

MAR 2 6 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-03-047 10CFR50.73

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2002-004-01

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2002-004-01 is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73. This report describes an unanalyzed condition due to inadequate separation of associated circuits. LER 2002-004-00 submitted on February 18, 2003, described an unanalyzed condition due to the same cause. Commitments are identified in Section VI of this submittal.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor – Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely,

BING

B. C. Waldrep Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant

BCW/jpy

Enclosure

 c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident) Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager) Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

1E22

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Harris Nuclear Plant P O Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 0.5000400 1. OF 7 Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 1. OF 7 Wand Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED DOCKET NUMBER 0. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED Mo DAV YEAR No. DAV YEAR DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 01 2.9 2003 2002 -0.04 -0.1 0.3 2.6 2003 DOCKET NUMBER 9. OPERATING 1 20.2010 20.2020(a)(30)(D. X 50.73(a)(2)(a)(A) 17.737(a)(5) 1. DE 2020101 20.2020(a)(2)(D. 50.36(c)(10)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(a)(A) 17.771(a)(5) 20.73(a)(2)(a)(A) 17.771(a)(5) 2.0.200102(2)(D. 50.36(c)(2)(D. 50.73(a)(2)(a)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(a)(A) 17.771(a)(A) 17.71(a)(A) 2.0.20010(2)(D. 50.73(a)(2)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(A) 17.771(a)(A) 17.71(a)(A) 2.0.20010(2)(D) 20.20010(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(A) 17.771(a)(A) 10.771(NRC FORM 366 (7-2001) LICEI	S NSEE (See re digits	EVEN	U.S. N T REI equired nu s for each	UCLEAR RE CO PORT (LI mber of block)	GULA OMMI ER)	ATORY SSION	APPF Estima hours industr U.S N bjs1@i (3150-i informa conduc	ROVED BY ted burden p Reported le y Send comm luclear Regu nrc gov, and I 0104), Office ation collectio t or sponsor.	ON er re ssoi nent lator o the of M n do and	AB NO. 3150-0 esponse to comply ns learned are ind s regarding burder y Commission, W e Desk Officer, Off anagement and Bi bes not display a d a person is not re	104 EX with this r corporated i estimate tr /ashington, ince of Infor udget, Was currently va guired to re	(PIRE nandate into the o the Re DC 2 mation hington alid OM	S 7-31 bry infor e licens ecords I 0555-00 and Re , DC 200 B contr to, the j	-2004 mation colle ing process danagemeni 001, or by i gulatory Affa 503 If a mea ol number, t nformation c	action request 50 and fed back to Branch (T-6 E6), Internet e-mail to urs, NEOB-10202 Ins used to impose the NRC may not sollection.
1. PROLIDIT NAME 0.000400 1. OF 7 4. TITLE Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Separation of Associated Circuits 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR FLEE NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR VEAR FLEE NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR VEAR FLEE NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR VEAR FLEE NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR FLEE NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0. DAY VEAR FLEE NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 0. DAY 1. D. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT OT HE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 OFH 3. Cloads all instance/n 30.7310/12/10/10 10.73710/12/10/10 1. DEVERNING 1. D. 22.02016/12/10/10 50.7361/02/10/10 50.7361/02/10/10 17.7116/16 77.7116/16 1. DEVERNING 1. D. 22.02016/12/10/10 50.7361/02/10/10 50.7361/02/10/10 10.7261/02/10/10 10.7261/02/10/10 10.7261/02/10/10 10.7261/02/10/10 10.7261/02/10/10 10.		NE						2 00	CKET NU	MR	FR	441100 10 10	3 P	AGE		
True 1 1 000000000000000000000000000000000000	Harris Nuclo	me ar Dlant	- Linit	1				2.00	05000	20	<u>n</u>		. Э. Г <i>і</i>	AGL	1 OF	7
NUME SEVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 6. OTHER PACILITIES INVOLVED MO DAY YEAR SECONSTUM REPORT DATE C. OTHER PACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MO DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 0 DOCKET NUMBER ODCKET NUMBER 1 29 2003 2002 OOCKET NUMBER 0 DOCKET NUMBER 1 DOCKET NUMBER 1 DOCKET NUMBER 0 DOCKET NUMBER 0 DOCKET NUMBER 1 DOCKET NUMBER 0 DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER <td>A TITLE</td> <td>ai riani</td> <td><u>- 0111</u></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>00000</td> <td>-0</td> <td>U</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	A TITLE	ai riani	<u>- 0111</u>	1					00000	-0	U					
Diriel robust 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED NO DAY YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR PROVIDED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 29 2003 2002 - 004 - 01 03 26 2003 DOCKET NUMBER DOC		Conditio		o Inode	austa Sar	vorati	ion of	٨٥٥٥٥	iatod Cir	oui	ite					
Date Discretion Field Discretion Field Discretion Field Discretion Discretion Field Discretion Discretion <thdiscretion< th=""> <thdiscret< td=""><td>Unanalyzed 5</td><td></td><td>n Due l</td><td></td><td>Equale Sep</td><td>Jarai</td><td></td><td>REPOR</td><td>T DATE</td><td></td><td>8</td><td>OTHER</td><td>FACILI</td><td>TIES I</td><td>VOLVED</td><td></td></thdiscret<></thdiscretion<>	Unanalyzed 5		n Due l		Equale Sep	Jarai		REPOR	T DATE		8	OTHER	FACILI	TIES I	VOLVED	
MO DAY YEAR SECURITIVAL PACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 29 2002 2002 - 004 -0 03 26 2003 PACLITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 9. OFERATING 1 11.11:81 REPORT IS SUBMITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 4. (Check all Init apply). 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 10. POWER 100 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.36(c)(1)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(n)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 771(a)(A)			1					T	1	F/	ACILITY NAME		DOC	KET N	JMBER	
01 29 2003 2002 - 004 - 01 03 26 2003 FACUITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 9. OPERATING MODE 1 20 2201(b) 10 20 2201(b) 10 50.75(a)(22)(b) 50.73(a)(2)(b) 5	мо	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	мо	DAY	YEAR							
01 29 2003 2002 - 0.04 - 0.1 03 26 2003 9. OPERATING MODE 1 THS REPORTS \$SUBMITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 4: (Check all that apch) 10. POWER 10 20 2201(b) 20 2203(a)(30) X 50.73(a)(2)(b)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(A) 10. POWER 10 20 2201(c) 10 20 2203(a)(10) 50.33(a)(2)(b)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(A) 10. POWER 10 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50.33(a)(2)(b)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(A) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2023(a)(2)(b) 50.33(a)(2)(b)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 20.2023(a)(2)(b) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50.73(1	F/	ACILITY NAME		DOC	KET N	JMBER	
9. OPERATING 1 11. THIS BEPORT IS SUBMITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10. CPR #: (CDRes all That app() 10. POWER 10. 20.201(d) 20.203(a)(3)(i) X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 10. POWER 100 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 50.37(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 10. POWER 100 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.37(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 10. 20.2020(a)(2)(D) 50.37(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.37(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(D)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(D)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(D) <td>01</td> <td>29</td> <td>2003</td> <td>2002</td> <td>- 004 -</td> <td>01</td> <td>03</td> <td>26</td> <td>2003</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	01	29	2003	2002	- 004 -	01	03	26	2003							
MODE 1 20 2201(b) 20 2203(a)(0) X 50.73(a)(2)(b) 50.73(a)(2)(b) 10. POWER 100 20 2203(a)(1) 50 32(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b) 10. POWER 100 20 2203(a)(1) 50 38(c)(1)(b)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50 38(c)(2) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(A) 73.71(a)(5) 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50 38(c)(2) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 20 2203(a)(2)(b) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 3 constraints 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 3 constraints 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 3 constraints 50 73(a)(2)(b)(B) 50 73	9. OPERAT	ING			11. THIS REP	ORT IS	SUBMI	TTED P	URSUANT 1	<u>T 0 T</u>	HE REQUIREM	ENTS OF	10 CFF	₹ <u>§</u> • (C	heck all tha	t apply)
10. POWER 100 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 50.33(a)(2)(w) 50.73(a)(2)(w) 50.73(a)(2)(w) 20.2203(a)(2)(w) 50.36(c)(1)(M)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(W)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 73.71(a)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(w) 50.36(c)(2)(W)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(W)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(W)(D) 50.73(a)(2)	MODE		1	20 2	2201(b)	_ _	20 22	03(a)(3)(ii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(II)(B)	<u> </u> !	50.73(a	a)(2)(ix)(A)
LEVEL 100 20 2203(a)(1) 50 38(c)(1)(0(A) 50 73(a)(2)(0(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20 2203(a)(2)(0) 50 38(c)(1)(0(A) 50.73(a)(2)(0(A) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) 20 2203(a)(2)(0) 50 38(c)(1)(0(A) 50.73(a)(2)(0(A) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(4) 20 2203(a)(2)(w) 50.38(c)(1)(0(A) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 20 2203(a)(2)(w) 50.73(a)(2)(0)(A) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 20 2203(a)(2)(w) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A 20 2203(a)(2)(w) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C) Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 20 2203(a)(2)(w) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(C) NRC Form 366A 12 0.2203(a)(2)(w) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 12 0.2203(a)(2)(w) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 366A 12 0.2203(a)(2)(w) 50 73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or In NRC Form 36A 13 complete Expected one Expected on 20 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)	10. POW	ER	100	20.2	2201(d)		20 22	03(a)(4)	L	50.73(a)(2)(u	n)	<u> _</u> !	50.73(a)(2)(x)	
