteria for fracture prevention measures for lightwater nuclear power reactors for normal operation;" 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications;" 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and standards;" Generic Letters (GL) 98-05, "Boiling Water Reactor Licensees Use of the BWRVIP-05 Report to Request Relief from Augmented Examination Requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Welds," GL 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety Related Power Operated Gate Valves;" GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions;" Regulatory Guide 1.139, "Guidance for Residual Heat Removal Systems."

In the area of engineered safety features the staff applied: 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptable criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power plants;" 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, "ECCS Evaluation Models;" Regulatory Guide 1.52, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

In the areas of instrumentation and control, electrical power and auxiliary systems, and power conversion systems the staff applied: Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 7; GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems;" 10 CFR 50.62, "Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants."

In the area of radwaste systems and radiation sources the staff applied: 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low as Is Reasonably Achievable' for Radioactive Material in Light-water-cooled

Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents;" 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation;" GDC 19, "Control room;" 40 CFR Part 190.

In the area of reactor safety performance evaluation the staff applied: Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 15; GDC 10, "Reactor Design;" GDC 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design;" GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems;" GDC 20, "Protection system functions;" 10 CFR 50.62, "Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants;" Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout;" 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of all alternating current power."

Regarding additional areas, including risk considerations and testing program, the staff applied: 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants;" GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems;" RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis;" Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

The scope of the review for the CPPU approach included "lessons learned" from past power uprate amendment reviews. In reviewing the LTR, the staff considered the recommendations of the report of the Maine Yankee Lessons Learned Task Group (SECY-97-042, "Response to OIG Event Inquiry 96-04S Regarding Maine Yankee," February 18, 1997). The task group's main findings centered on the use and applicability of the computer codes and analytical methodologies used for power uprate evaluations.

1.5 Technical Evaluation Summary

The staff expects licensees requesting plant-specific CPPUs will identify all codes and methodologies used to obtain safety limits and operating limits and to explain how these limits were verified to be correct for the uprated core. Licensees will also be expected to identify and discuss any limitations imposed by the staff on the use of these codes and methodologies. A table should be provided, indicating that all the applicable codes were reviewed and approved by the NRC, with any exceptions being noted and individually justified. The licensee is expected to confirm having reviewed the results of GENE analyses to assure that the codes were used correctly by GENE for CPPU conditions and that the limitations and restrictions were followed appropriately by GENE. The licensee submittal, including the plant-specific PUSAR, may be used as the basis for an NRC audit of selected safety analyses and system and component performance evaluations used to support the power uprate.

As discussed earlier, plant-specific core reload analyses (i.e., those results documented in the SRLR and COLR) are not submitted with the licensee's power uprate application and are not normally submitted for NRC staff review and approval. The reload analyses are conducted using methods previously reviewed and accepted by the staff. Further, the methods approved for reload analyses specify the acceptance criteria for the transients to be analyzed. The reload evaluation process is documented in GESTAR-II. Existing regulations require licensees to obtain staff approval for changes to analysis methods and acceptance criteria used for reload analyses. In addition, based on previous experience with reviewing EPU analyses for EPUs that maintained a constant reactor dome pressure, the staff does not expect significant differences in the results of such analyses for pre- and post-CPPU conditions. Therefore, the staff determined that further review of the reload analysis methods or results was not necessary.

for CPPU applications. The staff may choose to audit certain future reload analyses for CPPU applicants.

The initial CPPU transition reload core will consist of fresh and exposed GNF GE-14 (10x10) fuel and also may have existing GE co-resident fuel of a different lattice design. The CPPU cycle-specific reload analyses and safety analyses will be performed in accordance with NRC-approved GE analytical methodologies described in the latest approved version of GESTAR-II. The licensing topical reports specifying the codes and methodologies used for performing the safety analyses are typically documented in Section 5 of the plant TSs. The limiting AOO and accident analyses are confirmed to be valid (or are re-analyzed) for every reload and the safety analyses of transients and accidents are documented in Chapter 15 of the plant updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). Limiting transient or accident analyses are generally defined as analyses of events that could potentially affect the core operating and safety limits that ensure the safe operation of the plant. These reload analyses are not submitted for staff review and approval, but are available for staff audit. [.]

1.6 Conclusions

The staff's review of the CPPU LTR found it acceptable for referencing to provide a consistent format and a guideline for future EPU applications that meet the limitations and restrictions noted in the CPPU LTR and further stated in this staff safety evaluation. The staff noted that the applicability of any generic assessment for CPPU will be confirmed by the licensee in the plant-specific licensing application or a plant/reload-specific evaluation that will be performed using approved methodology. The staff expects that reload-specific analyses will not be submitted with the power uprate application for NRC staff review and approval. Appropriate sections in this safety evaluation acknowledge those areas where analyses will be conducted for the core reload and may not be available during the staff's review of the power uprate application.

2.0 REACTOR CORE AND FUEL PERFORMANCE

This section of the CPPU LTR addresses the evaluations in RG 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 4, that are documented in the previous plant EPU submittals. The subsections reviewed are:

- Fuel Design and Operation
- Thermal Limit Assessment
- Reactivity Characteristics
- Stability
- Reactivity Control

Plant-specific evaluations will be reported in the plant-specific submittal consistent with the format and level of detail of previous extended power uprate submittals, or as indicated below. [

.]

2.1 Fuel Design and Operation

For each fuel vendor, use of NRC-approved fuel design acceptance criteria and analysis methodologies assures that the fuel bundles perform in a manner that is consistent with the objectives of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the SRP and the applicable general design criteria (GDC) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A.

Fuel bundles are designed to ensure that:

- the fuel bundles are not damaged during normal steady-state operation and AOOs;
- any damage to the fuel bundles will not be so severe as to prevent control rod insertion when required;
- the number of fuel rod failures during accidents is not underestimated; and
- the coolability of the core is always maintained.

The fuel vendors perform thermal-mechanical, thermal-hydraulic, neutronic, and material analyses to ensure that the fuel system design can meet the fuel design limits during steady-state, AOO, and accident conditions.

The effect of the CPPU approach on the fuel and core design and operation is described in the CPPU LTR. [

.]
Fuel design limits are established [] for all new fuel product line designs as a part of the fuel introduction and reload analyses using the approved GESTAR-II process.

The power level above which fuel thermal margin monitoring is required may change with the implementation of the CPPU. The original plant operating licenses set this monitoring threshold at a typical value of 25 percent of rated thermal power. [

.] For CPPU, the fuel thermal margin monitoring threshold is scaled down, if necessary, to ensure that the monitoring is initiated [] A change in the fuel thermal monitoring threshold also requires a corresponding change to the TS reactor core safety limit for reduced pressure or low core flow.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.2 Thermal Limit Assessment

GDC 10 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, requires that the reactor core and the associated control and instrumentation systems be designed with appropriate margin to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits (SAFDLs) are not exceeded during normal operation, including AOOs. Operating limits are established to assure that regulatory and/or safety limits are not exceeded for a range of postulated events (transients and accidents).

The effect of the CPPU on the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) safety and operating limits and on the maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) and linear heat generation rate (LHGR) limits is discussed in the CPPU LTR. The topics considered include:

- Safety Limit MCPR
- MCPR Operating Limit
- MAPLHGR Limit
- Maximum LHGR Limit

The safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) ensures that 99.9 percent of the fuel rods are protected from boiling transition during steady-state operation. The operating limit minimum critical power ratio (OLMCPR) assures that the SLMCPR will not be exceeded as the result of an AOO.

The MAPLHGR operating limit is based on the most limiting loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and ensures compliance with the ECCS acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.46. For every new fuel type, the fuel vendors perform LOCA analyses to confirm compliance with the LOCA acceptance criteria, and for every reload licensees confirm that the MAPLHGR operating limit for each reload fuel bundle design remains applicable.

In general, the licensee must ensure that plant operation is in compliance with the cycle-specific thermal limits (SLMCPR, OLMCPR, MAPLHGR, and maximum LHGR) and specify the thermal limits in a cycle-specific COLR as required by Section 5 of the plant TS. In addition, while uprated power operation may result in a small change in average fuel burnup, the licensee cannot exceed the NRC-approved maximum burnup limits. In accordance with Section 5 of the TS, any cycle-specific analyses are performed using NRC reviewed and approved methodologies. Therefore, the staff expects that the licensee will appropriately consider the potential effects of uprated power operation on the fuel design limits, and that the current thermal limits assessment will show that the plant can operate within the fuel design limits during steady-state operation, AOOs, and accident conditions.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.3 Reactivity Characteristics

The effect of the CPPU approach on the minimum shutdown margin and hot excess reactivity is discussed in the CPPU LTR. The topics addressed in this evaluation are:

- Hot excess reactivity
- Shutdown margin

The higher core energy requirements of a power uprate may affect the hot excess core reactivity and can also affect operating shutdown margins. The general effect of a power uprate on core reactivity, as described in Section 5.7.1 of ELTR-1, is also applicable to a CPPU. Based on experience with previous plant-specific power uprate submittals, the required hot excess reactivity and shutdown margin can typically be achieved for power uprates through the

standard approved fuel and core reload design process. Plant shutdown and reactivity margins must meet NRC-approved limits established in GESTAR-II on a cycle-specific basis and are evaluated for each plant reload core, []].

The CPPU reload core design will account for any loss of margin for future cycles. The reload core analysis will ensure that the minimum shutdown margin requirements are met for each core design and that the current design and TS cold shutdown margin will be met. Since the licensee will continue to confirm that the TS cold shutdown requirements will be met for each reload core operation, the staff finds this acceptable.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.4 Stability

The staff review in the area of reactor stability is conducted to ensure that the requirements of GDC 12 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "Suppression of reactor power oscillations," are satisfied.

The CPPU LTR has taken exception to one of the generic guidelines in ELTR2, regarding thermal hydraulic stability. The staff SE on ELTR2, Section 3.2.2, "Long Term Solution," states: "The prevention and detection/suppression features of the long term stability solutions are either demonstrated to be unaffected by power uprate or are modified and validated in accordance with the solution methodology." The ELTR2 staff SE requires that the thermal hydraulic stability monitoring and monitoring system be validated in accordance with the generic solution methodology using a representative equilibrium core design and included in the application for EPU. [

.]

Section 3.2 of ELTR-2 documents interim corrective actions (ICA) and four long-term solution (LTS) stability options: Enhanced Option I-A, Option I-D, Option II, and Option III.

A generic evaluation was performed for the ICAs as documented in Section 3.2.1 of ELTR-2. This generic evaluation is applicable for the CPPU. Interim corrective action stability boundaries are the same in terms of absolute core power and flow. The listed power levels, as a percentage of rated power, are scaled [] based on the new uprated power.

For the long-term solution options, evaluations are reload core dependent and are performed for each reload fuel cycle. The analyses of each long-term option are addressed in the CPPU LTR. The topics addressed in this evaluation are:

- Enhanced Option I-A
- Option I-D

- Option II
- Option III (OPRM armed region and trip/Hot channel oscillation magnitude)

2.4.1 Plants with Enhanced Option I-A

The stability regions and associated trip setpoints may change with CPPU. Enhanced Option I-A (E1A) is classified as a prevention solution. Plants with the E1A stability solution have analytically-based flow biased APRM flux trip functions (exclusion and restricted regions) and an administratively controlled monitored region that are expressed as a percent of rated power. These features are either confirmed or adjusted for each plant reload. The trip function settings and monitored region for the CPPU will be established by the [] analysis that incorporates the uprated power level.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.4.2 Plants with Option I-D

The exclusion region may change and SLMCPR protection may be affected by the CPPU. Option I-D is a solution combining prevention and detect-and-suppress elements. The prevention portion of the solution is an administratively controlled exclusion region. The detect-and-suppress feature is a demonstration that regional mode reactor instability is not probable and that the existing flow-biased flux trip provides adequate SLMCPR protection for events that initiate along the rated rod line. These features will be analyzed for the [] analysis that incorporates the new rated power level.

CPPU will also affect the SLMCPR protection confirmation. Changes to the nominal flow-biased APRM trip setpoint or the rated rod line require the hot bundle oscillation magnitude portion of the detect-and-suppress calculation to be recalculated. This calculation is not dependent upon the core and fuel design. However, the SLMCPR protection calculation is dependent upon the core and fuel design and is performed for each reload. These features will be analyzed for the [] analysis that incorporates the new rated power level.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.4.3 Plants with Option II

The exclusion region may change and SLMCPR protection may be affected by CPPU. Option II is a detect-and-suppress solution, which applies to the two BWR/2 plants designed with a quadrant-based APRM trip system. This quadrant-based system will detect either core-wide or regional mode instability. These features will be analyzed for the [] analysis that incorporates the uprated power level.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.4.4 Plants with Option III

The Option III trip setpoint may be affected by CPPU operating conditions. The OPRM armed region will be rescaled with CPPU. Option III is a detect-and-suppress solution, which combines closely spaced LPRM detectors into "cells" to effectively detect any mode of reactor instability. Evaluation is dependent upon the core and fuel design and is performed for each reload. The generic analyses for the Option III hot channel oscillation magnitude and the OPRM hardware were designed to be independent of core power. [

.]

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.5 Reactivity Control

The control rod drive (CRD) system controls gross changes in core reactivity by positioning neutron-absorbing control rods within the reactor. The CRD system is also required to scram the reactor by rapidly inserting withdrawn rods into the core. The scram, rod insertion and withdrawal functions of the CRD system depend on the operating reactor pressure and the pressure difference between the CRD system hydraulic control unit (HCU) and the reactor vessel bottom head pressure. The CRD system was generically evaluated in Section 5.6.3 and J.2.3.3 of ELTR1 and in Section 4.4 of Supplement 1 to ELTR2. The [] evaluation concluded that the CRD systems for BWR/2-6 plants are acceptable for EPU as high as 20 percent above the original rated power. Therefore, no additional plant-specific calculations are required beyond confirmatory evaluation.

The topics considered in this section are:

- Scram Time Response (BWR/6 and BWR/2-5)
- CRD Positioning
- CRD Integrity

2.5.1 Control Rod Scram

In pre-BWR/6 plants, the scram times may be decreased by the transient pressure response. [] The pre-BWR/6 plant generic scram times for American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) overpressure protection and critical power ratio pressurization transient analyses may not be adversely affected by the reactor transient pressure. Thus, the analyses and results would remain valid.

For BWR/6 plants, the increase in the transient pressure response tends to increase the scram time. Because the normal steady-state reactor dome pressure for the CPPU does not change, the scram time performance relative to pre-power uprate plant operation may [

.] The BWR/6 design generic scram times for ASME overpressure protection and AOO analyses are based on generic reactor pressure versus time envelopes. The overpressure evaluation described in Section 3.1 of the CPPU LTR will be used to confirm that the transient reactor pressures remain within the generic envelopes.

In addition, scram time testing verifies the scram time for individual control rods. [

.] The staff SE for ELTR2 states that "the plant-specific submittal for BWR/6 plants must provide assurance that the scram insertion speeds used in the transient analyses are slower than the requirements contained in the plant."

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

2.5.2 Control Rod Drive Positioning

The increase in reactor power at the CPPU operating condition results in [

.] The automatic operation of the system flow control valve maintains the required drive water pressure [

.] The normal CRD positioning function is an operational consideration and is not a safety-related function.

2.5.3 Control Rod Drive Integrity Assessment

GENE indicated that the postulated abnormal operating condition for the CRD design assumes a failure of the CRD system pressure-regulating valve that applies the maximum pump discharge pressure to the CRD mechanism internal components. This postulated abnormal pressure bounds the ASME reactor overpressure limit. [

.] In its response to the staff's RAI dated December 18, 2001, (Reference 4), GENE indicated that in those cases where the existing design basis conditions do not bound CPPU conditions, a plant-specific evaluation of the CRD mechanism will be performed to account for other applicable design basis mechanical loads resulting from the reactor vessel motion.

On the basis of its review, the staff agrees with GENE's approach that confirmation of bounding existing design basis or plant-specific evaluations accounting for design basis mechanical loads affecting CRDMs would provide the basis to ensure that the CRDMs meet design basis and performance requirements at CPPU conditions.

3.0 REACTOR COOLANT AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS

The staff's review of the CPPU LTR focused on areas with regard to the structural and pressure boundary integrity of the piping systems and components, their supports, and reactor vessel and internal components and the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM), and the balance-of-plant (BOP) piping systems.

The previous GENE generic topical reports on guidelines and evaluation for 120 percent BWR extended power uprate, known as ELTR1 and ELTR2 respectively, were based on a 24 percent higher steam flow; an operating temperature increase of approximately 10°F; and an operating pressure increase up to approximately 75 psi. The CPPU approach assumes that the maximum reactor vessel dome pressure remains unchanged from the licensed power level, and the dome temperature is also unchanged. The steam flow rate will increase up to approximately 24 percent, similar to that specified in ELTR1 and ELTR2. The maximum core flow rate remains unchanged for the CPPU.

