Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000

MAR 2 4 2003

10 CFR 50, App E.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority )

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP.

| EPIP | Rev | Title | Effective Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPIP-1 | 21 | Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart | 3-3-2003 |

There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

Sincerely,

P. L. Pace
Manager, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs

Enclosure
cc: See Page 2

A045

MAR 2 4 2003

PLP:JES
Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):
NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

# EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES

## EPIP-1

## EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

Revision 21

Unit 0

**NON-QUALITY RELATED**

PREPARED BY: James F. Hagy
(Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emergency Planning

APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE: 03/03/2003

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

## REVISION LOG

| Revision Number | Implementation Date | Description of Revision |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 04/13/90 | New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes IP-1. |
| 1 | 02/04/91 | Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers. |
| 2 | 11/28/91 | Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown. |
| 3 | 03/04/92 | Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references. |
| 4 | 02/10/93 | Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92. |
| 5 | 09/15/93 | Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC. |
| 6 | 01/01/94 | Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes. |
| 7 | 05/27/94 | Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points. |
| 8 | 01/10/95 | FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information. |
| 9 | 4/28/98 | Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following: System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements. |

| Revision Number | Implementation Date | Pages Affected | Description of Revision |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN-1 | 09/28/95 | 10, 14, 26 | The following non-intent enhancements were made: (CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA), to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number. |
| CN-2 | 11/10/95 | 3, 6, 34 | The following non-intent enhancements were made: Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section. |

## REVISION LOG(Continued)

| Revision Number | Implementation Date | Pages Affected | Description of Revision |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN-3 | 05/24/96 | 8, 11, 16, 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 34 | The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back to the EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification. |
| 10 | 3/15/99 | All | The following non-intent enhancement were made: Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised - one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS. |
| 11 | 4/15/99 | 2, 34 | Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1. |
| 11A | 7/1/99 | 3,26 | Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed. |
| 12 | 9/30/99 | All | Non intent change. Minor editorial\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000. |
| 13 | 12/08/99 | All | Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification. |
| 14 | 04/10/00 | All (Pg.4 & 45) | Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen. |
| 15 | 08/17/00 | All (Pg. 4, 11A & B) | Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11b. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP. |

## REVISION LOG (Continued)

| Revision Number | Implementation Date | Pages Affected | Description of Revision |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | 3/30/01 | All (Pg. 11 &14) | Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:<br>Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.<br>Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301. |
| 17 | 09/25//01 | All<br>Page 6, 11B | Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:<br>Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.<br>Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix. |
| 18 | 02/15/02 | All<br>2, 11B, 44 | Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:<br>Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing $\beta$-$\gamma$ to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee. |
| 19 | 06/05/02 | All<br>4, 7 &30 | Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.<br>Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6) was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEI to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01 requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat. Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL. This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01 Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the Security Event Basis.<br>Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16. |
| 20 | 07/09/02 | ALL,<br>pg. 2, 10, 13, 15, 20, 24, 30, 32, 39, 43 | Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.<br>Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAL 1(a) revised to correspond to levels in AOI-28. Credible Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites. |
| 21 | 03/03/2003 | 2, 15 | Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s) indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.<br>Non-intent change: Deleted reference to table which was deleted from AOI-28, Ref. WBPER 03-004004-000. |

## 1.0 PURPOSE[4]

This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

## 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY[2,4]

The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

## 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS[4]

3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3 Classification Determination

3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.

3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

**3.0 INSTRUCTIONS** (continued)

3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

3.3.5 **IF** an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6 **IF** the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition **CAN NOT** be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered **MET** and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7 **IF** an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate **shall not** be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8 The **ACCEPTABLE** time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

