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Energy to Serve Your WorldSM

December 31, 2002

Docket No.: 50-348

NEL-02-0250

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 2002-003-00
Technical Specification Violation Due to Section of Condensate Storage Tank
Missile Barrier Not In Place

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2002-003-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There are no NRC commitments in this letter. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. B. Beasley, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

J. B. Beasley, Jr.

WAS/sdl: LER2002-003-00.doc

Attachment

IE22

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. D. E. Grissette, General Manager - Farley

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
Mr. F. Rinaldi, Licensing Project Manager - Farley

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry Send
comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U S Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503 If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid
OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the
information collection

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000348

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Technical Specification Violation due to section of Condensate Storage Tank Missile Barrier Not In Place

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
Nov	06	2002	2002	003	00	12	31	2002		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check all that apply) (11)			
1	100	20 2201(b)	20 2203(a)(3)(ii)	50 73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50 73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
		20 2201(d)	20 2203(a)(4)	50 73(a)(2)(iii)	50 73(a)(2)(x)
		20 2203(a)(1)	50 36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50 73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73 71(a)(4)
		20 2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50 73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73 71(a)(5)
		20 2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20 2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	
		20 2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50 73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
D. E. Grissette, General Manager Nuclear Plant	334-899-5156

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 6, 2002 at 0950, it was discovered that a section of the required missile barrier was not in place for the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) suction piping from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST). It was determined that this event represents a Technical Specification violation since the CST is required to be operable during severe weather events which can generate missiles. The required missile barrier section was replaced within time limits of CST Technical Specification 3.7.6 Action A from the time of discovery. A walkdown of other missile barriers on both units was conducted to identify any other possible missing barriers. None were identified.

The CST outlet isolation valves are enclosed in a concrete valve box enclosure for protection from tornado generated missiles, with a 4-section cover plate above the enclosure to protect the valves and piping from dropped objects that may occur during tornado events. Investigation revealed that one section of this plate had been removed on March 19, 2002 for work on the freeze protection system, and not replaced.

This event was due to lack of policy and administrative controls for removal of missile barriers when accessing equipment behind the missile barriers. Contributing causes were training and work practices in that plant personnel failed to recognize that all sections of the missile barrier were required to be in place to provide adequate missile protection

Permanent labels have been placed on the CST concrete valve box enclosure cover plates to require Shift Supervisor notification prior to removal, and the gratings have been tack welded in place for positive control until corrective actions are complete. Shift crews will be informed of this event prior to taking shift. Appropriate plant personnel will be informed of this event and missile barrier requirements by January 15, 2003, and FNP will establish and communicate policy and administrative controls for missile barriers by January 15, 2003. Appropriate procedures and preventative maintenance tasks will be revised by January 15, 2003 to require shift supervisor notification if missile barriers are to be removed during work activities.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit - 1	05000348	2002	- 003	- 00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

On November 6, 2002 at 0950, while at 100% power, it was discovered that a section of the required missile barrier was not in place for the Unit 1 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)[KA] outlet isolation valves to the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)[BA] system. It was determined that this event represents a Technical Specification violation since the CST is required to be operable during severe weather events which can generate missiles.

The CST outlet isolation valves are enclosed in a concrete valve box for protection from horizontal tornado generated missiles, with a 4-section cover plate above the enclosure to protect the valves and piping from dropped objects which may occur during tornado events. Investigation revealed that one section of this plate had been removed on March 19, 2002 for work on the freeze protection system, and was not replaced. This cover plate is above eye level, as viewed from the ground, and not readily visible without climbing above ground level.

A work order for troubleshooting freeze protection circuits in this area was released on March 19, 2002 with LCO being denoted as Not Applicable. At that time, the cover plate was left removed for continuing work. On March 21, 2002, the insulation on the piping between the CST and the transition to the underground pipe chase was removed for inspection of freeze protection wires. On August 7, 2002, continuing work in the area found the plate still removed. The plate was not reinstalled at that time since workers believed more work was to be performed.

Cause of Event

This event was due to lack of policy and administrative controls for removal of missile barriers when accessing equipment behind the missile barriers. Contributing causes were training and work practices in that plant personnel failed to recognize that all sections of the missile barrier were required to be in place to provide adequate missile protection.

Safety Assessment

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. Operability of the CST system was unaffected for all events for which it is required except for severe weather (tornado), and then only for the specific hazard of a dropped object.

This event does not represent a Safety System Functional Failure.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2) NUMBER	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit - 1	05000348	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2002	- 003	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Corrective Action

The required missile barrier section was replaced within time limits of Technical Specification 3.7.6 Action A from the time of discovery.

A walkdown of other missile barriers on both units was conducted to identify any other possible missing barriers. None were identified.

Permanent labels have been placed on the CST concrete valve box enclosure cover plates to require Shift Supervisor notification prior to removal, and gratings have been tack welded in place for positive control until corrective actions are complete.

Shift crews will be informed of this event prior to taking shift.

Appropriate plant personnel will be informed of this event and missile barrier requirements by January 15, 2003.

FNP will establish and communicate policy and administrative controls for missile barriers by January 15, 2003.

Appropriate procedures and preventative maintenance tasks will be revised by January 15, 2003 to require shift supervisor notification if missile barriers are to be removed during work activities.

Additional Information

The following LER has been submitted in the past 2 years related to inadequate policies/procedures:

LER 2002-001-00 Unit 1, Reactor Trip Due to Inadvertent Electrical Contact During Recorder Maintenance