

9 Twin Orchard Drive  
Oswego, NY 13126  
November 7, 2002

Mr. John A. Grobe, Director  
Division of Reactor Safety  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
801 Warrenville Road  
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Dear Mr. John A. Grobe:

These thoughts remained in my mind even after reading the Lessons Learned report.

1. Aren't there too many managers directly under the one overall site manager? (Isn't the organization too flat?)
2. How many cavities are actually on the first reactor head?
3. Was any NRC change ever implemented as a result of any Lessons Learned report?
4. There is no mention of Quality Control being missing from this site.
5. Wouldn't it have been useful to compare the safety consciousness of the plant staff under the previous (utility) ownership with that under the present nuclear operating company?
6. There is no comparison of IAEA recommendations with current NRC operations.
7. There is no mention of any QA performed on NRC Region 3. More specifically, there is no mention of any NRC Inspector General involvement.
8. From what I have read to date, it has been assumed that the plant workforce can change their safety culture. Can they?
9. Could overall plant safety performance have been compared with level of NRC enforcement against the company?
10. Could overall plant safety performance have been compared with level of NRC enforcement against specific individuals?
11. Was the displaced tube rolled against air? Did it meet specified acceptance criteria anyway? Is this done the same way at other plants, too?

12. How did flange leaks come to be ignored as a breach of the primary coolant pressure boundary? In any event, why would taking ten years to replace faulty gaskets even be considered?

13. Did INPO PWR inspections (ratings) improve or deteriorate nuclear safety for the people of Ohio?

This is my thirteenth letter. It needs no reply.

Thank you,  
  
Tom Gurdziel

Copy: D. Lochbaum