**4.0 RECORDS**

4.1 Non-QA Records

None

## 5.0 REFERENCES

### 5.1 Interfacing References

BP-236, *Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis*

SPP 3.5, *Regulatory Reporting Requirements*

WBN-EPIP-2, *Unusual Event*

WBN-EPIP-3, *Alert*

WBN-EPIP-4, *Site Area Emergency*

WBN-EPIP-5, *General Emergency*

WBN-EPIP-9, *Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)*

WBN-EPIP-13, *Termination of the Emergency and Recovery*

WBN-EPIP-14, *Radiological Control Response*

WBN-EPIP-16, *Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies*

CECC-EPIP-9, *Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures*

SI-4.04, *Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System*

### 5.2 Other Documents

10 CFR 50, *Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities*

10 CFR 20, *Standards for Protection From Radiation*

REG GUIDE-1.101, *Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.*

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual

EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions

EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

# EMERGENCY

# PLAN

# CLASSIFICATION

# FLOWCHART [1,3,4,5]

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## LOSS OF POWER



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## RADIOLOGICAL

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4.7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e within 15 minutes

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g , Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g , chlorine)

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e , within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

## 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier

### 1. Critical Safety Function Status

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Core Cooling Red | Core Cooling Orange<br>**OR**<br>Heat Sink Red<br>(RHR Not in Service) |

**-OR-**

### 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent iodine-131 | Not applicable |

**-OR-**

### 3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Greater Than 1200°F | Greater Than 727°F |

**-OR-**

### 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Not Applicable | VALID RVLIS level <33%<br>(No RCP running) |

**-OR-**

### 5. Containment Radiation Monitors

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| VALID reading increase of Greater Than:<br><br>74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272<br>**OR**<br>59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 | Not Applicable |

**-OR-**

### 6. Site Emergency Director Judgment

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

## 1.2 RCS Barrier

### 1. Critical Safety Function Status

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Not Applicable | Pressurized Thermal Shock Red<br>**OR**<br>Heat Sink Red<br>(RHR Not in Service) |

**-OR-**

### 2. RCS Leakage/LOCA

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| RCS Leak results in Loss of subcooling (<65°F Indicated), [85°F ADV] | Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of One Charging Pump (CCP) In the Normal Charging Alignment.<br>**OR**<br>RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1 |

**-OR-**

### 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| SGTR that results in a safety injection actuation<br>**OR**<br>Entry into E-3 | Not Applicable |

**-OR-**

### 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| VALID RVLIS level <33%<br>(No RCP Running) | Not Applicable |

**-OR-**

### 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

# 1.3 CNTMT Barrier

## 1. Critical Safety Function Status

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Not Applicable | Containment (FR-Z.1) Red<br>OR<br>Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE |

-OR-

## 2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Rapid unexplained decrease following initial increase<br>OR<br>Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with LOCA in progress) | Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume<br>OR<br>Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of Containment spray |

-OR-

## 3. Containment Isolation Status

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Containment Isolation is Incomplete (when required) AND a Release Path to the Environment Exists | Not Applicable |

-OR-

## 4. Containment Bypass

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| RUPTURED S/G is also FAULTED outside CNTMT<br>OR<br>Prolonged (>4 Hours) Secondary Side release outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits | Unexplained VALID increase in area or ventilation RAD monitors in areas adjacent to CNTMT (with LOCA in progress) |

-OR-

## 5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment

| LOSS | Potential LOSS |
|---|---|
| Not Applicable | VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:<br><br>108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and 1-RE-90-272<br>OR<br>86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274 |

-OR-

## 6. Site Emergency Director Judgment

Condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above

# Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

## INSTRUCTIONS

*NOTE. A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e , within 1 to 2 hours, in the absence of a viable success path) The classification shall be made a soon as this determination is made*

1. In the matrix to the left, review the **INITIATING CONDITIONS** in all columns and identify which, if any, **INITIATING CONDITIONS** are MET. Circle these **CONDITIONS**.
2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any **LOSS** or Potential **LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS** have been MET.
3. If a CSF is listed as an **INITIATING CONDITION**; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the **EVENT** classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.
4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the **EVENTS** below and make the appropriate declaration.

**FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX U1**

### EVENTS

| UNUSUAL EVENT | ALERT |
|---|---|
| Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier | Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier<br>OR<br>Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier |
| **SITE AREA EMERGENCY** | **GENERAL EMERGENCY** |
| LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers | LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier |

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## LOSS OF POWER



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## RADIOLOGICAL

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4 7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

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**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e. within 15 minutes

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

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**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

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**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine)

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e , within 15 minutes.

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

| | 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation | | 2.2 Loss of Function | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | 1,2<br>3,4 | **Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress** *(1 and 2 and 3 and 4)*<br>1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications<br>2. **SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT** in progress<br>3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS<br>4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:<br>Sub-criticality PTS<br>Core Cooling Containment<br>Heat Sink Inventory | 1,2<br>3,4 | **Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red<br>2 CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (RHR not in service)<br>*Note: Also Refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | 1,2<br>3,4 | **UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable** (1 and 2 and 3)<br>1. **UNPLANNED** loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.<br>2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)<br>3. *(a or b)*<br>a **SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT** in Progress<br>b. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS | 4 | **Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br>1. Shutdown is required<br>2. Loss of RHR capability<br>3 Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 1,2<br>3,4 | **UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >15 Minutes** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br>1. **UNPLANNED** loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes<br>2 SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)<br>3 ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and capable of displaying data requested | ALL | A **Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication capability** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br>1 **UNPLANNED** loss of EPABX (PAX) phones<br>2 **UNPLANNED** loss of all sound powered phones<br>3 **UNPLANNED** loss of all radios<br>or<br>B **UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication capability** *(1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)*<br>1. **UNPLANNED** loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones<br>2. **UNPLANNED** loss of all Radio frequencies<br>3. **UNPLANNED** loss of all OPX (Microwave) system<br>4. **UNPLANNED** loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines<br>5. **UNPLANNED** loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system |

GENERAL SITE

ALERT

UNUSUAL EVENT

## 2.3 Failure of Rx Protection

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| 1,2 | **Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. *(a or b)*<br>a CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red<br><br>b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red<br><br>2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing |
| 1,2 | **Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br><br>1. **VALID** Rx Auto Trip signal received or required<br><br>2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful<br><br>3 FR-S 1 has been entered |
| 1,2 | **Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. **VALID** Rx Auto Trip signal received or required<br><br>2 Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing |
| | Not Applicable |

## 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| 1,2, 3,4, 5 | **Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)**<br><br>1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates *(a or b)*<br><br>a Dose equivalent Iodine (I-131) >0 265 µCi/gm for >48 Hours<br>or<br>>21 µCi/gm<br><br>b Specific activity >100/E µCi/gm |

SYSTEM DEGRADATION U1

| | 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage | | 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 1,2<br>3,4,<br>*5 | **Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM**<br>1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below *(a or b)*<br>a 1-SI-68-32 results<br>b With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM<br>**Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized* | 1,2,<br>3,4,<br>*5 | **Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM**<br>1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec ) >25 GPM *(a or b)*<br>a. 1-SI-68-32 results<br>b Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank<br>**Note Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized* |

GENERAL SITE

ALERT

UNUSUAL EVEN

## 2.7 Uncontrolled Cooldown

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"* |
| 1,2,3 | **UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System (<675 psig)<br>2 Safety Injection has initiated or is required |

## 2.8 Turbine Failure

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx"* |
| 1,2,3 | **Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment**<br>1. Turbine **PROJECTILES** has resulted in **VISIBLE DAMAGE** in any of the following areas<br>Control Building, Auxiliary Building, Unit #1 Containment, Diesel Generator Bldg, RWST, Intake Pumping Station, CST |
| 1,2,3 | **Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration**<br>1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main Generator Seals |

SYSTEM DEGRADATION U 1

| | 2.9 Technical Specification | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Not Applicable* |
| SITE | | *Not Applicable* |
| ALERT | | *Not Applicable* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 1,2<br>3,4 | **Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Spec. limits** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. Any Tech Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered<br>2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement |

| 2.10 Safety Limit | |
|---|---|
| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| | *Not Applicable* |
| | *Not Applicable* |
| | *Not Applicable* |
| 1,2,<br>3,4,<br>5 | **Safety Limits have been Exceeded** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech. Spec Figure 2 1 1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits"<br>2 RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig) |

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## LOSS OF POWER



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## RADIOLOGICAL

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4 7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes.

