



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931**

January 31, 2003

Carolina Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. James Scarola
Vice President - Harris Plant
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

**SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/02-05**

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On January 4, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 8, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the USNRC has issued two Orders (dated February 25, 2002, and January 7, 2003) and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance access authorization. The USNRC also issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148 on August 28, 2002, that provided guidance to inspectors to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures (ICMs) required by the February 25 Order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during calendar year (CY) 2002, and the remaining inspections are scheduled for completion in CY 2003. Additionally, table-top security drills were conducted at several licensees to evaluate the impact of expanded adversary characteristics and the ICMs on licensee protection and mitigative strategies. Information gained and discrepancies identified during the audits and drills were reviewed and dispositioned by the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. For CY 2003, the USNRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls, conduct inspections, and resume force-on-force exercises at selected power plants. Should threat conditions change, the USNRC may issue additional Orders, advisories, and temporary instructions to ensure adequate safety is being maintained at all commercial power reactors.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) components of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-400/02-05
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

cc w/encl:

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No: 50-400

License No: NPF-63

Report No: 50-400/02-05

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562

Dates: September 29, 2002 - January 4, 2003

Inspectors: J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Hagar, Resident Inspector
D. Forbes, Physical Security Inspector (4OA5)
K. Davis, Physical Security Inspector (4OA5)

Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000400/2002-005; Carolina Power & Light; 09/29/2002 - 01/04/2003; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; routine integrated report.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and by regional physical security inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status The unit operated at 100 percent of rated thermal power for the entire inspection period, except for a reduction to 88 percent power for turbine valve testing on November 17.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

When a tornado watch was issued on October 11 and when a tornado warning was issued on November 10, the inspectors reviewed actions taken by the licensee in accordance with Procedure AP-300, Severe Weather Response, Attachment 1, prior to the onset of that weather, to ensure that the adverse weather conditions would neither initiate a plant event nor prevent any system, structure, or component from performing its design function.

After the licensee completed preparations for seasonal low temperature, the inspectors walked down the systems identified below, to verify that their safety-related functions could not be affected by adverse weather. These systems were selected for inspection because parts of these systems could be exposed to adverse weather.

- Diesel-driven fire pump and the fire-protection piping associated with that pump that could be exposed to adverse weather
- Emergency service water (ESW) system

The inspectors reviewed the documents listed below, observed plant conditions, and evaluated those conditions, to verify consistency with Procedure AP-301, Adverse Weather.

- Procedure ORT-1415, Electric Unit Heater Check Monthly Interval
- Procedure OP-161.01, Operations Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance Systems
- Work Orders 102886-01, 152628-01, and 152629-01, which implemented maintenance checklist CL-E0010, Heat Trace Panel Current Check and Relay CSR-4A Calibration
- Work Orders 100880-01, 100881-01, 100882-01 and 100883-01, which implemented maintenance checklist CL-I0008, Temperature Switch

In addition, while both the motor-driven and diesel-driven fire pumps were simultaneously out-of-service (OOS) on December 14 (discussed in Section 1R05), the inspectors walked down a temporary skid-mounted diesel-driven fire pump, to verify that the pump and its associated piping and instruments were appropriately protected from adverse weather. The following action requests (ARs) were reviewed.

- AR 79618, Diesel-driven fire pump secured due to underground leak
- AR 79228, Fire and ground associated with the motor-driven fire pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns while the indicated structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were OOS for maintenance and testing. The purpose of the walkdowns was to verify that correct valve and power alignments by comparing observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to their required positions as listed in the procedures and drawings listed below:

- 1) The A emergency diesel generator (EDG) with the B EDG OOS on October 2.
 - Procedure OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System
 - Drawing 2165-S-563, Simplified Flow Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System, Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-633S01, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil and Air Intake & Exhaust System - Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-0633S02, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Jacket Water System Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-0633S03, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Fuel Oil and Drainage Systems Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-0633S04, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Starting Air System Unit 1
- 2) The B train of residual heat removal system/low head safety injection with the A train OOS on November 20.
 - Procedure OP-111, Residual Heat Removal System
 - Procedure OP-110, Safety Injection System
 - Drawing 2165-S-1324, Simplified Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
 - Drawing 2165-S-1310, Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System
- 3) The B EDG with the A EDG OOS on December 18
 - Procedure OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System
 - Drawing 2165-S-563, Simplified Flow Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System, Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-633S01, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil and Air Intake & Exhaust System - Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-0633S02, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Jacket Water System Unit 1
 - Drawing 2165-S-0633S03, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel

- Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Fuel Oil and Drainage Systems Unit 1
- Drawing 2165-S-0633S04, Simplified Flow Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator 1A-SA & 1B-SB Starting Air System Unit 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the six areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to verify that those items were consistent with the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and FSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards Analysis. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from related surveillance tests, to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the FSAR.

