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FINAL REPLY:

Representative Nita M. Lowey

TO:

Chairman Meserve

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

\*\* PRI \*\*

CRC NO: 02-0825

Chairman Meserve

DESC:

ROUTING:

Safety at Nuclear Facilities

Travers

Paperiello

Kane

Norry

Craig

Burns/Cyr

Collins, NRR

DATE: 12/24/02

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

NSIR

Zimmerman

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

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AUTHOR: Nita Lowey  
AFFILIATION: REP  
ADDRESSEE: Richard Meserve  
SUBJECT: Concerns independent investigative report, commissioned by Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Indian Point...Security at nuclear facilities

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LETTER DATE: 12/11/2002  
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**Nita M. Lowey**  
**Congress of the United States**  
**18th District, New York**

December 11, 2002

Chairman Richard A. Meserve  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mailstop O16C1  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Meserve:

I would like to bring to your attention the conclusions of the attached independent investigative report, commissioned by Entergy Nuclear Northeast, owner of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in Buchanan, New York. As I have stated in my previous correspondence with you, I am gravely concerned about the safety at nuclear facilities and the preparedness of nuclear plant staff.


This report is the latest in a series indicating that guards at nuclear facilities lack the firearms training, tactical instruction, and necessary firepower to foil a terrorist attack. In a letter dated October 30, 2002, I urged you to adopt more stringent security standards for commercial nuclear reactors across the country. I have yet to receive a substantive response, and, to the best of my knowledge, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has not modified security requirements.

It is extraordinary to me that, despite the conspicuous security shortcomings documented in this report, Entergy technically complies with all federal security requirements. Entergy's ineffective security operations dramatically illustrate the consequences of our lax nuclear security standards. That's why I will continue to work to pass the Nuclear Security Act, which would establish a federal nuclear security force and plans for handling diverse threats, raising the bar for defense of this infrastructure.

Until this legislation is passed, I believe the NRC must modify work rules and staffing requirements to reduce guard fatigue and strengthen standards for firearms certification and requalification exams; tactical instruction and exercises; and basic physical fitness. Failure to do so imperils the tens of millions of Americans residing near nuclear reactors.

Thank you for your attention to these matters, and I look forward to your comments on the report.

Sincerely,

  
Nita M. Lowey  
Member of Congress


Attachment

# Report of Investigation

Entergy Nuclear Northeast

Indian Point #2

*Security Services (IP2-431)*

  
Keith G. Logan

January 25, 2002  
Date

## A. Executive Summary

In early November 2001, several concerns regarding security services at Indian Point #2 were brought to the attention of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Buchanan, NY. On November 13, 2001, [REDACTED] the ECP Manager, commissioned an independent investigation of the concerns by Mr. [REDACTED] is a former investigator with the NRC, Office of Investigations, and a licensed attorney.

The investigation focused on whether the security officers at Indian Point #2 believed they could adequately defend the plant on the day of their interview and if they believed that a chilled environment existed among the security force. In addition, there are other issues such as: security officer requalification, the security of safeguards information, and the accuracy of Wackenhut's Report (01-CED-011-02) on a chilling effect at Indian Point #2. A total of 59 security officers, including sergeants and lieutenants, were interviewed and, as a minimum, they were each asked a series of standard questions during the interviews.

The results of the investigation indicate that only 19% of those security officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant after the terrorist event of September 11<sup>th</sup>. The general feeling is that the standard "design basis threat" no longer applies and more security is needed. Each of the officers provided a list of improvements he/she thinks is necessary in order to "adequately" defend the plant. Some of their suggested improvements have already been made; other improvements are in the process of being made, and still other changes are under review by the Entergy Security Manager at Indian Point and consultants. The suggested improvements include new and updated security systems, weapons, defensive positions and equipment, additional training, and more security officers. Of particular concern to many of the officers is the belief that they should be carrying their weapons with a chambered round, as is the practice at Indian Point #3; they feel this would enable them to be better prepared to defend against an attack.

When asked, 59% of the security officers stated that they believe that a chilled environment exists among the security force. However, they stated that this does not apply to nuclear safety issues, which they believe would always be raised. Thirty-one percent of the officers stated that they have raised nuclear safety issues and 95% stated that they have raised concerns. Their belief is that the chilled environment exists as a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management, in areas such as administration, promotions, discipline, and general program management. Of those officers who raised issues with management, only 42% stated that those issues were adequately addressed. At the same time, 93% of the officers stated that they are willing to provide both positive and negative feedback to management. While 90% stated that they would raise issues during Guard Mount meetings, others have been

told it was appropriate to raise them after the meeting.