20.2203(a)(2)(b) 50.36(c)(1)(0)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(V(A) 17.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(b) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(b) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 120.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 120.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(V(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 120.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(D)(B) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A John Yadusky – Lead Licensing Engineer (919) 362-2020 (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FALURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT EAU Specify in Abstract Below or in NRC Form 366A 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED IN THIS REPORT Specify in Abstract Below or in NRC Form 366A 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED SuBMission DATE In Seau Second Fe	LEVEL		100	20 2	2203(a)(1)		50 36	(c)(1)(ı)	(A)		50 73(a)(2)(i	<u>v)(A)</u>]	73.71(<u>a)(4)</u>	- <u></u> .
20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.36(a)(2) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) 20.2203(a)(2)(u) E0.73(a)(2)(U)(C) E0.73(a)(2)(V)(C) 20.2		화장은	શ્ ^{રા} અન્ય છે. હતા છે અંતર	20.2	2203(a)(2)(I)	_	50 36	<u>(c)(1)(ii)</u>)(A)	┢	50.73(a)(2)(v	<u>/)(A)</u>	$\left - \right $	73.71(a 2711FI	a)(5) R	
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) B0.73(a)(2)(i)(A) B0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) NRC Form 300A 20.2203(a)(2)(v) B0.73(a)(2)(i)(A) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) NRC Form 300A 20.2203(a)(2)(v) B0.73(a)(2)(i)(A) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) B0.73(a)(2)(i)(A) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) B0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) NAME 20.2203(a)(2)(v) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) S0.73(a)(2)(v)(D) John Yadusky – Lead Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT PACTURER REPORTABLE 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION MONTH DAY YEA YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO SUBMISSION MONTH DAY YEA 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in there fire areas could cause spurious closure of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Protected CND if it was		e ng		20.3	2203(a)(2)(II)		50.36	(c)(2)		┼╌	50 73(a)(2)(v	<u>/)(B)</u>	\vdash	Specif	in Abstra	ict below or in
120.2203(a)(2)(V) 50.73(a)(2)(V(b) 50.73(a)(2)(V(b) 120.2203(a)(2)(V) 50.73(a)(2		24 A.C.	Mers all	20.2	2203(a)(2)(iii)	- -	50.46	(a)(3)(II) (A)	┼─	50 73(a)(2)(v	/)(C) //D)	{ '	NHCF	orm 366A	
Iduzionalization Iduzionalization Iduzionalization Iduzionalization Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Iduzionalization Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Iduzionalizationalization Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Iduzionalizationalizationalization Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Sor Taja(2)(0) Iduzionalizationaline and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern.		N BAN	See Seese	20.2	2203(a)(2)(IV)	_ _	50.73	(a)(2)(1)	(A) (B)	┢	50 73(a)(2)(//////////////////////////////////////	435.	Blorinde	e à àt	H.N. CAS
In the regulation In the regulation In the regulation Interview of the regulation regulation of the regulatin regulatin regulatin regulation of the rection of the regulatin				20.	2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73	(a)(2)(i)	(C)	┢╴	50.73(a)(2)(/iii)(A)	1. Carl	esere El con		
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) John Yadusky – Lead Licensing Engineer (919) 362-2020 TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS MEER (Include Area Code) COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT LICENE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED MANUL INTENT TO END TO THE SAIGN THE PORT INTENT SUPP	Repting the same	S. MAR	5 69 S	20 2	2203(a)(3)(i)	_	50 73	(a)(2)(ii	(<u>0)</u>)(A)	-	50.73(a)(2)(v	/iii)(B)			Sec.	ne kr. s
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED IS. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED IS. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR ITELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED IS. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR VES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO IS. EXPECTED MONTH DAY VES (12	2. LIC	ENSEE	CONT	ACT FOR 1	HIS	S LER	A=1	1		····	
John Yadusky – Lead Licensing Engineer (919) 362-2020 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER PROTOTIONER TO EXPECTED 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED VES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) Y NO DATE 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves in the flowpaths of water to the Protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were	NAME									T	ELEPHONE NUM	IBER (Incl	ude Ar	ea Coo	e)	
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUL FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPX SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPX 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO SUBMISSION DATE YEAR 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize susceptibility to mal-operation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of th	John Yadusł	y – Lea	d Licen	sing Er	ngineer							(91	9) 36	52-20	20	