- Switchgear room A (1-A-SWGRA)
- Main control room (12-A-CR)
- Cable spreading room B, (1-A-CSR B)
- 236' auxiliary feedwater and component cooling water pump area (1-A-3-PB)
- 261' chiller area (1-A-4-CHLR)
- Cable spreading room A (1-A-CSRA)

In addition, when independent equipment problems simultaneously rendered both the motor-driven fire pump (AR 79228) and the diesel-driven fire pump (AR 79618) OOS on December 14 and 15, the inspectors verified that the licensee implemented the compensatory actions required by Procedure FPP-013, Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements and Mitigating Actions. After the licensee installed a temporary, skid-mounted diesel-driven pump to pump water from the cooling tower basin into the plant's fire-protection piping, the inspectors walked down the equipment on that skid, to verify that the engine and pump were functional, and that water pressure in the plant's fire protection piping had been restored.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis of the effects of external flooding, as described in FSAR Section 2.4.10, Flooding Protection Requirements, and identified the safety-related cables that are located in underground bunkers and manholes that are

subject to local flooding. The inspectors reviewed the following documents to verify that those cables were environmentally qualified for long term submergence:

- FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.37, Underground Raceway Design
- Carolina Power & Light Company Quality Release No. 5984, Power and Coaxial Cable
- The Vendor Quality Assurance Report Release for Shipment for Purchase Order N4435045, Release 12
- Specification CAR-SH-E-14B, Electric Cables, Revision 10
- Cable-qualification test reports obtained from the Kerite Company under Kerite Factory Order D-857
- Kerite Engineering Memorandum No. 223, Determining Temperature Rating of High Temperature Kerite Insulated Cables for Operation in Wet and Alternate Wet/Dry Locations

As a result of the deficiencies identified in the ARs listed below, the licensee completed a visual examination, of the cable manholes that contained safety-related cables. The inspectors sampled the manhole inspections and completed a comprehensive review of photographs taken by the licensee during that examination to verify that the submerged cables and supports had experienced no significant deterioration from being submerged, and that safety-related cables had not been spliced in the manholes.

- AR 25688, Maintenance rule baseline inspections not accomplished within 5 years for cable vaults
- AR 60146, Maintenance rule self-assessment weakness No. 2 associated with failure to take timely corrective action for AR 25688
- AR 62193, AR 25688 closed without completing corrective action

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On October 30, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance during requalification simulator training for crew D, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Exercise Guide AOP-SIM-17.03. This training tested the operators' ability to respond to:

- A fire in the lubricating oil system for a charging/safety injection pump,
- Loss of component cooling water to the thermal-barrier heat exchanger
- Loss of the A main feedwater pump, and
- Failure of the steam dumps to shut following a secondary load rejection.

The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight. The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique, to verify that the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two degraded SSC performance problems listed below, to verify that the licensee's handling of these performance problems was in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule.

- Multiple equipment failures in the emergency services chilled water system
- Leakage from charging/safety injection pump seals.

The inspectors focused on the following:

- Appropriate work practices,
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures,
- Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),
- Characterizing reliability issues (performance),
- Charging unavailability (performance),
- Trending key parameters (condition monitoring),
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and
- Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1).

The inspectors' review included consideration of the following ARs:

- AR 56997, Valve 1CH-1398 failed to isolate
- AR 54450, Valve 1SW-1055 failed to modulate
- AR 22395, Chilled-water chiller WC-2A tripped on low oil pressure
- AR 09642, Chilled-water chiller WC-2A tripped 2 minutes after starting
- AR 55075, B charging/safety injection pump problems during pump startup
- AR 55129, Charging/safety injection pump seal leakage corrective action plan needed

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

For the four activities listed below, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments and risk management actions used by the licensee to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with these activities. The purpose of the inspection was to verify that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments, and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the review was to verify that any increase in risk was promptly assessed.

