

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

August 12, 1988

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-62: RECENT FINDINGS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION
OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMS BY SUPPLIERS
OF TRANSPORT PACKAGES

Addressees:

All holders of NRC quality assurance program approval for radioactive material packages.

Purpose:

This notice is provided to inform addressees of the results of NRC inspections of the implementation of NRC-approved Quality Assurance (QA) programs by persons who fabricate and supply packages to users. It is suggested that addressees review the information for applicability to their operations, and institute corrective action, as may be appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

NRC inspections of suppliers of transport packages have found various degrees of failure to fulfill NRC-approved QA programs, including cases of complete failure to implement the programs. The most severe cases resulted in NRC withdrawal of the QA program approvals. This action can have serious effects on the package supplier's continued operations, as well as the operations of users of the package.

Discussion:

NRC regulations require holders of NRC-approved QA programs to document the implementation of their programs through written procedures and instructions. The inadequacies of these programs appear to be the result of lack of adherence to this requirement. This has been confirmed by recent inspections which have identified instances of inadequate documentation in all areas of the QA program. Examples of QA program requirements for which written procedures or activities were found deficient are set forth below:

- a) independence of personnel who verify that an activity is performed correctly;

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- b) qualification of personnel who perform special processes such as welding;
- c) assurance that procurement documents contain appropriate requirements relating to the applicable requirements of Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 71 and 10 CFR Part 21;
- e) corrective action systems;
- f) training and indoctrination of personnel performing activities affecting quality;
- g) control of documents, including review and approval of changes by authorized personnel;
- h) assurance that sufficient records are available to furnish objective evidence of activities affecting quality. (As a minimum, records should include operating logs; results of inspections, tests, and audits; qualification of personnel procedures and equipment; and design, procurement, and fabrication data.)
- i) performance of audits and qualification of auditors.

NRC-approved QA programs applicable to user-licensees may only cover activities related to procurement, maintenance, repair and use. NRC recognized that other QA activities are performed by suppliers of packages, including design, fabrication, assembly, test and modification that are required to be controlled under Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 71. In such cases, user-licensees should assure themselves that those activities are conducted in accordance with the suppliers' NRC approved QA program by obtaining appropriate certification from the supplier.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the individual identified below.



Robert F. Burnett, Director
Division of Safeguards and
Transportation, NMSS
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards

Technical Contact: C.E. MacDonald, NMSS
(301) 492-3384

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date of Issuance	Issued to
88-61	Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience	8/11/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-60	Inadequate Design and Installation of Watertight Penetration Seals	8/11/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-04, Supplement 1	Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals	8/9/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-59	Main Steam Isolation Valve Guide Rail Failure at Waterford Unit 3	8/9/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-58	Potential Problems with ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays	8/8/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-57	Potential Loss of Safe Shutdown Equipment Due to Premature Silicon Controlled Rectifier Failure	8/8/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-56	Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals	8/4/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-55	Potential Problems Caused by Single Failure of an Engineered Safety Feature Swing Bus	8/3/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.
88-54	Failure of Circuit Breaker Following Installation of Amptector Direct Trip Attachment	7/28/88	All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.

OL = Operating License
 CP = Construction Permit

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NAME: *for Gordon* LLGordon:CRChappell:CEMacDonald:EKraus *RB* RECunningham:GWMcCokle:RFBurnett RBernero
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