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEA YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY YEA 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On Date Da			13. CO	MPLETE	ONE LINE F	OR E	ACH CO	OMPON	ENT FAIL	URI	E DESCRIBED	IN THIS	REP	DRT		
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER ITO EPIX Image: Component FACTURER TO EPIX 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPÉCTED 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to maloperation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of these conditions is inadequate origi					MANIL		PORTARI								MANU-	REPORTABLE
It. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED It. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to mal- operation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis of certain conductor-to-conductor interactions. Design changes or other methods approved by the NRC will be used to restore com	CAUSE	SYSTEM	СОМ	PONENT	FACTURER	1	TO EPIX	<u>-</u>	CAUSE		SYSTEM	COMPC	NENT	FA	CTURER	TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY YEAR 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to mal- operation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis of certain conductor-to-conductor interactions. Design changes or other methods approved by the NRC will be used to restore compliance.								je V								
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO DATE 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to maloperation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis of certain conductor-to-conductor interactions. Design changes or other methods approved by the NRC will be used to restore compliance.		14	. SUPPLI	EMENTA	L REPORT E	XPE	CTED				15. EXPE SUBMIS	CTED SION	M	DNTH	DAY	YEAR
 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On December 20, 2002, inspection of the Harris Nuclear Plant Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) identified that postulated fires in three fire areas could cause spurious closure of certain valves. Spurious closure of valves in the flowpath for the protected Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) could result in loss of the protected CSIP if it was in service at the time of the postulated fire. Similarly, simultaneous multiple spurious closures of valves in the flowpaths of water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seals could result in loss of RCP seal cooling credited in the SSA and subsequent RCP seal degradation. Upon discovery, interim compensatory actions were implemented to minimize the impact of the postulated fires including: de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves to minimize susceptibility to maloperation of components and posting a roving fire watch in fire areas of concern. On January 29, 2003, it was identified that simultaneous multiple spurious opening of certain valves could result in transferring of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) inventory to the containment recirculation sump. A roving fire watch has been posted in fire areas of concern. The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis of certain conductor-to-conductor interactions. Design changes or other methods approved by the NRC will be used to restore compliance. 	YES (If ye	es, compl	ete EXPI	ECTED S	UBMISSION	DATI	E)	X	NO		DAT	E		_		
	16. ABSTRACT On December fires in three protected Ch of the postul Reactor Coo seal degrada postulated fit operation of On January t transferring of watch has be The cause o interactions.	(Limit to er 20, 20 fire are harging/s ated fire lant Pur ttion. U res inclu compor 29, 2003 of Refue een pos f these of Design	1400 spa 002, ins as could Safety I Safety I Safety I Safety I Pon dis ding: co nents ar 3, it was ling Wa ted in fi condition change	aces, i e., pectior d cause njectior arly, sir P) seal covery, de-ener nd post s identif ater Sto re area ons is in es or o	approximate of the Han e spurious n Pump (C nultaneous s could res is could res interim co gizing the gizing the gizing that sir orage Tank s of conce adequate of ther metho	Iv 15 s rris N closu SIP) s mul sult ir mpe CSIF g fire nulta c (RW rn. origir ds a	single-s luclea ure of could tiple s n loss n loss suctio watch watch neous VST) in nal Sat	paced t r Plan certain result puriou of RC y action on cro n in fire s multi nvento fe Shu	vpewritten t Safe Sh n valves. in loss o us closure P seal co ons were ss-conne e areas o ple spuri ory to the utdown A the NRC	Inne nuti Sf th Sooli int Sooli int Sooli int Sooli ou: ou: ou: ou: ou: ou: ou: wil	down Analys purious clos ne protected of valves in ing credited plemented valves to m concern. s opening of ontainment r lysis of certa ll be used to	sis (SS. ure of v I CSIP i the flov in the S to minit inimize f certair ecircula ain cond restore	A) idd valve f it w vpath SSA : susc susc a valv ation	entifie s in t as in s of and s the in ceptit ves c sump or-to-o nplian	ed that p he flowp service water to subseque mpact of pility to n ould res p. A rov conducte	oostulated bath for the at the time the ent RCP f the nal- ult in ring fire

