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# Volunteer-Plant (VP) ECCCS Vulnerability Assessment

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ATTACHMENT 9



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# Overview

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- **Objectives of Volunteer-Plant Analysis**
- **Plant Description**
- **Sump-Screen Head Loss**
- **Pool Transport**
- **Blow Down/Wash Down Debris Transport**
- **Debris Generation**
- **Break Location**
- **Current Insights**





# Objectives of Study

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- **Volunteer Plant study integrates all phenomenology info and analysis methods using best available plant specific data**
- **Illustrates one possible implementation of the Reg Guide**
- **Provides NRC a detailed standard of comparison for reviewing future submittals and NEI ground rules**
- **May provide a template for content of plant assessments with exaggerated detail needed for methodology insight**
- **Sets expectations for conservatism and application of data**
- **Will address all major accident scenario components BUT... will not analyze all industry conditions/configs**
- **'Best Available' info will still require approximation and engineering judgment. Will improve as condition assessment and further head-loss analysis are completed**





# Required Plant Information

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- **Water balance calculations**
  - Return flow locations and rates
  - Minimum pool depths for various break scenarios
  - ECCS flow rates for various break scenarios
- **ECCS pool geometry**
  - Flow velocity calculations
  - Identify dead sumps that trap debris
  - Scope pool dynamics
- **Piping layout and insulation applications by type**
- **Sump-screen geometry**
- **Plant cleanliness characterization (Latent Debris)**





# VP Geometry Features


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- **Large dry containment (133 ft diam), four loop, 'remote' sumps**
- **Raised steam generator compartments**
  - Continual falling water sweeps compartment floor
  - Compartment opposite break cannot accept debris during fill phase
  - No damping of falling water. Momentum directed to annulus
- **Two adjacent roughly equivalent sump cages (260 ft<sup>2</sup> total)**
  - Very close to one steam generator compartment outlet
- **Sump-screen curb (4 in)**
  - Effective at stopping RMI unless severe piling occurs
  - Reduces effective pool depth
- **Nonsubmerged vertical sump screens 4.75 ft above curb**
  - Failure criteria ~1/2 pool depth above curb (ft H<sub>2</sub>O)
- **Fall height from upper level drains ~10 ft**
- **Spray return drains adjacent to vertical sump screens**
- **Reactor cavity with curb and partial steel-plate cover**






# Sump Pool Plan View





# Sump Cages




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




# Sump-Screen Construction




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# SG Compartment Entry




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# Steam Generator Compartment




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# Floor Drains and Curbing

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


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


# Concrete Structures





# Piping and Equipment Model




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# Ranges of Sump Flow





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# Preliminary Head-Loss Results



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# Volunteer Plant Containment Pool Flow Analysis



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# Observations Regarding CFD

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- **Good qualitative agreement between CFD models of fill/steady-state velocities and Tank Experiments**
- **Ancillary sources representing containment spray return paths can dominate pool activity**
- **Quantitative flow maps provide access to an approximate, yet tractable estimate of transport fraction**
  - Logic maps and engineering judgment will be needed to consider fractions and characteristics of debris returned to the pool via various paths
- **Uncertainties in location and timing of debris entering pool limit the need for a high fidelity model of debris transport**

Area > threshold velocity proportional to degradation and transport for initial uniform distribution of fill-up phase debris





# Transitional Pool Flow Sequence

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<u>Event</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
<b>Break Occurs</b>	Jet impingement, steam expansion, water to bare floor with sheet flow directed away from break. Highest transport velocities. Initial deposition pattern in dead areas and sumps.
<b>Sprays Trip</b>	Spray runoff accumulates and washdown begins, Sheet cover complete. Sumps fill via directed flow. Deposition pattern modified by splash zones
<b>Max Spray Return</b>	Maximum energy in minimum pool depth (~inches). No directed flow. Pool begins to fill. Max degradation. Pseudostable deposition pattern develops.
<b>Lower Sumps Full</b>	Directed flow begins to develop. Deposition pattern modified in vicinity of sump. Suspended debris collected very quickly. Steady-state flow pattern established.

**Dead sump sheltering is only significant sequester**






# Key Transport Test Observations

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- **Cal-Sil and fiber were able to form a thin bed on a 1/4-in mesh vertical screen at nominal approach velocity**
- **Fiber flocks that enter turbulent splash zones are effectively shredded to transportable sizes**
- **Individual fibers are suspended and continue to collect for many hours**
- **Shear forces between higher and lower pool velocity zones are capable of slowly degrading piles of fiber flocks**





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# Containment Airborne/Washdown Debris Transport Methodology




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# Two-Phase Debris Generation






# Rederived ZOI (NUREG/CR-6762-3)


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- **Rederived using OPG data and equivalent spherical pressure volume compared to ANSI/ANS-58.2 and EPRI jet models**
- **Slightly increased ZOI size**
  - Nukon: 12-D (PWR) vs 10-D (BWR)
  - Cal-Sil: 8-D (PWR) vs 6- D (BWR)
- **Higher fraction of fines**
  - Nukon: 29% (BWR) vs 40% (PWR)
  - Cal-Sil:  $\approx 0\%$  (BWR) vs 30% (PWR)






# Survey of Break Locations




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# Integrated Vulnerability Assessment






# Required Skill Set

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- **Familiarity with containment**
  - Visual understanding of spray and floor water flow paths
- **Understanding of water levels and pump-flow rates as related to EOPs**
- **Competent application of BLOCKAGE or other implementation of NUREG/CR-6224 head-loss correlation**
  - All plants should start by understanding current sump vulnerability
- **Understanding of ZOD correlations to scope break locations**
- **Knowledge of applied insulation types and ability to query/manipulate electronic spatial information**
  - CAD models desirable, but not critical
- **Awareness of debris generation and head-loss data**
  - Identify unique materials and plan for characterization





# Methodology Insights

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- **Must design/adapt screens to defeat thin-bed formation**
  - Transverse bulk and inlet flows to sweep or 'self-clean' surface
    - Stacked disks, crenulated plates, etc.
  - Complex filter surface to fragment fiber layer
- **Can mitigate to protect against large debris volumes**
  - Reducing insulation volume
  - Increase screen area with compact high surface modifications
  - Intermediate gates at pool level
  - Divert fill-up flow towards dead sumps/cavities
- **Always maximize pool depth**
  - Especially important for nonsubmerged screens
  - Run sprays for breaks of all sizes?
- **Special attention to cleanliness at pool level for small break/no spray**
- **Fill-up retention in dead sumps is perhaps the only important pool-transport reduction factor**





# Mitigation Strategies

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## **Preserve Integrated Safety Plan!**

- **Submerge screens without compromising area**
  - Utilizes full NPSH margin of mechanical pumps
- **Avoid horizontal screens below grade**
- **Test and approve back-flush/throttle cycles to dislodge compacted debris**
- **Midstream debris screens to intercept steady-state flow channels**
- **Plant cleanliness programs**
- **Modification of insulation types**
  - With due care not to increase resident loading
- **Active mechanical sweep and collect concepts**
- **Innovative porous media designs on top of existing screens**

