#### February 13, 2003

Mr. Peter S. Hastings Licensing Manager Duke Cogema Stone & Webster P.O. Box 31847 Mail Code FC12A Charlotte, NC 28231-1847

SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 2003 MONTHLY OPEN ITEM STATUS REPORT

Dear Mr. Hastings:

The purpose of this letter is to update Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) on the status of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) review of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request (CAR).

The attached table provides the status of the staff's review of open items. Endnotes are included to clarify the staff's expectations of DCS for information and commitments required to close open items.

The enclosed table also reflects the staff's findings relative to NRC meetings with DCS held January 15-16, 2003, and February 6-7, 2003. Issues discussed during the January meeting included confinement ventilation, chemical safety, and nuclear criticality safety; issues discussed during the February meeting included fire protection and chemical safety. More information about some of the items in this report are provided in a separate meeting summaries.

Sincerely,

#### /RA/

Andrew Persinko, Sr. Nuclear Engineer Special Projects and Inspection Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

cc: J. Johnson, DOE

H. Porter, SC Dept. of HEC

J. Conway, DNFSB

L. Zeller. BREDL

- G. Carroll, GANE
- D. Curran
- D. Silverman

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
Docket: 70-3098 ADAMS PUBLIC FCSS/r/f SPIB r/f ELeeds. MLeach, SPIB DBrown, SPIB DAyres, RII SShaukat, RES JHull, OGC JMcAnallen, SPIB TPham, NSIR PCastleman, SPIB TJohnson, SPIB AMurray, SPIB WSmith, SPIB SSteele, SPIB WTroskoski, SPIB RWescott, SPIB Hearing File JKramer, RES HGraves, RES FBurrows, FCFB KEverly, NSIR PLoeser, NRR JCalvert, RES LGross. SPIB MChatterton, SPIB MLamastra BSmith, EDO

ADAMS Accession Number: ML030440229

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| OFC  | SPIB*      | SPIB*     | SPIE    | 3*     | SPIB*  |          |  |
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| NAME | DBrown     | APersink  | o LG    | LGross |        | JGiitter |  |
| DATE | 02/ 13 /03 | 02/ 13 /0 | 03 02/1 | 3 /03  | 02/ 13 | /03      |  |

Status of Open Items since the NRC's Draft Safety Evaluation Report was issued on April 30, 2002.



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Category 1) DCS action to address = OPEN

Category 2) DCS addressed, Staff reviewing = OPEN

| Item<br>No. | DSER<br>Section | DSER Open Item Description   | DCS Response                      | NRC Finding /<br>Estimated Review<br>Completion Date | Current<br>Status |
|-------------|-----------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| GI-1        | 1.1             | Provide organizational changes and new foreign ownership, control, or influence determination after the upcoming sale to Framatome   | CAR 1.2.1                         | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §1.2.4                        | CLOSED            |
| SD-1        | 1.3             | Provide the sensitivity of field and laboratory radiation measurements used to determine the extent of existing soil radioactivity. (DSER Section 1.3.1.4)   | CAR 1.3.4.6<br>2/11/03 letter     | NRC Reviewing/<br>2/28/03                            | OPEN              |
| FQ-1        | 2.0             | Provide information on project design costs. (DSER Section 2.1.1)  | 2/28/03                           | DCS Action/30 days from receipt                      | OPEN              |
| FQ-2        | 2.0             | Update financial statements and project costs  | New Open Item <sup>1</sup>        | DCS Action/30 days from receipt                      | OPEN              |
| SA-1        | 5.0             | All functions presently listed under the Process I&C System are to be listed as either functions of the Safety Control Subsystem or Emergency Control System. (DSER Section 5.1.5.3.1)   | CAR 5.5<br>CAR 11.6               | Acceptable, per SRP §11.4.3.2                        | CLOSED            |
| SA-2        | 5.0             | DOE information is needed to verify the applicant's assumptions regarding a potential explosion in F-Area. (DSER Section 5.1.5.2)  | CAR 5.5.2.7.6.2<br>CAR 11.1.7.4.3 | DCS Action <sup>2</sup> / 30 days after receipt      | OPEN              |
| SA-3        | 5.0             | The aircraft hazard analysis provided is insufficient to exclude the consideration of aircraft impact load for Seismic Cat. I structures because the analysis provided did not consider projected flight information that could affect the site. (DSER Section 5.4.1.2)  | CAR Table 5.5-8                   | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §5.4.3.1                      | CLOSED            |
| SA-4        | 5.0             | The applicant needs to justify the mitigation strategy of the seismic event in regard to isolation of flammable gas lines. Seismic isolation valves were identified as PSSCs in CAR Chapter 11.9 but not in CAR Table 5.5-21 with respect to earthquakes. The applicant should explain why the seismic isolation valves were not included as PSSCs. (DSER Section 5.1.5.1) | CAR 11.8.7<br>CAR 5.5.2.6.5.2     | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §11.4.6.2                     | CLOSED            |

