

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

January 17, 1985

IE Information Notice No. 85-04: INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY RESPONSE
DRILLS

Addresses:

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP), and fuel fabrication and processing facilities using or processing a formula quantity of special nuclear material.

Purpose:

This Information Notice is provided to inform addressees of: (1) a potential danger in conducting security response drills without properly notifying participants; and (2) the need to ensure, through proper management control, that such drills do not decrease the overall effectiveness of the security program. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:


During a recent test of response force capabilities at an operating nuclear power facility, the following occurred. A security shift supervisor announced during a pre-shift briefing of security officers arriving for duty that a drill would be conducted that evening. However, not all shift personnel attended the briefing. Less than one hour into the midnight shift, a security officer posted in a guard tower challenged an unidentified individual who was attempting to unlock a nearby vehicle gate at the protected area perimeter. Ignoring the challenge, the individual opened the gate, entered the protected area in his privately owned vehicle, leaving the vehicle gate open, and proceeded toward the nearest vital area. At the time of the intrusion, the central alarm station was notified of the unauthorized entry and the armed response force was immediately dispatched. Apprehended by the response force at the boundary of a vital area as he attempted to climb a chain link fence, the intruder was identified as the security shift supervisor responsible for conducting response drills.

Discussion:

A review of applicable records and interviews with response force participants determined that the security officer in the guard tower had seriously considered the use of small arms fire when his warning was ignored by the intruder. Another security officer, who responded to the alert from his post outside the protected area, also considered the use of his weapon as he arrived at the open protected area gate. Neither officer was present for the pre-shift briefing. Violations of several aspects of access control, as well as the failure to announce that a drill was in progress as required by procedure, created a doubt in the minds of other responders as to whether the event was a drill or an actual intrusion.

The NRC strongly supports the use of drills as a valuable method of assessing the security force training program. However, it is imperative that security requirements are strictly followed and that drills are adequately managed to preclude danger to plant employees and degradation of site security controls.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or this office.



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Attachment: List of recently issued IE Information Notices

Attachment
IN 85-04
January 17, 1985

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date of Issue	Issued to
85-03	Separation Of Primary Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft And Impeller	1/15/85	All pressurized water power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
85-02	Improper Installation And Testing Of Differential Pressure Transmitters	1/15/85	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
85-01	Continuous Supervision Of Irradiators	1/10/85	All material licensees possessing irradiators that are not self-shielded and contain more than 10,000 curies of radioactive material
84-94	Reconcentration Of Radionuclides Involving Discharges Into Sanitary Sewage Systems Permitted Under 10 CFR 20.303	12/21/84	All NRC materials licensees other than licensees that use sealed sources only
84-93	Potential For Loss Of Water From The Refueling Cavity	12/17/84	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
84-92	Cracking Of Flywheel On Cummins Fire Pump Diesel Engines	12/17/84	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
84-91	Quality Control Problem Of Meteorological Measurements Problems	12/10/84	All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP
84-90	Main Steam Line Break Effect On Environmental Qualification Of Equipment	12/7/84	All pressurized water reactor and gas cooled power facilities holding an OL or CP

OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit