

From: Robert Haag
To: Joelle Starefos
Date: 8/16/02 5:46PM
Subject: Fwd: Input to section 3.4.2...

attached is some input to 3.4.2

c/a

From: Patrick Castleman
To: Robert Haag
Date: 8/16/02 4:44PM
Subject: Input to section 3.4.2...

is on the shared drive.

CC: Joseph Donoghue

3.4.2 The NRC failed to Provide Adequate Reactor Oversight Process Guidance

The LLTF found that the staff was having difficulty characterizing the significance of the Davis-Besse event. This difficulty appeared to stem from technical limitations of risk assessments and SDPs in that pressure boundary integrity does not appear to be treated explicitly in PRAs. As a result, the type and extent of wastage of the RCS pressure boundary encountered at Davis-Besse appeared to be more within the scope of traditional deterministic analyses than in a risk-informed framework. In fact, as of the time of the LLTF review, the SDP for this event had been in progress for 5 months, with no resolution. Members of the NRC staff expressed the opinion that, in the transition to the ROP, the agency has placed an over-reliance on risk information as opposed to deterministic methods.