3.1 Nuclear System Pressure Relief/Overpressure Protection

The design pressure of the reactor vessel and reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) remains at 1250 psig. The ASME Code allowable peak pressure for the reactor vessel and the RCPB is 1375 psig (110 percent of the design pressure of 1250 psig), which is the acceptance limit for pressurization events. [

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Section 5.5.1.4 and Appendix E of ELTR1 evaluated the ASME overpressure analysis in support of a 20-percent power increase, stating that the limiting pressurization transient events are the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure and turbine trip with turbine bypass failure (TTNBP). However, the MSIV closure has been determined generically to be the more limiting event. The staff-approved evaluation model ODYN is used for the CPPU overpressure protection analysis and this is consistent with the generic analysis in Section 3.8 of ELTR2.

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The safety relief valves (SRVs) provide overpressure protection for the NSSS, preventing failure of the nuclear system pressure boundary and uncontrolled release of fission products. In general, the SRVs are piped to the suppression pool. These SRVs, together with the reactor scram function, provide overpressure protection. The SRV setpoints are established to provide the overpressure protection function while ensuring that there is adequate pressure difference (simmer margin) between the reactor operating pressure and the SRV actuation setpoints. The SRV setpoints are also selected to be high enough to prevent unnecessary SRV actuations during normal plant maneuvers.

The CPPU evaluation is generally consistent with the generic evaluations and discussions in Section 5.6.8 of ELTR1 and Section 3.8 of ELTR2.

The limiting ASME code overpressure analyses (discussed in Section 3.1 of the LTR) is based on 102 percent of the CPPU power level. The current SRV setpoints and upper tolerance limits

will not generally change. The ASME overpressure situation is evaluated [.] Therefore, the capability of the SRVs to ensure ASME overpressure protection will be confirmed [.]

3.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Internals

The RPV structure and support components form a pressure boundary to contain the reactor coolant and moderator, and form a boundary against leakage of radioactive materials into the drywell. The RPV also provides structural support for the reactor core and internals. Many reactor vessel components are not significantly impacted by CPPU. [

,] the plant-specific evaluation will be performed consistent with the methods documented in Appendix I of ELTR1. Plant-specific evaluations will report the maximum stresses and fatigue usage factors for the limiting reactor vessel components and supports, that are required to meet the allowable limits in accordance with the existing design basis.

The CPPU LTR evaluated the reactor vessel internal components in accordance with their current design basis. The loads and load combination include dead weight, RIPDs, seismic loads, hydrodynamic containment loads, annulus pressurization loads, jet reaction loads, thermal load effects, flow loads, acoustic and flow-induced loads due to recirculation line break, and fuel lift loads, as applicable, consistent with the design basis. [

.] The evaluation for CPPU includes internal components such as shroud, shroud support, core plate, top guide, jet pumps, fuel channel, orificed fuel support, control rod guide tube, control rod drive housing, control rod drive mechanism, shroud head and separators, access hole cover, feedwater (FW) sparger, core spray line and sparger steam dryer, and low pressure core injection (LPCI) coupling. The power uprate assessment of the internals is performed for the normal, upset, emergency and faulted conditions, as applicable, consistent with the existing design basis. For components where the CPPU conditions are bounded by the design basis analyses, no further evaluation is performed. For other components, the plant-specific evaluations will be performed consistent with the methods documented in Appendix I of ELTR1. Plant-specific evaluations will report the maximum stresses and fatigue usage factors for the limiting reactor internal components against the acceptable limits consistent with the existing design basis. In cases where permanent structural modifications or permanent repairs have been performed to the internals, the modified configuration and the corresponding documentation will form the design basis, in conjunction with the original design basis, as applicable.

On the basis of its review, the staff finds the proposed CPPU methodology acceptable. The staff concludes that the performance of the [] evaluations at CPPU conditions should provide the basis to determine the acceptability of stresses and fatigue usage factors of the limiting reactor vessel and internal components when compared against allowable code limits.

3.2.1 Reactor Vessel Fracture Toughness

The CPPU LTR stated that CPPU may result in a higher operating neutron flux at the reactor pressure vessel wall, consequently increasing the integrated flux over time (neutron fluence). The report stated that any licensee seeking future CPPU will need to perform a plant-specific

vessel wall neutron fluence analysis consistent with NRC-approved methods. The licensee will also need to assess the effect of the change in neutron fluence on the adjusted reference temperatures (ART) values and upper shelf energy (USE) values for the RPV materials. Further, any increase in ART values and decrease in USE values for a given material will be calculated in accordance with RG 1.99, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," Revision 2. With regard to evaluating the effect of CPPU on the RPV ART values and pressure-temperature (P-T) limits, GENE stated that, for the case where the plant's P-T limit curves are limited by the most limiting ART for the RPV beltline materials, the increase in the ART will also require a revision to the P-T limit curves. The new P-T limit curves are to be based on meeting the requirements related to P-T limit curves in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. Those requirements provide adequate margins of safety during normal operations, including anticipated operational transients and systems hydrostatic tests, to which the pressure boundary may be subjected over its service life.

With regard to evaluating the effect of the CPPU on USE, GENE stated that the USE values for the vessel materials at end of life must remain above 50 ft-lb. The criteria cited by GENE is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. If a USE value for a given RPV material does not meet the 50 ft-lb criterion, or if the available data are insufficient to determine what the USE value is, an equivalent margins analysis (EMA) can be performed to demonstrate that lower values of USE will provide acceptable margins of safety for the RPV material. In the report, GENE stated that it had performed a generic EMA for the RPV materials of the U.S. BWR fleet in Reference 12, which was approved by the NRC in an SE to Gulf States Utilities Company dated December 8, 1993. Although the generic EMA indicated that all BWR RPV materials would meet the EMA requirements, [

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The staff concurs that applicants for the power uprate will need to perform revised plant-specific neutron fluence assessments for the RPV materials and that those assessments must be performed in accordance with an NRC-approved methodology. The plant-specific assessments for calculating the P-T limits and USE will be based on these neutron fluence assessments and will need to comply with the following:

- Section 50.60(a) requires that plants meet the fracture toughness and material surveillance program requirements for the RCPB specified in Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50. Section 50.60(b) specifies that proposed alternatives to the described requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices G and H, may be used when an exemption is granted by the Commission under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.12.
- Section 50.36 requires that the P-T limits for a given facility be included as part of the limiting conditions for operation in the plant TS. Proposed changes to the P-T limits therefore need to be submitted as license amendment requests pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90. Section IV.A.2. of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G provides the criteria for generating these P-T limits. With regard to generation of the P-T limits, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G requires that the P-T limits must be at least as conservative as those that would be generated if the methods of analysis in Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code were used to generate the curves. Section IV.A.2. of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, also specifies minimum temperature requirements for the operation of the reactor. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.60(b), licensees must request appropriate exemptions from the requirements of Section IV.A.2. of 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix G, if their P-T limit curves are less conservative than those that would be generated if the methods of Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code were used to generate the curves, or if the P-T limits do not satisfy the applicable minimum temperature requirements for RPV specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. The NRC will evaluate all exemption requests on a case-by-case basis against the exemption acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.12.

- Section III.A. to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, requires that ferritic materials of the RPV beltline and other regions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary be evaluated in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code and that surveillance materials must be tested in accordance with the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. Paragraph F of Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50, defines the beltline as follows: "Beltline or Beltline region of reactor vessel means the region of the reactor vessel (shell material including welds, heat affected zones, and plates or forgings) that directly surrounds the effective height of the active fuel core and adjacent regions of the reactor vessel that are predicted to experience sufficient neutron radiation damage to be considered in the selection for the most limiting material with regard to radiation damage." The threshold for monitoring used by the NRC is listed in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, as 1×10^{17} n/cm² (E 1.0 MEV). Applicants for the CPPU will need to perform a plant-specific evaluation of the effect of the CPPU on the end-of-life neutron fluence levels (E 1 MEV) for the RPV materials to determine (1) whether additional materials need to be added to those previously listed for the beltline of the RPV, and (2) what the change is to the fluence levels for the materials listed for the beltline region of the vessel. The applicant must evaluate each non-beltline material expected to experience an end-of-life fluence greater than 1×10^{17} n/cm². Those materials that have the potential to become limiting will be added to the materials listed for the beltline region of the vessel.

Applicants seeking to use the LTR as their basis for CPPU license amendments will have to evaluate all beltline materials for ART and USE based on the CPPU-based fluence values. The ART is evaluated for beltline materials including any materials that are added to the beltline list. The current plant specific PT limit curves are evaluated relative to the change in ART. If the change in ART results in new and bounding PT limit curves, GENE will recommend that the PT curves be revised. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, if this occurs, the applicant must submit a license amendment request for NRC approval of the new limiting PT curves.

Licensees seeking to use the LTR as their basis for CPPU license amendments must assess the effects of the CPPU-based fluence levels on the acceptability of the USE values for the RPV beltline materials. The licensee must demonstrate that either the USE values for all beltline materials, as determined from the CPPU-based fluence levels, will remain above 50 ft-lb throughout the licensed life of the plant, or that GENE's staff-approved generic EMA analysis, as provided in Reference 12 remains bounding for their CPPU-based USE values. If a licensee cannot satisfy these conditions, the licensee must submit a revised, plant-specific EMA analysis for its RPV beltline materials demonstrating compliance with Section IV.A.1 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. This is consistent with Section 3.2.1 of Revision 1 to the LTR.

The staff has noted that Revision 1 to the LTR does not address the potential effects of neutron fluences resulting from power uprate on relief requests that have been previously submitted as alternative programs to the augmented inspection requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A), and that have been approved in conformance with the acceptable alternative program

provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). Applicants for CPPU that have obtained approvals for relief from the augmented inspection requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) must evaluate the effect of the neutron fluences resulting from power uprate on their probabilistic fracture mechanics and ART assessments that were previously performed (i.e., Generic Letter (GL) 98-05, "Boiling Water Reactor Licensees Use of the BWRVIP-05 Report to Request Relief from Augmented Examination Requirements on Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Welds," assessments) to determine if the previous assessments remain bounding and valid. Licensees must verify that their technical basis for continued relief from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) remains valid or revise their RPV inspection program to comply with the regulations.

On the basis of the above review, the staff concludes that demonstration of the performance of the reactor vessel materials will be dependent on plant-specific evaluations under CPPU conditions using plant-specific design and as-built information.

3.3 Flow-Induced Vibration

The flow-induced vibration (FIV) levels will increase in proportion to the increase in the fluid density and the square of the fluid velocity following the proposed power uprate. The FIV evaluation addresses the influence of an increase in flow during CPPU on RCPB piping, RCPB piping components and RPV internals.

The CPPU LTR evaluated the FIV effect on the RPV internal components using the recorded FIV data of all instrumented internal components for extrapolation of the CPPU vibration levels. Components in the [] are not affected by the CPPU since the core flow remains unchanged. Components in the [] that are affected by FIV due to the increase in feedwater, recirculation drive and steam flow will be evaluated []

.] Components such as jet pump assemblies, jet pump sensing lines, feedwater sparger and steam separators are evaluated at the maximum core flow point for the uprated power level, based on available vibration data from the specific plant and/or from another plant of the same or similar design. The plant-specific evaluation includes assessment of plant startup data, dynamic structural analysis and, if necessary, fatigue usage determination. The staff concurs with the CPPU LTR regarding the performance of plant-specific FIV evaluation, and if necessary, fatigue determination for components affected by an increase in flow during CPPU.

CPPU will increase main steam and feedwater flow approximately 24 percent. The flow-induced vibration levels are expected to increase by approximately []

.] To ensure that the vibration level will be below the acceptable limit, a startup vibration assessment will be required during the initial implementation of CPPU. The startup testing would include monitoring and evaluating flow-induced vibration during initial plant operation at CPPU conditions. The remote vibration monitoring sensors will be used for piping inside the containment and for areas that are inaccessible to plant personnel when the plant is at high power levels. The vibration testing will involve the performance of visual observations and conducting vibration measurements using hand-held vibration instruments during walkdown for piping outside the containment. In its response dated December 18, 2001, (Reference 4) to the staff's RAI, GENE provided the test procedure, analysis and acceptance criteria of the startup vibration test to be conducted on a plant-specific basis. The staff finds the vibration test methodology and acceptance criteria consistent with ASME Section III and ANSI/ASME

OM-S/G-1997 Code, "Requirements for Pre-Operational and Initial Startup Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Piping," and therefore, acceptable.

3.4 Piping Systems and Components

The piping evaluation addresses the effects of CPPU due to increased flow rate, temperature and pressure on the RCPB and the BOP piping systems and components. The components evaluated included equipment nozzles, anchors, guides, penetrations, pumps, valves, flange connections, and pipe supports (including snubbers, hangers, and struts). The RCPB piping systems consist of safety-related piping subsystems that move fluid through the reactor and other safety systems. The BOP piping systems consist of piping subsystems that move fluid through systems that are not evaluated in conjunction with the RCPB piping systems.

The RCPB piping evaluations compare the changes in the design parameters such as flow, pressure, temperature, and mechanical loads between the current existing design basis and the CPPU conditions. For most RCPB piping systems such as the [], these design parameters will not increase. Consequently, there will be no change in pipe stress, pipe support loads (snubbers, hangers), and fatigue evaluations. For other safety-related piping systems such as the main steam, feedwater piping and associated branch piping as well as safety-related thermowells that are significantly affected by CPPU, an increase in the flow, pressure, temperature and mechanical loads will be evaluated [] consistent with the methods specified in Appendix K of ELTR1. Plant-specific evaluations are required to demonstrate that the calculated stresses and fatigue usage factors are less than the code allowable limits in accordance with the requirements of the applicable code of record in the existing design basis stress report. As such, the staff concludes that, where required, plant-specific analysis for CPPU would provide the basis to ensure that the RCPB piping systems and supports will continue to meet the code requirement and maintain the structural and pressure boundary integrity at the CPPU condition.

The evaluation of the BOP piping and appropriate components, connections and supports will be performed in a manner similar to the evaluation of the RCPB piping systems and supports. Results of the evaluation will be compared to the allowable limits in the original code of record such as ASME Code Section III. No new assumptions were introduced that were not included in the original analyses. In cases where the Code allowable values are not satisfied, detailed analyses or field modifications can be completed such that Code requirements are met. Pipe break locations and pipe whip restraint hardware capacities are also evaluated to demonstrate acceptability. The existing design analyses of the affected BOP piping systems were assessed on a plant-specific basis using applicable ASME Section III, Subsections NB/NC/ND or B31.1 Power Piping Code equations. The original codes of record (as referenced in the appropriate calculations), code allowable values, and analytical techniques will be used. The plant-specific evaluations will be performed to demonstrate that the calculated stresses and fatigue usage factors are less than the allowable limits in accordance with the requirements of the applicable code of record in the existing design basis stress report. As such, the staff concludes that the plant-specific analysis for the BOP piping systems would provide the basis to ensure that BOP piping will continue to maintain its structural and pressure boundary integrity at the CPPU condition.

A [] evaluation will be performed to address the effects of CPPU on the capacity and performance of safety and relief valves, air-operated-valves, motor-operated-valves and other safety-related valves. In its response to the staff RAI, dated December 18, 2001

(Reference 4), GENE required the plant-specific assessment to include consideration of GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety Related Power Operated Gate Valves," in addition to the assessment items associated with the evaluation of the containment system. Other evaluations include effects of CPPU on the plant-specific response and commitments to GL 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," for the plant MOV program and GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions," for the overpressurization of penetration piping segments. The staff agrees with the CPPU LTR requirement to perform plant-specific evaluations relating to GL 89-10, GL 95-07 and GL 96-06 in consideration of CPPU.

On the basis of the above review, the staff concludes that although the method for the evaluation is consistent with Appendix K of ELTR1, the adequacy of affected piping, piping components, and their supports will be dependent on the plant-specific design and as-built information to demonstrate the structural and pressure boundary integrity of the RCPB and BOP piping systems and supports for the CPPU condition.

3.5 Main Steam Flow Restrictors

At normal operation, the main steam flow restrictors are required to pass a higher CPPU flow rate, which will result in an increased pressure drop. For the faulted condition with a postulated steam line break outside containment, the fluid flow in the broken steam line increases until it is limited by the main steam line flow restrictor. Because the maximum operating dome pressure does not change, [

.] Therefore, the main steam flow restrictors [

.] Because the flow restrictors were designed and analyzed for the choked flow condition with the maximum pressure difference, which is bounding for the CPPU condition, the CPPU LTR concludes that the structural integrity of flow restrictors [

.] The staff agrees with this conclusion.

Because the maximum operating pressure of the reactor steam dome will not change, the maximum flow rate through the flow restrictor is unchanged from the current analysis. Therefore, values from the current analysis for steam line break flow remain valid for uprate conditions.

