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Oswego, NY 13126
October 18, 2002

Mr. John A. Grobe, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Dear Mr. John A. Grobe:

I have just finished reading the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Report and am very favorably impressed with the work that went into it by highly competent NRC employees. The section listing all those Boric Acid references should remove any question that sufficient warning/information has been available to any nuclear plant employee or operating company with the initiative to study safety concerns.


Economy of Scale vs. Reduction in Diversity

Large "nuclear operating companies" may be efficient when providing proper guidance to all their plants, but can be unsafe if they provide bad direction, or fail to provide good corrective direction. Such direction, (or lack), may be propagated to ALL plants run by the organization. Specifically, with a "QA" organization at Davis-Besse that provides incompletely reported (intentionally or not) information, shouldn't the NRC be inspecting the "QA" function for completeness in reporting at ALL other plants run by the same nuclear operating organization?

Repetitive Failure

Why would one NRC region be forced to establish 0350 panels all over the region? Could it be a lack of effective ordinary nuclear plant regulation by that region? Let me explain why I think this is so. There is no effective enforcement. Actually, I would have to say there is no enforcement of nuclear plants. However, in contrast, the NRC does a good job of fining every earthwork/paving contractor who loses a density gauge \$3000. Notice the difference: lose a density gauge, pay \$3000; lose your margin of safety for part of the State of Ohio, pay nothing.

This is my tenth letter. It needs no reply.

Thank you,

Tom Gurdziel

Copy: D. Lochbaum