



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

January 22, 2003

Duke Energy Corporation
ATTN: Mr. G. R. Peterson
Site Vice President
Catawba Nuclear Station
4800 Concord Road
York, SC 29745

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
50-413/02-04 AND 50-414/02-04

Dear Mr. Peterson:

On December 28, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on December 30, 2002, with Mr. Sweigart and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-413/02-04, 50-414/02-04
w/Attachment - Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (see page 2)

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2

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3

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OFFICE	DRP:RII	DRP:RII	DRS:RII	DRS:RII	DRP:RII		
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414

License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52

Report No: 50-413/02-04, 50-414/02-04

Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 4800 Concord Road
York, SC 29745

Dates: September 22, 2002 - December 28, 2002

Inspectors: E. DiPaolo, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
M. Giles, Resident Inspector
R. Carroll, Senior Project Engineer (Section 1R01.1)
J. Ennis, Senior Physical Security Inspector (Sections 4OA3.2
and 4OA5)
D. Forbes, Physical Security Inspector (Section 4OA5)

Approved by: R. Haag, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2002-004, IR 05000414/2002-004; Duke Energy Corporation; 09/22/2002-12/28/2002; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; routine integrated report.

The inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors, one senior project engineer, and two regional physical security inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period, except for a brief period from November 8 to November 10, 2002, when power was reduced to 45 percent to facilitate the repair of a main condenser tube leak.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Cold Weather Program Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's cold weather protection program as it related to ensuring that the nuclear service water (RN) pump house and standby shutdown facility (SSF) would remain functional and available for plant shutdown in cold weather conditions. In addition to reviewing the licensee's program-related documents and procedures, walkdowns were conducted to evaluate the material condition and operation of the freeze protection equipment (e.g., heat tracing, area space heaters, etc.) associated with the above systems/components. Licensee problem identification and resolution was also assessed by determining if cold weather-related problems identified during the inspection, as well those identified at other times by the licensee, were appropriately entered into their corrective action program and properly addressed for resolution. Documents reviewed during the course of this inspection are listed in the Attachment at the end of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Adverse Weather Condition

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for forecasted adverse weather (snow/freezing rain conditions) on December 4-5, 2002, per Response Procedure RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations, Revision 000. Prior to and during the adverse weather, the inspector performed walkdowns of susceptible equipment, which included the SSF, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) level transmitters, and the RN pump house, to assure that equipment required for freeze protection (i.e., heat tracing and space heaters) was functional.

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) C-02-06256, associated with thermostats in the SSF building found set lower than desired, and PIP

C-02-06366, which documented water intrusion problems in a Unit 2 FWST level transmitter box resulting in reduced heat trace temperatures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns

The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during the inspection period. The inspectors walked down the B Train of the control room chilled water system on October 23, 2002, when the A Train was out-of-service due to a planned overhaul. The inspectors walked down the B Train of RN on November 19, 2002, while the A Train was out-of-service due to intake pit inspections. On December 4, 2002, the inspectors walked down the Unit 2 A emergency diesel generator (EDG) when the B EDG was out-of-service due to planned engine governor work. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to determine correct system lineup. The inspectors assessed conditions such as equipment alignment (i.e., valve positions, damper positions, and breaker alignment) and system operational readiness (i.e., control power and permissive status) that could affect operability of these systems.

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-06118, which documented an inappropriate material substitution associated with the installation of flexible hose, vice stainless steel tubing, in the air supply line to the Unit 1 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (CA) flow control valve to A steam generator (1CA60).

