

April 17 2003

MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2 */RA/*
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION,
DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) TO BE
DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL (TAC NO.
MB6611)

The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on April 17, 2003, to Mr. Mike O'Keefe of FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC (the licensee). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate the technical review being conducted by NRR and to support a conference call with the licensee to discuss the RAI. The RAI was related to the licensee's October 11, 2002, submittal concerning containment building penetrations. Review of the RAI would allow the licensee to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey or represent an NRC staff position regarding the licensee's request.

Docket No. 50-443

Attachment: Draft RAI

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PDI-2 Reading

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DATE	4/17/03	4/17/03

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DRAFT

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86
FPL ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC
SEABROOK STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-443
TAC NO. MB6611

1. On page 6 of the "Introduction and Safety Assessment of Proposed Changes," the submittal states that the most limiting time to boil after a loss of RHR cooling with at least 23 feet of water above the vessel flange, the upper internals removed, and after 80 hours of decay time is approximately 8.3 hours. Section B of the "Introduction and Safety Assessment of Proposed Changes," states that "Removing or reinstalling the containment equipment hatch is a lengthy evolution that requires approximately one shift to complete." The staff understands that a shift is approximately 8-12 hours. This last statement appears to be in conflict with TS 3.9.8.1 and TS 3.9.8.2 which, according to the submittal, requires that all containment penetrations with direct access from the containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours in the case of a loss of RHR cooling. Based on the conflicting information above, the staff is concerned that the containment equipment hatch may not be closed prior to boiling in the case of a loss of RHR cooling. Verify that the containment equipment hatch can be closed prior to boiling in the case of a loss of RHR cooling.

2. The intent of the proposed wording for LCO 3.9.4b is not clear. As proposed, the LCO would state:

"A minimum of one door in each airlock[#], or the containment outage door is capable of being closed, is closed, however both doors of one personnel airlock may be open if..."

The Note states "[#]This requirement does not apply to the equipment hatch air lock when the containment outage door is installed."

The staff considers that the statement "...or the containment outage door is capable of being closed." is unnecessary and confusing. If, according to the proposed Note, LCO 3.9.4b is not applicable to the equipment hatch airlock when the outage door is installed, what is the purpose of the above statement? The staff believes that the proposed LCO 3.9.4b could be interpreted as a minimum of one door of the containment personnel airlock does not need to be closed if the containment outage door is installed.