. - •

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS	SION							
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	<u>i. Ler nu</u>	MBER	1		3. PAGE	
		YEAR	SEQUEN NUMB	ITIAL ER	REVISION NUMBER			
Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2002	- 004	1 -	01	2	OF	7
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	opies of NRC Form 3	866A)						
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT								Î
The Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) discove for redundant components credited by th December 20, 2002 and reported in LEF describes another potential condition, w	red that a poten ne Safe Shutdow R 2002-004-00, c hich was discove	tial conditio In Analysis Jated Febru Pered on Jan	n exists v (SSA). Jary 18, 2 Juary 29,	with th This 2003. 2003	he lack of condition The revis	separa was dis sion to	ation of o scovered this LEF	cables d on R
On December 20, 2002, with the Unit in Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) in Case design and compensatory actions credit remain available. Specifically, the inspe- components potentially resulting in loss Coolant Pump (RCP) [AB-P] seal coolin closure of valves in the flowpaths for the designed to preserve these flowpaths, r postulated fire. Similarly, the fires were Component Cooling Water (CCW) [CC] RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers co	Mode 1 at 100% of Fire identified ed by the SSA we oction identified the of the Charging/ g credited by the protected CSIP esulting in loss of postulated to can to the RCP ther redited by the SS	b power, ins that for pos- vould not er hat postulat Safety Inject SSA. The SSA. The system of the protect use spurious mal barrier SA for RCP	spection stulated f asure a p ted fires fires we pplement ted CSII us closur heat exc protectio	of the lires i rotec could np (C re po ation P if it e of v shang on.	Harris Nu n three SS ted train o cause sp SIP) [CB- stulated to of the pre was in sen valves in th ers, result	uclear I SA fire f equip urious P] or Ico cause planne vice at ne flow ting in I	Plant (H areas, t ment w actuatio ss of R spurio d action the tim path of loss of f	NP) he ould in of eactor us is e of the low to
On January 29, 2003, with the Unit in Me opening of certain valves could result in containment recirculation sump. A rovir	ode 1 at 100% p transferring of F ng fire watch has	ower, HNP lefueling W been poste	identifie ater Stor ed in fire	d that age 7 areas	multiple s Fank (RW s of conce	simulta ST) inv m.	neous s /entory f	purious to the
structures, or components were inoperative	ble at the time o	f discovery	that con	tribut	ed to that	conclu	sion.	5161115,
The three SSA fire areas identified inclu 1. 1-A-BAL-B, located in the Reactor A 2. 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elev 3. 1-A-EPA, located in the RAB Electri	ded: Auxiliary Building ration 286' cal Penetration I	(RAB) Elev Room "A" E	vation 26 levation	1' and 261'	d 286'			
For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1 outlet valves (1CS-165 or 1CS-166) of t thermal barriers (1CC-207) are not prote NUREG 0800, Attachment 1 (Branch Te power cables for charging system Motor are routed through SSA fire areas 1-A-E charging system MOV 1CS-166 is unpro and inside its MCC in SSA fire area 1-A vulnerable to fire-induced hot shorts. Th suction from the VCT during a postulate result in spurious closure of one of the V subsequent damage to the running CSI system valve is required to remain open result, a postulated fire in this area could barrier heat exchangers credited by the of valves in the charging system and the seals, possibly leading to an RCP seal I	-A-BAL-B or 1-A he Volume Cont ected from spurio chnical Position Operated Valve BAL-B and 1-A-E otected for about -BAL-B. Therefor the charging syster of fire in these fir /CT outlet valves P credited by the to provide CCW d result in spurio SSA for RCP se component coo oss of coolant ac	-EPA (261' rol Tank (V ous actuatio CMEB 9.5 e (MOV) [20 PA with no tone foot a ore, the unp em valves a e areas. A s, loss of su e SSA for ch / flow to RC us closure eal protectio oling water s ccident (LO	elevation CT) and on in acc -1) Secti J 1CS-11 fire barri bove its protected are requi s a resul action flo narging fl CP therm of this va on. Multij system c CA) with	n), ce the C ordar on C. 55 an ier. S Motor cable red to t, a fil w to t low al al bas alve a ole sil ould out ci	rtain cabli CW supp nee with th 5.b. Spec d CCW sy similarly, th c Control C es for thes o remain o re in any c he running nd RCP so rrier heat nd loss of multaneou result in d redited CS	ng [CB ly valve if requirisically vstem I he conficter is MON pen to of these g CSIP eal coor exchar flow to us spur egrada SIPs.	L3] for t to RCI irement the cor MOV 1C irol cable (MCC) [/s are provide areas , and bling. Th igers. A b RCP th ious act tion of t	the two s of htrol C-207 e for MCC] CSIP could ne CCW ts a hermal uations he RCP