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|-------------|-----------------|---|--|--|---------------------|
| NCS-1       | 6.0             | The need for specific Pu/MOX experience for NCS staff involved in the design phase (DSER Section 6.1.1) Roles and responsibilities during design phase. Need for familiarity with NCS programs at similar facilities for NCS Function Manager.    | 2/11/03 letter                                   | NRC Reviewing /<br>3/14/03                           | OPEN                |
| NCS-2       | 6.0             | Definition of NCS design basis controlled parameters for AP and MP process auxiliary systems (specifically including process ventilation, isotopic dilution, and high-alpha waste) (DSER Section 6.1.3.4.1)                                       | CAR Table 6-1<br>2/11/03 letter                  | NRC Reviewing / 3/14/03                              | OPEN                |
| NCS-3       | 6.0             | Justification for the bounding density values assumed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 (DSER Sections 6.1.3.4.1 and 6.1.3.4.2) Justification for bounding nature of Pu and stripped U isotopics. Controlled parameters for dissolution/dechlorination unit.  | CAR Table 6-1<br>CAR Table 6-2<br>2/11/03 letter | NRC Reviewing /<br>3/14/03                           | OPEN                |
| NCS-4       | 6.0             | Determination of Design Basis USLs for each process type, and justification for the administrative margin (DSER Section 6.1.3.5.2); description of sensitivity methods to be provided in Part III of the Validation Report (DSER Section 6.1.3.5) | 1/8/03 letter<br>2/11/03 letter                  | NRC Reviewing/<br>6/30/03                            | OPEN                |
| NCS-5       | 6.0             | The definition of "highly unlikely" for criticality hazards (DSER Section 6.1.4.2)  | CAR 5.4.3<br>2/11/03 letter                      | NRC Reviewing / 3/14/03                              | OPEN                |
| NCS-6       | 6.0             | For ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983 (R1988): What is meant by "other justification methods" in the means for extending the code's area(s) of applicability beyond experimental data (DSER 6.1.4.3)  | CAR 6.4<br>1/16/03 meeting<br>2/11/03 letter     | Acceptable, per SRP §6.4.3.3.1                       | CLOSED <sup>3</sup> |
| NCS-7       | 6.0             | For ANSI/ANS-8.15-1981: The applicability of ANSI/ANS-8.1 limits to mixtures involving special actinide elements at the MFFF (DSER Section 6.1.4.3)   | CAR 6.4<br>2/11/03 letter                        | Acceptable, per SRP §6.4.3.3.1                       | CLOSED              |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|--|--|-------------------|
| NCS-8       | 6.0             | For ANSI/ANS-8.17-1984: What is meant by "other methods justification" in the means for extending the code's area(s) of applicability beyond experimental data (DSER Section 6.1.4.3)  | CAR 6.4<br>1/16/03 meeting<br>2/11/03 letter | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §6.4.3.3.1                    | CLOSED⁴           |
| NCS-9       | 6.0             | Clarification that areas requiring exemption from CAAS coverage under §70.24 will be submitted to NRC for review and approval.   | 1/16/03 meeting<br>2/11/03 letter            | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §6.4.3.3.1                    | CLOSED⁵           |
| NCS-10      | 6.0             | Clarification of commitments to ANSI/ANS-8 series standards.   | New Open Item <sup>6</sup><br>2/11/03 letter | NRC Reviewing / 3/14/03                              | OPEN              |
| FS-1        | 7.0             | The applicant did not provide sufficient justification that the C3 and C4 final HEPA filter could perform their safety function under fire/soot conditions. (DSER Section 7.1.5.5.)  | 2/28/03                                      | DCS Action/30 days from receipt                      | OPEN              |
| FS-2        | 7.0             | The applicant has not demonstrated that an adequate margin of safety has been provided for the fire barriers. (DSER Section 7.1.5.6.)  | CAR 7.4<br>2/7/03 meeting                    | DCS Action <sup>7</sup> / 30 days after receipt      | OPEN              |
| FS-3        | 7.0             | The applicant is evaluating the pneumatic transfer tubes to determine if PSSCs will be required to prevent propagation of hot gases through the tubes. (DSER Section 7.1.5.6.)   | CAR 5.5.2.2.6.6                              | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §7.4.3.2                      | CLOSED            |
| FS-4        | 7.0             | The design basis criteria and qualification criteria and qualification standards for the gloveboxes are not sufficient to ensure that gloveboxes will be used in their expected performance range.  Additional information is needed to assure that the mechanical (including high temperature non-fire-related failure of glovebox windows) fire, and seismic properties, as provided by the applicant, are valid or bounding. (DSER Section 7.1.2.13; 11.7.13) | CAR 11.4.7.1.3                               | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §7.4.3.2                      | CLOSED            |
