

HOLTEC PRESENTATION TO NRC

TECHNICAL ISSUES MEETING

January 9, 2003

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Holtec International

AGENDA

Introductions

- Opening Remarks (NRC/Holtec)
- Meeting Overview (B. Gutherman)
- BORAL[®]/Water Compatibility Issue (B. Gutherman)
- MPC Lid Material Issue (B. Gilligan)
- Material NDE Issue (B. Gilligan)
- QA Perspective (M. Soler)

Meeting Overview

- 2 of 3 issues occurred at plants in preparation for, or during dry cask storage campaigns
 - BORAL/Water Compatibility Issue CGS
 - MPC Lid Material Issue Hatch
- Meeting is vital to ensure technical facts are presented clearly and NRC questions can be answered directly
- Overall, all actions taken and information presented by Holtec are consistent with knowledge at the time, with the highest regard for quality and accuracy

BORAL/Water Compatibility

BORAL construction Al Cladding B₄C/Al core



- Aluminum exposed to air will form a thin aluminum oxide layer
- Aluminum in water will form a thicker, more protective oxide layer
- BORAL panels used in wet storage not pre-passivated
 - In-pool hydrogen generation not a concern for wet storage

- BORAL panels used in dry storage are prepassivated in shallow water tank for at least 144 hours prior to installation in MPC
 - Aluminum oxide layer forms on the aluminum cladding surfaces and edges of BORAL panels
 - Knowledge at the time was that the aluminum oxide layer from pre-passivation would reduce additional aluminum-water interaction to essentially zero
 - Original FSAR language (i.e., "no" hydrogen generation) was believed to be accurate

- No problem during normal storage (dry helium environment)
- During preparation for fuel loading at CGS, bubbles were observed emanating from the submerged cask in the SFP
 - 65-75% hydrogen, balance air
- No reliable information as to the hydrogen evolution rate

- Holtec evaluated the reaction of BORAL with spent fuel pool water (DS-248, Revision 2)
- Calculation shows over 24 days after lid is installed before hydrogen ignition limit is reached (well beyond actual time needed for this evolution)
- Holtec technical evaluation was reviewed by two separate third parties for EN and conclusions found to be reasonable

- Amount of gas generated and released varies based on:
 - Size of B₄C particles in the BORAL core
 - Smaller particles = smaller void space and thicker protective aluminum oxide layer on panel edges
 - Elevated hydrostatic pressure (time and depth)
 - Aluminum oxide on panel edges may not prevent relatively high pressure water from entering the BORAL core
 - I Under pressure, air in the BORAL core capillaries is compressed, exposing previously unexposed internal aluminum material to water
 - Presence of trace impurities in B₄C and SFP water can affect the rate of generation

- Galvanic reaction of Al and SS evaluated and not considered significant; confirmed by test
 - BORAL outer surface oxide layer acts as an insulator to current
 - Low water flow and neutral or slightly acidic water maintains oxide layer
 - High resistance in path between SS and inner BORAL cladding surface
 - Experience with SS-framed BORAL test coupons in SFP water shows insignificant corrosion

Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions

- FSAR text was based on knowledge at the time that pre-passivation would essentially eliminate further aluminum-water interaction
- Additional gas generation due to elevated hydrostatic pressure in the spent fuel pool was unexpected
- FSAR modified under 10 CFR 72.48
 - Clarify language to recognize potential for additional gas generation
 - Require combustible gas monitoring
 - Recommend purging or exhausting space beneath lid

MPC Lid Material

MPC Lid-to-Shell Weld Description

- 3/4" thick groove weld between MPC lid (SA-336 F304) and MPC shell (SA-240 Type 304) to form confinement boundary
- Weld subjected to visual examination and liquid penetrant examination at root and final layer and each 3/8" of weld depth
- Weld subjected to hydrotest at 125% of design pressure and subjected to helium leakage testing

MPC Lid Forging Pedigree

- ASME Code Section III, Subsection NB, Class 1 Material
- Important to Safety Category A
- SA-336 F304
- 100% UT Examination (NB-2542)
- 100% PT Examination (NB-2546)

Summary of Hatch Welding Difficulties

- Rejectable indications found in MPC lid base metal during liquid penetrant examination of root pass
- Indications distributed along entire circumference having the appearance of porosity
- Code weld repairs attempted by grinding and rewelding - similar indications found
- Changes in welding processes (GTAW, FCAW, SMAW) and welding parameters also unsuccessful



Gulf Coast Machine & Supply Co. RJ Lee Group Project No. MAH210298



Figure 2. Photomicrographs of crecks in Gulf Coast Semple 2F815, etcharit: exetlic/hitric adid/HCl/glycerol

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Root Cause

- Large grain size (≥ "00" ASTM E-112)of lid forgings makes the lid susceptible to liquation cracking (grain boundary cracking in the base metal)
- Subject lids met all ASME requirements for mechanical properties and chemistry
- Lids already in service are unaffected based on satisfactory weld inspection



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Grain Size Effect on Material Properties

- Grain size does have measurable effect on most mechanical properties - literature is extensive for low carbon steels
- Lid mechanical properties measured from protrusion on each lid forging - grain size is fully accounted for in tests

Liquation Cracking

- Impurities in metal are concentrated at grain boundary. Metals with large grain size have less grain boundary available, causing local concentrations of impurities
- Material still meets ASME Code chemistry requirements
- Impurities reduce the melting point reducing intergranular cohesion at high temperatures.