•

•

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO (1-2001)	MMISSION						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE	:R)						
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	5. LER NUMBER	1		3. PAGE	=
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2002	- 004 -	01	3	OF	7
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use addition	onal copies of NRC Form :	366A)					
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Contin	<u>ued)</u>						
 For a postulated fire in SSA fire are valve from RCP thermal barriers (1208) are not protected from spuriou Attachment 1 (Branch Technical Potthe CCW system MOVs 1CC-251 at in this area with no fire barrier. The hot shorts. These valves are required flow to RCP thermal barrier heat exwould still be protected by the norm For a postulated fire in SSA fire are cross-connect valves (1CS-168 and discharge cross-connect valves (1CS-168, and MCC in C.5.b. Specifically, the conunprotected inside their MCC in SS 1CS-169, 1CS-214, 1CS-218, and MCC in the same fire area. Therefishorts. MOVS 1CS-168 and 1CS-169 valve fire in these fire areas. As a result, valves, loss of suction flow to the ru SSA for charging flow and RCP sea in this area could result in spurious the CSIPs. However, this loss of fu 1CS-217, 1CS-218, and 1CS-219 a As a result, a postulated fire in this subsequent loss of flow to charging function would be recoverable since Multiple simultaneous spurious acttor 218, and 1CS-219) could result in his injection, and subsequent damage Upon discovery, interim compensa These measures included de-energing operation of components, and post 	ea 1-A-BAL-C (286' el CC-251) and the CCU is actuation in accord position CMEB 9.5-1) S and 1CC-208 are rout prefore, the unprotect red to remain open to ted fire in this area co changers credited by nal seal injection func ea 1-A-BAL-B (261' el d 1CS-169), the CSIF CS-217, 1CS-218, an of NUREG 0800, Atta trol power cable for co SA fire area 1-A-BAL- 1CS-219 are unprotected es are required to ren a fire in this area cou unning CSIP, and sub al cooling. MOV 1CS closure of the mini-fil unction would be recco are required to remain area could result in s g or high head safety e the CSIPs would no uations of valves in th oss of mini-flow to the to the running CSIP.	evation), th <i>N</i> supply va- lance with the Section C.5. red through ed cables for provide CC puld result in the SSA for tion of the r evation), th P mini-flow i d 1CS-219) ichment 1 (icharging sys- B. The con- cted for abo- cables for the nain open to purious cloo- injection crea- to be damaged to construct the con- purious cloo- to be damaged to construct the con- construction crea- to construct the con- to construct the con- to construct the con- to construct the con- to construct the con- h in fire are	e control powe alve to RCP se he requirement b. Specifically SSA fire area or these MOV CW flow to RC n spurious clos or RCP seal pre- edundant cha e control powe solation valve are not prote Branch Techn stem MOVs 10 trol power cab out one foot al hese MOVs and o provide CSII spurious clos image to the r les mini-flow for valve, and su ce the CSIPs rovide chargin sure of one of edited by the S ged. system (i.e., I d loss of flow for as of concern	er cables f eals and m its of NUF y, the cont 1-A-BAL- s are vulne P thermal sure of the otection. rging/safe er cables f (1CS-214 cted from ical Position CS-168 an oles for cha cove their re vulneral P suction of une of one unning CS or the CSIP basequent would not g flow from the CSIP SSA. How MOVs 1CS to charging e impact o	or the later of the leg 08 rol pow C and barrie barie barrie barie ba barrie barie barie barie barrie barrie barri	CCW repolers (1 600, ver cabl into their to fire-ir r heat ves and ver, RCF the CSI us actua EB 9.5- -217 ard system and insid ire-induc CSIP si dited by s a resu f mini-file maged. unning (0 arge valv his loss 1CS-21 gh head	eturn 1CC- es for ir MCC duced loss of P seals ns. uction P ation in 1) e MOVs de their ced hot lated uction the lt, a fire ow to MOVs CSIP. ves, and of 7, 1CS safety d fires. r to mal

•

.

NRC FO (1-2001) LIC	RM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM	MISSION)							
	1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LE	RNUMBER			3. PAGE	
			YEAR	SE	EQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		·	
Harris	Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2002	-	004	- - 01	4	OF	7
17. NAR	RATIVE (If more space is required, use additional	al copies of NRC Form 3	166A)			-			
۱.	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continue	ed)							
	For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas three in each area, (1SI-300, 1SI-310 protected from spurious actuation in a Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) Sect 310, and 1SI-322 are unprotected ins cables for MOVs 1SI-301, 1SI-311, an MCCs in this area with no fire barrier. induced hot shorts. These valves are containment recirculation sump. Mult these areas could result in inadverten sump. If this transfer of inventory we System (RCS) would not be available	s 1-A-BAL-B or 1-A , and 1SI-322; or 13 accordance with the ion C.5.b. Specific ide their MCCs in S nd 1SI-323 are rout Therefore, the un e required to shut to tiple simultaneous s ty transferring inve- re to occur, the wat from a suction sou	BAL-C (28 SI-301, 1S e requirement ally, the co SA fire are ed through protected of prevent tr spurious op entory from er used fo irce (i.e., th	36' el il-311 ents ontrol ea 1- n SS/ cable ransfe penin n the r inve he RV	evation), I, and 1SI of NURE(power ca A-BAL-B. A fire area s for these er of inver ag of these RWST to entory ma WST) cre	certain cat -323, resp G 0800, At bles for M Similarly, a 1-A-BAL- e MOVs a ntory from e valves fro the contai keup to the dited by th	oling fo ectivel tachmo OVs 15 the cc C and re vuln the RV om a fi nment e Reac e SSA	r six MC y) are no ent 1 (B SI-300, ontrol po into the erable t VST to t re in eittl recircul stor Coo	DVs, ot ranch 1SI- ower ir o fire- the her of lation lant
	Energy Industry Identification System	(EIIS) codes are id	lentified in	the t	ext within	brackets [].		
11.	CAUSE OF EVENT								
	The cause of these conditions is inad conductor interactions (i.e., hot shorts	lequate original Saf s) were not adequa	e Shutdow tely evalua	n An Ited i	alysis. Sin the initia	pecifically, al Safe Shu	certair utdown	n condu Analysi	ctor-to- is.
111.	SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE								
	All of the findings are based on scena adverse safety consequences.	arios that have not a	actually oc	curre	ed. There	fore, there	are no	o actual	
	Potential safety consequences for po result in spurious closure of certain S	stulated fires in fire SA MOVs may incl	areas 1-A ude:	-BAL	B and 1-	-A-EPA (26	61' elev	vation) t	hat also
	 Loss of suction flow and subsequence RCP seal cooling, 	uent damage to the	running C	SIP	credited b	y the SSA	for cha	arging fl	ow and
	 Loss of flow to RCP thermal barr Loss of charging or high head sa Multiple simultaneous spurious a the CSIPs and loss of flow to char CSIP 	ier heat exchangers fety injection flow c ctuations of valves arging or high head	s credited redited by in the cha safety inje	by th the \$ rging ection	e SSA for SSA, system c , and sub	r RCP seal could resul sequent d	protec t in los amage	ction, s of min e to the r	ii-flow to running
	 Multiple simultaneous spurious a system could result in degradatio CSIPs. 	ctuations of valves on of the RCP seals	in the cha , possibly	rging leadi	system ang to a R	and the cor CP seal LC	npone)CA w	nt coolır ithout cr	ng water redited
	Potential safety consequence for a po spurious opening of certain SSA MO	ostulated fire in fire Vs may include:	area 1-A-E	BAL-I	B (286' el	evation) th	at also	results	in
	 Multiple simultaneous spurious of RWST inventory to the containment available for use, if needed, from 	pening of valves in ent recirculation su the containment re	the safety mp. Howe circulation	injec ever, 1 sum	tion syste this water ip.	em could re r inventory	esult in would	transfe still be	r of

