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FROM: DUE: 03/25/03 EDO CONTROL: G20030125
DOC DT: 03/03/03
FINAL REPLY:

Senator Jon S. Corzine

TO: Chairman Meserve
FOR SIGNATURE OF : Chairman Meserve

** PRI **

CRC NO: 03-0144

DESC: Security at Oyster Creek Generating Plant - An
Unsecured Warehouse Loading Dock

ROUTING:
Travers
Paperiello
Kane
Norry
Craig
Burns/Cyr
Collins, NRR
Zimmerman, NSIR

DATE: 03/14/03

ASSIGNED TO: RI CONTACT: Miller

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
Ref. G20030073.

JON S. CORZINE
NEW JERSEY

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United States Senate

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(856) 757-5353

March 3, 2003

Chairman Richard A. Meserve
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Meserve:


Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch (JSNW) has raised a number of security concerns about the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Plant in Lacey Township, New Jersey. Some of the most pressing of those issues relate to an unsecured warehouse loading dock some 200 feet from the Oyster Creek facility, but outside the protected area of the plant. JSNW expressed particular concern about the ease with which a truck bomb might be placed in the warehouse area in an October 31, 2002, communication to NRC Region 1.

In a written response, dated November 18, 2002, NRC Region 1 informed JSNW that "normal use of this particular facility does not compromise the plant security features." I have enclosed a copy of this letter and other pertinent communications for your reference. One of those communications is from Scott Portzline, whose research has been used by the US Department of Energy. In his letter, Mr. Portzline presents evidence that a large truck bomb could indeed cause a radioactive release even if detonated outside the "protected area."

In light of this evidence and the concerns of residents around the Oyster Creek plant, I believe that it is the NRC's responsibility to address this threat more fully and specifically than has been done to date. Therefore, I am requesting an immediate and thorough reassessment of this threat as well as a description of whatever corrective actions you believe are necessary.

I look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,



Jon S. Corzine
U. S. Senator

February 28, 2003

Scott D. Portzline
3715 N 3rd Street
Harrisburg PA 17110
717-232-8863

re: truck bomb vulnerability at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Facility in Lacey Township NJ

U.S. Senator Jon S. Corzine
One Gateway Center, 11th Floor
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(973) 645-3030

Senator Corzine,

The Oyster Creek nuclear plant currently has a security gap which must be addressed immediately. Because large trucks are able to get too close to the reactor building without a proper security check, a powerful bomb could fracture reactor coolant pipes inside the reactor building and cause a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Current NRC regulations and interim NRC regulations do not adequately protect vital reactor systems to the "real world" bomb threats, but are limited to much smaller bombs. The 1996 bombing of the US military barracks at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia was equal to 20,000lbs of TNT¹ and is considered a large bomb by terrorism experts.

Although the NRC safeguards the size of the bomb it is now requiring licensees to protect against, one can easily deduce by the small size of the setback distances allowed to exist that regulations fail to protect against a large bomb - Oyster Creek is an example of this inadequacy. The NRC provides false assurances by being able to hide behind the secrecy of the bomb size used to promulgate its current regulations. I am not against the secrecy, but am severely critical of the lack of protection regarding this matter of national security.

There are two shock waves produced by a truck bomb - the air wave and the ground wave. The earthquake-proofing measures of reactor coolant pipes can be overwhelmed by a large truck bomb resulting in a devastating failure. The lateral accelerations propagated through the ground from a truck bomb far exceed those produced during the peak magnitude of an earthquake.² This shock wave can cause a large break Loss of Coolant Accident by virtue of the rapid jolt where pipes do not have time to flex and act in a forgiving manner as they were designed to do during an earthquake.

In the event of a large truck bomb attack detonated from several hundred feet away from the reactor, the reactor building will most likely continue standing, but the pipes inside can rupture. Any water pipe which breaks, also becomes a potential water jet which could produce the unwanted consequence of an electrical short circuit. Oil pipes used to cool reactor pumps can

¹ Report of Investigation Concerning The Khobar Towers Bombing, 25 June 1996 Prepared By The Inspector General and The Judge Advocate General <http://www.af.mil/current/Khobar/part2f.htm>

² "Blast-induced ground shock accelerations for bombs of the size used at the World Trade Center can far exceed a major earthquake's peak ground acceleration, even several hundred feet from the blast." Blast Evaluation for High-risk Facilities, EQE International 1994.

rupture and potentially start fires if they have in effect become a blowtorch as burning oil under pressure is sprayed from the fracture. There are other safety systems pipes which can rupture and cause explosions which I am not comfortable disclosing publicly.