Liquation Cracking (cont'd)

- Lack of cohesion between grain boundaries initiates cracks aided by tensile stresses resulting from contraction of weld
- Cracks were determined to be "microfissures" limited in length to 400 microns (roughly the grain size)

Delayed Cracking/Hydrogen Cracking

- Typically observed in carbons steels and martensitic and ferritic stainless steels (e.g., 400 series)
 - Higher diffusibility and lower solubility allows hydrogen ions to move about and join to create hydrogen gas in the structure
 - Hydrogen gas leads to increased internal pressure and ensuing hydrogen cracking
- All MPC stainless steel is austenitic (300 series)
 - Lower diffusibility and higher solubility do not allow hydrogen ions to move about freely and join together

Time Line for MPC Lid Welding Difficulties

- UST&D issues NCRs for 2 unweldable lids 9/01
- Holtec orders lids scrapped 9/01
- Welding difficulties begin on S/N 40 lid 9/18/02
- Holtec notifies licensees via HIB-9 9/23/02
- Holtec issues QPV 9/23/02
- Decision to replace S/N 40 lid 10/16/02
- 10 CFR 72.242(d) Report to NRC 11/13/02
- Root cause report completed 11/18/02



Corrective Actions

- S/N 40 & 25 lids replaced at Hatch
- Holtec recommends to all clients loading at that time to perform weld tests prior to use
- Lids not in-service tested for grain size. Grain sizes > 1.0 receive additional weld tests
- Revise lid purchase specification to include grain size and weldability requirements

Corrective Actions (cont'd)

- Add weldability requirements to all purchase specifications for metal which is to be welded
- Provide training to Holtec & UST&D regarding insufficient evaluation of initial lid welding problems
- Revise Holtec checklist for SMDR issuance to provide additional guidance for evaluating impact of deviations

Material NDE Issue

MPC Closure Ring

- Provides redundant confinement boundary closure not normally pressure-retaining, but analyzed
- Meets ASME Code Section III Subsection NB
- UT examination required per NB-2530
- MPC Cover Plates
 - Part of confinement boundary
 - Meets ASME Code Section III Subsection NB
 - UT examination required per NB-2530



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Missed NDE

- Closure rings and cover plates made from non-UT'd plate delivered to clients
 - Three (3) closure rings placed in service (2 at Dresden and 1 at Hatch) without UT

No cover plates in service without UT

Acceptability of Closure Rings In-Service

- Closure ring provides redundant confinement boundary closure (not pressure retaining)
- MPC lid-to-shell weld and port cover plates can withstand all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions
- Straight beam UT examinations detect laminations parallel to surface of plate, which are not potential leak paths

Acceptability of Closure Rings In-Service (cont'd)

- 3/8" thick Type 304SS rarely fails UT
- As part of corrective actions, **52** cover plates and **22** closure ring segments from same heat number as closure rings in-service were UT examined with no failures
- Safety factor of 3/8" thick closure ring under normal design pressure of 100 psig (HI-STAR FSAR, Appendix 3.E)

- Acceptability of Closure Rings In-Service (cont'd)
 - No mechanism available to cause any potential indications or laminations to propagate
 - No cyclical loading, closure ring is normally under no stress, environment not conducive to SSC
 - Closure ring material is 304 stainless steel, which is very ductile



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Root Cause

Inadequate self-checking of procurement documents by author/reviewer

Contributing Cause

Technical and quality information not easily accessible/organized for procurement agent

Corrective Actions

- One-time Code alternative request made for 3 inservice closure rings to exempt UT inspection
- UT all other affected items not placed into service
- Add applicable ASME Code subsection to Holtec drawings for each affected bill-of-material item
- Modify Holtec PO database to include "smart" bill-ofmaterial
- Enhance Holtec documentation package review process
- Enhance UST&D receipt inspection and documentation package review processes

QA Perspective

Overview

- Each of the three issues thoroughly addressed under Holtec's corrective action process
- Extensive root cause evaluations performed, including interfacing with Holtec's licensee clients, Holtec's suppliers, and third party experts
- No similar occurrences since actions were implemented

QA Perspective (cont'd)

Positive Issues

- Holtec Information Bulletins (HIBs) are effective in providing real-time information on operating events to licensees, NRC, and other parties
- Corrective actions resulted in broad-based enhancements of processes to reduce human error

Areas for Improvement

- Looking at "the big picture"
- Need pro-active vs. reactive implementation of electronic barriers to prevent human performance errors.