Several issues were raised regarding the requalification of the security officers. During the course of this investigation, there was also an ongoing Quality Assurance (Q/A) audit of the Wackenhut security officer training. There are five parts to an officers' annual requalification and each part is completed at different times of the year. It is the responsibility of the Training Coordinator to ensure that the security officers requalify within twelve months. Only 69% of the officers stated that they had completed what they believe to be the requalification process. The officers generally believed that the Simunition training was part of the Training and Qualification Plan (T&Q) required for requalification. While it was included in the Wackenhut training program, it was not part of the official T&Q standard. Seventy-nine percent of the officers stated that they had completed the Simunition training by the time of their interviews; this did not reflect a failure to complete training as alleged to the ECP. While 98% of the officers who carry the Glock believe that their training was adequate, most believe that they should qualify more than once each year. They would also like to see additional time at the range to improve their skills.

In response to a concern about the security of Safeguards information, 5 (~8%) security officers identified a problem in this area. One problem dated back to 2000 and related to the security of training modules and exams, and the handling of those documents by one person. When the problem was reported to management in October 2000, it was not perceived as a Safeguards issue and no action was taken. There was a new Training Coordinator in the following year and none of the comments reflected any concerns with the security of the modules during 2001. Another officer indicated that he saw unprotected Safeguards material and then secured it.

Most of the security officers were critical of the results of the report conducted in March 2001 by Wackenhut (TWC) to "evaluate if a 'chilling effect' existed, or resulted from...the termination of a security officer" at Indian Point #2. Over an eight day period, two auditors interviewed 80 TWC personnel from each of the functional work groups. They concluded that "No chilling effect was indicated from the candid responses received during the interview process, nor a hesitation to report any concern or safety issue in the past, or future." During this investigation, several officers recalled telling TWC auditors that they thought that a chilled environment did exist as a result of that termination. Most of the officers stated that they did not believe that their concerns were adequately addressed by the TWC report. The officers further indicated that their responses in March were similar to the responses that they provided during this investigation pertaining to the issue of a chilled environment.

However, the report did identify several problems which are relevant to concerns

identified during this investigation. The Wackenhut report indicated that: "some of the TWC supervisory cadre are not trusted by the security force to properly and professionally address issues or concerns"; "perceived problem behaviors were the result of feedback/communication, lack of understanding, or lack of personnel management skills by supervision"; security officers are "more often 'in the dark' about emerging issues and changes that affect their performance on the job"; and "the lack of feedback caused a perception that 'management did not care'."

Entergy has retained consultants to review and improve security at Indian Point #2; preliminary changes to the defensive positions and strategy have already been made. Entergy has also organized a team to consolidate the security plans of the two units and ensure that the technical systems and strategies are compatible. The security officers favorably commented on the new support and respect they have received from the Vice President Operations. As noted above, a majority of the officers have articulated improvements which they feel are necessary to present a strong defense and repel any threat. They believe that Entergy management is concerned about security and noted that the time that was taken to listen to their concerns during this investigation is evidence of that. The officers appear optimistic that changes will occur and look to Entergy to effect some of those changes over the next several months.

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C List of Witnesses

[REDACTED]

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NOTE: To protect the identity of the source(s) of the concerns at issue in this investigation, any interview(s) which were done during the issue identification process are not included as part of this report and are maintained in the ECP files.

## **D. Details of the Investigation**

### **D.1 Purpose of the Investigation**

In early November 2001, several concerns regarding security services at Indian Point #2 were brought to the attention of [REDACTED], Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Manager, Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Buchanan, NY. On November 13, 2001, [REDACTED] commissioned an independent investigation of the concerns by Mr. Keith Logan. Mr. Logan is a former investigator with the NRC, Office of Investigations, and a licensed attorney.

The investigation focused on whether the security officers at Indian Point #2 believed they could adequately defend the plant on the day on their interview and if they believed that a chilled environment existed among the security force. In addition, there are other issues which were reviewed, such as: security officer requalification, the security of safeguards information, and the accuracy of Wackenhut's Report (01-CED-011-02) on a chilling effect at Indian Point #2.

### **D.2 Methodology**

Based on interviews with the alleged(s), the ECP Manager identified fourteen key points which served as standard base questions during the investigative interviews; this resulted in the resolution of 6 issues.

During the investigation, there were 59 interviews of Security Officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants, in addition to management personnel from both Entergy and Wackenhut. The responses to the base questions are listed individually in one table and summarized in another table; both tables are attached to this report. Copies of pertinent documents and correspondence are also attached. The comments of the additional witnesses are factored into the conclusions. All of the interview reports are attached.

## **E. Issues & Conclusions**

- E.1 Issue: 1.** Do the security officers/guards believe that they can adequately defend the plant without additional resources?