3.6 Reactor Recirculation System

The primary function of the recirculation system is to vary the core flow and power during normal operation. However, the recirculation system also forms part of the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary.

The plant licensee must evaluate the changes in the system operating pressure and temperature at the CPPU conditions to either confirm that changes are small and result in conditions that remain within the current rated conditions, or to reevaluate. The CPPU will not result in an increase in the steady-state dome pressure. However, operation at the CPPU power level may increase the two-phase core flow resistance, requiring a slight increase in the recirculation system drive flow. The required pump head and pump flow at the CPPU conditions may increase the power demand of the recirculation motors slightly. CPPU does not generally require changes to the recirculation flow control system. The recirculation system evaluations should be consistent with the generic evaluation in ELTR2. Section 4.5 of

Supplement 1 to ELTR2 evaluated the recirculation system performance for a 20-percent power uprate with a 75 psig increase in the normal dome operating pressure and concluded that the recirculation system design can accommodate the operating condition associated with the power uprate.

The licensee should also confirm that CPPU conditions would not significantly increase the net positive suction head (NPSH) required or reduce the NPSH margin for the recirculation pumps.

In support of CPPU for a plant-specific application, the licensee will also re-analyze the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) with recirculation pump trip. Evaluation of the ATWS is discussed in Section 9.3.1 of the CPPU LTR. The staff concludes that the impacts on the recirculation system safety functions discussed in Supplement 1 to ELTR2 will be adequately considered for CPPU applications.

3.7 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV)

The MSIVs are part of the RCPB and perform a safety function (i.e., steam line isolation). The MSIVs must be able to close within the specified time limits at all design and operating conditions upon receipt of a closure signal. They are designed to satisfy leakage limits set forth in the plant TS.

The MSIVs were generically evaluated in Section 4.7 of Supplement 1 to ELTR2. The generic evaluation covered the effects of the power uprate changes on: (a) the capability of the MSIVs to meet pressure boundary structural requirements, and (b) the safety function of the MSIVs.

CPPU conditions are typically bounded by the conditions assumed [] The increased steam flow will assist in the closure of the MSIVs. The licensee is expected to adjust the actual in-plant closure rate so that the MSIV closure time will be maintained within the required TS range.

The staff accepts the [] assessment that the MSIV closure time can be maintained as analyzed and specified in the TS. In addition, various TS surveillances require routine monitoring of MSIV closure time and leakage to ensure that the licensing basis for the MSIVs is preserved.

Based on the review of the CPPU evaluation and rationale, the staff agrees with the conclusion that CPPU operation, as indicated above, [] and that the plant operations at the EPU level will not affect the ability of the MSIVs to perform their safety function.

3.8 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)/Isolation Condenser

The RCIC system provides core cooling in the event of a transient where the RPV is isolated from the main condenser, concurrent with the loss of all feedwater flow (LOFWF), and when the RPV pressure is greater than the maximum allowable for the initiation of a low-pressure core cooling system.

Section 5.6.7 of ELTR1 provides the scope of the RCIC system evaluation. The maximum injection pressure for RCIC is conservatively based on the upper analytical setpoint for the

lowest set available group of SRVs operating in the relief mode. For the CPPU condition, the reactor dome pressure does not change, and the SRV setpoints should remain unchanged, and there would be no changes to the RCIC high pressure injection parameters. The RCIC injection rate required at CPPU conditions should also be unchanged from the system design flow rate. The RCIC turbine operation at CPPU should not change any startup transient or affect system reliability. Either the RCIC system has been modified to include the startup control function concept presented in GENE guidance in Reference 13 or the licensee will provide an evaluation and justification for no modification. [

.] The required CPPU surveillance testing and system injection demands would occur at the same reactor operating pressures, so there would be no change to existing system and component reliability. The loss of feedwater (LOFW) transient event will be evaluated [, and the acceptance criterion, (to maintain reactor water level above top of active fuel) will continue to be met for CPPU conditions.

Because the licensee will analyze the LOFW transient for CPPU operation, consistent with the ELTR1 guidelines, and will conservatively evaluate the pressure performance requirements of the RCIC system, the staff accepts the CPPU LTR assessment.

3.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System

The RHR system is designed to restore and maintain the reactor coolant inventory and to remove sensible and decay heat from the primary system and containment following reactor shutdown for both normal shutdown and post accident conditions. The RHR system is designed to operate in the low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode, the suppression pool cooling (SPC) and containment spray cooling (CSC) modes, the shutdown cooling (SDC) mode, the steam condensing mode, and the fuel pool cooling assist mode. The LPCI mode is discussed in Section 4.2.4 of the LTR. The SPC and CSC modes are addressed in Section 4.1 of the CPPU LTR. The fuel pool cooling assist mode is discussed in Section 6.3.1 of the CPPU LTR. The effects of the CPPU on the RHR modes are described below. The results of the following evaluations are consistent with the [] evaluation in Section 4.1 of ELTR2.

During normal plant operation, the suppression pool cooling function is to maintain the suppression pool temperature below the TS limit. Following abnormal events, the SPC function controls the long-term suppression pool temperature such that the design temperature limit is not exceeded. The proposed CPPU would increase the reactor decay heat, which increases the heat input to the suppression pool during a LOCA, and results in a higher peak suppression pool temperature. The effect of CPPU on the suppression pool after a design basis LOCA is discussed in Section 4.1 of the CPPU LTR. In Section 4.1 of this staff evaluation, the staff accepted the proposed approach for CPPU to conduct [] reviews of the containment effects of a LOCA.

The containment spray cooling mode provides suppression pool water to the spray headers in the containment to reduce containment pressure and temperature during post-accident conditions. [

.] The effect of the containment spray on containment is discussed in Section 4.1 of the CPPU LTR.

The operational objective for a normal shutdown is to reduce the bulk reactor temperature after scram to an acceptable value (typically 125°F) within a specified time (approximately 20 hours) using the available SDC heat exchanger loops. A single loop cooldown target may be specified (e.g., to reach 212°F within 20 hours). The staff accepts the proposed approach that licensees will conduct plant-specific SDC evaluations at the CPPU condition to demonstrate that plants can meet the required cooldown time.

For the same time after shutdown, the spent fuel pool heat load increases due to the decay heat generation as a result of the power uprate. If needed, the assist mode of the RHR system uses the RHR heat removal capacity to provide supplemental fuel pool cooling in the event that the fuel pool heat load exceeds the heat removal capacity of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. This mode can be operated separately or along with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system to maintain the fuel pool temperature within acceptable limits. Operation of this mode is discussed in Section 6.3.1 of the LTR. The CPPU LTR requires a plant-specific evaluation of the impact of operations at the CPPU conditions on the assist mode of the RHR system.

Based on its review of the CPPU evaluation and rationale, the staff concludes that plant operation at the proposed CPPU conditions would be expected to have acceptable impacts on the different modes of the RHR system. This is based on the proposed approach that relies on analysis methods previously accepted by the NRC in ELTR2. Licensees are expected to provide confirmation of the impact of operation at CPPU conditions on RHR system capabilities in plant-specific submittals.

3.10 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System

The RWCU is designed to remove solids and dissolved impurities from the reactor coolant, thereby reducing the concentration of radioactive and corrosive species. The RWCU is a normally operating system with no safety-related functions other than containment isolation. The increase in feedwater flow after power uprate will slightly affect its operation. Higher feedwater flow increases the input of contaminants to the reactor and results in a slight increase in the normal level of conductivity and activated corrosion products. Also, increase in the feedwater line pressure will have slight effect on the system operating conditions related to the containment isolation. This function of the RWCU is addressed in Section 4.1 of the report in the containment system performance evaluation. [

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The staff reviewed the methodology described in the CPPU LTR for evaluating the effects of power uprate on the performance of the RWCU. The methodology [

] evaluations of the effects of power uprate and to report the results of these evaluations. The staff finds this method of evaluation of the effects of power uprate on the performance of the RWCU acceptable.

3.11 Conclusion

To support the proposed CPPU approach, GENE has provided analytical evaluations of affected plant components and equipment, and required evaluations of existing generic communications applicable to the extended power uprate (up to 20-percent increase in core

thermal power). Based on its review, the staff has determined that CPPU LTR in conjunction with the generic guidelines and evaluation provided in ELTR1/ELTR2 coupled with a plant-specific licensing evaluation, would provide the information necessary for the staff's review of individual applications for extended power uprate in the areas of structural and pressure boundary integrity for piping systems, components, and their supports, reactor vessel and internals, core support structure, and the control rod drive mechanisms.

4.0 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

The staff evaluated the system/program performance of the following structures, systems, components, and regulatory programs, as well as anticipated operational occurrences, and design basis accidents described in the CPPU LTR:

- Steam Dryer/Separator Performance
- Main Steamline Flow Restrictions
- Main Steam Isolation Valves
- Residual Heat Removal System (including Suppression Pool Cooling, Containment Spray Cooling, and Fuel Pool Cooling Assist Modes)
- Containment System Performance (including Pressure and Temperature Response, Containment Dynamic Loads, Containment Isolation, and Generic Letter 96-06)
- ECCS Net Positive Suction Head
- Main Control Room Atmosphere Control System
- Standby Gas Treatment System
- Post-LOCA Combustible Gas Control System
- Fuel Pool Cooling
- Water Systems
- Power Dependent Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
- Fire Protection Program
- Turbine-Generator
- Condenser and Steam Jet Air Ejectors
- Turbine Steam Bypass
- Feedwater and Condensate Systems
- Liquid Waste Management
- Gaseous Waste Management
- Station Blackout
- High Energy Line Breaks
- Moderate Energy Line Breaks
- Environmental Qualification of Mechanical Equipment with Non-Metallic Components
- Mechanical Component Design Qualification

Plant-Specific Evaluations

The CPPU LTR identified the following structures, systems, components, regulatory programs, anticipated operational occurrences, and design basis accidents as subject to plant-specific evaluation without defining a specific method:

[

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[

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Because the LTR does not constrain the scope of reviews in these areas, the plant-specific approach regarding system/program performance is acceptable without further evaluation.

4.1 Containment System Performance

The CPPU LTR states that the containment evaluation will be based on the methodology described in Section 5.10.2 of ELTR1. This approach involves a plant-specific analysis of the effect of the uprate power on containment. These evaluations will include containment pressures and temperatures, LOCA containment dynamic loads, safety-relief valve containment dynamic loads and subcompartment pressurization.

Appendix G of ELTR1 prescribes the generic approach for this evaluation and outlines the methods and scope of plant-specific containment analyses to be done in support of power uprate. These analyses will cover the response through the time of peak drywell pressure throughout the range of power/flow operating conditions with power uprate. Appendix G states that the licensee will analyze short term containment pressure and temperature response using the previously applied GE M3CPT code.

The approach also includes an evaluation of long-term containment heatup (i.e., suppression pool temperature) for the limiting safety analysis report events to show that pool temperatures will remain within limits for suppression pool design temperature, ECCS NPSH, and equipment qualification temperatures. These analyses can be performed using the GE computer code SHEX. SHEX is partially based on M3CPT and is used to analyze the period from when the break begins until after peak suppression pool heatup (i.e., the long-term response).

The staff found the assumptions and methods presented in Appendix G of ELTR1 acceptable with the following exceptions:

- The SHEX and TRACG computer codes have not been approved for generic use. However, since the review and acceptance of ELTR1, substantial confirmation of SHEX has been performed by both GENE and the NRC. In accord with the stipulations in Letter to G. L. Sozzi (GE) from A. Thadani (NRC), "Use of the SHEX Computer Program and ANSI/ANS 5.1-1979 Decay Heat Source Term for Containment Long-Term Pressure and Temperature Analysis," dated July 13, 1993 (Reference 18), GENE has performed benchmarking calculations for each application of SHEX. The NRC has performed independent confirmatory analyses on extended uprates for both Mark I and

Mark III containment designs and found the results consistent with SHEX results. Therefore, the confirmatory calculations with SHEX (benchmarking with current licensing basis assumptions – pre-uprate) for plant specific modeling are not required for extended power uprates for Mark I and Mark III containment designs. If future NRC performed independent confirmatory analyses on an extended power uprate for a Mark II containment design also is determined to be consistent with the SHEX results, then similar confirmatory calculations for plant-specific modeling are not required for extended uprates for Mark II containment designs. Plant-specific submittals must continue to show a comparison of SHEX results at the pre-uprate and uprated conditions.

- Plant-specific evaluations should continue to use the computer codes described in the safety analysis report for the facility unless adequate justification for use of an alternate code is provided.
- Safety-relief valve dynamic loads should be evaluated including the effects of second actuation conditions.

In addition to the above analyses, the CPPU LTR describes that the effect of increased decay heat (i.e., increased containment pressure and temperature) on the following equipment will be evaluated [

.]

The staff reviewed the scope of the proposed containment evaluation for CPPU and found it acceptable. The proposed methodology was previously reviewed and accepted for plant-specific applications provided that suitable justification for its use and validation of its accuracy are included with each plant-specific analysis.

4.2 Emergency Core Cooling Systems

The ECCS components are designed to provide protection in the event of a LOCA due to a rupture of the primary system piping. The limitation of constant reactor dome pressure minimizes the effect of power uprate for ECCS evaluation. Although design basis accidents (DBAs) are not expected to occur during the lifetime of a plant, plants are designed and analyzed to ensure that the radiological dose from a DBA will not exceed the 10 CFR Part 100 limits. For a LOCA, 10 CFR 50.46 specifies design acceptance criteria based on: (a) the peak cladding temperature (PCT), (b) local cladding oxidation, (c) total hydrogen generation, (d) coolable core geometry, and (e) long-term cooling.

The LOCA analysis considers a spectrum of break sizes and locations, including a rapid circumferential rupture of the largest recirculation system pipe. Assuming a single failure of the ECCS, the LOCA analysis identifies the break sizes that most severely challenge the ECCS systems and the primary containment. The MAPLHGR operating limit is based on the most limiting LOCA analysis, and fuel vendors perform LOCA analyses for each new fuel type to demonstrate that the 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria can be met.

The ECCS components considered for CPPU include the high pressure system [either high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) or high pressure core spray (HPCS)], the core spray (CS) or low pressure core spray (LPCS) system, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the

RHR system, and the automatic depressurization system (ADS). The following topics are addressed:

- High Pressure Coolant Injection
- High Pressure Core Spray
- Core Spray or Low Pressure Core Spray
- Low Pressure Coolant Injection System
- Automatic Depressurization
- ECCS Net Positive Suction Head

4.2.1 High Pressure Coolant Injection

The increase in decay heat changes the response of the reactor water level following a small break LOCA or a loss of feedwater transient event. There is no change to the normal reactor operating pressure or to the SRV setpoints. The HPCI system, utilized in all BWR/4 and some BWR/3 plants, is designed to pump water into the reactor vessel over a wide range of operating pressures. The primary purpose of the HPCI is to maintain reactor vessel coolant inventory in the event of a small break LOCA that does not immediately depressurize the reactor vessel. In this event, the HPCI system maintains reactor water level and helps depressurize the reactor vessel. Although for this analysis, the HPCI system is typically assumed to be out-of-service, the adequacy of the HPCI system is demonstrated by the margins discussed in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR.

In addition, the HPCI system serves as a backup to the RCIC system to provide makeup water in the event of a loss of feedwater flow transient, as described in Section 9.1 of the CPPU LTR. The adequacy of the HPCI system to meet the safety requirement following a loss of feedwater flow event is discussed in Section 9.1.3 of the CPPU LTR.

[

].

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

4.2.2 High Pressure Core Spray

The HPCS system (with other ECCS systems as backup) is designed to maintain reactor water level inventory during small and intermediate-break LOCAs, isolation transients and LOFW. The HPCS system is designed to pump water into the reactor vessel over a wide range of reactor operating pressures. The HPCS system also serves as a backup to the RCIC system. The system is designed to operate from normal offsite auxiliary power or from its dedicated emergency diesel generator.

The HPCS system is required to start and operate reliably over its design operating range. During the LOFW event and isolation transients, the RCIC maintains water level above the top-

of-active-fuel level (TAF). For the MSIV closure, the SRVs open and close as required to control pressure and the HPCS eventually restores water level.

The capability of the HPCS system during operation at the CPPU power level must be evaluated to ensure core cooling to the reactor in order to prevent excessive fuel PCT following small-and intermediate-break LOCAs, and to ensure the system capability to restore core coverage up to the TAF in isolation transients and LOFW transients. The HPCS evaluation should be applicable to and consistent with the evaluation in Section 4.3 of ELTR2. The maximum reactor pressure at which the HPCS system must be capable of injecting into the vessel for the RCIC backup function is typically selected based on the upper analytical values for the second lowest-set group of SRVs operating in the low-low setpoint mode of operation.

[

].

The generic evaluation in Section 4.3 of the Supplement to ELTR2 is based on typical HPCS pump design pressures. The licensee must evaluate the capability of the HPCS system to perform as designed and analyze its performance at the CPPU conditions, and confirm that HPCS system can start and inject the required amount of coolant into the reactor for the range of reactor pressures associated with LOCAs and isolation transients. CPPU does not change the power required for the pump or the power required from the dedicated HPCS diesel generator.