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g , Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

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| | 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) | | 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | 1,2, 3,4 | **Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. 1A and 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes<br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Core Cooling Red or Orange<br>b Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours of loss. | | *Not Applicable* |
| SITE | 1,2, 3,4 | **Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes**<br>1. 1A and 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes | | *Not Applicable* |
| ALERT | 1,2, 3,4 | **Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes<br>2 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available | 5,6, or De-fuel | **UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes**<br>1. 1A and 1B 6 9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes<br>*Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 1,2 3,4 | **Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes<br>2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board | 5,6, or De-fuel | **UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes<br>2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board |

LOSS OF POWER U 1

## 3.3 Loss of DC Power

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| GENERAL | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)* |
| SITE AREA EMERGENCY | 1,2, 3,4 | **Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes**<br>1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-II and 1-III and 1-IV for >15 minutes<br>*Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2.2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2 1)* |
| ALERT | *Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", "Loss of Function" (2 2), and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2 1)* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 5,6, or De-fuel | **UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes<br>2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes |

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1 Fuel Clad
1.2 RCS
1.3 Containment

1

## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1 Loss of Instrumentation
2.2 Loss of Function/Communication
2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection
2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation
2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage
2.6 RCS Identified Leakage
2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down
2.8 Turbine Failure
2.9 Technical Specification
2.10 Safety Limit

2

## LOSS OF POWER

3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
3.3 Loss of DC

3

## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1 Fire
4.2 Explosion
Table 4-1
Figure 4-A
4.3 Flammable Gas
4.4 Toxic Gas
Table 4-2
Figure 4-B
4.5 Control Room Evacuation
4.6 Security
4.7 SED Judgment
Table 4-3

4

## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1 Earthquake
5.2 Tornado
5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash
Table 5-1
5.4 River Level High
5.5 River Level Low
5.6 Watercraft Crash
Figure 5-A

5

## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems
6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)
6.4 Fuel Handling

6

## RADIOLOGICAL

7.1 Gaseous Effluent
7.2 Liquid Effluent
Table 7-1
Figure 7-A
7.3 Radiation Levels
7.4 Fuel Handling
Table 7-2

7

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**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

| | 4.1 FIRE | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | All | **FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment** *(1 and 2)*<br>1 **FIRE** in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1<br>2. (a or b)<br>a **VISIBLE DAMAGE** to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the **FIRE**<br>b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the **FIRE** |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)** |

| | 4.2 Explosions | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | All | **EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. **EXPLOSION** in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1<br>2 (a or b)<br>a An **EXPLOSION** has caused **VISIBLE DAMAGE** to Safety Related equipment<br>b Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the **EXPLOSION**<br>*Refer to "Security" (4.6)* |
| | All | **UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)**<br>*Refer to "Security" (4 6)* |

## TABLE 4-1
## PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS

Unit #1 Reactor Building
Auxiliary Building
Control Building
Diesel Generator Building
CST
Additional Diesel Generator Building
Intake Pumping Station
Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2)
RWST

HAZARDS/SED JUDGMENT U1

## Figure 4-A
## PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER



| | 4.3 Flammable Gas | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | All | **UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment <u>or</u> associated with Power production**<br><br>1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft triangular Area is >25% **(LEL)** Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2 |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER**<br><br>1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a ~10ft Triangular Area is >25% **(LEL)** Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the **SITE PERIMETER** (Refer to Figure 4-B)<br><br><u>OR</u><br><br>**B. Confirmed report by Local, County, <u>or</u> State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)** |

| | 4.4 Toxic Gas | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | All | **Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish <u>or</u> maintain Cold S/D** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br><br>1. Plant personnel report **TOXIC GAS** within any building listed in Table 4-2<br><br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to **TOXIC GAS** (i.e , burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)<br>b. Sampling indications > **(PEL)** Permissible Exposure Limit<br><br>3 Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment |
| | All | **A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2**<br><br><u>OR</u><br><br>**B. Confirmed report by Local, County, <u>or</u> State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)** |

## TABLE 4-2
## Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs

Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings
Auxiliary Building
Control Building
Diesel Generator Building
Additional Diesel Generator Building
Intake Pumping Station
Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)
CDWE Building
Turbine Building