**Conclusion:** No.

The results of the investigation indicate that only 19% of the security officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant after the terrorist event of September 11<sup>th</sup>. While the alleged(s) could not identify any aspects of security at Indian Point #2 that

were not in compliance with the security plan or met its design basis threat, the alleged(s) was (were) concerned about the security force being able to defend the plant. The feeling of most of those interviewed was that after the 9/11 event, the standard design basis threat no longer applied and more security was needed overall. Each of the officers listed those improvements that he/she thought were necessary in order for that officer to feel that the plant could be adequately defended. Some of their suggested improvements have already been completed; others improvements are in the process of being made and still other changes are under review by the Entergy Security Manager at Indian Point.

As of December 9<sup>th</sup>, [REDACTED] Security Consultant, who was retained by Entergy, was evaluating the security defenses at Indian Point #2 and Indian Point #3. He is also responsible for developing a new single site security plan which would apply to both facilities. Subsequent to the completion of most of the interviews of the security force, [REDACTED] made several improvements to the defensive strategy of the plant. On December 10, 2001, a team from the NRC reviewed the security at Indian Point. [REDACTED], Security Superintendent, stated that since the 9/11 event they have spent \$2.4 million to improve security at Indian Point #2.

#### Weapons Qualification:

An alleged believes that 15-20% of the guard force would "not tactically be able to successfully defend the plant," in spite of having passed their weapons qualification. There are several points to consider: defensive plan, weapons qualifications, and the T&Q. The defensive plan at Indian Point #2 has been amended since the concern was raised and [REDACTED] is proposing additional changes. The T&Q is being reviewed and a change being prepared by [REDACTED] Plant Protection Specialists, also a Consultant with Entergy. All of the security officers are current with their weapons qualification and in compliance with the T&Q.

However, an audit of the Security Training & Qualification Program was conducted in December 2001. A Surveillance Report (01-S-19-SC) was prepared which concluded that the officers were "trained and qualified in accordance with the" T&Q, but found "numerous documentation discrepancies." It did not reveal any officers who were not qualified according to the T&Q to carry an issued Glock or shotgun.<sup>1</sup>

While it was also alleged that "the weapons qualification test is not sufficient to show that a person is qualified to use a weapon in defense of the plant," the qualifications

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<sup>1</sup> It was reported by the Training Coordinator and others that [REDACTED], the former ConEd Security Manager, changed the pistol qualification course for the .38 caliber revolver without making the appropriate change to the T&Q.

(Glock and shotgun) are in compliance with the current T&Q. Indian Point security management recognizes the need to improve the T&Q and, as noted above, it is being revised. There will also be a new defensive strategy when the two sites operate under a single security plan.

Currently, there are five parts to the annual requalification which can be completed on seven different dates over 12 months.

- physical (which includes eye/glaucoma test),
- agility test,
- tactical tasks (usually accomplished on the same day as the Simunition)
- Watch person challenge tests and tasking, and
- Range Qualification.

Range Requalification consists of the following:

- handgun-scored,
- shotgun-scored,
- night fire-handgun,
- night fire-shotgun, and
- stress- familiarization.

It was alleged that "people get chance after chance to qualify, until they just skate through the qualification." The records indicate that the security officer training has permitted multiple attempts to qualify with the handgun. The records that were reviewed reflect that scores were kept showing the attempts, as well as the final qualification.

#### Carrying the Glock:

It was stated that "weapons are not carried in a manner designed to ensure the security of the plant," in that the officers do not have a round chambered in their Glock or in their shotgun. The security officers at Indian Point #3 carry an H&K with a chambered round. Two of the Entergy Nuclear Northeast sites carry a chambered round and two do not. This inconsistency is under review by [REDACTED] interim Director of Corporate Security, who intends to have a unified policy for Entergy Nuclear Northeast. In addition, [REDACTED] the Security Manager, Indian Point Units #2 and #3, has stated that this is being reviewed with the intention of having the unified Indian Point site carry their weapons<sup>2</sup> in the same manner; his decision will comply with the other Northeast sites. [REDACTED] stated that in bench

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<sup>2</sup> The security officers at Indian Point #2 carry .40 caliber Glocks and the security officers at Indian Point #3 carry .45 caliber H&Ks. A decision is still pending on which weapon will be carried by the unified force at Indian Point.

marking this point within the industry, there is not an overwhelmingly prevalent way to carry the weapons. [REDACTED] is also reviewing the need for specific weapons in his preparation of the new site defense plan.

It was noted that "the training is not consistent with the policy" for carrying weapons. A review of the training plans and interviews with the trainers indicates that the range qualification for the Glock is done with a chambered round, while the "stress course" requires the officer to "rack a round" during the course of fire.