| FS-5        | 7.0             | The applicant is developing design bases for the "glovebox fire protection features" PSSC. (DSER Section 7.1.5.8.)   | CAR 5.6.7                                    | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §7.4.3.2                      | CLOSED            |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|---|--|-------------------|
| FS-6        | 7.0             | Clarify that design basis for clean agent includes manually connected reserve.   | 1/15/03 meeting                                   | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §7.4.3.2                      | CLOSED8           |
| FS-7        | 7.0             | Clarify the difference between the terms "isolation valves" and "fire dampers."  | New Open Item                                     | DCS Action/ 30<br>days from receipt                  | OPEN              |
| FS-8        | 7.0             | Add final C4 HEPA filters as a PSSC for glovebox fires (event GB-1)  | New Open Item<br>CAR 5.5.2.2.6.2                  | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §7.4.3.2                      | CLOSED            |
| CS-1        | 8.0             | The staff concludes that the red oil phenomena analysis in Chapter 5.5 of the CAR is not complete and that PSSCs and their design bases for preventing red oil explosions are not adequate for all potentially affected components. At a minimum, this applies to the following areas: purification, solvent recovery, calciner, oxalic mother liquor, acid recovery, and offgas. (DSER Section 8.1.2.5.2.5) | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.7<br>CAR 8.5<br>2/7/03 meeting      | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED            |
| CS-2        | 8.0             | The staff concludes that the HAN/hydrazine analysis in Chapter 5.5 of the CAR is not complete and that PSSCs and their design bases for preventing HAN/hydrazine explosions are not adequate for all potentially affected units and components. At a minimum this applies to the following areas: purification event, recovery, offgas. (DSER Section 8.1.5.2.3)   | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.4<br>CAR 8.5.1.3                    | DCS Action <sup>9</sup> / 30<br>days after receipt   | OPEN              |
| CS-3        | 8.0             | The staff concludes that the HAN/hydrazine analysis in Chapter 5.5 of the CAR is not complete and that PSSCs and their design bases for preventing azide formation and potential explosions are not adequate for all potentially affected units and components. (DSER Section 8.1.5.2.3)   | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.10<br>CAR 5.5.2.4.6.11<br>CAR 8.5.1 | NRC Reviewing 02/15/03 <sup>10</sup>                 | OPEN              |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|---|--|----------------------|
| CS-4        | 8.0             | Chapter 8 of the CAR and supplemental information provided by the applicant identified pH control as serving a safety function (avoiding precipitation, such as azides) in the liquid waste unit. However, PSSCs and design bases for controlling pH have not been identified by the applicant. (DSER Section 8.1.5.2.3)   | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.11<br>CAR 5.5.2.4.6.10<br>CAR 8.5.1<br>2/7/03 meeting | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED <sup>11</sup> |
| CS-5a       | 8.0             | Modeling of hazardous chemical releases. The applicant should identify any operator actions outside of the control room that are required for chemical safety. If such actions are identified, then information is needed on the modeling of potential chemical releases and any PSSCs and design bases. Also, staff review indicates that at least one chemical ( $N_2O_4$ ) could meet the definition of hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials in 10 CFR 70.4 and potentially impact the offsite public which also would require identification of PSSCs and their design bases. (DSER Section 8.1.2.4.1) | CAR 5.5.2.10.6.3<br>CAR 8.4   | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED               |
| CS-5b       | 8.0             | Rather than reference TEEL levels, numerical values for which are subject to frequent updates and changes, provide commitment to and justification for specific hazardous chemical concentrations (or other exposure values) to meet 70.61 performance requirements.   | New Open Item   | DCS Action <sup>12</sup> /30 days from receipt       | OPEN                 |
| CS-6        | 8.0             | The potential controls for a facility worker from a laboratory explosion have not been identified. (DSER Section 8.1.2.1.2.3)  | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.14<br>CAR 5.6.2.7                                     | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED               |