•

• •

	1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LER NU	MBER			3. PAG	E			
				SEQUE		REVISION						
			YEAR	- NUME	<u>- 858</u>	NUMBER						
Harris	Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2002	- 00	4 -	01	5	OF				
17. NA	RRATIVE (If more space is required, use addi	tional copies of NRC Form :	366A)									
111.	SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Continu	ued)										
	Potential safety consequences for spurious actuation of certain SSA	a postulated fire in fire MOVs may include:	e area 1-A-	BAL-C (2 by the SS	286' e	levation) ti RCP seal	hat als	o result	s in owever,			
 Loss of now to HCP thermal barrier near exchangers credited by the SSA for HCP seal protection. FRCP seals would still be protected by the normal seal injection function of the redundant charging/sa injection trains. Multiple simultaneous spurious opening of valves in the safety injection system could result in transference. 												
RWST inventory to the containment recirculation sump. However, this water inventory would still b available for use, if needed, from the containment recirculation sump.												
	The defense-in-depth fire protection	on program mitigates s	some of the	ese poter	ntial sa	afety cons	equen	ces by:				
	 Prevention of fire initiation, Prompt detection of fires or in Effective suppression of fires 	cipient fire conditions by installed automatic	by installed fire suppre	l automa ession sy	lic det stems	ection sys	items, prigade	e backu	р.			
	Opening and de-energizing the CS potential safety consequences of a	SIP suction cross-conr a postulated fire in fire	nect valves area 1-A-E	(1CS-16 3AL-B.	8 and	1CS-169) also i	mitigate	s the			
IV.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS											
	Upon discovery, interim compense These measures included de-ene minimize susceptibility to mal-ope	atory actions were imp rgizing the CSIP suction ration of components,	elemented t on cross-co and postin	o minimi onnect va g a rovin	ze the lives (g fire	impact of 1CS-168 watch in fi	f the po and 10 ire area	ostulate CS-169) as of co	d fires. to ncern.			
	An additional fire area has been a identified on January 29, 2003.	dded to the roving fire	watch as i	nterim co	mper	nsatory ac	tion foi	r the co	ndition			
	Complete a validation of the HNP	safe shutdown analys	is.									
	Restore the identified conditions of this LER to compliance by design changes or other methods approved by the NRC.											
	These actions are scheduled to be	e completed by the ne	xt available	e refuelin	g outa	ige (RFO1	2).					
		,										