#### Glock Transition Training:

While the allegor was critical of the "Glock transition training," 56 of 57 officers interviewed believed that their training was adequate.<sup>3</sup> Almost all of the officers would like to see additional time at the range for familiarization, stress exercises, or qualification. They have suggested training scenarios which are more reflective of their work on site. As noted above, the current T&Q is being revised. In addition, there will be additional revisions with the merger of the training departments and the T&Qs from Indian Point #2 and Indian Point #3.

#### Communication:

A common concern among the officers was that information that they feel affects the security of the plant is not being communicated down from management in a timely manner. They felt that this is particularly important in a state of heightened awareness. There were two incidents which concerned a majority of the officers, including Sergeants and Lieutenants. The first incident involved the receipt of a package which was thought to contain "white powder" on the wrappings. The second related to a car with illegal tags that approached the gate to the OCA and then sped away.<sup>4</sup> While each of these incidents did not involve an actual compromise in the security of the site, the security staff, including the officers on post, were not informed of the facts in a timely manner. Their concern about the incidents was elevated when they learned about these problems from workers in other areas of the plant. They correctly felt that information which relates to the security of the site should be immediately sent to them. While these two incidents did not affect the

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<sup>3</sup> The ECP is responding to another concern, that was referred by the NRC, that raises another aspect of weapons training. This will be reported in a separate ECP report.

<sup>4</sup> In the latter situation, the car made a u-turn after approaching the gate to the OCA and in the vicinity of the NY State trooper. The vehicle was then pursued by the trooper. [REDACTED] stated that this was a state police matter and it was not perceived to be a problem related to plant security. [REDACTED] did not see the need to report this to the members of the security force.

performance of their job, it sets a poor precedent in regard to ensuring that they receive accurate and timely information about security events. Withholding this information can affect morale as well as job performance.

[REDACTED] stated that he expects this type of information to be communicated in a timely manner. When he learned that the information relating to the "white powder" had not been sent to the guards, he directed [REDACTED] to provide some information about what transpired. He acknowledged that it is important to pass information and will continue to ensure that it is done. [REDACTED] stated that since the event took place outside the protected area and was handled by a supervisor, it was not necessary to disseminate the information to the guard force.

When [REDACTED] was asked why the information about the second issue (the car turning from the OCA gate) was not disseminated, he stated that this was a state police matter and it was not perceived to be a problem related to plant security.

[REDACTED] acknowledged that there are not specific procedures at the site in which to be done when it is believed that a suspicious package contains white powder (suspected Anthrax), or something of a similar concern. [REDACTED] noted that the only guidance available Security Officers in such situations is from a supervisor. There is no additional guidance for the supervisor, [REDACTED].

#### Suggested Improvements:

In addition to the points listed above, the following improvements were suggested, during this investigation, by the officers to better enable them to defend the plant:

- replace the shotgun with a rifle for firing distances beyond 50 yards;
- install pan-tilt-zoom cameras to improve the technical surveillance of the site;
- hire additional security officers;
- return to an eight hour shift to reduce officer fatigue;
- new cameras, that can pan, tilt, and zoom
- repair/replace alarms that do not work or are repaired on a regular basis;
- upgrade the alarm system to reduce the number of false alarms, especially under adverse weather conditions;
- replace card readers that do not work;
- caller ID on all of their phones;
- replace non-working tamper alarms;
- update the defensive plan for the site in light of the 9/11 event;
- improve the tactical and defensive positioning of the officers;
- improve communication of Temporary Post Guidelines (TPG) to the

officers, especially those who have been away from work when the changes are made;

- provide additional tactical training at the plant to improve response skills;
- install a second outside fence which is alarmed;
- razor wire on the fences;
- replace the sand barrels with more effective defensive barriers;
- purchase trucks for patrol duties that have room for EMT kits inside of the trucks;
- ensure the backup computer for the alarm system is working and test it on a regular basis;
- replace the radios with smaller updated models that will be on a common frequency for both Indian Point units (the old radios are to be returned to ConEd 18 months after the sale of the plant);
- have a special team that is available (and not performing other tasks) to respond to an intrusion attempt/assault on the plant;
- upgrade the defenses at the main gate;
- the minimum range score should be increased from the current 170, to ensure that the officers have a higher skill level;
- upgrade to a double gate entrance for vehicles into the protected area;
- protective head cover;
- designated "choke points" need to be revised so that security officers will have a longer line of site (greater than 20');
- provide additional security for the water access areas;
- provide additional firefighting apparatus and more security for containers with flammable liquids or gases, such as the hydrogen trailer;
- improve communications within the security program, this includes the timely notification of events and threats (security officers indicated that they are hearing about threats and suspicious packages after the rest of the plant);
- ensure that procedures are developed and in place to handle situations where suspicious packages are identified (such as those containing white powder or suspected anthrax), the present policy of having the security officer to notify a supervisor is not adequate and there is no policy for the supervisor to follow);
- improve the physical agility test for security officers/guards;
- improve the physical conditioning of the security officers to ensure that they will be able to defend the plant;
- each security officer/guard should be provided with an appropriately sized protective vest (the vests that are available at different posts are not sized for each of the officers, which does not enable them to perform their duties wearing those vests);
- BREs (Bullet Resistant Enclosures) should be installed at critical points;



- identify new targets and set tactical positions as a result of the 9/11 event;
- replace the current Wackenhut management with a team that will provide direction to the force; and
- ensure that discipline is uniformly administered (to improve morale).