| CS-7        | 8.0             | The safety functions for delivery of chemicals have not been adequately addressed. (DSER Section 8.1.2.1.3)  | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.15<br>CAR 5.5.2.10.1                                  | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED               |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| CS-8        | 8.0             | The applicant has not analyzed the potential chemical toxicity impacts from events involving depleted uranium stored in the secured warehouse building. Potential PSSCs and design bases have not been identified. (DSER Section 8.1.2.4.1)  | CAR 8.4.1                         | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED            |
| CS-9        | 8.0             | The applicant has not provided a solvent temperature design basis with sufficient margin. (DSER Section 8.1.2.5.2.2)   | 2/28//03                          | DCS Action /30<br>days from receipt                  | OPEN              |
| CS-10       | 8.0             | A suitable design basis for habitability in the Emergency Control Room has not been identified. (DSER Section 8.1.2.6.1)   | CAR 11.4.11.1.16                  | DCS Action <sup>13</sup> / 30 days after receipt     | OPEN              |
| RS-1        | 9.0             | Means by which a worker becomes aware of the sintering furnace loss of confinement. (DSER Section 9.1.2.4)   | CAR 11.2.2.16<br>CAR 5.5.2.1.6.12 | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §9.1.4.2.3                    | CLOSED            |
| ES-1        | 10.0            | The staff is continuing its review of the applicant's environmental consequence analysis. (DSER Section 10.1.3.2)  | CAR 5.4                           | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §10.4.3                       | CLOSED            |
| ES-2        | 10.0            | The applicant did not identify solvent wastes as a hazard requiring PSSCs to reduce the risk from spills. (DSER Section 10.1.3.4)  | CAR 5.5.2.11                      | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §10.4.3                       | CLOSED            |
| AP-1        | 11.2            | With respect to the electrolyzer, the applicant has not provided sufficient justification for protecting the electrolyzer against the overtemperature event in the hazard analysis. This applies to the dissolution and silver recovery units. (DSER Section 11.2.1.2)   | CAR 11.6.7                        | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED            |
| AP-2        | 11.2            | With respect to the electrolyzer, the applicant's hazard and accident analysis did not consider fires and/or explosions caused by ignition of flammable gases generated by chemical reactions and/or electrolysis, such as from an overvoltage condition. This applies to the dissolution and silver recovery units (DSER Sections 11.2.1.2 and 11.2.1.10) | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.13                  | DCS Action <sup>14</sup> / 30 days after receipt     | OPEN              |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|---|--|-------------------|
| AP-3        | 11.2            | The applicant's hazard and accident analysis did not include events involving titanium, such as titanium fires. Accident events should be evaluated and PSSCs identified as necessary. This applies to the dissolution and silver recovery units (DSER Sections 11.2.1.2 and 11.2.1.10)                                      | CAR 7.2.2   | DCS Action <sup>15</sup> / 30 days after receipt     | OPEN              |
| AP-4        | 11.2            | The design basis value of the corrosion function of the fluid transport system PSSC should address instrumentation and/or monitoring of lower alloy components (stainless steel) that could be exposed to aggressive species (silver II) in the dissolution and silver recovery units (DSER Sections 11.2.1.2 and 11.2.1.10) | CAR 5.6.2.4<br>CAR 5.5.2.1.6.2<br>CAR 5.5.2.1.6.4 | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5         | CLOSED            |
| AP-5a       | 11.2            | Confirm that the wastes generated will conform to the SRS WACs and that SRS will accept these wastes, based on the program redirection (DSER Section 11.2.1.12)  | CAR 10.1.4  | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5         | CLOSED            |
| AP-5b       | 11.2            | Identify any PSSCs and design bases for the waste unit, such as maximum inventories (DSER Section 11.2.1.12)   | New Open Item<br>CAR 10.1.4<br>2/7/03 meeting     | Acceptable, per SRP §8.4.3.4, §8.4.3.5               | CLOSED            |
| AP-6        | 11.2            | The applicant identified the high alpha waste system as an IROF. The staff finds that the applicant should identify design basis safety functions and values for this unit (DSER Section 11.2.1.12)  | CAR 11.3.2.14<br>CAR 5.5                          | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5         | CLOSED            |
| AP-7        | 11.2            | Parameters have not been identified for the plutonium feed to the facility. PSSCs and design bases should be identified for this feed material or a justification provided that it is not necessary (DSER Section 11.2.1.1)  | CAR 11.3.7  | NRC Reviewing<br>02-28-02                            | OPEN              |
| AP-8        | 11.2            | A design basis and PSSCs are needed for flammable gases and vapors in the Offgas unit (DSER Section 11.2.1.11)   | 2/28/03   | DCS Action /30 days from receipt                     | OPEN              |