. •

٠

NRC (1-2001		SSION						
		2 DOOKET					3 0400	
 		2. DUCKEI	C	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION		U. FAGE	<u> </u>
			YEAR		NUMBER			
Harri	is Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2002	- 004 -	01	6	OF	7
17. N	ARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional	copies of NRC Form :	366A)					
۷.	PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS							
	HNP LER 2001-002-00 (reported 6/15/	(01)						
	This LER reported a determination by I train separation, in the event of a fire ir function due to a design error. A fire ir Operated Relief Valve (PORV) and as condition by isolating the PORV Block power to the plant computer for PORV Valves and the position indication on th cause of this event was inadequate an included: 1) The applicable fuses were train separation, 2) The design analysi correct fuses.	HNP engineering in the "A" Switchge in one fire area cou sociated block val Valve control circ Block Valve posit ne PORV Block V alysis during desit e pulled as a temp s was corrected, a	personnel t ear Room, a uld result in ve. These uit on an ele tion indication alve control gn of the ap porary comp and 3) HNP	hat fuses inter re not capable the inability to fuses were int ectrical short c on. The powe switch is not oplicable circuit pensatory mea- implemented	e of perfor isolate a ended to p lue to a fir r to repos powered b t. The co isure to pr a design o	aintain ming ti Pressi protect e. The ition th by thes rrective ovide change	sate sn heir inte urizer Po against e fuses p e PORV e fuses. e actions safe shu e to insta	utdown nded ower this provide / Block / Block The s utdown all the
	NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09	Image: State in the image: State in						
	This inspection identified two unresolve plant licensing basis requirements and revise the fire rating of selected Therm separation barrier between the "B" Tra Train Cable Spreading Room. Based this fire barrier did not have the require Switchgear Room, of significant intens damage certain redundant "A" train ca significance determination for these tw inadequate fire testing of the installed rooms and establishing review criteria	ed items (URIs) c the adequacy of no-Lag fire barriers in Switchgear Roo on Thermo-Lag b ed three-hour fire ity and duration, c bles and their ass to items was one fire barrier. The c to ensure that fut	oncerning a the 10 CFR s. The iden om/Auxilian arrier fire re resistance r could breact ociated fun notice of vic corrective ac ure fire barr	dequacy of a 50.59 for cha tified fire barri y Control Pane sistance tests ating. Therefore the Thermo- ctions of safe plation (White ctions included ier modification	Thermo-L nges mac er serves el (ACP) R conducte ore, a sing Lag fire ba shutdown finding). d modifica ons do not	ag fire le to th as the com a d in 19 gle fire arrier a syster The roo tions to invalio	barrier fire area of the fire area of the fire assembly fins. The ot cause of the aff date test	to meet to a A" 1995, 3" Train y and final was ected results.
	HNP LER 97-020-00 (reported 9/12/97	7)						
	This LER reported that design discrep Analysis in Case of Fire. These discre RAB for the EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pu requirements to maintain safe shutdow and inadequate design verification dur the required protection for the cited ca safe shutdown cables in the unit 2 are protection discrepancies were found. performed and no similar deficien	ancies were ident epancies pertain to mps "A" and "B". vn capability. The ing initial plant co bles. The root ca as north of colum Also, an in-depth cies were identifie	ified during o safety-rela These cablese deficien nstruction. use investion n line 43 wa review of all ed."	an Engineerin ated electrical les did not cor cies were cau A plant modifi gation (CR 97- as performed a n additional fir	g review of cables in a nply with s sed by en- cation wa 03861) st and no add e area (1-	of the \$ 261' el separa gineeri s insta ated, " ditiona A-EPE	Safe Shi levation tion ing over lled to p A review l cable b) was	utdown of the sight rovide v of the
	HNP LER 97-006-00 (reported 4/17/9	7)						
	This LER reported that an undocumer through the Thermo-Lag Wall in the 2 additional thermo-lag fire barrier defice do not comply with the 3-hour fire-rate identified to be incomplete design, inc penetration was modified per ESR 95- indicates a common trend to the fact of final construction walkdown."	nted breach was in 86' Cable Spread iency in a floor dra d barrier requiren omplete construc -00715. The root of an area of a Th	dentified in ing Room " ain assembl nents speci tion, and ind cause inve ermo-lag pa	the thermo-lag A." Follow-up ly in the cable lied in the HNI complete final stigation (CR s anel being mis	y wall while investigat spread ro P FSAR. constructi 97-01123) sed both	e seali ion rev om. T The ro ion wa stated in desi	ng pene vealed a hese co ot cause Ikdown. d, "Nothi gn and i	trations n nditions was The ng n the

. . .

-

	1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LE	R NUMBER	i		3. PAGE	
			YEAR	s	EQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION			
Harri	s Nuclear Plant Unit 1	05000400	2002	-	004	. 01	7	OF	7
7. N/	ARRATIVE (If more space is required, use addit	tional copies of NRC Form :	866A)					<u></u>	
/1.	<u>COMMITMENTS</u>								
	The actions committed to by Progr actions discussed in this submittal They are described for the NRC's	ress Energy Carolinas represent intended or information and are no	, Inc. in this planned a ot regulator	s doo ctior ry co	cument ar ns by Prog mmitmen	e identifieo ress Energ ts.	l below gy Caro	^r . Any ot olinas, In	her c.
	Commitm	nent(s)				So Com	chedule pletion	ed Date	
	1. Complete a validation of the HI	NP safe shutdown ana	lysis.			Aug	ust 5, 2	2004	
	2. Restore the identified condition changes or other methods app	n	Refueli (Curro Novem	ng Out ent sch ber 11	age 12 edule , 2004)				

. . . .