Complete System Walkdown

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2 high head safety injection system. The inspector reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, associated attachments of Operating Procedure OP/2/A/6200/001, Chemical and Volume Control System (NV), Revision 094, and the system flow diagram (drawing number CN-2554 Series 1) in determining correct system lineup. The inspectors reviewed pending design and equipment issues to verify that the identified deficiencies did not significantly impact the system's functions. Items included in this review were: (1) the operator workaround list; (2) the temporary modification list; (3) outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders (WOs); and (4) operator turnover sheets. The following related system PIPs were reviewed to assure that the licensee had properly characterized and prioritized equipment problems in the corrective action program:

<u>PIP Number</u>	<u>Issue</u>
C-02-03424	Unit 2 NV pump A oil cooler low flow alarm when swapping NV pumps
C-01-06149	Unit 2 NV letdown did not isolate on loss of all NV pumps

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Fire Area Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured six areas important to reactor safety to verify that combustible material and fire ignition sources were properly controlled, and that fire detection and suppression capabilities were intact. For areas where fire detection equipment was out-of-service, the inspectors verified that compensatory measures (i.e., fire watch tours) were properly implemented. For dry pipe suppression systems, the inspectors verified that pre-fire plans specified proper steps for fire brigade personnel to activate the systems when needed. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis, probabilistic risk assessment based sensitivity studies for fire related core damage accident sequences, and summary statements related to the licensee's 1992 Initial Plant Examination for External Events submittal to the NRC. Areas toured included:

- Unit 1 component cooling water (KC) pump and heat exchanger area
- Unit 2 ETA 4160 volt essential switchgear
- RN pumphouse
- Unit 1 A auxiliary shutdown room
- Unit 1 B auxiliary shutdown room SSF

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-06112 associated with fire watch implementation when the Unit 2 A EDG carbon dioxide system was removed from service.

f. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Fire Suppression Water System Outage

a. Inspection Scope

During the removal of the fire suppression water system from service on November 15, 2002, to facilitate repair of supply header valves RY-19 and RY-23, the inspectors reviewed Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9, Auxiliary Systems, Revision 0, to

determine the required compensatory actions. A temporary modification, which was installed as a backup water supply to the auxiliary building fire suppression system, was also reviewed (see Section 1R23). During the maintenance, the inspectors toured the following Unit 1 and 2 areas to verify that the required compensatory actions were in place: (1) residual heat removal (ND) pump rooms; (2) containment spray (NS) pump rooms; (3) KC pump areas; and (4) auxiliary building general area elevations 577, 543, and 522. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's 10CFR50.59 evaluation for extending the action statement time to establish a backup fire suppression water system per SLC 16.9-1, Fire Suppression Water System, Revision 0. The change was never implemented, for it was intended only if unexpected delays in returning the fire header to service were encountered.

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's resolution of an inspector-identified issue documented in PIP C-02-06080. The issue was associated with not addressing whether the proposed changes to SLC 16.9-1 (discussed above) had an adverse affect on the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On November 20, 2002, the inspectors observed a simulator examination, as well as the subsequent evaluation and critique, during licensed operator requalification training. The inspection focused on high-risk operator actions, emergency plan implementation, and lessons learned from previous plant experiences. The inspectors assessed whether appropriate feedback was provided to the licensed operators. The simulator examination evaluated operator response to loss of all AC power and a subsequent reactor coolant leak with abnormal system response and use of the following procedures:

<u>Procedure</u>	<u>Title</u>
EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0	Loss of All AC
EP/1/A/5000/FRZ.	High Containment Pressure
EP/1/A/5000/E-1	Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
EP/1/A/5000/E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectivenessa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities. This review included an assessment of the licensee's practices pertaining to the identification, scoping, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historical equipment problems. For those systems, structures, and components scoped in the maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly monitored and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this inspection for the following PIPs:

<u>Associated PIPs</u>	<u>Equipment Problem</u>
C-02-05052 and C-02-03338	Units 1 and 2 KC heat exchanger flushing/cleaning/testing programmatic issues
C-02-05558 and C-02-05683	Unit 1 containment ventilation system purge containment isolation valve (1VQ-3B) failures, repairs, and testing activities

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's resolution of an inspector-identified issue documented in PIP C-02-06333. This issue was associated with the discovery of an instrument cable on the Unit 2 B EDG, which came into contact with the fuel control rack when it was in the full open position. The interference, which was promptly corrected, was later shown that it did not affect the performance of the EDG.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluationa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments of the risk impact of removing from service those components associated with the six emergent and planned work items listed below. This review primarily focused on activities determined to be risk significant within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed the adequacy of the licensee identification and resolution of problems associated with maintenance risk assessment and emergent work.