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|-------------|-----------------|---|-------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| AP-9        | 11.2            | A design basis and PSSCs are needed for maintaining temperatures below the solvent flashpoint (DSER Section 11.2.1.11)  | 2/28/03                       | DCS Action /30 days from receipt                           | OPEN              |
| AP-10       | 11.2            | Provide a design basis and PSSCs for removal of potentially toxic or reactive gases in the Offgas unit (DSER Section 11.2.1.11)   | 2/28/03                       | DCS Action/30 days from receipt                            | OPEN              |
| AP-11       | 11.2            | The design basis values of the corrosion function of the fluid transport system PSSC should address instrumentation and/or monitoring of components that could be exposed to aggressive species in the Offgas unit (DSER Section 11.2.1.11)   | CAR 5.6.2.4                   | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5               | CLOSED            |
| AP-12       | 11.2            | Provide PSSC and design basis information on the sampling systems (DSER Section 11.2.1.13)  | 1/15/03 meeting               | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5               | CLOSED            |
| AP-13       | 11.2            | The applicant has not proposed a safety strategy, and any needed PSSCs and design bases, for hazardous chemical releases resulting from the potential loss of confinement of radioactive materials in process cells. This affects the dissolver, oxalic precipitation and oxidation, acid recovery, oxalic mother liquor, silver recovery, and liquid waste reception units (DSER Section 11.2.1.2) | CAR 5.5.2.10<br>CAR 8.4       | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5               | CLOSED            |
| AP-14       | 11.2            | Provide a qualitative approach that will link the residual plutonium (VI) oxalate introduced into the calciner furnace to the design basis pressure margin of the furnace.  | New Open Item 2/7/03 meeting  | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4,<br>§8.4.3.5               | CLOSED            |
| MP-1        | 11.3            | PSSC and design basis information associated with the pyrophoric nature of some UO <sub>2</sub> powders (DSER Section 11.3.1.2.1)   | CAR 8.5.1.6                   | DCS Action,<br>pending resolution<br>of FS-1 <sup>16</sup> | OPEN              |
| MP-2        | 11.3            | PSSC and design basis information associated with the pyrophoric nature of some PuO <sub>2</sub> powders (DSER Section 11.3.1.2.3)  | CAR 8.5.1.6<br>2/7/03 meeting | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                            | CLOSED            |