The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station has tripled its setback distance for proper security checks of incoming vehicles following the September 11th attacks. The new setback distance is approximately 500 feet.

The Sandia National Laboratories have concluded that a large truck bomb can cause a radioactive release even if detonated from outside the "Protected Area at most plants."³ The Protected Area⁴ at Oyster Creek falls under this analysis.

The force of the Oklahoma City bomb blast "damaged 324 surrounding buildings, overturned automobiles, touched off car fires, and blew out windows and doors in a 50-block area. News reports indicated the explosion was felt 55 miles from the site and registered 6.0 on the Richter scale."⁵ Foundations were cracked over a four block area. The Oklahoma City bomb is categorized as a medium sized bomb by terrorists experts.

There are many lessons which can be learned from the Khobar Towers bombings. Prior to the bombing, there were some attempts by the US Air Force to expand the security perimeter out further from the building. But, repeated assurances by Saudi security officers led the wing leadership to delay further efforts to expand the perimeter. The wing support group commander believed the jersey barrier placement provided "reasonable protection given the threat that we had."⁶

I have nearly two decades of research and participation in Federal and State hearings regarding sabotage and terrorism of nuclear power plants. I have found that the NRC has consistently understated the threat potential while overstating its protective measures. Some of my research has been cited by the US Department of Energy and the various US military branches. The Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch is absolutely correct about the vulnerability of the Oyster Creek nuclear plant to truck bombs and I encourage you to act with urgency and with your full capacity as a US Senator to resolve this issue.

Sincerely,

Scott D. Portzline

cc: US Senator Edward Markey
Edith Gbur, The Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch

³ "Unacceptable damage to vital reactor systems could occur from a relatively small charge at close setback distances, and from larger but still reasonable-sized charges at large setback distances, greater than the protected area for most plants." An Analysis of Truck Bombs Threats at Nuclear Facilities, Sandia National Laboratories, 1984
⁴ definition for the purposes of this letter: The "Protected Area" is a designation given by the NRC for a security zone marked by a boundary where vehicles cannot enter without a proper security check

⁵ "Responding to Terrorism Victims Oklahoma City and Beyond" US Department of Justice, October 2000 www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/pdftxt/NCJ183949.pdf

⁶ Report of Investigation Concerning The Khobar Towers Bombing, 25 June 1996 Prepared By The Inspector General and The Judge Advocate General



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

November 18, 2002

Ms. Edith Gbur
C/o Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch
P.O. Box 4283
Brick, NJ-08723

SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERN AT WAREHOUSE NEAR OYSTER CREEK
GENERATING STATION

Dear Ms. Gbur:

Thank you for your phone call on October 31, 2002, to Mr. Peter Tam, NRC project manager for Oyster Creek, regarding the security at a warehouse at the Oyster Creek Generating Station. Specifically, you expressed concerns regarding the lack of security at the loading dock of an unidentified warehouse. Due to the absence of a security barrier or security guard at that location you noted that a vehicle may obtain access to the loading dock from Route 9.


The NRC senior resident inspector toured the area surrounding Oyster Creek Generating Station on October 31, 2002. An area similar to the one you have described was found. This warehouse loading dock is designed to permit vehicle access to offload materials while remaining outside the protected area of the plant. Normal use of this particular facility does not compromise the plant security features.

As you may be aware, on February 25, 2002, the NRC issued Orders to all operating power reactor facilities to require certain compensatory security measures be taken beyond that called for by current regulations. These measures are the result of the NRC's consideration of current safeguards and security plan requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the intelligence community. The Orders generally formalized a series of steps that nuclear power plant licensees had been advised to take by the NRC in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, as well as certain additional security enhancements. For security reasons, the details of specific security requirements cannot be made public, but include such things as strict controls of personnel entering the plant; increased control of vehicles approaching nuclear facilities; increased vehicle standoff distances; extensive searches; external vehicle barriers; and close examination of all materials and vehicles entering the plant.

