March 2, 2003

NOTE TO: File

FROM: Daniel Frumkin, Plant Systems Branch, DSSA/NRR**/RA/**

SUBJECT: FIRE PROTECTION SDP REVISION TASK GROUP CONFERENCE CALL
TEAM G: HOT SHORTS/SPURIOUS OPERATIONS

TEAM MEMBERS: Daniel Frumkin, NRC - Team Lead
Steven Nowlen - Sandia National Laboratories
Harry Barrett - Duke Energy
Fred Emerson - NEI
Mark Salley - NRC

On March 2, 2003, a conference call was held to discuss developing a process for using risk insights from Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 00-01, for handling identified fire induced hot shorts and spurious operations into the proposed fire protection significant determination process (SDP).

Fred Emerson provided via email a list of conditional core damage probabilities (CCDP) (Attached). Fred also suggested that the a four factor risk formula be used, inculding the following factors, 1) fire frequency, 2) probability of suppression prior to damage, 3) probability of spurious actuation, and 4) probability of CCDP. Steve and Mark commented that the first two factors would be considered by the rest of the SDP process.

The participants presumed that this process for steps 3 and 4 would be a substitute for the plant notebooks, since the plant notebooks do not address hot shorts and spurious operations. The consequence will not be considered in these steps.

Fred suggested that two tables could be developed. Fred will submit the tables later this week. The strawman will be discussed during a conference call on March 5th at 1:30.

Attachment: As stated

CONTACT: Daniel Frumkin, NRR/DSSA/SPLB
415-2280

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ATTACHMENT

In preparation for our phone call this afternoon at 3 PM Eastern, this is the information on CCDP I have compiled from the NEI 00-01 pilot evaluations.

Scenario	Conservative CCDP	Refined CCDP
(P) RCP Seal LOCA	.05, .2	
(P) Open PORVs	,1	
(P) Loss of Service Water	.02	
(B) Multiple SRVs open, Failure to isolate Main Steam	.05	3E-03
(B) Suppr pool depletion/HPCI	.1	3E-03
(B) Suppr pool depletion/RCIC	.1	2E-03
(B) IN 92-18 valve scenario	1.0	1.0

P and B refer to PWR and BWR. Keep in mind that these values are plant- and fire area-specific. However, they do provide an order of magnitude estimate for certain types of scenarios.

Fred Emerson
202-739-8086