The HPCS system utilized in BWR/5 and 6 plants is designed to spray water into the reactor vessel over a wide range of operating pressures and was evaluated in Section 4.3 of ELTR-2. The adequacy of the system is discussed in the CPPU LTR Section 4.3 and in the containment evaluation, Section 4.1.

The HPCS system serves as a backup to the RCIC system to provide makeup water in the event of a loss of feedwater flow transient. The safety requirement following a loss of feedwater flow event is discussed in Section 9.1.3 of the CPPU LTR.

The SRV settings remain the same for CPPU, [.]

The staff accepts the proposed approach to demonstrate HPCS capability under CPPU conditions because the ECCS-LOCA analysis discussed in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR is based on the current HPCS capability, and [] evaluations at CPPU conditions will demonstrate that the system provides adequate core cooling.

4.2.3 Core Spray or Low Pressure Core Spray

The LPCS system initiates automatically in the event of a LOCA and in conjunction with other ECCS systems.

As indicated in the ECCS performance discussion in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR, the calculated LOCA PCT could increase slightly due to the CPPU. However, the existing LPCS system, combined with other ECCS systems, should still provide adequate long-term post-LOCA core cooling. The existing LPCS system hardware has the capability to perform its design injection function at the CPPU conditions and the generic evaluation in Section 4.1 of ELTR2 should bound the CPPU LPCS system performance. The ECCS-LOCA analysis (see

Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR) is based on the current LPCS capability, and will confirm on a plant-specific basis that the system provides adequate core cooling. The staff further reviewed ECCS system performance, as discussed in Section 4.3 of this SE. The staff finds the proposed evaluation and confirmation approach acceptable.

The CS/LPCS system sprays water into the reactor vessel after it is depressurized. The primary purpose of the CS/LPCS system is to provide reactor vessel coolant inventory makeup for a large break LOCA and for any small break LOCA after the reactor vessel has depressurized. It also provides spray cooling for long-term core cooling in the event of a LOCA. The adequacy of the CS/LPCS system performance is discussed in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR. There is no expected change in the reactor pressure at which the CS/LPCS is required.

[

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The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

4.2.4 Low Pressure Coolant Injection

The LPCI mode of the RHR system is automatically initiated in the event of a LOCA and, in conjunction with other ECCS systems, the LPCI mode is used to provide adequate core cooling for all LOCA events. The licensee will confirm that the existing system has the capability to perform the design injection function of the LPCI mode for operation at the CPPU condition and that the generic evaluation in Section 4.1 of ELTR2 [

.] Since the ECCS-LOCA analysis (see Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR), based on the current LPCI capability will demonstrate that the system provides adequate core cooling, the staff finds the proposed approach acceptable.

The LPCI mode of the RHR system is automatically initiated in the event of a LOCA. There is no change in the reactor pressures at which the LPCI mode of RHR is required. The primary purpose of the LPCI system is to help maintain reactor vessel coolant inventory for a large break LOCA and for any small break LOCA after the reactor vessel has depressurized. The adequacy of this system is discussed in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

4.2.5 Automatic Depressurization System

The ADS uses relief or safety/relief valves (SRVs) to reduce reactor pressure after a small-break LOCA, allowing the LPCI and CS/LPCS systems to provide cooling flow to the vessel. The adequacy of this system is discussed in Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR. CPPU does not change the conditions at which the ADS must function. The plant design requires the SRVs to have a minimum flow capacity. After a specified delay, the ADS actuates either on low water

level plus high drywell pressure or on sustained low water level alone. The licensee will confirm that the ability of the ADS to initiate on appropriate signals [].

Since the licensee's ECCS-LOCA analysis (see Section 4.3 of the CPPU LTR), based on the current ADS capability, demonstrates that the system provides adequate core cooling, the staff finds the evaluation acceptable.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

4.2.6 Emergency Core Cooling System Net Positive Suction Head

Operation at CPPU conditions increases the reactor decay heat, which increases the heat addition to the suppression pool following a LOCA event. As a result, the long-term peak suppression pool water temperature and long-term peak containment pressure may increase. The most limiting case for NPSH typically occurs at the peak long-term suppression pool temperature. The ECCS NPSH was evaluated in Section 4.1.8.5 of ELTR2, Supplement 1, Volume I. For HPCI, HPCS, CS/LPCS and RHR/LPCI systems, changes in the peak long-term suppression pool temperature and containment pressure are determined by the containment analyses (Section 4.1 of the CPPU LTR). If these values are bounded by the previous evaluation, no additional plant-specific analyses are required for the NPSH.

[

.] The CPPU LTR states that the ECCS NPSH evaluation will be based on the methodology described in Section 4.1.8.5 of ELTR2. This approach involves a plant-specific analysis of the effect of the increased wetwell temperature on NPSH. To the extent credited in the current design basis, the approach credits positive containment pressure to augment NPSH. The staff finds this approach acceptable. However, if, due to the effects of power uprate, this positive containment pressure is credited for a longer duration or a higher magnitude, then these changes would be subject to additional review.

4.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Performance

The ECCS is designed to provide protection against postulated LOCAs caused by ruptures in the primary system piping. The ECCS performance under all LOCA conditions and the analysis models must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K.

The CPPU approach takes an exception to the guidelines given in ELTR1. The ELTR1 approach called for a complete plant-specific break spectrum evaluation to be submitted as part of the PUSAR, using equilibrium core design parameters. In the CPPU approach, the LOCA analysis description is based on [

.]

The CPPU approach [] is judged to be acceptable for the following reasons:

- (a) The staff evaluations of several requests for stretch power increases (i.e., those limited to 5 percent of originally licensed power) and for extended power uprate at BWRs have shown that the change in PCT for power uprates is not significant. The maximum increase in the PCT observed was [], and this is well within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46. []
- (b) []
- (c) The limiting break sizes are well known and have been shown not to be a function of reactor power level.
- (d) []
- (e) The PCT for the limiting large-break LOCA is determined primarily by the hot bundle power, []
- (f) The reload evaluation confirms that the MAPLHGR for each fuel type in the specific reload core is bounded by the MAPLHGR used in the ECCS-LOCA performance analysis.
- (g) If the plant is MAPLHGR-limited or if the LOCA analysis results are at (or above) the acceptance criteria limits, a detailed plant-specific analysis for the licensing basis PCT will be performed.

The LOCA analysis for CPPU builds on the existing SAFER/GESTR LOCA analyses for a plant. []

[] The licensing basis PCT is based on the Appendix K PCT. []

[] Use of the most limiting of the nominal or Appendix K PCT changes for the licensing basis PCT will ensure continued compliance with the requirements for the SAFER/GESTR LOCA application methodology as approved by the NRC.

In addition to the large-break LOCA analysis, the analysis of small recirculation break LOCA response at CPPU conditions will be reviewed in order to assure adequate ADS capacity. The increased decay heat associated with CPPU will increase the steam generation rate. The higher steam generation rate may result in a longer ADS blowdown and a higher PCT for the small break LOCA. A spectrum of small breaks will be analyzed in order to determine the effect of CPPU on the PCT for the small break LOCA response. A sufficient number of break sizes will be analyzed to establish the worst small break size at CPPU conditions.

The licensee will perform the LOCA analysis using the CPPU methodology at 102 percent of the CPPU rated thermal power (RTP), using the limiting fuel design. The ECCS-LOCA analysis is based on the NRC-approved methodology (i.e., SAFER/GESTR). []

.]

If the CPPU SAFER/GESTR LOCA analysis has sufficient margin to the acceptance criteria, the simplified CPPU analysis approach will be used for the CPPU. [

.] The results will confirm that the licensing basis PCT and upper bound PCT meet the 10 CFR Part 50.46 acceptance criteria and the NRC SE requirements on the SAFER/GESTR LOCA application methodology at CPPU conditions.

The CPPU is expected to [] acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (local cladding oxidation, core-wide metal-water reaction, coolable geometry). Long-term cooling is assured when the core remains flooded to the jet pump top elevation and when a core spray system is operating.

Because the licensee will perform [] evaluations of ECCS-LOCA performance and confirm the applicability [] at the CPPU conditions, using approved methods, the staff agrees that the CPPU ECCS-LOCA performance will comply with 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K requirements.

The applicability of the [] assessment presented in the CPPU LTR will be confirmed in the licensee's submittal. If during the plant specific review it is determined that the [] assessment is not applicable to the plant, the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. The reload evaluation confirms that the MAPLHGR for each fuel type in the specific reload core is bounded by the MAPLHGR used in the ECCS-LOCA performance analysis. This process is acceptable to the staff.

4.4 Standby Gas Treatment System

In the LTR, GENE identified the CPPU effects on the standby gas treatment system (SGTS). [

.]

The core inventory of iodine and subsequent loading on the SGTS filters or charcoal adsorbers are affected by the power uprate. The SGTS is designed to maintain secondary containment at a negative pressure and to filter the exhaust air for removal of fission products potentially present during abnormal conditions. By limiting the release of airborne particulate and halogens, the SGTS limits off-site doses following a postulated design basis accident.

The design flow capacity of the system maintains the secondary containment at the required negative pressure to minimize the potential for exfiltration of air from the reactor building. [

.]

[] The total post-design basis accident iodine loading on the charcoal adsorbers increases proportionally with the increase in core iodine inventory. Adequate charcoal mass is typically present so that post-accident iodine loading on the charcoal remains within the guidance limits provided in RG 1.52, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

Decay heat from fission products accumulated within the system filters and charcoal adsorbers increases in proportion to the increase in thermal power. The cooling air flow required to maintain components within operating temperature limits is within the cooling flow capability of the system.

The CPPU LTR, as supplemented, presents the assumptions used in and the results of [] analyses to evaluate system performance for the following two accident source term models: (1) facilities implementing RG 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Term for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors," and (2) facilities that remain committed to RG 1.3, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors." The LTR states that the assumptions used in the evaluations []
[] The LTR also states that []
[]

The analyses demonstrate that the peak iodine loading and charcoal bed temperatures are within the criteria specified in RG 1.52. Therefore, for plants bounded by parameter values used in the [] analysis, SGTS performance with regard to iodine loading and charcoal bed temperature is acceptable.

4.5 Conclusion

The CPPU LTR provides an acceptable scope and approach for plant-specific license amendment requests for constant pressure power uprates. Within the scope of the review described in this portion of the staff's evaluation, and when relevant assumptions are satisfied, the staff found that [] evaluations for the following systems and design basis events were acceptable: the standby gas treatment system, the liquid and solid waste management systems, the gaseous waste management system, the main steamline flow restrictors, the main steamline break mass and energy release and associated evaluations, and the flooding analysis for moderate energy line breaks. These [] evaluations provide either a new design basis for a system or a basis for continued validity of existing design basis evaluations for operation at the uprated power level.

5.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

This section addresses the evaluations in RG 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 7, that are documented in previous plant power uprate submittals. The principal instrumentation and control evaluations are as follows:

- NSSS Monitoring and Control
- Reactor Protection System (RPS)/Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values

- BOP Monitoring and Control
- Technical Specification Instrument Setpoints

5.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System and Balance-of-Plant Monitoring and Control Systems

The instruments that monitor and the controls that directly interact with or control reactor parameters are usually within the NSSS. TSs address those instrument allowable values and/or setpoints for those NSSS sensed variables, which initiate protective actions. The effect of CPPU on TSs is addressed in Section 5.3 of the CPPU LTR. The topics considered in this section are:

- Average Power Range Monitors, Intermediate Range Monitors, and Source Range Monitors
- Local Power Range Monitors
- Rod Block Monitor
- Rod Worth Minimizer/Rod Control Information System

For CPPU, GENE evaluated the NSSS and BOP systems [.] The plant-specific submittal will [] provide a [] evaluation. The staff agrees with the GENE evaluation. However, the staff believes that the evaluation should go beyond the systems analysis and should cover all CPPU related changes to instrumentation and controls (setpoint and scaling changes, changes to upgrade obsolescent instruments, changes to the control philosophy).

In response to the staff's concern, GENE submitted a response by letter dated December 3, 2001 (Reference 3), stating that any plant system design that falls outside the basis for the generic analysis will be addressed in the plant-specific submittal. GENE has committed to include these requirements in the CPPU PUSAR shell which is used as the starting point in the preparation of plant-specific CPPU PUSAR documents and reflects the expected level of details for each section. Any major changes to the NSSS or BOP monitoring and control are addressed in the plant-specific CPPU PUSAR. Based on this commitment, the staff finds the proposed approach acceptable.

5.2 Reactor Protection System/Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoint and Allowable Values

In ELTR2, GENE committed to use their instrumentation setpoint methodology in Reference 14 to determine instrument setpoints for the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation. The staff has previously reviewed this instrument setpoint methodology and found it acceptable for establishing new setpoints in power uprate applications. However, GENE has proposed to use a simpler method for determining instrument setpoints in the CPPU LTR. GENE justified this change based on the experience with other extended power uprate applications [

.] In its request for additional information, the staff expressed the concern that the proposed method may not be consistent with the plant's licensing basis and may result in non-conservative instrument setpoint and allowable values. In its response, GENE provided the following restrictions on the use of the simplified process to assure its validity:

- NRC-approved GENE or plant-specific setpoint methodology is used.
- []

[

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1. Therefore, the staff finds the simplified instrument setpoint methodology discussed in the LTR for extended power uprate acceptable.

No safety-related setpoint change for these systems is required as a result of the uprate, with the exception of main steam line high flow. Main steam line high flow is discussed in Section 5.3.1 of the CPPU LTR and is considered in Section 10.1.1 of the staff's SE.

TS instrument allowable values and/or setpoints are those sensed variables that initiate protective actions and are generally associated with the safety analysis. The determination of instrument allowable values and setpoints generally includes consideration of measurement uncertainties and is derived from the conservative analytical limits used in specific licensing or safety evaluations. Increases resulting from CPPU in the core thermal power and steam flow affect some instrument setpoints. The following setpoints are discussed in this section:

- APRM Flow-Biased Scram
- Rod Worth Minimizer/RCIS Rod Pattern Controller Low Power Setpoint
- Rod Block Monitor
- RCIS Rod Withdrawal Limiter High Power Setpoint
- APRM Setdown in Startup Mode

[

.] The TS will be modified by adjusting the flow-biased scram setpoint.

5.4.2 Rod Worth Minimizer/RCIS Rod Pattern Controller Low Power Setpoint

The rod worth minimizer/RCIS rod pattern controller low power setpoint is used to bypass the rod pattern constraints established for the control rod drop accident at low power levels. [

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5.4.3 Rod Block Monitor

The severity of rod withdrawal error during power operation event is dependent upon the RBM rod block setpoint. [

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5.4.4 RCIS Rod Withdrawal Limiter (RWL) High Power Setpoint (HPSP)

[

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5.4.5 APRM Setdown in Startup Mode

The value for the TS safety limit for reduced pressure or low core flow conditions may be reduced to satisfy the fuel thermal monitoring requirements established as described in Section 2.1 of the CPPU LTR. The setpoint for the APRM setdown in the startup mode is based on the TS setpoint. The current TS may be based on either a conservative generic setpoint or on a plant-specific calculated value.

5.5 Conclusion

GENE has justified each of these instrument setpoints and allowable values based on the fact that either the CPPU has no effect on instrumentation error or is not credited in the accident analysis or the amount of error has no effect on the analysis. The staff reviewed the CPPU LTR discussion and finds the simplified setpoint methodology for these instruments under the conditions specified in the LTR acceptable. This is based on the staff's expectation that licensees referencing the CPPU LTR will justify any plant-specific differences from the CPPU LTR with respect to instrumentation setpoint methodologies.

Based on the above review and evaluation of the LTR and GENE's responses to the staff's RAI, the staff concludes that instrument setpoint changes for CPPU are acceptable.

6.0 ELECTRICAL POWER AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

The power system includes the generators, the main transformers, the switchyard, and the other transformers. Each generator is connected through a forced cooled isolated phase bus to main transformers. Alternating current (AC) power to the onsite distribution system is provided from the main generator output, from the transmission lines, or from onsite diesel generators.

6.1 AC Power

6.1.1 Grid Stability

The increased power from the generator may affect grid stability/reliability. For CPPU, GENE proposed to handle this effect by administrative controls or distribution logic. The staff raised concerns that the increase in megawatt (MW) electrical due to the power uprate would affect the supply of reactive power (MVAR) from the main generator. The staff considered that a decrease in MVAR output from the main generator affects the voltage on the grid and the voltage to the Class 1E systems and the MVARs cannot be handled by administrative controls or distribution logic alone, as stated in the CPPU LTR. In response to the staff's request for additional information on the grid stability analysis, GENE stated that the CPPU PUSAR shell identifies the requirement that a grid stability analysis be performed, and the results of the analysis are to be summarized in the plant-specific submittal. In addition, GENE has added the following sentence to the CPPU Basis of Section 6.1:

"The licensee will perform a grid stability analysis, and the results of the analysis will be summarized in the plant-specific submittal. Any plant changes to control the reactive power will be identified in the plant-specific submittal."

