



Constellation
Nuclear

**Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Station**

*A Member of the
Constellation Energy Group*

December 13, 2002
NMP1L 1703

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Docket No. 50-220
License No. DPR-63

Special Report, Channel #12 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
Inoperable Due to Loss of Power

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Action Statements 3.a and 4.a of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Technical Specification Table 3.6.11-2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action Statements," Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS) is submitting the following Special Report concerning the inoperability of the Channel #12 Drywell Pressure Monitor, the Channel #12 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, the Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitor, and the Channel #12 Suppression Chamber Water Level indication.

Description of Event

On December 2, 2002, at approximately 1647 hours, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced a loss of power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus #12. As a result, the Channel #12 Drywell Pressure Monitor, the Channel #12 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, the Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitor, and the Channel #12 Suppression Chamber Water Level indication were deenergized. This is energize-to-function instrumentation and thus was required to be declared inoperable. Power to RPS bus #12 is normally supplied by an uninterruptible power source, UPS172. At approximately 1709 hours, power was restored to RPS bus #12 from an alternate power source, Instrumentation and Controls bus #130A, and the Channel #12 accident monitoring instrumentation was returned to service.

On December 3, 2002, the Channel #12 accident monitoring instrumentation was again deenergized, between 1247 and 1248 hours, to allow transferring RPS bus #12 back to its normal power source, UPS172.

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For both of the instances described above, the Channel #11 Drywell Pressure Monitor, the Channel #11 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor, the Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitor, and the Channel #11 Suppression Chamber Water Level indication were operable while the Channel #12 instrumentation was deenergized.

Cause of Event

The loss of power to RPS bus #12 was due to the failure of protective relaying power supply PWRS-(PRC172)PS-1. The failed power supply has been sent to a vendor for failure analysis.

Corrective Actions

1. The immediate corrective action was to restore power to RPS bus #12 from Instrumentation and Controls bus #130A.
2. Power supply PWRS-(PRC172)PS-1 was replaced and on December 3, 2002, at approximately 1248 hours, RPS bus #12 was returned to its normal power supply, UPS172.

Very truly yours,



Lawrence A. Hopkins
Plant General Manager

LAH/DEV/jm

xc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator, Region I
Mr. G. K. Hunegs, NRC Senior Resident Inspector