**E.2 Issue: 2. Are the Security Officers/Guards physically able to meet the demands of the position?**

**Conclusion: Yes.**

The records indicate that the members of the security force are physically able to meet the demands of their position. The records indicate that the officers have successfully completed their physical agility tests and meet the criteria set forward in their approved T&Q. There have also been changes to the defensive strategy of the plant which relies on "choke points" rather than "pursuit"; the latter strategy would require improved physical conditioning of the members of the security force.

However, most of the security force believes that the group should improve their physical conditioning; some officers believe that as many as 50% of the force may not be physically able to meet the demands of defending the plant. At least one officer reportedly had back problems after carrying the shotgun on his shift.

The current physical agility test is extremely lax and is not adequate to evaluate the actual physical conditioning of the security force. [REDACTED] while the acting Wackenhut Project Manager, telephonically told an applicant for a security officer position that the person should not be concerned about having to pass a physical agility test. His comments indicated that it was an easy/non-challenging test.

#### **Improper Conduct:**

There were also concerns about whether there were security officers whose past conduct did not indicate that they should be carrying weapons. One situation involved a security officer (Sergeant #1) who was alleged to have become very angry and acted inappropriately in CAS (Central Alarm Station). A request for the personnel file of this officer did not indicate any discipline or other record with regard to this incident. Yet, an interview with [REDACTED] Wackenhut Project Manager, indicated that he was aware of a problem that developed regarding a Sergeant (#1) with a subordinate security officer. [REDACTED] noted that the Sergeant (#1) also had confrontations with several individuals and was removed from the work schedule. After a clinical analysis and 4-5 days off schedule for the Sergeant (#1), he separated the Sergeant (#1) from the security officer's shift. He was also able to substantiate some of the additional allegations about harassment instigated by both

individuals (Sergeant (#1) and subordinate). In addition, both the Sergeant (#1) and the officer were going through a divorces at the time, but he did not recall that it was ever brought to his attention that the Sergeant (#1) had "trashed" CAS.

In another situation there was a Sergeant (#2) who resigned and had several DWI convictions. ██████████ stated that they wanted to bring the Sergeant (#2) back to the security program and understood that he had worked through his drinking problem. ██████████ recalled that ██████████ Wackenhut, consulted with ██████████ a Regional Inspector with the NRC, who did not have a problem with the Sergeant's return. He felt that the Sergeant's (#2) circumstances did not fully apply to the situation which was provided in the *Code of Federal Regulations* and this is why they consulted with the regulator (NRC).

██████████ Security Administrator, Entergy, noted that he was involved in the records review and the authorization process. He stated that there was a Medical Officer's review of the Sergeant (#2) and the records. He stated that it appeared "OK" from the standpoint of a medical evaluation, and both SAO 128 and SAO 123. He indicated that a person may be sent for psychological evaluation regarding fitness for duty and they would look at the person from a perspective of trustworthiness and reliability. They will also look at the person's work history which is covered by the results of the background investigation. These investigations are done for them by two companies, Confidential Services and Power Systems Energy Services Inc.

██████████ noted that there was a situation involving a former security officer, and his extremely aggressive behavior. The officer had been sent for a clinical evaluation and the summary indicated that the person was not suitable to work in security at a nuclear power plant. The security officer was released from Wackenhut.

██████████ Operations Manger, provided information about another security supervisor who allegedly made "derogatory remarks" and unprofessional comments to another security officer. The problem was resolved with an apology. However, it was not alleged that the supervisor was unfit for his position.

#### Security Officer Qualifications:

A concern was raised that the new guards did not meet the minimum qualifications for the positions. In response to a request for a list of the criteria that were applied to screen all applicants, a copy of a September 6, 1994 letter from ██████████ to ██████████ regarding "Security Force Candidates," was provided. In the letter, ██████████ listed the minimum qualifications for Indian Point #2 Security Officers as follows:

- 21 years of age; and
- 24 months experience as a Law Enforcement Agent, Watchperson,

Armed Security Guard, Member of the Armed forces, or  
an A.A.S. degree in Police Science or Criminal Justice.