<u>PIP Number/WO</u>	<u>Title/Description</u>
PIP C-02-05437	Unit 2 B containment pressure control system inoperable due to failed hydrogen skimmer fan B performance test on October 7, 2002 (emergent)
WO 98551463	Unit 2 B KC heat exchanger removed from service for cleaning due to elevated differential pressure on October 24, 2002 (planned)
WO 98522534	Unit 2 power reduction to repair tube leak in 2C1 waterbox (increase in turbine building flood initiating event and risk reduction measures) on November 8, 2002 (planned)
WO 98475187	Units 1 and 2 A RN intake pit inspection/cleaning on November 23, 2002 (planned)
WO 98549440	Governor tuning and testing on the 2B EDG with adverse weather (freezing rain) in the forecast on December 4, 2002 (planned)
PIP C-02-06601	Unit 2 reactor coolant system (NC) flow loop C Channel 1 failed low on December 27, 2002 (emergent)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or observed the operating crews' performance during the following unplanned transient/abnormal conditions to determine if the response was appropriate to the event and in accordance with procedures and training. Operator logs, plant computer data, and associated operator actions were reviewed.

<u>PIP Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
C-02-5810 and C-02-5807	Invalid auto-start of the Unit 1A auxiliary feedwater pump and injection into the applicable steam generators during auxiliary safeguards panel periodic testing on October 29, 2002
C-02-05978	Operator response to a failed fuse in Unit 2 A main feed pump trip logic circuit on November 8, 2002

The inspectors observed operating crew performance during portions of the planned Unit 2 power reduction, to repair a condenser tube leak, and subsequent power ascension on November 8-10, 2002. The inspectors observed reactivity manipulations performed by operators-in-training to assure they were properly completed under the instruction of licensed operators.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations (or justifications for continued operation) to verify that the operability of systems important to safety were properly established, that the affected components or systems remained available to perform its intended safety function, and that no unrecognized increase in plant or public risk occurred. Operability evaluations were reviewed for the six issues listed below:

<u>PIP Number</u>	<u>Issue</u>
C-02-03469	Unit 2 A residual heat removal discharge header pressurization requiring periodic venting
C-02-05022	Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDCA) pump operability with C steam generator supply isolation valve (2SA-5) leakage and heat trace line low temperatures
C-02-05187	Nonconforming intermediate deck vent curtain material installed in Units 1 and 2 ice condensers
C-02-05452	Unit 2 containment pressure control system Channel 4 momentarily failing low
C-02-05740	Unit 1 A EDG failed jacket surge tank water level switch
C-02-06119	Operability evaluation of Unit 2 TDCA with hot piping areas due to heat tracing system abnormal operation

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C 02-05978 associated with a faulty electrical solenoid coil in the Unit 2 A main feedwater pump trip circuitry. The faulty coil caused a loss of control power in the circuit, which rendered the Unit 2 A CA pump auto-start logic inoperable. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment, documented in PIP C-02-06301, associated with a portion of the Unit 2 B EDG starting air tubing that was found with reduced wall thickness due to vibration and contact with fuel oil piping.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workaroundsa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the list of operator workarounds for potential effects on the functionality of mitigating systems. The workarounds were reviewed to determine: (1) if the functional capability of the system or human reliability in responding to an initiating event was affected; (2) the affect on the operator's ability to implement abnormal or emergency procedures; and (3) if operator workaround problems were captured in the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors performed an in-depth review of an operator workaround associated with containment ventilation system purge isolation valve (1VQ-3B) being opened for containment venting while the valve was inoperable.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of all identified operator workarounds and their: (1) impact on the reliability, availability, and potential for mis-operation of the identified system(s); (2) potential for increasing an initiating event frequency; and (3) impact on the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to a plant transient and accident. Aggregate impacts of the identified workarounds on each individual operator watch station were also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed post-maintenance tests associated with the following six work activities to verify that equipment was properly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted to ensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function following maintenance.