Also, GENE has deleted the following sentence from the CPPU Basis Section 6.1:

"However, this effect can be handled by administrative controls or distribution logic."

The staff concluded that the above response from GENE satisfies the staff's concern. There is reasonable assurance that GDC-17 will be met at the uprated power condition, assuming the plant-specific submittal appropriately addresses the areas described above.

6.1.2 Main Generator

The turbine generator converts the thermal energy in the steam into electrical energy. The increase in thermal energy and steam flow from the reactor is translated to an increased electrical output from the station by the turbine generator. Experience with previous power uprate applications indicates that turbine generator modifications may be required to support power uprate. The staff raised a concern that the increase in generator MW would also affect the protective relaying for the main generator/main transformer.

In response to the staff's concern on the increase in generator MW and the impact on the protective relaying for the main generator, GENE has added the following sentence to the CPPU basis of Section 6.1:

"The protective relaying for the main generator may require changing. Any changes will be identified in the plant-specific submittal."

The staff concluded that the above response from GENE satisfies the staff's concern. The staff's review determined that the main generator can be operated safely at the CPPU condition with any need for protective relay changes evaluated in the plant-specific submittal.

6.1.3 Main Power Transformer

The normal loads are increased to support the increased feedwater and cooling water requirements. Experience with previous power uprate applications indicates that main transformer modifications may be required to support power uprate. The staff raised a concern that the increase in generator MW and non-Class 1E loads will also affect the protective relaying for the main transformer and will require minor modifications to ensure reliable operation before achieving full power uprate. In response to the staff's concerns, GENE stated that any main transformer relay changes will be identified in the plant-specific submittal. The staff's review determined that, by modifications to the main power transformer and protective relaying scheme, the main power transformer can be operated safely at the CPPU condition, assuming the plant-specific submittal appropriately addresses this issue.

6.1.4 Isolated Phase Duct

The isolated phase bus conductors and insulators are protected and shielded by continuous, welded aluminum enclosures. Experience with previous power uprate applications indicates that isolated phase duct modifications such as isolated phase bus cooling may be required to support the additional loads associated with CPPU. The staff's review determined that plant-specific submittals will need to evaluate the need for isophase bus cooling modifications.

6.1.5 AC Distribution

The normal loads are increased to support the increased feedwater and cooling water requirements. The staff raised a concern that the type of increased loads such as recirculation pumps, condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps etc. should be addressed. In response to the staff's concern, GENE added the following sentence to the CPPU basis of Section 6.1:

"The increased normal operating loads are dependent on the specific plant design and may include: the recirculation pumps, condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps, motor drive feedwater pumps, and circulating water pumps."

The staff concluded that the above response from GENE satisfies the staff's concern. Plant-specific submittals will evaluate the increased normal operating loads.

6.1.6 Emergency Diesel Generators

Station loads under emergency conditions are based on existing equipment operating at or below the nameplate rating and within the calculated brake horse power (BHP) for the stated pumps. [

.] Therefore, a plant-specific evaluation of

the AC power system is to be performed for CPPU to assure an adequate AC power supply to safety-related systems. The staff finds this to be acceptable.

6.2 Direct Current (DC) Power

GENE stated that experience with previous power uprates has shown that the DC loads are not significantly increased because of power uprate. System loads are computed based on equipment nameplate data. [

], the DC power distribution

system is adequate for CPPU.

The staff concluded that [], the design for DC power systems is acceptable for CPPU.

6.3 Standby Liquid Control System

The standby liquid control system (SLC) is a manually operated system that pumps concentrated sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor vessel in order to provide neutron absorption. It is designed to be capable of bringing the reactor to a subcritical shutdown condition from rated thermal power.

An increase in the core thermal power does not by itself directly affect the ability of the SLC boron solution to bring the reactor subcritical and to maintain the reactor in a safe-shutdown condition. A higher fuel batch fraction, a change in fuel enrichment, or a new fuel design may affect the shutdown concentration, but operating at the CPPU condition does not affect the required boron solution. The SLC system shutdown capability is reevaluated []. The effect of the CPPU on the SLC system injection and shutdown capability will be evaluated [].

The SLC system is designed to inject at a maximum reactor pressure equal to the upper analytical setpoints for the lowest group of SRVs operating in the relief mode. Since the reactor dome pressure [] will not change, []. The SLC pumps are positive displacement pumps, and small changes in the SRV setpoint would have no effect on the SLC system capability to inject the required flow rate. The licensee will confirm [] that there is sufficient margin to lifting the SLC system relief valves. The calculated maximum required pump discharge pressure, based on the peak reactor pressure during the limiting ATWS event, should be below the lowest calculated nominal opening pressure for the SLC pump relief valves. Consequently, the SLC relief valves would not lift during the ATWS events. The operation of the SLC system is also analyzed to confirm that the pump discharge relief valves will reclose in the event that the system is initiated before the time that the reactor pressure recovers from the first transient peak. The evaluation compares the calculated maximum reactor pressure needed for the pump discharge relief valves to reclose with the lower reactor pressure expected during the time the SRVs are cycling opened and closed. Considerations are also given to system flow, head losses for full injection, and cyclic pressure pulsations due to the positive displacement pump operation in determining the setpoint for the relief valve. The relief valves are periodically tested to maintain this tolerance. Otherwise, it is expected that the relief valves will operate as designed and originally tested.

The SLC ATWS performance is addressed in Section 9.3.1 of the LTR and the licensee will confirm that the evaluation was based a representative core design at the CPPU condition. The minimum allowable solution concentration used in the ATWS analysis may be increased from the current value. This may be done to minimize the risk of having the ATWS analysis for CPPU generate a peak suppression pool temperature that exceeds current design limits.

6.4 Conclusion

The staff reviewed the information provided in the CPPU LTR, along with responses to the staff's concerns that described the plant-specific evaluations expected for CPPU and the generic effects on parts of the electrical power system. The staff concludes that CPPU would not adversely affect the plant electrical power systems and is, therefore, acceptable.

Based on the description and evaluation of the system operation that will be provided by licensees pursuing CPPU, the staff agrees with the conclusion that the SLC will be able to inject boron into the reactor coolant system as required by 10 CFR 50.62.

7.0 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS

7.1 Turbine Generator

The CPPU LTR identifies a turbine missile evaluation for plants using turbines with shrunk-on wheels as the only necessary safety-related evaluation associated with turbine operation at the uprated power level. As turbines with integral rotors are not considered a credible source of turbine missiles, it is not necessary to evaluate the potential change in turbine missile frequency at plants using this type of turbine. In their supplement provided by letter dated December 3, 2001, GENE stated that although the power uprate slightly increases energy trapped in the turbine following a load rejection, the turbine overspeed would remain within design limits. Therefore, this limitation in the scope of turbine generator reviews for power uprates is acceptable to the staff.

7.2 Turbine Steam Bypass System

The turbine steam bypass system is a normal operating system that is used to bypass excessive steam flow. The bypass flow capacity is included in some AOO evaluations (Section 9.1 of the CPPU LTR). These evaluations demonstrate the adequacy of the bypass system. The turbine steam bypass system capacity in terms of mass flow is not changed for CPPU. As a result, the increase in reactor power level and the resulting increase in steam flow to the turbine effectively reduces the bypass system capacity in terms of percent of uprated steam flow. If the limiting event in the reload analysis takes credit for the availability of the bypass system, the bypass flow is used in the reload analysis to establish the core operating limits. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

7.3 Feedwater Control System

The increase in reactor power and steam flow for CPPU results in an increase in feedwater flow. The feedwater control system is a normal operation system that controls the water supply to the reactor to maintain water level. Failure of this system is evaluated in the reload analysis for each reload core with the feedwater controller failure-maximum demand event. This approach is acceptable to the staff. A loss of feedwater event can be caused by downscale

failure of the controls. The loss of feedwater flow and loss of one feedwater pump events are discussed in Section 9.1.3 of the CPPU LTR.

8.0 RADWASTE SYSTEMS AND RADIATION SOURCES

This evaluation focuses on the power uprate's impact on occupational worker doses from increases in plant dose rates, and impacts on calculated doses to members of the public from increases in radioactive effluents.

8.1 Liquid and Solid Waste Management

GENE concludes that increased power levels and steam flow result in slightly higher levels of both liquid and solid radwastes. GENE notes that the major impact of the power uprate on liquid and solid radioactive waste production is the increased generation of spent condensate cleanup resins (SCCR). Because of the estimated increased levels of feedwater flow and corrosion products in the feedwater system, SCCR quantities are expected to increase as a result of the increased change-out frequency for resin bed media. Similarly, due to slightly higher levels of activation and fission products in the reactor coolant, the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) filter-demineralizer will require more frequent backwash/change-out.

The LTR describes the condensate demineralizers as the single largest source of liquid and wet solid waste. [

]. Therefore, the overall increase in liquid and solid waste volume will be bounded by the increase in condensate demineralizer flow rate. The staff concludes that this small increase is within the capability of the system, and, due to the batch nature of the discharges, can be easily managed within regulatory requirements to maintain discharges to the environment as low as reasonably achievable.

[, GENE expects the quantity (activity) of activated corrosion products (ACP) to increase [

]. The average offsite doses to the public from the liquid release pathway are generally very small fractions of the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, numerical design objectives and the dose limits of 40 CFR Part 190. The projected ranges of increases of these very small calculated doses are expected to result in a negligible increase in calculated public dose, and the overall contribution to the public dose from the liquid effluent pathway would remain a very small fraction of the regulatory limits.

However, due to site-specific environmental factors and plant-specific radwaste equipment configurations and waste management practices, a plant-specific evaluation must be submitted with each power uprate request. These evaluations will assess the operational impact of increased liquid and solid waste processing. The evaluation will ensure that plant liquid effluent releases remain as-low-as-is reasonably achievable (ALARA), and the resultant calculated doses remain below the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I.

8.2 Gaseous Waste Management

Gaseous wastes generated during normal operation are collected, controlled, processed, stored, and disposed of using the gaseous waste management (offgas) system. This system is designed to process and control the release of gaseous radiological effluents to the

environment such that the total radiation exposure of persons in offsite areas is as low as reasonably achievable. The release rate is administratively controlled to remain within limits and is principally a function of fuel cladding performance, main condenser air inleakage, and charcoal adsorber performance. These factors are not a function of reactor power. However, the power uprate has a secondary effect in that any fuel pin leaks will release greater quantities of fission product gases and a greater fraction of condenser inleakage will be activated by the higher average neutron flux. But these secondary effects are negligible in comparison with variations in the primary contributors to gaseous radiological effluents.

Radiolysis of water (i.e., formation of H_2 and O_2) in the core increases linearly with power, thus increasing the heat load on the offgas recombiner and related components. Because the offgas recombiner and associated condenser remove most of the radiolysis products from the waste gas stream as liquid water, this increase has a negligible effect on other portions of the offgas system.

[

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Thus, offgas system components designed for the generic rate of radiolytic gas production have ample margin to accommodate the increase in radiolytic gas production associated with the power uprate.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that administrative controls are adequate to manage any increase in gaseous radiological effluents resulting from the power uprate. Also, plants having recombiners and associated components originally designed for a radiolytic gas production rate of [] have adequate margin to accommodate the increased radiolysis resulting from the power uprate. However, systems designed to a radiolytic gas production rate lower than [] remain subject to plant-specific review, as specified in the LTR.

GENE discussed the main offgas system (MOS) and the impact of the power uprate on the MOS gaseous radiological effluent release rate. Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced by the fuel in the core during normal reactor operation. A small percentage of these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant from a small number of fuel assemblies which are assumed to develop leaks during reactor operation. GENE estimates that fission product gases input to the MOS will increase [

.] The main offgas system removes these fission gases directly from the plant main condenser, and they are processed before release. The MOS effluent release rate is a function of fuel cladding integrity, air in-leakage into the main condenser, charcoal inlet dew point and absorber temperature. GENE notes that the functions of the MOS and the main offgas radiological gaseous effluent release rate [

.] Given that installed MOS in operating plants effectively reduce gaseous effluents by factors greater than 100, fission product input increases of up to 20 percent into the MOS are expected to have a negligible impact on calculated doses to the public from gaseous effluents.

8.3 Radiation Sources in the Reactor Core

For both plant operation and post-operation, GENE has examined the impact of the power uprate on the facility radiation levels from radiation sources in the core. The radiation sources in the core include radiation from the fission process, accumulated fission products, and

neutron reactions as a secondary result of reactor power. The radiation sources in the core during operation are expected to increase in proportion to the increase in power. However, this increase is bounded by the existing safety margins of the design basis sources. Since the reactor vessel (inside the fully-inerted primary containment) is inaccessible during operation, a proportional increase in the radiation sources in the reactor core will have no effect on occupational worker personnel doses during power operations. Due to design shielding and containment surrounding the reactor vessel, worker occupational doses are largely unaffected, and doses to the public from radiation shine from the reactor vessel remain essentially zero as a result of the power uprates. Potential impacts of increased dose rates inside primary containment on component reliability are discussed in Section 10.3 of the staff's safety evaluation.

From a post-operation perspective, GENE discussed the two separate sets of radiation source data for the core, and both must be corrected for radioactive decay after shutdown. The first, the gamma-ray source, is used for radiation shielding calculations for the core and individual fuel bundles. In terms of MeV/sec per reactor thermal power, this source is a function of, and increases in proportion with, reactor power. The second set of post-operational source data is the nuclide activity (fission products primarily) in the fuel. This data is used as input for post-accident and spent fuel analyses, which apply appropriate regulatory modeling for source term release fraction, timing and transport assumptions and parameters. Both short-lived and long-lived nuclides are expected to increase in approximate proportion to increase in core thermal power. GENE discusses appropriate decay and equilibrium considerations, and establishes bounding parameters to be used for core radiation source calculations. [

.] Plant power uprate applications that conform with the values of these bounding parameters would be acceptable.

However, as discussed in Section 8.5 of this SE, in order to follow NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2, post-accident shielding requirements, licensees would need to perform plant-specific analyses of post-accident dose rates as they affect operator access to designated vital areas.

8.4 Radiation Sources in the Reactor Coolant

Radiation sources in the reactor coolant contribute to the plant radiation levels. These sources include coolant activation products, activated corrosion products (ACP) and fission products. GENE examined the impact of the power uprate on each type of source. The staff accepts the approach described below to address CPPU effects on radiation sources in reactor coolant.

8.4.1 Coolant Activation Products

During operations, the reactor coolant passing through the reactor core region becomes radioactive as a result of nuclear reactions. GENE notes that the activation product concentrations in the steam [] following the power uprate since the increase in activation production in the steam passing through the core is [] with the power increase, but [] by the increase in steam flow through the core. [], the transit time from the core to the turbine building components will be reduced (due to increased steam flow rate). This decrease in transit time reduces the decay period of very short-lived radionuclides

(mainly N-16), resulting in higher dose rates, roughly proportional to the power increase, in and around the turbine/condenser and other main steam components.

Because of plant-specific design and varying operational chemistry regimes, the percent increase in activation products (and operational dose rates) as a result of the power uprate will be determined [].

8.4.2 Activated Corrosion Products

ACPs result from the activation of metallic corrosion and wear materials in the reactor coolant, and are expected to increase as a result of a power uprate. The equilibrium level of ACPs in the reactor coolant is expected to increase as a result of the increase in feedwater flow rate and the increase in neutron flux in the reactor. The increased feedwater flow will likely reduce the efficiency of the condensate filtration and demineralization system (CFDS), thereby resulting in an additional increase in the equilibrium level of ACPs (and increased external dose rates). However, GENE expects that the ACP increase will not exceed the design basis concentrations.

Because of plant-specific design of the CFDS and feedwater systems, and varying operational chemistry regimes, the increase in ACP as a result of the power uprate will be determined by a plant-specific analysis.

8.4.3 Fission Products

Fission products in the reactor coolant result from the escape of minute fractions of the fission products in the fuel rods. Fission product release into the primary coolant is dependent on the nature and number of fuel defects and GENE does not expect an increase in these defects as a result of the power increase. []

[] Given that current levels of fission product activity typically found in reactor coolant and steam are [], a percent fission product increase of no more than the power uprate [].

Because of potential plant design and operational differences, []

.]

8.5 Radiation Levels

External radiation levels contribute to the plant worker occupational doses during plant operation, post operations (plant shutdowns), and during postulated accident conditions. These plant radiation levels result from activation and fission products, and ACP discussed in Section 8.4. GENE examined the impact of power uprates for each operational mode or condition.