██████████ also wrote that Wackenhut could request a "waiver submitted in writing for applicants not meeting this requirement." In addition, he indicated that "the owner" reserved the right to make the final determination concerning the eligibility of the applicant.

#### Attrition Rates:

When evaluating the ability of the security force to meet the demands of their positions, experience in their position can be a significant factor. It is important to note that at Indian Point #2 the attrition rate for Wackenhut security officers, as of November 2001, was 18.39%. ██████████ commented that at Indian Point #3, the attrition rate is approximately 1%.

E.3 Issue: 3.. Are the Requalification Results False?

Conclusion: No, as it applies to the challenge tests and the T&Q.  
Yes, as it applies to Simunition Training, as contained in The Wackenhut Indian Point Policy #15, Rev. 0 (dated January 1, 1997), Section 3.1.1.

The primary basis for this concern was (1) that security officers were permitted to take requalification challenge tests, also known as Watchperson Tests, more than twice without being retrained and (2) the Simunition portion of tactical training was not completed as required by the T&Q.

The T&Q, Section 2.3, Requalification Requirements indicates that:  
Security Force personnel are requalified at least every 12 months in assigned duties and associated critical tasks for both normal and Contingency operations in accordance with this Plan.<sup>5</sup>

#### Requalification Challenge Test Results:

There are a series of six challenge exams. A concern had been raised that there were

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<sup>5</sup> The Wackenhut Corporation Indian Point Station Weapons Qualification Policy, Policy #4, Revision 1 (March 31, 1992) indicates in Section 3.1 that the "TWC Project Manager is responsible for ensuring that all the TWC personnel are qualified/requalified in accordance with the standards set forth in the T&Q prior to assignment to a duty position.

security officers who were permitted to take the challenge tests three times before passing, while the procedures permitted only two tests.

Interviews with the security officers indicated that there was not a common understanding of how many times an officer could fail these tests before they were required to be zero assessed and retrained. A review of the appropriate policy sections (below) indicates that the language is not clear and subject to misinterpretation. Interviews with the training staff indicated that full retraining would not result until there had been three failures. Interview results indicated that officers had been given three opportunities to pass the challenge tests; there were several officers who required the third attempt, having failed twice. There were not any concerns raised or information developed that the results contained in the records were false.

The Wackenhut Indian Point Policy #15, Rev. 0 (dated January 1, 1997) states:

- 4.1.5 If, for some reason, security personnel fail to attain 80% on any of the modules of the Initial Challenge Test, the individual will be technically relieved from duty. The individual will have the immediate opportunity to try a challenge test again after remediation training through job tasking, and/or after review of study materials.
- 4.1.6 The individual will be given the remediation training from the specific refresher lesson plan(s) and the applicable review guide(s). The individual may be given the review guide(s), lesson plan(s) to read and review on his/her own before being given a re-test.
- 4.1.7 When the individual says he/she is ready for a re-test, the training instructor or proctor will administer the test.
- 4.1.10 Failure of the challenge test after remediation will require classroom training prior to a final re-challenge test.

██████████ Training Coordinator, and ██████████ Trainer, stated that these sections have been interpreted to mean that an officer may be retested three times before having to be removed from the schedule and retrained. This has been the practice that they are familiar with at Indian Point #2 and is what they have followed.

██████████ stated that after the "first failure" the officer is not reassigned to work on site. The instructor will review the challenge test module with the officer and retest the officer. After the "second failure" the instructor will review the subject material with the officer. The instructor will also let the person read the lesson plan, before reviewing it with the person; then the person is re-tested for the third time. If

a person is being tested on site, then the person is sent to see him [REDACTED] before the third test is administered. Since this all occurs during a training day, the officer will not have been returned to a work schedule at Indian Point #2 until after the third attempt and successful pass.

#### **Tactical Training:**

There was a concern that Tactical Training, and in particular Simunition Training, as part of annual requalification was not being completed 9 out of 10 times. A review of the T&Q indicates that Simunition Training is not required for annual requalification. Interviews with the trainers and the security officers indicated that the Simunition Training was not provided in all cases and the records indicate that the security officers were listed in the training records as requalified. The Trainers indicated that certain parts of the training were simulated and that this included Simunition Training.

The Wackenhut Indian Point Policy #15, Rev. 0 (dated January 1, 1997) states:

- 3.1.1 A standard eight (8) hour class will consist of CPR requalification and tactical training with Simunition.

While the T&Q does not require Simunition Training, the training policy (#15) indicates that it will be provided. Therefore, not all of the currently requalified security officers have been requalified according to the stated Wackenhut training policy for Indian Point #2.

A Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance Report (01-S-19-SC) "Security Training & Qualification Program" issued on December 12, 2001, concluded that:

- The security guard force was found to be trained and qualified in accordance with the Indian Point #2 T&Q. However, there were numerous documentation discrepancies noted, pertaining to details in the T&Q files,
- Interviews with both security management, training instructors, supervisors, and guards showed a willingness to improve the training program....

E.4 Issue: 4. Is there is a Chilled Environment among the security officers at Indian Point #2?

Conclusion: No, as it applies to the raising of nuclear safety concerns.  
Yes, as it applies to other issues relating to the security force.

When asked, 59% of the security officers stated that they believe that a chilled

environment exists among the security force. However, they stated that this did not apply to nuclear safety issues, which they would ensure were raised. At the same time, 31% of the officers stated that they have raised nuclear safety issues and 95% stated that they have raised (general) concerns. Their belief was that the chilled environment was a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management, in areas such as administration, personnel, discipline<sup>6</sup>, and general program management. Of those officers who raised issues to management, only 42% stated that those issues were adequately addressed.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, 93% of the officers stated that they were willing to provide both positive and negative feedback to management and 98% of the officers stated that they would do so after receiving training at the site.

██████████ stated that there was "absolutely not" a chilled environment among the security force and noted that none of the 13 concerns that have been raised with them (Wackenhut) relate to retaliation. He stated that concerns, telephone calls, and conversations that he has had, do not support that. He noted that several of his managers and he have asked the officers and they have been told that they are willing to raise issues. He stated that most of the issues relate to equipment and one concern relates to not being responsive to issues. However, complaints raised during this investigation, during the Wackenhut audit in March 2001, to the ECP, and to Mr. ██████████ such as noted in the resignation letter of ██████████ would indicate otherwise.<sup>8</sup>

#### Chilled Environment: Guard Mount

There was a concern about being able to raise issues during Guard Mount meetings. When asked, 90% stated that they would raise issues during Guard Mount meetings; others had been told to raise them after the meeting. A security officer stated that he raised an issue at Guard Mount and was admonished, being told that he should not do it at that time. Entergy and Wackenhut management indicated that they wanted issues to be raised, but they also wanted the time to ensure that information was passed to the officers. They indicated that at times, they have told officers not to raise an issue or continue with a point during the Guard Mount but to see them after. It was noted that since the officers are working twelve hour shifts, they do not want to hold the officers any longer than necessary. Officers with issues could stay after to

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<sup>6</sup> See also the two 2001 discipline logs attached as Exhibits.

<sup>7</sup> See also the Suggestion List, as provided by Wackenhut project management.

<sup>8</sup> A letter from ██████████ indicates that her departure was due, in part, from problems she had after raising an EEO complaint against ██████████

discuss their concerns.

#### Questioned after ECP/NRC Meetings:

There were 4 officers (~8%) who stated that they have been questioned after meeting with the ECP or the NRC. The officers noted that they were also questioned by fellow officers, more out of curiosity than in any attempt to interfere with the process. One security officer stated that after meeting with the ECP, he was questioned by Lieutenant [REDACTED] as to why he was there and why it took so long. This officer felt that the Lieutenant was attempting to determine what he had said to the ECP.

After the first round of interviews, almost all of the guards knew some of the questions that were asked during this investigation. It was reported that even the Wackenhut Project Manager had been asking what was being asked during their interviews.

#### Retaliation:

Each security officer was asked if he/she had ever been threatened, harassed, admonished, etc after raising concerns and/or making suggestions for the improvement of security at IP#2. While two officers stated that this question did not apply to them, 12% of those responding stated "Yes." Seven individuals believed that there had been some retaliation after either raising concerns or making suggestions for improvement of security.<sup>9</sup> The merits of each of these concerns will be reported by the ECP under separate cover. There were also several strong rumors mentioned regarding retaliation against others; several officers mentioned [REDACTED] and that he had been retaliated against for raising a fitness-for-duty issue about fatigue.

In particular, a Sergeant (#3) felt that he had been targeted by Wackenhut management and that [REDACTED] was "out to get him." The Sergeant (#3) stated that [REDACTED] asked another Sergeant (#4) to "keep an eye on" him and stated that the Sergeant (#3) "had a bad temper." The Sergeant (#4) recalled being asked by Mr. [REDACTED] if the other Sergeant (#3) "had blown up on him" yet. When asked about his

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<sup>9</sup> Copies of the interview reports of these seven security officers were formally forwarded to the ECP Manager in a letter dated December 17, 2001. The Manager has indicated that each officer will be interviewed about this issue and their concerns investigated.