<u>WO Number</u>	<u>Maintenance/Test Activity</u>
98534498	Replacement of Unit 1 CA flow control valve to A steam generator (1CA-60) regulator/positioner
98547647	Replacement of Unit 2 B hydrogen skimmer fan damper (2VX-2B) auxiliary contacts
98546405	Replacement of 1A EDG jacket water level switch (LS 5220)
98555033	Repair of Unit 1 Loop A T-hot instrument per IP/1/A/3222/076A, Calibration Procedure for Delta T/T-avg Protection Channel, Rev 086
98556310	Repair of 2A main feed pump (CFPT) trip circuitry

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-06466, which documented the discovery that the Unit 1 upper containment personnel airlock inner door latching pins did not extend as far as expected following replacement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

.1 Routine Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the five surveillance test procedures listed below to verify that Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements and/or SLC requirements were properly complied with, and that test acceptance criteria was properly specified. The inspectors observed actual performance of some of the tests, and reviewed completed procedures to verify that acceptance criteria had been met. The inspectors also verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, and that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred.

<u>Procedure Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
PT/2/A/4350/002A, Rev. 076	Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test
PT/1/A/4400/009, Rev. 050	Cooling Water Flow Monitoring For Asiatic Clams and Mussels Quarterly Test
PT/2/A/4200/009A, Rev. 173	In-service Test (IST) testing of NS valves
PT/2/A/4350/12B, Rev, 003	Diesel Generator 2B Governor and Voltage Regulator Test performed on December 4, 2002

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-06278 associated with the Unit 2 B reactor trip bypass breaker not closing during reactor trip breaker testing. The inspectors also reviewed PIP C-02-06578, which documented the licensee's actions associated with the calculated Unit 2 moderator temperature coefficient exceeding the 300 ppm Boron limit as specified in the Core Operating Limits Report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Inservice Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of PT/2/A/4200/004C, Rev. 029, Unit 2 B Containment Spray (NS) Pump 2B Performance Test. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI testing program to determine equipment availability and reliability. The inspectors evaluated selected portions of the following areas: (1) testing procedures; (2) acceptance criteria; (3) testing methods; (4) compliance with the licensee's in-service testing program, TS, SLC, and applicable code requirements; (5) range and accuracy of test instruments; and (6) required corrective actions. The inspectors also assessed whether corrective actions were taken as applicable.

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-06397, which was associated with obtaining different ASME Section XI test results for the Unit 2 A2 and B2 KC pumps while acquiring data using test instrumentation versus process instrumentation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification CNTM-0093. This modification provided a temporary water supply to the auxiliary building fire suppression system from the RN system during maintenance on fire protection supply header valves (see Section 1R05.2). The inspectors reviewed the modification to determine whether system operability and availability were affected and that adequate protection against the increase in flood risk was provided. The inspector verified that proper configuration control was maintained, appropriate operator briefings were planned, and post-installation testing was performed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Quarterly Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's emergency preparedness training exercise conducted on October 29, 2002. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario narrative to

identify the timing and location of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) development activities. During the drill, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of event classification and notification activities. The licensee's drill critique and corrective actions were also reviewed as documented in PIP C-02-05851. The inspectors assessed the licensee's evaluation of drill performance with respect to performance indicators.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted annual reviews of the following two Reactor Safety PIs for Units 1 and 2, as submitted to the NRC by the licensee:

<u>Cornerstone</u>	<u>PI</u>
Mitigating Systems	Safety System Unavailability-Residual Heat Removal System
Mitigating Systems	Safety System Unavailability-High Pressure Safety Injection

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's data for completeness and accuracy for the period covering the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first, second, and third quarters of 2002. To verify the PI data, the inspectors reviewed control room logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log entries, and related licensee calculations provided on PI Validation/Approval Forms. The inspectors also reviewed the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute document NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidance, Revision 2, while assessing the accuracy in the reported data.