GENE stated that many aspects/areas of the plant were conservatively designed for higher-than-expected radiation sources. Therefore, for most plants, the increases in radiation levels during operations at higher power levels will not affect radiation zoning or shielding adequacy for most plant areas. []

], plants that employ hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) experience increasing radiation levels [] from gaseous activation products (chiefly N-16) in and around the turbine building during plant operations. The NMIP is used primarily to maintain worker doses ALARA. The NMIP also provides a public dose reduction benefit by significantly reducing hydrogen injection rates which results in the reduction of direct radiation shine from the steam-side turbine building components. Thus HWC-only plants may have little design margin remaining and could be particularly impacted by power uprates. In any case, all plants should perform special surveys and monitor for external radiation level changes during power ascension to ensure any significant radiation level increases in specific areas are identified in a timely manner and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 and plant technical specifications. For plants employing the HWC injection process, a plant-specific analysis will be performed to assess the impact of increasing radiation levels from the increased activity level of gaseous activation products on plant radiation zoning in and around the turbine building and main steam piping.

The post-operation external radiation levels [

.] ACP are the main source of shutdown dose rates and the chief contributor to occupational doses to workers. Some post-operational radiation levels may also be higher in those areas of the plant where accumulation of ACP is expected (i.e., near the spent fuel pool cooling system piping and the reactor coolant piping as well as near some liquid radwaste equipment). Licensees will use pre-job worker training/briefings, procedural access, and work planning and controls to compensate for any increased radiation levels and to maintain occupational doses ALARA. [

], applicants also need to analyze the impact of the resultant increase in radiation levels in plant systems and areas from ACP.

GENE concludes that post-accident radiation levels will increase due to the change (increase) in the reactor core source term inventory as a result of power uprate. [

.] This increase in post-accident dose rates impacts Item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737, which establishes occupational worker dose guidelines during a postulated accident so that operators can access and perform required duties and actions in designated vital areas. These design limits (GDC 19, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A) require that adequate radiation protection be provided such that the dose to personnel not exceed 5 rem whole body or the equivalent to any part of the body for the duration of the accident (the extremity limit is 75 rem). Plant design and vital area missions differ from plant to plant, and since plants can choose between two different post-accident dose models, a plant-specific evaluation of the power uprate impact on all vital areas and missions will need to be performed to ensure that personnel access to and work in designated vital areas for accident mitigation following a LOCA can still be accomplished without exceeding the dose requirements of GDC 19.

8.6 Normal Operation Off-Site Doses

During normal operation GENE notes that the two primary sources of off-site public doses are airborne releases from the MOS, and gamma shine from the plant steam turbines and associated steam components.

The MOS effluent release quantities are greater than the sum of all gaseous streams released by the plant. GENE estimates that the MOS effluent gaseous releases will increase by no more

than the percentage increase in reactor thermal power. Given that the installed MOS in operating plants effectively reduces main offgas effluents by factors greater than 100, effluent release increases of up to 20 percent from the MOS are expected to have a negligible impact on calculated doses to the public. GENE concludes that the actual estimated increase in off-site doses from the MOS will be determined by [] to ensure that the public doses remain below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I and 40 CFR Part 190.

Gamma radiation (skyshine) from coolant activation products (chiefly Nitrogen-16) in the reactor steam in the main steam system components in the turbine building provides another offsite public dose pathway. GENE notes that the power uprate results in increased steam flow, leading to generally proportional higher levels of activation products (chiefly Nitrogen-16) and resultant external dose rates in and around the turbine building. Typical shielding design more than adequately bounds any such radiation level increase due to power uprate. During power operations, N-16 production is increased by the HWC process (routine hydrogen gas injection into the reactor feedwater in an effort to prevent intergranular stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals). The resulting higher dose rates then increase the gamma skyshine both on-and off-site. Applicants should be aware of the impact on station workers working in buildings adjacent to the turbine building (e.g., administrative station employees that may be designated as members of the public). These station employees then would be subject to the 10 CFR Part 20 public dose limits. For plants that use HWC, a site-specific analysis will need to be performed to confirm that the turbine building skyshine increases due to power uprate do not result in doses to members of the public exceeding the limits in 40 CFR Part 190.

9.0 REACTOR SAFETY PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

This section addresses the evaluations in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Chapter 15, that are documented in the current plant power uprate submittals. These reactor safety performance evaluations include:

- Anticipated Operational Occurrences
- Design Basis Accidents
- ATWS
- Station Blackout

Plant-specific evaluations will be included in the plant-specific submittal consistent with the format and level of detail of previous extended power uprate submittals or as discussed in the CPPU LTR sections. The applicability of the generic assessments for a specific plant application will be evaluated. The plant-specific submittal will either document the successful confirmation of the generic assessment or provide a plant-specific evaluation if the applicability assessment is unsuccessful.

The staff agrees that this [

], the plant must perform a [] evaluation using an approved methodology. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

9.1 Anticipated Operational Occurrences

AOOs are abnormal transients that are expected to occur one or more times in the life of a plant and are initiated by a malfunction, a single failure of equipment, or a personnel error. The applicable acceptance criteria for the AOOs are based on 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, 15, and 20.

GDC 10 requires that the reactor core and associated control and instrumentation systems be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the SAFDL are not exceeded during normal operation and during AOOs.

GDC 15 stipulates that sufficient margin be included to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during normal operating conditions and AOOs.

GDC 20 specifies that a protection system be provided that automatically initiates appropriate systems to ensure that the specified fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operating conditions and AOOs.

The SRP provides further guidelines that:

- pressure in the reactor coolant and main steam system should be maintained below 110 percent of the design values according to the ASME Code, Section III, Article NB-7000, "Overpressure Protection;"
- fuel cladding integrity should be maintained by ensuring that the reactor core is designed to operate with appropriate margin to specified limits during normal operating conditions and AOOs;
- an incident of moderate frequency should not generate a more serious plant condition unless other faults occur independently; and
- an incident of moderate frequency, in combination with any single active component failure or single operator error, should not result in the loss of function of any fission product barrier other than the fuel cladding.

A limited number of fuel cladding perforations are acceptable under these guidelines.

The plant UFSAR typically evaluates a wide range of potential transients. Chapter 15 of the UFSAR contains the design basis analyses that evaluate the effects of an AOO resulting from changes in system parameters such as: (1) a decrease in core coolant temperature, (2) an increase in reactor pressure, (3) a decrease in reactor core coolant flow rate, (4) reactivity and power distribution anomalies, (5) an increase in reactor coolant inventory, and (6) a decrease in reactor coolant inventory.

Plant response to the most limiting transients are analyzed each reload cycle and are used to establish the thermal limits. A potentially limiting event is an event or an accident that has the potential to affect the core operating and safety limits.

The generic guidelines for the EPU evaluation (Appendix E of ELTR1) identified the set of limiting transients to be considered in each event category.

The CPPU approach takes an exception to the guidelines given in ELTR1. The staff SE for ELTR1 states that: "- -the staff agrees with the minimum set of limiting transients to be analyzed, which is contained in Appendix E of ELTR1." [

.]

Plant-specific core reload analyses (i.e., those results documented in the SRLR and COLR) are not submitted with the licensee's power uprate application and are not normally submitted for NRC staff review and approval. The reload analyses are conducted using methods previously reviewed and accepted by the staff. Further, the methods approved for reload analyses specify the acceptance criteria for the transients to be analyzed. The reload evaluation process is documented in GESTAR-II. Existing regulations require licensees to obtain staff approval for changes to analysis methods and acceptance criteria used for reload analyses. In addition, based on previous experience with reviewing EPU analyses for EPUs that maintained a constant reactor dome pressure, the staff does not expect significant differences in the results of such analyses for pre- and post-CPPU conditions. Therefore, the staff determined that further review of the reload analysis methods or results was not necessary for CPPU applications. The staff may choose to audit certain future reload analyses for CPPU applicants.

The following transients in Appendix E of ELTR1 will be evaluated or re-analyzed []:

[

.] This is acceptable to the staff.

All of the transients listed in Table E-1 of ELTR1 were considered. The limiting overpressure transient will be analyzed as defined by GESTAR-II and by the ELTR1. [

.] Analyses of the events listed in Table E-1 of ELTR1, for plants pursuing extended power uprates, have confirmed the applicability of the GESTAR-II list of limiting events. [

.]

The limiting events are defined in GESTAR-II and the core reload analysis will be based on approved GESTAR-II methodology. The other events listed in Table E-1 of ELTR1 do not establish the OLMCPR, based on experience and the characteristics of these events, and therefore are not analyzed to establish this limit.

As discussed above, most of the transients listed in Appendix E of ELTR1 will be analyzed [

] these evaluations are not expected to be included in the power uprate license amendment submittal. [

.] The results of the limiting thermal margin

event analyses are dependent upon [.] Based on the experience with previous analyses of power uprate in this area and that the conclusions in the CPPU LTR will be confirmed on a plant-specific basis, this part of the proposed CPPU approach is acceptable to the staff.

[

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- Fuel Thermal Margin Events
- Power and Flow Dependent Limits
- Loss of Water Level Events (Loss of feedwater flow/Loss of one feedwater pump)

9.1.1 Fuel Thermal Margin Events

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9.1.2 Power and Flow Dependent Limits

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9.1.3 Loss of Water Level Events

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For the LOFWF event, transient core cooling is provided by maintaining the water level inside the core shroud above the top of active fuel. Plant-specific analysis will be performed as described in Section 5.3.2 of ELTR1, using the limiting high pressure makeup system (IC, RCIC or HPCS). To be consistent with the accepted practice for the application of best-estimate decay heat models, the loss of feedwater flow evaluation will use the ANSI/ANS 5.1-1979 decay heat standard with a two-sigma uncertainty.

Loss of one feedwater pump involves operational considerations, as discussed in Section 3.9 of the CPPU LTR, to avoid ADS timer initiation and MSIV closure activation functions associated with the low-low-low reactor water level setpoint (Level 1). This requirement is intended to avoid unnecessary initiations of safety systems. This requirement is not a safety related function and need not be re-evaluated on a plant-specific basis for CPPU.

9.2 Design Basis Accidents: Radiological Consequences

This section addresses the radiological consequences of DBAs. The CPPU LTR section entitled, "Design Basis Accidents," addresses the radiological consequences of DBAs. This section, as originally submitted, addressed five DBAs: LOCA, fuel handling accident (FHA), control rod drop accident (CRDA), main steamline break outside containment (MSLBA), and instrument line break (ILBA). [

.] A cross-

reference was made to Appendix H of ELTR1 for analysis guidance. [

.]

[

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9.2.1 Accident Dose Assessment

The staff reviewed the CPPU LTR for aspects related to analyses of the radiological consequences of DBAs. The staff review focused on sections addressing radiation sources in the reactor core (as it relates to DBAs) and design basis accidents. The staff also reviewed other CPPU LTR sections for potential impacts on the radiological consequences of accidents.

The CPPU LTR section entitled, "Radiation Sources in the Reactor Core," addresses the increase in radiation sources in the core due to the CPPU. These source terms are used in both normal operational and post-accident radiological assessments. This part of the staff's evaluation considers only the post-accident applications of this source term. This section identifies [] input parameters for a [] analysis of the core inventory expressed in units of Ci/MWt. [

.]

The staff requested additional information in this area. GENE responded to this request in a letter dated December 3, 2001. Changes to the CPPU LTR were proposed as part of this response. The staff accepts the CPPU approach, including the proposed changes to be incorporated in the final approved version of the CPPU LTR.

9.2.2 Radiation Sources in the Reactor Core

The CPPU LTR addresses the increase in the magnitude of radiation sources in the reactor core due to the CPPU. Included is a description of a core inventory analysis performed by GENE using the industry-accepted ORIGEN code. This analysis was performed using a set of input parameters and assumptions [

.] Although the core inventory itself is not tabulated in the CPPU LTR, a table was provided as part of the RAI response and was reviewed by the staff by comparison to other tabulations and found to be acceptable for use in analyzing DBAs.

9.2.3 Radiological Dose Analysis of Design Basis Accidents

The magnitude of the potential radiological consequences of a DBA is proportional to the quantity of fission products released to the environment. The magnitude of the environmental release is a product of the activity released from the core and the transport mechanisms between the core and the effluent release point. In general, the inventory of fission products in the fuel rods, the creation of radioactive materials outside of the fuel by irradiation, and the concentration of radioactive material in the reactor coolant system are directly proportional to the rated thermal power. Thus, an increase in the rated thermal power can be expected to increase the inventory of radioactive material that is available for release. The transport mechanisms are dependent on plant process parameters, such as process stream flows, temperatures, pressures, and may be dependent on the timing of plant protective responses, such as reactor trips, isolation valve closures, and control room isolation. The power uprate and plant modifications associated with the power uprate may affect the assumptions made in previous consequence analyses. [

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The original language of the CPPU LTR and that in the cross-referenced ELTR1 focused on the increase in core inventory due to the CPPU. However, the staff felt that inadequate attention was paid to the impact of the CPPU on the transport of radioactive materials from the core to the environment. Although the CPPU LTR identified the potential impact of both core inventory and transport changes, the CPPU LTR asserted that: "For most DBAs, the radiological releases under CPPU are expected to increase proportional to the core inventory increase." No further discussion of transport impacts was provided in the CPPU LTR or in ELTR1. The staff believes

that this implied disposition of transport impacts may not be adequate and that there are plant-specific impacts that could negate this conclusion. While the staff agrees that maintaining a constant reactor pressure minimizes the impact on transport mechanisms, it does not eliminate the need to consider the full range of plant-specific impacts. In its RAI, the staff provided several plant-specific examples in which the transport could be affected by the power uprate. Many of these examples applied only to facilities that had implemented an alternative source term (AST). Since the CPPU LTR is intended for use by all BWRs, the staff requested the cross-reference to Appendix H be deleted and that a discussion on the need for a plant-specific evaluation of the impact of a CPPU on transport be added to the CPPU LTR. GENE proposed a revision to the CPPU LTR to provide separate sub-sections for facilities using the traditional TID-14844 source term and those using an AST. These sections address the need to consider impacts on transport. The staff finds the proposed revision acceptable.

The staff has reviewed several extended power uprate requests that reference ELTR1. With the exception of one facility that based its analyses on an AST, all analyses involved development of a dose scaling factor []. This dose scaling methodology is consistent with the discussions in ELTR1 and its appendices (or with the discussions in the CPPU LTR), and has been found acceptable in these early uprate requests. Briefly summarized, the analysis approach develops [].

Appendix H to ELTR1 stated that the basic premise of the power uprate radiological/radiation evaluations is that the existing calculations as shown in the current safety analysis reports may be extended to higher reactor power levels. The staff believes that this premise may not be appropriate for all facilities. The staff's experience in reviewing license amendment requests indicates that some licensees have analyses based on analysis inputs and assumptions that may not be acceptable for analyses at CPPU conditions.

In approving a license amendment request based on the CPPU approach, the staff must make a finding with reasonable assurance that public health and safety will not be impacted by allowing reactor operation at CPPU conditions. Although the validity of extending current analyses, as proposed in ELTR1 Appendix H was accepted by the staff in its approval of ELTR1, the staff has reconsidered its position as it will apply to future uprate requests.

In its response to the staff's concern on this issue, GENE proposed adding a discussion to the template used for generating the plant-specific PUSAR. While the staff finds that the language of the proposed PUSAR template discussion addresses the staff concern, the PUSAR template was not submitted for review and is not covered by this SE. To ensure that this concern will continue to be addressed, the staff will request that applicants for a CPPU amendment confirm that the current plant analyses, to which the scaling factors will be applied, meet the guidance of current versions of applicable regulatory guides and current versions of applicable sections of the SRP, or to propose alternative justification for extending the current analyses to uprated power conditions.

The staff reviewed the [] MSLBA and ILBA provided in the CPPU LTR. While the staff generally found the bases [] to be acceptable, the staff requested that GENE expand the discussion to identify the significant assumptions []. This additional language was provided in the RAI response. The staff finds the proposed revisions to be acceptable.

The staff finds that the CPPU LTR provides an acceptable framework for evaluating the impact of a CPPU of up to 20 percent on the potential consequences of DBAs. Given the significant increase in core inventory and the resulting increase in postulated accident radiation doses due to an increase in rated thermal power of up to 20 percent, the staff expects that each licensee for a power uprate that references the CPPU LTR will perform the required plant-specific evaluations in accordance with the content of the CPPU LTR and the following additional guidance.

- a. Plant-specific radiological dose analyses should be performed using the guidance of current versions of applicable RGs and the current versions of applicable sections of the SRP except where the licensee can show that the staff has explicitly accepted an alternative approach to the guidance set forth in the SRP and applicable regulatory guides. Applicants may propose alternatives to the applicable guidance for staff consideration as part of CPPU license amendment requests.

The [] is an acceptable methodology provided that:

- (1) The licensee has confirmed that the CPPU has not affected analysis inputs [], and
- (2) The prior analyses were performed as stated in Paragraph (a) above.