Ms. Edith Gbur
C/o Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch

If you have any further questions or concerns on this matter, please feel free to contact me at (610) 337-5146.

Sincerely,

for 
John F. Rogge, Chief
Projects Branch 7
Division of Reactor Projects

24 January 2003

ATTENTION: MAYDA LIEBMAN

Fax: 973-645-0502

Phone: 973-645-3030

From: Edith Gbur, Chairperson

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch

Phone & Fax: 732-255- 8044 or 732-864-1830

Dear Senator Corzine:

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch is requesting a complete investigation of security at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Plant in Lacey Township. We wish the following issues included:

- 1. The absence of security at the warehouse loading dock, (The main focus of this letter.)**
- 2. The absence of a safe evacuation plan.**

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch telephoned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the concern that there are no security barriers or security guards at the entrance to the on-site warehouse loading dock located from the traffic light off Route 9.

The NRC rejected our concerns in their Nov 18 letter. They said that the loading dock is "outside the protected area of the plant. Normal use of this particular facility does not compromise the plant security features."

We strongly disagree. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11th; normal use dictates that the entire plant, every aspect of the plant should be a protected area.

The Nov 18 letter gives misleading information by stating that "close examination of all materials and vehicles entering the plant." We have been informed that materials are examined AFTER they are unloaded at the dock. It may be too late.

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch is concerned that allowing delivery trucks and cars free access to the plant without being stopped and inspected is an OPEN invitation to an Oklahoma type catastrophe with far worse consequences. A delivery truck loaded with a suitcase-sized nuclear device can take down the reactor building. The radioactive material released from either the reactor or the spent fuel pool can kill and injure millions of people living within a 500 mile radius.

The NRC attempts to lull us into a false sense of security by assuring us that since 9/11 steps were ordered beyond NRC regulations. By comparison, airline passengers are detained while their persons and baggage are checked minutely.

A STEP THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN IS AN THOROUGH EVALUATION OF THE EVACUATION PLAN IN LIGHT OF THE VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM.

The attached letter by Barbara Bailine, a JSNW member, was published in the Asbury Park Press and the Ocean County Observer.

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch will be sending out a press release regarding the absence of security at the loading dock.



Ocean County
Observer

Opinion

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2003 • PAGE A12

Ocean County Observer

Readers' Viewpoints

Nuclear agency missed point of call on security

Here I sit, reading and re-reading a letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that is supposed to comfort us regarding what we have uncovered — a totally hideous situation at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station — that any delivery truck can drive up to a loading dock within the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant, unload its contents, and never be questioned as to who they are or what they are carrying on the truck.

Should I tremble or should I be outraged?

We were in shock!

We — Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch — called the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about this when we learned from a delivery vendor that this vendor drove his truck on site at the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant and was not

questioned about who he was or what his truck contained.

We immediately contacted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Its reply to this outrage was a letter proclaiming that delivery trucks can move on-site without questioning because the truck was "outside the protected area of the plant."

Let's get real. With terrorists being able to command all types of weapons and missiles and with no regard for their own lives, there is no area of a nuclear power plant that is not vulnerable.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in its response to our cry of outrage, sent us a letter filled with bureaucratic doublespeak.

Can you believe in this day and age that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission states that, "Normal

use of this particular facility does not compromise the plant security features."

Are "normal conditions" what we are dealing with now?

Within the past few days, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been dragged over the coals regarding evacuation plans for the Indian Point nuclear power plant in New York.

The investigation, conducted under the auspices of Gov. George Pataki, has found the plans to evacuate residents ridiculous and totally unworkable.

Why do we sit here and say, "All is well?"

Because it hasn't happened yet? Is this what keeps us in line and very quiet?