To assess the licensee's identification and resolution of problems in this area, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-01113 concerning the NV pump being considered available during testing with no procedural restoration steps. In addition, the inspectors reviewed PIP C-02-04162 which was written to address some Unit 2 ND pump unavailability that was not included in performance indicator data for April 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of two issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The samples selected were within the cornerstone of mitigating systems, and involved risk significant systems. The reviewed issues included PIP C-02-05810, which documented an issue associated with the Unit 1 A CA pump auto-starting unexpectedly during auxiliary safeguards testing on October 29 , 2002; and PIP C-02-05659, which described an issue associated with the failure to declare RN pumps inoperable during alignments required for periodic pump testing. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to determine if the licensee had adequately addressed the following attributes:

- Complete, accurate, and timely identification of the problem
- Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- Consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause implications
- Prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with the safety significance
- Identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem
- Identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the safety significance of the issue

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

40A3 Event Followup

.1 Event Response

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two reported events this quarter to evaluate the licensee's actions and to confirm that these events were properly classified and reported to NRC and state/county governments, as warranted. The first event event involved the loss of 47 of 89 emergency sirens due to loss of local power to the sirens. The loss of power was the result of severe weather (ice/freezing rain) in the area, which occurred December 4-5, 2002. The second event concerned the notification of an offsite agency to investigate boat activities adjacent to the plant. These events were all reported and updated to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72 reportability requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-413/2001-S01-00: Security Access Revoked for Falsification of Criminal Record

This LER addressed the licensee's granting of unescorted access to the protected area during the period March 31 through May 20, 1999, based on inaccurate criminal history information entered into the Plant Access Data System (PADS) by another licensee. PADS is widely used database which allows sharing of background screening data among nuclear sites. On April 10, 2001, Catawba became aware that another licensee failed to update PADS to reflect criminal history information developed during its background investigation process of an applicant which had not been reported by the applicant on his background investigation questionnaire (BIQ). Based on a review of information in the LER submitted by the licensee who failed to update PADS with the derogatory information, the chronology of events at Catawba concerning the individual who was granted access based on the incorrect PADS information, and Duke Power's Access Authorization Procedure, NSD-218, Revision 7, the inspectors concluded that the licensee followed their access authorization process for granting the individual unescorted protected area access at Catawba and took appropriate actions upon being notified of the BIQ falsification by the other licensee. Based on the review of available information, no findings or significance or violations of regulatory requirements were identified related to Catawba.

4OA5 Other Activities

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148, Appendix A, Pre-inspection Audit for Interim Compensatory Measures (ICMs) at Nuclear Power Plants

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an audit of the licensee's actions in response to a February 25, 2002, Order which required the licensee to implement certain interim security compensatory measures. The audit consisted of a broad-scope review of the licensee's actions in response to the Order in the areas of operations, security, emergency preparedness, and information technology as well as additional elements prescribed by the TI. The inspectors selectively reviewed relevant documentation and procedures; directly observed equipment, personnel, and activities in progress; and discussed licensee actions with personnel responsible for development and implementation of the ICM actions.

The licensee's activities were reviewed against the requirements of the February 25, 2002 Order; the provisions of TI 2515/148, Appendix A; the licensee's response to the Order; and the provisions of the NRC-endorsed NEI Implementation Guidance, dated July 24, 2002.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. A more in-depth review of the licensee's implementation of the February 25, 2002, Order utilizing Appendix B and C of TI 2515/148 was conducted the week of December 16, 2002. The results of that review are to be documented in NRC Special Inspection Report 50-413,414/02-09.