The CPPU LTR provides [] of the core inventory and the impact on the main steam line break accident outside of containment and an instrument line break accident. These [] are acceptable to the staff provided that applicants referencing these [] confirm that the dispositions are bounding for their facilities.

9.3 Special Events

This section considers two special events: ATWS and Station Blackout (SBO).

9.3.1 Anticipated Transients Without Scram

An ATWS is defined as an AOO with failure of the reactor protection system to initiate a reactor scram to terminate the event. The requirements for ATWS are specified in 10 CFR 50.62. This regulation requires BWRs to have the following mitigating features for an ATWS event:

- A standby liquid control (SLC) system with the capability of injecting a borated water solution with reactivity control equivalent to the control obtained by injecting 86 gpm of a 13 weight percent sodium pentaborate decahydrate solution at the natural boron-10 isotope abundance into a reactor vessel with 251-inch inside diameter.
- An alternate rod insertion (ARI) system that is designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and that is independent from sensor output to the final actuation device.
- Equipment to trip the reactor coolant recirculation pumps automatically under conditions indicative of an ATWS.

BWR performance during an ATWS is also compared to the criteria used in the development of the ATWS safety analyses described in Reference 15. The criteria include:

- limiting the peak vessel bottom pressure to less than the ASME Service Level C limit of 1500 psig,
- ensuring that the peak cladding temperature remains below the 10 CFR 50.46 limit of 2200 degrees F,
- ensuring that the cladding oxidation remains below the limit in 10 CFR 50.46,
- limiting peak suppression pool temperature to less than the containment design temperature, and
- limiting the peak containment pressure to a maximum of 110 percent of the containment design pressure.

The ATWS analyses assume that the SLC system will inject within a specified time to bring the reactor subcritical from the hot full power condition and maintain the reactor subcritical after the reactor has cooled to the cold shutdown condition.

The plant-specific analysis will confirm that the CPPU conditions meet the ATWS mitigation requirements defined in 10 CFR 50.62, because (a) an ARI system is installed, (b) the boron injection capability is equivalent to 86 gpm, and (c) an automatic ATWS-recirculation pump trip (RPT) has been installed. Section L.3 of ELTR1 discusses the ATWS analyses and provides a generic evaluation of the following limiting ATWS events in terms of overpressure and suppression pool cooling: (a) MSIV closure, (b) pressure regulator failure to open (PRFO), (c) loss-of-offsite power (LOOP), and (d) inadvertent opening of a relief valve (IORV). The ATWS analyses will be performed [] at the CPPU operating condition []. The LOOP event will be analyzed only if it produces a significant loss in suppression pool cooling. The plant specific ATWS analysis for CPPU will demonstrate that the ATWS acceptance criteria for []

[] To benchmark the plant response to limiting ATWS events at CPPU conditions, the licensee may also perform the ATWS analyses for the current rated thermal power.

[] The plant operating staff will be able to identify and respond to an ATWS event as under the current power level. [] Boron injection is assumed to start at the boron injection initiation temperature or 2 minutes after the ATWS trip point (i.e, low reactor water level or high reactor pressure), whichever is later. In both the current power conditions and CPPU conditions, the SLC pumps are started at 2 minutes after the trip point. []

The licensee is expected to list the key input parameters used in the plant-specific ATWS analyses and the corresponding results []

[] The licensee will confirm that the results of the plant-specific ATWS analyses meet the ATWS acceptance criteria. []

.] Therefore, the proposed approach to evaluation of the plant response to an ATWS event for CPPU operation is judged to be acceptable.

Since the ATWS analyses are based on NRC-approved methods and the licensee will perform the ATWS analyses at the CPPU conditions, the staff accepts the CPPU LTR evaluation approach.

The staff agrees that licensees following the CPPU approach can continue to satisfy the requirements of the ATWS rule stipulated in 10 CFR 50.62 and that the results of the ATWS analyses for CPPU operation are likely to meet the ATWS acceptance criteria. [

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9.3.2 Station Blackout

The plant response to and the coping capabilities for the SBO event are affected by operation at the CPPU power uprate level, due to the increase in the decay heat. For CPPU, the SBO event will be reevaluated using the guidelines of NUMARC 87-00 and RG 1.155, "Station Blackout," consistent with the plant-specific licensing basis. The results of the plant-specific evaluation will be reported in the plant-specific submittal. The staff concluded that, if the results of the plant-specific evaluations are consistent with the guidelines of NUMARC 87-00 and RG 1.155, the design for SBO would meet GDC 17 and 10 CFR 50.63 and would be acceptable.

10.0 ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF CPPU

10.1 High Energy Line Breaks (HELB)

10.1.1 Main Steam Line Break

For CPPU, reactor vessel dome pressure is unchanged relative to the pre-uprate value. Therefore, during plant operation the uprate will not significantly affect the fluid conditions, i.e., pressure, temperature, and enthalpy, within the system piping. In the event of a steam line break, flow will be choked either at the break or at the steam line flow restrictions. For flow choked at the steam line flow restrictor, the reactor will be brought subcritical by the increased void fraction in the core and the main steam line high flow isolation signal will close the MSIVs. For breaks where flow is choked at the break, high area temperature or high area differential temperature isolation signals initiate MSIV closure. Initiation of MSIV closure initiates a reactor trip, which ensures the reactor is subcritical prior to isolation. During the short period between the reactor going subcritical and the automatic closure of the MSIVs, [

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Based on the above information, for plants implementing CPPU, [

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10.1.2 Liquid Line Break

Operation at the uprated power level will affect liquid pressure, temperature, and flow rates within certain piping systems, including the reactor recirculation system and the main feedwater system. Therefore, plant-specific evaluations of HELBs in liquid systems are necessary. The evaluations include subcompartment pressure and temperature, pipe whip, jet impingement, and flooding, consistent with the plant licensing basis, as described in the LTR.

10.2 Moderate Energy Line Breaks

Operation at the uprated power level [

]

reevaluation of flooding events within the plant's current licensing basis would only be necessary for modifications that increase the flow rate in open-cycle systems, such as circulating water.

10.3 Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electrical Equipment

The CPPU SAR will provide a review of the equipment qualification for safety-related electrical equipment for CPPU [] for the normal and accident conditions expected in the area where the EQ equipment is located. [

.]

EQ for safety-related electrical equipment located inside the containment is based on MSLB and DBA/LOCA conditions and their resultant temperature, pressure, humidity and radiation consequences, and includes the environments expected to exist during normal plant operation. The current accident conditions for temperature, pressure, and humidity from containment analysis [.] Normal temperatures and radiation levels are expected to increase slightly in some areas (e.g., near the feedwater lines). [] changes in normal and accident conditions to assure EQ equipment remains qualified in the uprated power environment and that documentation of the qualification of equipment is maintained. [

.] The plant-specific submittal should address this effect and the NRC staff will review the submittal against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. EQ for safety-related electrical equipment located outside the containment is based on MSLB in the steam tunnel, or other HELBs, whichever is limiting for each plant area for accident temperature, pressure, and humidity environments. [

.] The plant-specific submittal should address this effect and NRC staff will review the submittal against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The staff reviewed the information provided in the CPPU LTR, along with responses to the staff's concerns. The staff concludes that CPPU would not adversely affect the plant electrical power systems and the environmental qualification of electrical equipment. The design will conform to GDC 17 and 10 CFR 50.49 and the proposed LTR is, therefore, acceptable.

10.4 Risk Implications

The staff reviewed the individual plant evaluation (IPE) section, which is herein also referred to as the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) section, of the CPPU LTR, as revised by GENE responses to the staff requests for additional information dated December 3, 2001, and December 18, 2001.

Though license applications that use the CPPU LTR will not necessarily be risk-informed submittals, the LTR does require the presentation and discussion of the plant-specific risk impacts associated with a CPPU. The staff will use the guidelines delineated in RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," to focus their evaluation of these plant-specific impacts. This evaluation will include a review of the CPPU impacts to core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) due to internal events, external events (e.g., fire, seismic, and high winds), and shutdown operations. The staff evaluation will also address the quality of the licensee's plant-specific PRA that is used to support the licensee's analyses and conclusion that the risk impacts associated with a CPPU are acceptably small.

Each of the major PRA-related review areas presented in the CPPU LTR, as modified by the GENE responses to the staff's requests for additional information, are discussed in the following subsections.

10.4.1 Internal Events

The CPPU LTR PRA section discusses the potential effect of CPPU from internal events, specifically identifying the need for licensees in plant-specific submittals, to address the risk impacts of CPPU associated with initiating event frequency, component reliability, operator response, and success criteria. The staff agrees that the licensee's plant-specific submittal should individually address the risk impacts of CPPU in each of these areas of the internal events analysis, as well as address the overall risk impact of CPPU for internal events. To determine that the risk impacts of CPPU from internal events are acceptable, the staff will evaluate the information provided by the licensee in plant-specific submittals using the guidance provided in RG 1.174. Therefore, the licensee should provide and describe the change in risk associated with implementing the CPPU for each of these areas of the internal events analysis and demonstrate that the overall change in risk from internal events is acceptably small. If the licensee's analysis identifies any vulnerabilities or took credit for plant modifications that had not been implemented when the analysis was conducted, the licensee should identify these conditions, resolution of these conditions for CPPU conditions, and demonstrate, either quantitatively or qualitatively, that these risk impacts of CPPU are acceptably small. If the estimated change in CDF and/or LERF, or base CDF and/or LERF, exceeds the RG 1.174 guidelines, including the consideration of the existence of a potential vulnerability or if a potential vulnerability is introduced by the CPPU, the licensee should provide a more detailed justification to support the acceptability of implementing the CPPU. The licensee's information needs to be sufficient for the staff to conclude that the risk impact of CPPU from internal events is acceptably small.

10.4.2 External Events

The PRA section in the CPPU LTR discusses the potential effect of CPPU from external events and identifies the need for licensees, in plant-specific submittals, to address the risk impacts of

CPPU from external events. The staff agrees that the licensee's plant-specific submittal should address the risk impacts of CPPU for external events.

To determine that the risk impacts of CPPU from external events are acceptable, the staff will evaluate the information provided by licensees in plant-specific submittals using the guidance provided in RG 1.174. Therefore, if the licensee has a PRA for some external events, the change in risk associated with implementing the CPPU for these external events should be described and the submittal should demonstrate that this change in risk is acceptably small. If the licensee does not have a PRA for some external events, such as, if a margins-type analysis was performed as part of the individual plant evaluation of external events (IPEEE) for the plant, the submittal should describe how the CPPU affects these external events analyses. If the analysis identified any vulnerabilities, outliers, or anomalies or took credit for plant modifications that had not been implemented when the analysis was conducted, the licensee should identify these conditions, the resolution of these conditions for CPPU conditions, and demonstrate, either quantitatively or qualitatively, that the risk impacts of CPPU associated with these external events are acceptably small. If the estimated change in CDF and/or LERF, or base CDF and/or LERF, exceeds the RG 1.174 guidelines, including the consideration of the existence of a potential vulnerability, such as may be identified in a margins-type analysis or if new potential vulnerabilities are introduced by the CPPU, the licensee should provide a more detailed justification to support the acceptability of implementing the CPPU. The licensee's information needs to be sufficient for the staff to conclude that the risk impact of CPPU from external events is acceptably small.

10.4.3 Shutdown Risks

The CPPU LTR PRA section discusses the potential effect of CPPU from shutdown operations and identifies the need for licensees, in plant-specific submittals, to address the risk impacts of CPPU on shutdown operations. The staff agrees that the licensee's plant-specific submittal should address the risk impacts of CPPU for shutdown operations, including a description of how the licensee manages and controls risks during shutdown operations.

To determine that the impacts of CPPU on shutdown risk are acceptable, the staff will evaluate the information provided by the licensee in plant-specific submittals using the guidance provided in RG 1.174. Therefore, if the licensee has a shutdown PRA, the change in risk associated with implementing the CPPU should be described and the submittal should demonstrate that this change in risk is acceptably small. If the licensee does not have a shutdown PRA, the submittal should discuss how the CPPU affects shutdown risks, how the risks are managed, and address any critical or time-limited conditions to demonstrate that these risks are acceptably small and properly controlled at CPPU conditions. If the estimated change in CDF and/or LERF, or base CDF and/or LERF, exceeds the RG 1.174 guidelines, including the consideration of potential vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or limitations in the licensee's shutdown risk management approach or if new potential vulnerabilities are introduced by the CPPU, the licensee should provide a more detailed justification to support the acceptability of implementing the CPPU. The licensee's information needs to be sufficient for the staff to conclude that the risk impact of CPPU for shutdown operations is acceptably small.

10.4.4 PRA Quality

The CPPU LTR PRA section discusses the need for licensees to address the quality of the supporting PRA. The staff agrees that the licensee's plant-specific submittal should address

the scope, level of detail, and quality of the PRA and other relied upon risk-related evaluations (e.g., seismic margins analysis) used to support the licensee's determination that the risk impacts associated with CPPU are acceptably small for internal events, external events, and shutdown operations.

The scope, level of detail, and quality of the licensee's plant-specific PRA and other risk-related evaluations used to support a CPPU license application should be commensurate with the application for which it is intended and the role that the PRA results play in the utility's and staff's decision-making process and should be commensurate with the degree of rigor needed to provide a valid technical basis for the staff's decision. To determine that the PRA used in support of the license application is of sufficient quality, scope, and level of detail, the staff will evaluate the information provided by the licensee in plant-specific submittals using the guidance provided in RG 1.174, as well as consider the staff's previous reviews on the licensee's individual plant examination (IPE) and IPEEE submittals and the conclusions and findings of any industry or independent peer reviews. Therefore, the licensee should discuss how the process used to update and maintain the PRA and supporting analyses (e.g., thermal hydraulic calculations) would ensure that they are representative of the as-built, as-operated plant and should discuss any previously identified weaknesses, review findings, and conclusions on the IPE and IPEEE, up through the current PRA model, to ensure that they have been adequately considered and addressed in the CPPU analyses. The licensee's information needs to be sufficient for the staff to conclude that the PRA and other relied upon risk-related evaluations adequately reflect the as-built, as-operated plant for the specific CPPU license application.

10.4.5 Conclusions

Based on the staff's review of the PRA section of the CPPU LTR, as modified by the GENE responses to the staff's requests for additional information, the staff finds this section acceptable for use by licensees as the overall, high-level guidance for the plant-specific submittals of PRA information in support of CPPU license applications. However, the staff notes that in this section of the CPPU LTR, evaluations were dispositioned as being completely plant-specific and the staff recognizes that GENE has created a submittal shell report, based on their experience with prior extended power uprate reviews, to aid licensees in providing the proper level of detail and quality of information to address the plant-specific risks associated with a CPPU. The staff expects GENE to continue to use and improve upon this shell report to support the licensee's plant-specific submittals by proactively addressing the risk-related issues and topics that have previously been raised by the staff for extended power uprates.

The staff further notes that it will use the guidelines delineated in RG 1.174 to focus its evaluation of the plant-specific risk impacts associated with a licensee's CPPU license application. This evaluation will include a review of the CPPU impacts to CDF and LERF due to internal events, external events, and shutdown operations. The staff evaluation will also address the quality of the licensee's plant-specific PRA and other relied upon risk-related evaluations that are used to support the licensee's analyses and conclusion that the risk impacts associated with a CPPU are acceptable.

10.5 Testing

The "Testing" section of the CPPU LTR states that testing is required for the initial power ascension following the implementation of CPPU, [

.] The CPPU LTR establishes a standard set of tests for the initial power

ascension steps of CPPU. [

.]

10.5.1 Testing Program

The following power increase-testing, which supplements normal TS testing, is provided in the CPPU LTR:

- Testing will be done in accordance with TS surveillance requirements on instrumentation that is re-calibrated for CPPU conditions. Overlap between the intermediate range monitor and the APRM will be assured.
- Steady-state data will be taken at points from 90 percent up to 100 percent of the pre-uprated thermal power so that system performance parameters can be projected for CPPU conditions before the pre-uprated power rating is exceeded.
- Power increases will be made along an established flow control/rod line in increments of less than or equal to 5 percent power. Steady-state operating data, including fuel thermal margin, will be taken and evaluated at each step. Routine measurements of reactor and system pressures, flows and vibration will be evaluated from each measurement point prior to the next power increment. Radiation measurements will be made at selected power levels to ensure the protection of personnel.
- Control system tests will be performed for the feedwater/reactor water level controls, pressure controls, and recirculation flow controls, if applicable. These operational tests will be made at the appropriate plant conditions for that test at each power increment, to show acceptable adjustments and operational capability.
- Testing will be done to confirm the power level near the turbine first-stage scram and recirculation pump trip bypass setpoint.