- Safety system outage for the B train EDG and B train ESW system on October 2 and 3
- Safety system outage for the A train residual heat removal system and work in the switchyard on the Asheboro line breakers to the north offsite power bus on November 20
- Changes in planned work due to a major ice storm that included canceling a planned EDG safety system outage, B charging pump vent valve installation modification, adverse weather preparations, and instrumentation testing on December 4-6
- Failure of switchyard breaker 52-16 and subsequent isolation of the south switchyard bus on November 17

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

On November 17 the licensee reduced power to 88 percent, conducted turbine valve testing, and returned to full power. During these evolutions, the inspectors observed plant instruments and operating crew performance, to verify that the operators performed in accordance with the associated procedures and training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

For the three operability evaluations described in the ARs listed below, the inspectors determined the accuracy of the evaluations and assessed the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures. The inspectors also determined completeness of the operability determinations as specified by Procedure AP-618, Operability Determinations. The inspectors compared the arguments made in the determination to

the requirements from the Technical Specifications (TS), the FSAR, and associated design-basis documents, to verify that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

- AR 70670, Based on performance data and visual inspection, containment isolation valve 1FP-347 may not meet local leak rate testing requirements
- AR 74829, Evaluation of overpressurization of the B charging/safety injection pump
- AR 78458, Voiding was discovered in the charging/safety injection pump suction line

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the five maintenance activities and post maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and reviewed the test data, to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s) described in the FSAR and TS.

- Fuel oil system maintenance on Humphrey valve
-Operations Surveillance Test OST-1086, 1B-SB Diesel Generator Operability Test Semiannual Interval
- Preventive maintenance on 1RH-25, A train piggyback valve
-Operations Surveillance Test OST-1008, 1A-SA [Residual Heat Removal Pump] Operability Quarterly Interval, Section 7.2
- Replacement of residual heat removal flow switch FIS-602A which controls the residual heat removal miniflow stop valves, 1RH-31 and 1RH-69
-Operations Surveillance Test OST-1008, 1A-SA [Residual Heat Removal Pump] Operability Quarterly Interval, Section 7.1 and PIC I032
- Disassembly and inspection of B charging/safety inspection pump discharge check valve, 1CS-192
-Operations Surveillance Test OST-1007, [Chemical and Volume Control System/Safety Injection] System Operability Train A Quarterly Interval
- Refurbishment of B charging/safety inspection pump mechanical seal
-Operations Surveillance Test OST-1093, [Chemical and Volume Control System/Safety Injection] System Operability Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the five surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and reviewed the test data, to verify that the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in TS, the FSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

- Operations Surveillance Test OST-1076, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-SB Operability Test Quarterly Interval
- Maintenance Surveillance Test MST-I0190, Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure P-0402 Operational Test of Train A CVCS Miniflow Circuit.
- Operations Surveillance Test OST-1093*, [Chemical and Volume Control System/Safety Injection] System Operability Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4
- Operations Surveillance Test OST-1122, Train A 6.9 [Kilovolt] Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Contact Check
- Maintenance Surveillance Test MST-I0141, Delta T/Tavg Loop (T0422) Operational Test

*This procedure included inservice testing requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

From a list of equipment clearances that had been in place for longer than three months, the inspectors selected the clearances identified below because they were related most closely to risk-significant SSCs. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with the selected clearances, to verify that those circumstances did not constitute a temporary engineering change as described in EGR-NGGC-005, "Engineering Change."

The selected clearances included the following:

- 17288, document installation of a pancake flange
- 17386, isolate a tank to prevent water hammer
- 17401, prevent an H&V equipment room heater from being continuously energized
- 25951, isolate 1CP-1, to ensure containment isolation
- 34992, isolate 1FW-27, to ensure containment isolation
- 35151, isolate air handler E5-A pre-entry exhaust fan

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected AR 68915 for detailed review, because the licensee had identified that AR as a significant adverse condition. This AR documented that the residual heat removal system had exceeded its maintenance rule performance criteria. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify that the licensee had identified the full extent of the issue, performed an appropriate evaluation, and specified and prioritized appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the report against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as described in Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148, Appendix A, Pre-inspection Audit for Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) at Nuclear Power Plants

The inspectors conducted an audit of the licensee's actions in response to a February 25, 2002 Order, which required the licensee to implement certain interim security compensatory measures. The audit consisted of a broad-scope review of the licensee's actions in response to the Order in the areas of operations, security, emergency preparedness, and information technology. The inspectors selectively reviewed relevant documentation and procedures; directly observed equipment, personnel, and activities in progress; and discussed licensee actions with personnel responsible for development and implementation of the ICM actions.

The licensee's activities were reviewed against the requirements of the February 25, 2002 Order; the licensee's response to the Order; and the provisions of the NRC-endorsed NEI Implementation Guidance, dated July 24, 2002.

No findings of significance were identified. A more in-depth review of the licensee's implementation of the February 25, 2002, Order will be conducted in the near future.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On January 8, 2003, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jim Scarola, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

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T. Natale, Outage and Scheduling Manager
T. Pilo, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President
G. Simmons, Superintendent, Radiation Control
B. Waldrep, Harris Plant General Manager

NRC Personnel

P. Fredrickson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None