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|-------------|-----------------|--|--|--|-------------------|
| MP-3        | 11.3            | PSSC and design basis information associated with the sintering furnace regarding potential steam explosions (DSER Section 11.3.1.2.4)   | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.2<br>CAR 11.4.11                   | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED            |
| MP-4        | 11.3            | PSSC and design basis information associated with the sintering furnace regarding potential explosions in the room due to a hydrogen leak (DSER Section 11.3.1.2.4)  | CAR 11.2.2.16<br>CAR 5.5.2.4.6.1<br>CAR 8.5      | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §8.4.3.4                      | CLOSED            |
| VS-1        | 11.4            | Justify the use of a leak path factor of 1E-4 for two banks of HEPA filters under accident conditions (DSER Section 11.4.1.3)  | 2/28/03  | DCS Action/30 days from receipt                      | OPEN              |
| IC-1        | 11.5            | Clarify commitment to IEEE 603 for seismic sensors and seismic trip actuation  | 2/11/03 letter                                   | Acceptable, per SRP §11.4.3.2                        | CLOSED            |
| FTS-1       | 11.8            | The staff requires additional information on DCS's design basis for corrosion allowances for process equipment that will not be readily inspectable; such as fully welded process equipment located in process cells. (DSER Section 11.8.1.3)  | CAR 5.5.2.1.6.2<br>CAR 5.5.2.1.6.4               | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §15.3.4                       | CLOSED            |
| FLS-1       | 11.9            | The accident scenario of a hydrogen explosion in the glovebox outside of the sintering furnace airlock due to insufficient purging in the airlock needs to be developed. (DSER section 11.9.1.1)   | CAR 5.5.2.4.6.1<br>CAR 8.5                       | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §5.4.3.1                      | CLOSED            |
| FLS-2       | 11.9            | DCS has stated that the purpose of the nitrogen blanket on the hydroxylamine and hydrazine tanks is to displace and prevent air from entering these tanks, thereby eliminating flammability concerns. The staff has continuing concerns that this is an apparent safety function and that no PSSCs have been identified for this system. (DSER Section 11.9.1.1) | CAR 5.5.2.10.6.3<br>CAR 8.4<br>(Related to C5-5) | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §5.4.3.1                      | CLOSED            |