The same performance criteria will be used as in the original power ascension test unless they have been replaced by updated criteria since the initial test program. [

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10.5.2 Large Transient Tests

In the CPPU LTR, GENE proposed that large transient tests (MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests similar to those conducted during initial plant startup) included in the NRC-approved topical report ELTR1 not be performed for CPPU. ELTR1 includes the MSIV closure test for power uprates greater than 10 percent above any previously recorded MSIV closure transient data and the generator load rejection test for power uprates greater than 15 percent above any previously recorded generator load rejection transient data. GENE provided justification for not performing these tests and concluded that they are not needed to demonstrate the safety of plants implementing a CPPU.

In evaluating GENE's justification not to perform the two large transient tests, the staff considered: (1) the modifications made to the plant for a CPPU that are related to the two tests, (2) component and system level testing that will be performed either as part of the licensee's power ascension and test plan or to meet TS surveillance requirements, (3) past experience at other plants, and (4) the importance of the additional information that could be obtained from performing the two tests with respect to plant analyses.

10.5.3 Transient Tests and Modifications

Large transient testing is normally performed on new plants because experience does not exist to confirm a plant's operation and response to events. However, these tests are not normally performed for plant modifications following initial startup because of well-established quality assurance and maintenance programs including component and system level post- modification testing and extensive experience with general behavior of unmodified equipment. When major modifications are made to the plant, large transient testing may be needed to confirm that the modifications were correctly implemented. However, such testing should only be imposed if it is deemed necessary to demonstrate safe operation of the plant.

GENE stated that large transient tests only challenge a limited set of systems and components and provided information regarding such systems. This situation results because the scram rapidly reduces power and the long-term consequences are relatively benign and controlled by normal operator actions. For example, the system requirements for the required actions for the closure of all MSIVs and load rejection are limited to the following:

<u>Closure of all MSIVs</u>	<u>Systems Challenged</u>
<u>I</u>	
	<u>I</u>
<u>Load Rejection</u>	<u>Systems Challenged</u>
<u>I</u>	
	<u>I</u>

The instrumentation that initiates these actions is also included in the list of required functions. The only other components that have a significant effect on these transients are [

.] Since feedwater flow for normal operation is significantly greater

than that required to restore water inventory and for decay heat removal following a scram, a large transient test is not required.

[

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10.5.4 Other Testing

Regarding the testing requirements for the required systems other than feedwater, GENE provided a list of applicable requirements in the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) that are representative of a typical plant's testing requirements. The feedwater system is a normal operating system and its normal operating requirements are more demanding than requirements for these transient tests. The STS system/component test requirements are:

<u>System</u>	<u>Technical Specification Surveillance</u>
<u>1</u>	
	<u>1</u>

GENE concluded that meeting these TS requirements is sufficient to demonstrate the system and/or component initiation setpoint and performance characteristics. [

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10.5.5 Experience

GENE provided information on testing and or events that occurred at previously uprated BWR plants. Tests were performed at a foreign plant to demonstrate modifications made to its system to enable it to successfully avoid a scram during a turbine trip or generator load rejection transient from full power. These tests involved turbine trips at 110.5 percent OLTP and 113.5 percent OLTP and a generator load rejection test at 104.2 percent OLTP. The testing demonstrated the performance of equipment that was modified in preparation for higher power levels. Equipment that was not modified performed as before. The reactor vessel pressure was controlled at the same operating point for all the tests. No unexpected performance was observed except in the fine-tuning of the turbine bypass opening that was done as the series of tests progressed. These large transient tests at the foreign plant demonstrated the response of the equipment and the reactor response. The observed response closely matched the predicted response from which GENE concluded that the licensing analyses for uprated conditions reflected the behavior of the plant.

The three unplanned transients at BWR plants included two load rejections and a turbine trip subsequent to power uprate. In each case the licensee concluded that no anomalies were seen in the plant's response to these events, and the behavior of the primary mitigation systems was as expected. No new plant behavior was observed.

10.5.6 Safety Analyses and Mitigation Capability

GENE maintains that the database on large transient testing is extensive. All plants performed a rapid pressurization transient test at essentially the OLTP during initial startup testing. The purpose of the test was primarily to demonstrate the installed systems' mitigation capability. In addition, it provided a substantial amount of information used for transient model qualification for the specific plant systems' performance. To further support transient model qualification, separate transient testing was performed. These tests were designed to capture the important transient effects. These tests provide the primary test data used in the development of all current BWR transient analysis models used for the simulation of rapid pressurization transients such as the MSIV closure and generator load rejection.

[

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10.5.7 New Systems or Features

GENE has concluded that current power uprate experience has demonstrated that new systems or features are not required to mitigate the consequences of rapid pressurization transients. Therefore, for the typical CPPU, there is no need to perform large transient testing to test new systems or features. [.]

In addition, GENE has committed that, if a new system or feature is required to mitigate a rapid pressurization event for CPPU, its need will be documented in the plant-specific PUSAR. [

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10.5.8 Staff Evaluation

Section 50.92, "Issuance of amendment" states, in part, that for the determination of issuing amendments, the Commission will be guided by the considerations which govern the issuance of initial licenses or construction permits to the extent applicable and appropriate.

Section 50.34, "Contents of Applications: Technical Information" addresses initial licenses. It requires, in part, that a licensee include the principal design criteria in the safety analysis. The Introduction to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," states that these principal design criteria are to establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety.

Regarding testing and as stated in RG 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," the primary objectives of a suitable test program are to:

- (1) Provide additional assurance that the facility has been adequately designed and, to the extent practical, to validate the analytical models and to verify the correctness or conservatism of assumptions used for predicting plant responses to anticipated transients and postulated accidents, and
- (2) Provide assurance that construction and installation of equipment in the facility have been accomplished in accordance with design. The staff based its acceptance of the CPPU testing program on these objectives.

The staff is developing guidance to generically address the requirement for conducting large transient tests in conjunction with power uprates. Therefore, the staff is not prepared to accept the proposed elimination of large transient tests for CPPU. The staff intends to issue a supplement to this safety evaluation when the guidance is available. As part of the PUSAR, the plants will address this subject.

10.5.9 Conclusion

ELTR1 has been accepted by the NRC as the review basis for EPU amendment requests. The CPPU LTR also includes [] guidelines for testing, but has eliminated the recommendation in ELTR1 to perform large transient tests. The staff has previously accepted not performing these tests on a plant-specific basis. However, the staff is developing guidance to generically address the requirement for conducting large transient tests in conjunction with power uprates. Therefore, the staff is not prepared at this time to accept the proposed elimination of large transient tests for CPPU.

The staff finds that the performance of numerous component, system, and other testing, in combination with the evaluation of the systems and components and operating experience discussed above, is sufficient to satisfactorily demonstrate successful plant modifications and performance. The staff also finds that information obtained from the MSIV closure and generator load rejection tests could be useful to confirm plant performance, adjust plant control systems, and enhance training material. However, the staff will consider, on a plant-specific

basis, the need to conduct these tests (i.e., the risk due to potential random equipment failures during the test); and the additional burden that would be imposed on the licensee.

The staff concludes that the GENE test program, with the exception of the proposal to eliminate large transient testing (i.e., MSIV closure and turbine generator load rejection), meets the objectives of a suitable test program in that the testing included in the program provides additional assurance that the CPPU design is adequate and it provides assurance that the modifications and installation of equipment as part of a CPPU is accomplished in accordance with design.

10.6 Human Factors Evaluation

The staff reviewed the CPPU LTR and the additional information provided by letter dated December 3, 2001, in the area of human factors and operator response considerations.

10.6.1 Operator Response

[

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Based on PRA experience for uprated BWRs, some effect is expected on PRA results such as CDF and LERF. The CPPU effect will be determined when the plant-specific PRA is revised. GENE has dispositioned operator response as plant-specific. In their December 3, 2001, letter, GENE provided additional information stating that GENE will update the CPPU PUSAR shell document to indicate that the expected level of detail for a plant-specific submittal would be as follows:

- Explain and justify any changes in plant risk that result from changes in risk-important operator actions.
- Describe any new risk-important operator actions required as a result of the proposed power uprate and changes (e.g., reduced time available or additional time required) to any current risk-important operator actions that will occur as a result of the power uprate.
- Describe the specific procedural steps involved in these actions.
- Address any operator workarounds that might affect these response times.
- Identify any operator actions that are being automated as a result of the power uprate.

The staff concludes that the effect of CPPU on operator response and plant risk is plant-specific. Licensees applying for CPPU should provide plant-specific information as described above and in the GENE PUSAR shell.

10.6.2 Operator Training

The CPPU LTR states that classroom training will address "various aspects of CPPU" and provides examples. [.] In Attachment 1 to their December 3, 2001 letter, GENE provided additional information to clarify that the examples cited in the LTR are provided for information only and not as a plant-specific commitment. GENE also noted that changes to operator training are considered as part of the

CPPU implementation plan, are expected to be limited in scope, will be made consistent with current plant training program requirements, and must be completed and implemented prior to any power ascension above the currently licensed power level.

The LTR states that simulator changes and fidelity revalidation will be performed in accordance with ANSI/ANS 3.5-1985. By letter dated December 3, 2001, GENE committed to revise the LTR to read:

"Simulator changes and fidelity revalidation will be performed in accordance with the ANSI/ANS 3.5 standard applicable to the current program."

GENE also noted that simulator changes and fidelity revalidation are considered as part of the CPPU implementation plan and that any required simulator changes and revalidation will be completed and implemented prior to any power ascension above the pre-CPPU power level. The staff concludes that the CPPU LTR, as revised by GENE's December 3, 2001, letter, describes controls providing adequate assurance for the training of operators for CPPU.

10.6.3 Human Factors

In the CPPU LTR, GENE dispositioned human factors changes that may be necessary to support CPPU as a plant-specific matter. By letter dated December 3, 2001, GENE provided additional information stating that human factors changes depend on the specific plant modifications, are the responsibility of the licensee, and will be made consistent with current program requirements. GENE also stated that human factors changes are considered as part of the CPPU implementation plan and any required changes will be completed and implemented prior to any power ascension above the currently licensed power level. The staff concludes that the effect of CPPU on control room human factors is plant-specific. Licensees applying for constant pressure power uprate should provide plant-specific information describing the human factors changes resulting from CPPU.

10.6.4 Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures

The CPPU LTR states that operator actions in the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are not changed as a result of increasing rated reactor power, only the conditions at which some of the actions specified will change. The report also states that EOP curves and limits may also be included in the safety parameter display system and will be updated accordingly. By letter dated December 3, 2001, GENE stated that the LTR will be revised to note that abnormal operating procedures (AOPS) include event based operator actions and that some of the actions may be influenced by plant modifications required to support the increase in rated reactor power. GENE also stated that operating procedure changes will be made consistent with the plant requirements for their updating. In addition, changes to operating procedures are considered as part of the CPPU implementation plan and that these changes must be completed and implemented prior to any power ascension above the currently licensed power level.

Consistent with the CPPU LTR, licensees applying for a CPPU will provide plant-specific descriptions of the effect of CPPU on the plant's EOPs and AOPs.

10.7 Plant Life

In the report, GENE states that two degradation mechanisms are affected by CPPU: (1) irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), and (2) flow accelerated corrosion (FAC). GENE stated that the potential increase in irradiation of the core internal components may influence IASCC, and that the increase in steam and feedwater flow rates influences FAC.

10.7.1 Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking

With regard to increasing the potential of the core internals to be affected by IASCC, GENE states that the peak fluence increase experienced by the reactor internals does not represent a significant increase in the potential for IASCC, and therefore the current inspection strategy for the reactor internal components is expected to be adequate to manage any potential effects of the power uprate on the integrity of the components.

In its RAI, the staff informed GENE that operating experience has identified stress corrosion cracking as a mechanism active in both domestic and foreign BWR plants and as a result, the BWR owners have established the BWR Vessel and Internals Project (BWRVIP), which mandated an augmented inspection program for the reactor internals. The BWRVIP program has been reviewed and approved by the staff as being adequate to control and manage degradation of BWR safety-related reactor internals. The staff requested that GENE address this issue by specifying in its LTR that each licensee applying for power uprate should implement the BWRVIP recommendations. By letter dated December 18, 2001, GENE provided revised wording for Section 10.7 of the CPPU LTR that directed the licensees to conform to the staff's request. The staff concludes that GENE's revised wording concerning the reactor vessel internals in Section 10.7 of the CPPU LTR provides enough specific direction to a licensee for assessing the impact of a proposed CPPU on the susceptibility of the reactor internal components to IASCC.

10.7.2 Flow Accelerated Corrosion

FAC occurs in carbon steel components exposed to flowing single or two-phase water. These components may be located in NSSS, turbine generator, or BOP. Therefore, all plants are recommended to have adequate FAC programs for managing any potential effects of FAC in these systems. FAC depends on several plant parameters, including fluid flow velocity in subject piping. Increased fluid flow velocity will increase FAC. A power uprate of 20 percent will cause higher steam flow and the corresponding flow of feedwater and will influence FAC in the susceptible components. Although this influence in many cases may not be very significant, the phenomenon is plant-specific, and in order to determine its significance, a plant-specific evaluation should be performed. In the response to the staff's request to provide more consistent guidance for preparation of plant-specific submittals, GENE will add to the CPPU LTR a requirement that the plant uprate reports contain descriptions of plant-specific FAC programs and methodologies and specify how the programs will be adjusted as a result of power uprate. The staff has reviewed the GENE guidance for evaluating effects of the power uprate on FAC and finds it to be satisfactory.

11.0 CPPU CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS

11.1 General Comment on Use of CPPU LTR

Licensees proposing to reference the CPPU LTR as a basis for a power uprate license amendment request and proposing to obtain a license amendment to incorporate one or more of the plant changes mentioned in the seven restrictions applicable to the CPPU LTR must first request and obtain a license amendment for the associated change in accordance with the CPPU LTR. The one exception is with regards to a source term methodology change. A licensee may submit and the NRC staff will review a source term methodology change, in lieu of the analysis in Section 9.2 of the CPPU LTR, concurrent with the power uprate request, if the source term submittal supports operation at the uprated power level. Licensees proposing to utilize fuel designs other than GE fuel, up through GE 14 fuel, may not reference the CPPU LTR as a basis for their power uprate since the CPPU LTR process applies only to GE fuel and GE accident analysis methods. However, such licensees may reference the CPPU LTR for areas other than those involving reactor systems and fuel issues which are not impacted by the fuel design. Licensees should afford the staff sufficient time to complete its review of all associated licensing basis changes prior to submittal or request for the implementation of the power uprate when referencing the CPPU LTR.

11.2 Application of the CPPU LTR

Each of the sections of the CPPU LTR were in one of two disposition categories:

- Generic assessment
- Plant-specific evaluation

The generic assessments are those safety evaluations that can be dispositioned for a group or for all BWR plants by:

- A bounding analysis for the limiting conditions,
- Demonstrating that there is a negligible effect due to CPPU, or
- Demonstrating that the required plant cycle specific reload analyses are sufficient and appropriate for establishing the CPPU licensing basis.

Licensees using this LTR must provide analyses demonstrating the generic analyses bound their plant. If not, a plant-specific analyses must be provided or provide the plant-specific analyses, as required by each section of this safety evaluation.

12.0 REFERENCES

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2. Letter from J. F. Klapproth (GE Nuclear Energy), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Submittal of Proprietary Licensing Topical Report NEDC-33004P, 'Constant Pressure Power Uprate', Revision 1," July 26, 2001.

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4. Letter from J. F. Klapproth (GE Nuclear Energy), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Responses to Draft Request for Additional Information (RAI) to Licensing Topical Report NEDC-33004P, Revision 1," December 18, 2001.
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6. Letter from J. F. Klapproth (GE Nuclear Energy), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Errata & Addenda 1, Update of GE Proprietary Licensing Topical Report NEDC-33004P, 'Constant Pressure Power Uprate', Revision 1," December 21, 2001.
7. GE Nuclear Energy, "Generic Guidelines for General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate," NEDC-32424P-A, February 1999 [Known as ELTR1].
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12. GE Nuclear Energy, "10 CFR 50 Appendix G Equivalent Margin Analysis for Low Upper Shelf Energy in BWR/2 Through BWR/6 Vessel," NEDO-32205-A, Revision 1, February 1994.
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14. NEDC-31336, "General Electric Instrumentation Setpoint Methodology."
15. NEDO-24222, "Assessment of BWR Mitigation of ATWS", Volume II, December 1979.
21. Letter from J. F. Klapproth (GE Nuclear Energy), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Submittal of Proprietary Licensing Topical Report NEDC-33004P, 'Constant Pressure Power Uprate', errata and Addenda 2, October 7, 2002.

17. Letter from J. F. Klapproth (GE Nuclear Energy), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Submittal of Proprietary Licensing Topical Report NEDC-33004P, 'Constant Pressure Power Uprate', Revision 3," February 6, 2003.
18. Letter to G. L. Sozzi (GE) from A. Thadani (NRC), "Use of the SHEX Computer Program and ANSI/ANS 5.1-1979 Decay Heat Source Term for Containment Long-Term Pressure and Temperature Analysis," July 13, 1993.

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