4OA6 MeetingsExit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Richard Sweigart, Safety Assurance Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 30, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

E. Beadle, Emergency Preparedness Manager
W. Beaver, Reactor Electrical Systems - Freeze Protection Coordinator
S. Brown, Operations Superintendent
W. Byers, Security Manager
J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager
G. Gilbert, Regulatory Compliance Manager
W. Green, Work Control Superintendent
P. Grobusky, Human Resources Manager
M. Glover, Station Manager
P. Herran, Engineering Manager
L. Keller, Safety Review Group Manager
R. Parker, Maintenance Superintendent
G. Peterson, Catawba Site Vice President
F. Smith, Chemistry Manager
G. Strickland, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
R. Sweigart, Safety Assurance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

50-413/2001-S01-00	LER	Security Access Revoked for Falsification of Criminal Record (Section 40A3.2)
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Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ASME	-	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BIQ	-	Background Investigation Questionnaire
CA	-	Auxiliary Feedwater
CFR	-	Code of Federal Regulations

Attachment

EDG	-	Emergency Diesel Generator
FWST	-	Refueling Water Storage Tank
ICM	-	Interim Compensatory Measure
IST	-	In-Service Test
KC	-	Component Cooling Water
LER	-	Licensee Event Report
MWO	-	Model Work Order
NCV	-	Non-Cited Violation
ND	-	Residual Heat Removal
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	-	Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NS	-	Containment Spray
NSD	-	Nuclear System Directive
NV	-	Chemical and Volume Control System
PADS	-	Plant Access Data System
PI	-	Performance Indicator
PIP	-	Problem Investigation Process (report)
ppm	-	parts per million
REV	-	Revision
RF	-	Fire Protection
RN	-	Nuclear Service Water
SLC	-	Selected Licensee Commitment
SSF	-	Standby Shutdown Facility
TDCA	-	Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TI	-	Temporary Instruction
TS	-	Technical Specification
WO	-	Work Order

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

(Section 1R01.1)

Nuclear Station Directive (NSD) 317, Freeze Protection Program, Revision 1
 Engineering Support Program Document for Freeze Protection, dated 3/29/01
 Inspection Procedure (IP)/0/B/3560/008, Preventive Maintenance And Operational Check Of
 Freeze Protection Heat Trace and Instrument Box Heaters, Revision 15
 Performance Test (PT)/0/B/4700/038, Cold Weather Protection, Revision 13
 PT/0/B/4350/008, Heat Tracing Alignment Verification, Revision 35
 Response Procedure RP/0/B/5000/030, Severe Weather Preparations, Revision 0
 Model Work Order (MWO) 97014224, 6 Year SSF Diesel PM
 MWO 97022387, Perform Operational Check of SSF Heaters SSF-EUH-1 through 6,
 dated 8/24/02
 MWO 97022385, Perform Operational Check of RN Pump House Unit Heaters, dated 10/16/02
 Operator Aid Computer Alarm Response(s):
 - RN Pump House Temperature (C1A0936, C1A0942, C1A0948, C1A0954)
 - Outside Air Temperature (C1P0118)
 Operating Procedure OP/1/B/6100/010R, RN Pump House HI/LO Temperature Response -
 Panel 1AD-19
 Drawing Number CN-1579-4.3, Miscellaneous Structures Ventilation System - SSF

Drawing Number CN-1557-2.0, RN Pump Structure Ventilation System

PIP C-00-06495, Low Pressure Service Water (RL) Transmitter 0RLP5030 Failed High Due to Freezing

PIP C-00-06497, Process Line Feeding 0RLP5030 Frozen

PIP C-01-05878, Need to Evaluate Process for Scheduling and Execution of Work for Cold and Hot Weather Protection

PIP C-02-05286, Documentation of 2002 Freeze Protection Program Status for the Action Register Management Report

PIP C-02-05780, Faulty Heat Trace Controller Discovered During Annual Freeze Protection IP

PIP C-02-05770, Heat Trace Voltage Regulator Installed Without Proper Documentation

PIPs Generated During Inspection

PIP C-02-06158, Duct Heaters for SSF Battery Room and Control Room (SSF-H-1 and H-2) Do Not Have a Predefined Preventive Maintenance Task and Operator Rounds Don't Check Room Temperatures

PIP C-02-06165, No Identification Labels on SSF Room Heaters SSF-EUH-1 through 6