## Figure 4-B
## ONE MILE RADIUS/SITE PERIMETER



## 4.5 Control Room Evacuation

| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | All | **Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br><br>1. (a or b)<br>a AOI-30 2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered<br>b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered<br>2 SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation<br><br>3 Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L11B |
| ALERT | All | **Evacuation of the Control Room is Required** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. (a or b)<br>a. AOI-30 2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered<br><br>b AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered<br><br>2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | | *Not Applicable* |

## 4.6 Security

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| All | **Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant**<br><br>1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability |
| All | **Security Event has or is occurring which results in Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public**<br><br>1. **VITAL AREA**, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force |
| All | **Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br><br>1. **BOMB** discovered within a **VITAL AREA**<br><br>2. **CIVIL DISTURBANCE** ongoing within the **PROTECTED AREA**<br><br>3 **PROTECTED AREA** has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force<br><br>*Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of* ***Protected Area and Site Perimeter*** |
| All | **Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant** *(1 or 2)*<br><br>1. **BOMB** discovered within the **PROTECTED AREA**<br><br>2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3 |

## 4.7 Emergency Director Judgment

| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL SITE | All | Events are in progress or have occurred which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A. |
| | All | Events are in progress or have occurred which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A. |
| ALERT | All | Events are in progress or have occurred which involve Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels. |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs. |

HAZARDS/SED JUDGMENT U1

### Table 4-3
### SECURITY EVENTS

a **SABOTAGE/INTRUSION** has occurred or is occurring within the **PROTECTED AREA**

b **HOSTAGE/EXTORTION** Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations

c **CIVIL DISTURBANCE** ongoing between the **SITE PERIMETER** and **PROTECTED AREA**

d Hostile **STRIKE ACTION** within the **PROTECTED AREA** which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received)

e. A **CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** security threat notification.

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2



## LOSS OF POWER

3



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6



## RADIOLOGICAL

7

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4 7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six **CSFs**· Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

**EVENT:** Assessment of an **EVENT** commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e. within 15 minutes

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g , Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g , chlorine)

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e , within 15 minutes

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes. deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

| | 5.1 Earthquake | | 5.2 Tornado | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | All | **Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. *(a and b)*<br>a Ann 166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded"<br>b Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated"<br><br>2 *(a or b)*<br>a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel<br>b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event | All | **Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1<br><br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Confirmed report of any **VISIBLE DAMAGE**<br>b Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event<br><br>*Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. Ann 166 E indicator "Seismic Recording Initiated"<br><br>2 (a or b)<br>a Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel<br>b National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event | All | **Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER**<br><br>1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the **SITE PERIMETER** (Refer to Figure 5-A) |

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON U1

## 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Crash

| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | All | **Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1<br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Confirmed report of any **VISIBLE DAMAGE**<br>b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER**<br>1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or **PROJECTILE** impact within the **SITE PERIMETER** (Refer to Figure 5-A) |

**Table 5-1**
**Plant Structures Associated With**
**Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs**

Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings
Auxiliary Building
Control Building
Diesel Generator Building
Additional Diesel Generator Building
Intake Pumping Station
Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)
CDWE Building
Turbine Building
RWST
CST

| | 5.4 River Level HIGH | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | All | **River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft<br>2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br>1. River Reservoir level >726 5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30<br>2 River Reservoir level >714 5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15<br>3 Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations |

| 5.5 River Level LOW | |
|---|---|
| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| All | **River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations** |
| All | **River Reservoir level is ≤673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations** |

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON U 1

## 5.6 Watercraft Crash

| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| ALERT | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"* |
| UNUSUAL EVEN | All | **Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station<br><br>2 (a or b or c)<br>a ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A O-PI-67-18A is <15 psig<br><br>b ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig<br><br>c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is <15 psig |

## Figure 5-A
## PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER



## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## LOSS OF POWER



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION



## RADIOLOGICAL

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4 7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e within 15 minutes

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g , Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required.