BARBARA BAILINE
Jersey Shore
Nuclear Watch

it
C
d

Subj: [JerseyShoreNuclearWatch] NRC says Oyster loading dock is safe
Date: 2/19/2003 1:14:13 PM Eastern Standard Time
From: ncohen12@comcast.net
Reply-to: JerseyShoreNuclearWatch@yahoogroups.com
To: JerseyShore-announce@yahoogroups.com, JerseyShoreNuclearWatch@yahoogroups.com, cpj-studentpeace@yahoogroups.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

At least this article has soem quotes from JSNW.

February 19, 2003

N-plant regulators: Loading dock safe

By **ANDREW JOHNSON** Staff Writer, (609) 978-2012

LACEY TOWNSHIP - Local activists are concerned that security arrangements at the Oyster Creek Generating Station are inadequate because of easy access to a loading dock, but nuclear regulatory officials say the area in question does not pose any extra risk.

The plant is operated and owned by the Pennsylvania-based company AmerGen.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigated the group's fall complaint, which outlined a scenario in which an explosion would set off a deadly chain reaction.

The commission sent a letter to Dover Township Administrator Barbara Iasillo Jan. 31 saying that the plant is operating with every federal security measure required.

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch still contends, however, that the four-decades-old plant is leaving itself open wide open for a potential terrorist attack.

The source of the dispute is a green loading dock area, estimated to be less than 200 feet away from where the plant produces energy, in a separate structure from the loading dock.

The watchdog group is concerned that equipment trucks currently drive up to the area, unimpeded, by-passing the heavy security that is provided for the rest of the plant. The federal government doesn't dispute this.

The trucks supply nondangerous materials needed to equip the plant, according to East Coast NRC branch chief John Rogge, who granted an investigation at the request of Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch.

The NRC ruled, after an investigation performed by two inspectors, that the loading area was well out of the area in where explosives could

compromise the safety of the facility.

"We meet all security requirements," said Dana Fallano, spokeswoman for AmerGen.

For the purposes of the Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, the federal government's ruling is less than satisfactory, and fails to appease those worried by the "code orange" alert issued by the federal government two weeks ago.

Wednesday, February 19, 2003 America Online: Eg8044

"That's their opinion," said Edith Gbur, president of the watchdog group, regarding the stated safety of the plant. "We want the (loading) area reclassified."

"Theirs is an arbitrary designation that has nothing to do with protecting people," she said. "We want it be a protected area."

If the plant was so secure, she wonders why there were guards stationed outside the plant around the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

Gbur said that she personally fears another Oklahoma City-type attack.

She said that she first went to Dover Township and Lacey Township committee meetings this fall, before making her request for an investigation to the federal government.

Lacey Mayor Brian A. Reid said that the township has no jurisdiction regarding the security of the plant. "There's nothing that the committee can do."

He said that the NRC told him that the loading area was "not in the critical area."

John Rogge said he dispelled the hypothesis of the Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch's feared attack for several reasons.

"What they don't like is that you can bring anything onto plant property," he said.

He said that the plant has areas designated secure and nonsecure, and the loading area was two designated areas away from any sensitive part of the plant.

He compared the safety of the reactor area to a safe in one's house, the building that houses the area to the structure of one's home, and the adjacent loading area to a neighbor's property.

Regarding the possibility of a missile attack, he said, "they could do that from Forked River."

Rogge oversees three nuclear plants on the East Coast, including Three Mile Island in Middletown, Penn., and Beaver Valley, outside Pittsburgh. The former inspector has been in charge of Region 1 for the last 10 years.

He said that it is frequently forgotten or perhaps not known that all nuclear power plants' security is forged with terrorism concerns in mind.

"They think terrorism started with 9/11," he said of some nuclear power plant skeptics.

"Where would you put it?" he asked rhetorically of a loading area for the plant, noting that materials are then screened on their way into the plant. "You have to do it somewhere."

He said inspectors Bob Summons and Steven Dennis investigated the Lacey township plant last month.

To e-mail Andrew Johnson at The Press:

AJohnson@pressofac.com

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Coalition for Peace and Justice and the UNPLUG Salem Campaign; 321 Barr Ave., Linwood, NJ 08221; 609-601-8583 or
"First they ignore you; Then they laugh at you; Then they fight you; Then you win. (Gandhi) "Why walk when you ca

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Wednesday, February 19, 2003 America Online: Eg8044