Category 1) DCS action to address = OPEN

Category 2) DCS addressed, Staff reviewing = OPEN

Category 3) CLOSED - DCS addressed, Staff accepts

| Item<br>No. | DSER<br>Section | DSER Open Item Description   | DCS Response    | NRC Finding /<br>Estimated Review<br>Completion Date | Current<br>Status |
|-------------|-----------------|--|-----------------|--|-------------------|
| FLS-3       | 11.9            | DCS has stated that the nitrogen system functions to cool the calciner bearing for containment of material. However, the N2 system has not been identified as a PSSC in Chapter 5. (DSER Section 11.9.1.1)   | CAR 11.9.2.1    | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §5.4.3.1                      | CLOSED            |
| FLS-4       | 11.9            | Due to the possible impact of the non-safety related instrument airsystem on the PSSC seismic isolation system and due to its similarity in function to similar systems in nuclear power plants, the staff requests DCS to address how the current instrument air system design may address Information Notices 95-53, 92-67, 88-214, and 87-28. (DSER section 11.9.1.3) | CAR 11.9.1.10.1 | Acceptable, per<br>SRP §5.4.3.1                      | CLOSED            |

CAR refers to the Revised Construction Authorization Request submitted on 10/31/02.

#### Endnotes for Monthly Open Item Status Report, January 2003

1. FQ-2. Provide up-to-date financial information, including project costs and a financial statement. In your response, include a commitment to provide annual updates of this information.

On August 31, 2001, in response to an NRC request for additional information (RAI) dated June 21, 2001, DCS submitted propriety financial information pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR, §70.23(a)(5) and Standard Review Plan §2.4.3.D (NUREG-1718). The information provided by DCS included project costs and financial statements dated April 6, 2001, for the year ending December 31, 2000, and the period from March 22, 1999, to December 31, 1999. NRC anticipates project costs could be different because DCS has modified the facility design basis to accommodate alternate feedstock. Further, staff anticipates that a current DCS financial statement is available for the year ending December 31, 2001, and that a financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2002, will be available in April 2003.

- 2. SA-2. In the CAR revision (§ 5.5.2.7.6.2), DCS commits to calculating in the ISA the final peak pressures resulting from explosions to demonstrate that the BEG and MFFF will withstand explosion overpressures. The interim conclusion reached by DCS is that no new PSSCs are required for this event. This item remains open pending staff review of the supporting calculations.
- 3. NCS-6. Closed receipt of revised CAR pages pending.
- 4. NCS-8. Closed receipt of revised CAR pages pending.
- 5. NCS-9. Closed receipt of revised CAR pages pending.
- 6. NCS-10 Revision to CAR Section 6.4 had changes to the words committed to in the response to RAI 90. These words made it unclear what provisions of the standards were being committed to and which standards were part of the design basis. In addition, the commitment to include ANSI/ANS-8.23-1997 as part of the design basis was removed.
- 7. FS-2. DCS will provide an evaluation (heat flux method or alternative) of 44 fire areas exceeding the 80% criterion where maximum temperature exceeds the E 119 curve, using ultr-fast growth curve for solvent and fast for everything else. DCS will draw a conclusion about the need to assess other areas, based on the criterion of no changes to fire barrier rating in the 44 areas evaluated.
- 8. FS-7. Closed receipt of revised CAR pages pending.
- 9. CS-2. DCS to provide additional information in February 2003.
- 10. CS-3. DCS provided a description of the neutralization and sampling controls in the CAR revision. Staff continue to review this description.
- 11. CS-4. Closed receipt of revised CAR pages pending.
- 12. CS-5b. DCS to revise CAR section to reflect consideration of latent health effects. DCS to provide additional information regarding indoor windspeed values used.
- 13. CS-10. Provide information, not included in the information provided by DCS in CAR 11.4.11.1.6, on the design basis hazardous chemical concentrations at which the Emergency Control Room would be deemed "habitable" by DCS.

- 14. AP-2. Provide the lower flammability limit methodology and a Hanford report that supports the use of acid normality controls as design bases, as described at CAR 5.5.2.4.6.13.
- 15. AP-3. Provide additional information to NRC that demonstrates the adequacy of the DCS glovebox fire strategy for fires involving bulk titanium (thermite reaction).
- 16. MP-1. Address uranium dioxide burnback in the analysis of soot loading (FS-1).