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g , chlorine)

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e , within 15 minutes

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

| | 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems | | 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | 5,6 | Note. Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs<br><br>*Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* | | *Not Applicable* |
| SITE | 5,6 | **Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established** *(1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)*<br><br>1. Loss of RHR capability<br><br>2 Rx vessel water level < el 718'<br><br>3 Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp >200° F<br><br>4 RCS is vented/open to CNTMT<br><br>5 CNTMT closure is established<br><br>*Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* | | *Not Applicable* |
| ALERT | 5,6 | **Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br><br>1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling<br><br>2 Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp. >200° F<br><br>3 CNTMT closure is established | 5,6 or De-Fuel | **UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes**<br><br>1. 1A and 1B 6 9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 5,6 | Note Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs<br><br>o | 5,6 or De-Fuel | **UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes<br><br>2 Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board |

## 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| GENERAL | | Not Applicable |
| SITE | | Not Applicable |
| ALERT | | Not Applicable |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | 5,6 or De-fuel | **UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for >15 minutes** *(1 or 2)*<br><br>1 Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes<br><br>2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes |

## 6.4 Fuel Handling

| Mode | Initiating/Condition |
|---|---|
| | *Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| | *Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| All | **Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel** *(1 and 2)*<br><br>1. **VALID** alarm on O-RE-90-101 or O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400<br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods<br>b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered |
| All | **UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br><br>1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal<br><br>2 VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60<br><br>3 Fuel remains covered with water |

## FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1



## SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2



## LOSS OF POWER 3



## HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4



## DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5



## SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6



## RADIOLOGICAL 7

# DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

**UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY:** (see SED Judgment 4 7)

**BOMB:** An explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

**CIVIL DISTURBANCE:** A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

**CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC** -The determination is made by WBN senior plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan

**CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):** A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

**EVENT:** Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e within 15 minutes

**EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):** The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

**EXPLOSION:** A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation

**EXTORTION:** An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force

**FAULTED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e , steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

**FIRE:** Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

**FLAMMABLE GAS:** Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the **LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)** will not explode due to ignition.

**HOSTAGE:** A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

**INEFFECTIVE:** The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures

**INITIATING CONDITIONS:** Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

**INTRUSION/INTRUDER:** Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

**ODCM:** Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

**ORANGE PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

**PROJECTILE:** An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein

**PROTECTED AREA:** Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

**RED PATH:** Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge, prompt operator action is required

**RUPTURED:** (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity

**SABOTAGE:** Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable

**SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:** An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

**SITE PERIMETER (SP):** Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

**STRIKE ACTION:** A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations

**TOXIC GAS:** A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine)

**UNPLANNED:** An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

**UNPLANNED:** (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP) Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e g , alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

**VALID:** An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i e., within 15 minutes

**VISIBLE DAMAGE:** Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering Surface blemishes (e g , paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.

**VITAL AREA:** Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

| | 7.1 Gaseous Effluents | | 7.2 Liquid Effluents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | All | **EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded.<br>2 Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 μ Ci/cc at SP<br>3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A) | | Not Applicable |
| SITE | All | **EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded<br>2 Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3 9E-7 μ Ci/cc at SP<br>3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A) | | Not Applicable |
| ALERT | All | **Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded<br>2 Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes<br>3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A) | All | **Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded<br>2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes** *(1 or 2 or 3)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under **UE** in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded<br>2. Field survey results indicate >0 1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes<br>3 EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0 1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A) | All | **Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes** *(1 or 2)*<br>1. A **VALID** rad monitor reading exceeds the values under **UE** in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the **Criterion** is Not exceeded<br>2 Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration |

# TABLE 7-1
# EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS[1]

NOTE: The values below, **if exceeded**, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the **VALID** reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on **ICS** are the primary indicators. If **ICS** is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

| Monitor | ICS Screen | Units | UE | Alert | Site | General |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total Site** | EFF1 | µCi/s [2] | 1.5E+05 | 1.5E+07 | 2.5E+08 | 2.5E+09 |
| **U1 Shield Building 1-RE-90-400** | EFF1 | µCi/s | 6.7E+04 | 6.7E+06 | 1.0E+08 | 1.0E+09 |
| **U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400** | EFF1 | µCi/s | 1.5E+04 | 1.5E+06 | 2.5E+07 | 2.6E+08 |
| **Auxiliary Building 0-RE-90-101B** | 4RM1 | cpm | 1.2E+04 | 1.2E+06 | *****(1) | *****(1) |
| **Service Building 0-RE-90-132B** | 4RM1 | cpm | 4.3E+03 | 4.3E+05 | 9.8E+06 | *****(1) |
| **U1 Condenser Vacuum Exhaust** | | | | | | |
| **1-RE-90-404A** | 3PAM | µCi/cc[3] | 5.5E-02 | 5.5E+00 | 8.83E+01 | 8.83E+02 |
| **1-RE-90-404B** | 3PAM | µCi/cc | 5.5E-02 | 5.5E+00 | 8.83E+01 | 8.83E+02 |
| **S/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90-421 thru 424 (B)** | 4RM2 | mR/hr[4] | NA | 3.5E+02 | 3.5E+03 | 3.5E+04 |
| **Liquid Monitors** | n/a | µCi/ml[2] | 1.8E-05 | 1.8E-03 | N/A | N/A |
| **0-RE-90-122** | 4RM2 | cpm | 1.1E+06 | *****(1) | N/A | N/A |
| **1-RE-90-120,121** | 4RM2 | cpm | 1.0E+06 | *****(1) | N/A | N/A |
| **0-RE-90-225** | 4RM2 | cpm | 9.2E+05 | *****(1) | N/A | N/A |
| **0-RE-90-212** | 4RM2 | cpm | 1.5E+04 | 1.5E+06 | N/A | N/A |
| **RELEASE DURATION** | minutes | | 60 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| **ASSESSMENT METHOD:** ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary | | | | | | |

Note: (1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.

(2) These releases rate values in µCi/s and µCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor for the **four** emergency classifications

(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the **MCR**. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates µCi/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02µCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 600°F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

## Figure 7-A
## EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER

NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."




Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

| | 7.3 Radiation Levels | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| GENERAL | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| SITE | | *Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnx" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| ALERT | All | **UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown** *(1 or 2)*<br>1 **VALID** area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room or CAS<br>2 *(a and b)*<br>a **VALID** area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2<br>b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown<br>*See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below* |
| UNUSUAL EVENT | All | **UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility**<br>1 **VALID** area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels<br>*Note: In Either the **UE** or **ALERT** EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other **INITIATING/CONDITIONS** for Applicability (e g , a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).* |

| | 7.4 Fuel Handling | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mode | Initiating/Condition |
| | | *Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| | | *Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)* |
| | All | **Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel** *(1 and 2)*<br>1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-101 or 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400<br>2. *(a or b)*<br>a Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods<br>b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered |
| | All | **UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered** *(1 and 2 and 3)*<br>1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal<br>2 **VALID** alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60<br>3 Fuel remains covered with water. |

## Table 7-2

## ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS

| Monitor No. | Location Building and Elevation | Monitor Reading * |
|---|---|---|
| 1&2 RE-90-1 | Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool) | $2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1-RE-90-2 | Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock) | $2.5 \times 10^0$ R/hr |
| 0-RE-90-3 | Auxiliary El. 729.0 (waste pac. area) | $2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-4 | Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-5 | Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1&2-RE-90-6 | Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1&2-RE-90-7 | Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room) | $2 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1&2-RE-90-8 | Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux feed pump area) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-9 | Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap tk. ar.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1&2-RE-90-10 | Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs area) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-11 | Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 1-RE-90-61 | Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.) | $2.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-230 | Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |
| 0-RE-90-231 | Turbine El. 685.0 (conden demin.) | $1.5 \times 10^3$ mR/hr |

Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

# SOURCE NOTES

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| | |
|---|---|
| 1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC-850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366. | Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3. |
| 2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400 | SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility. |
| 3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO-920030222 CNTMT | Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications. Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling). |
| 4. ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI | EPIPs will contain the following elements. |
| 5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 | Chemistry detection of failed fuel. |
| 6. EPPOS #2 | Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions. |