<sup>10</sup> [REDACTED] claim about retaliation is currently under investigation by the NRC and was the basis for a Wackenhut Audit to determine if there was a "chilled effect" on the security force as a result of his dismissal. [REDACTED] filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and reached a settlement with Wackenhut.

comment, [REDACTED] stated that he may have asked the Sergeant (#4) that question, but he does not recall it. In addition, [REDACTED] provided copies of Information Reports and a memorandum relating to unprofessional conduct by the Sergeant (#3).

A Sergeant (#5) complained about problems on the night shift, stating that he was threatened by [REDACTED] when he did not conform. The Sergeant (#5) stated that Lieutenant [REDACTED] allegedly told him that if things were not done his [REDACTED] way, such as overlooking minor infractions, then his sergeants would take care of him, get rid of him. Lieutenant [REDACTED] denied making that statement and no additional corroboration was developed to support the Sergeant's (#5) concern.

#### **Selections for Positions/Promotion Policy:**

It was alleged that selections for positions were not made on the basis of merit. This included promotions to Lieutenant, and the selection of the Training Coordinator, Trainer, and assignment to the Attachment 3 team. The source of this concern believed that this was having an adverse effect on morale, which could have an adverse effect on plant security.

Mr. [REDACTED] was asked whether he followed the Wackenhut Corporation Indian Point Promotion Policy (#7) for past promotions. He stated that normally (99%) they do follow the policy, but not always, such as with the selection of Lieutenant [REDACTED].<sup>11</sup> However, he could not specifically recall the promotions of the last couple of years and specifically whether the policy was followed. He noted that they will usually have a promotion board, interviews, scoring etc. He maintains these records. He agreed to locate the records and advise the undersigned when this had been done. However, [REDACTED] only provided the records for one selection panel.<sup>12</sup> He indicated that he could not locate the records of any others. The promotion policy in the Wackenhut Security Officer Handbook (Handbook) is less definitive than Policy #7.

Attachment 3 is a special assignment that was offered to five security officers (four of whom are Sergeants).<sup>13</sup> While this was not a promotion, the participating officers

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<sup>11</sup> Several officers proffered that [REDACTED] was promoted because he was not a party to the lawsuit against Wackenhut, as opposed to him being the best qualified candidate.

<sup>12</sup> It is not clear from the records that were provided, what selection was made, for what position, and when the selection was made.

<sup>13</sup> Those individuals are: [REDACTED]



generally worked regular office hours, Monday through Friday, with weekends off; to many officers, this seemed to be a reward. It was also presumed by many that since the project involved a review of the plant's defensive strategy, the officers who were assigned to the project would have special skills in this area.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he was not consulted and initially did not agree with the selections. He had concerns about the selections and he voiced his concerns to Mr. [REDACTED]. He asked Mr. [REDACTED] why he was not consulted and was told that he [REDACTED] would probably not have agreed with Mr. [REDACTED] selections. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) [REDACTED] and he selected the participants, although he did listen to input from other SSSs. He noted that this was a detail and not a promotion. However, Mr. [REDACTED] stated, as the project was coming to a close, that he [REDACTED] wanted to promote one of the participants for the work that was done on the Attachment 3 assignment. There was a significant amount of discontent among the officers about who was selected, not only because of their skills (or lack thereof), but because of the discipline records of three of the individuals. The closed nature of the selections has had a negative impact on the morale of the security force.

#### Failure to Uniformly Administer Discipline:

There were numerous complaints about the inequitable manner in which discipline is meted out by Wackenhut management, and, in particular, Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he follows the discipline policy contained in the Handbook and not the more specific policy contained in the Wackenhut Nuclear Services Division Procedure Manual, Progressive Discipline, Number 108, Revision 0 (Effective October 15, 1999). When asked about the latter, he stated that he has not read Wackenhut's Progressive Discipline policy. The Handbook lists the following as grounds for immediate dismissal:

- Malicious (sexual) harassment of fellow employees,
- "Horseplay," and
- Job performance that is unacceptable.

The Handbook does not provide for any special conditions, nor does it list how these three offenses are to be dealt with from a progressive discipline perspective. Policy 108 is more specific in providing additional guidance. Numerous officers complained how discipline for tardiness was strictly enforced with some officers and ignored or treated lightly with others. There were also complaints about how substantiated claims of sexual harassment brought about little apparent disciplinary action and

certainly did not result in termination.<sup>14</sup> There were also complaints about how officers with an ongoing discipline history (including six months of probation) were selected for special assignments, such as Attachment 3. Two incidents appeared to be particularly troublesome to the security officers. They did not understand how three officers could respectively receive two, three, and four week suspensions (and six months probation) for throwing snowballs on post (CR# 200100518), while another officer abandoned his post (during a stated of heightened awareness) to go to the cafeteria which resulted in a four hour suspension on a Friday, with his weekend days off.

### Sexual Harassment

As noted above, there have been several complaints about sexual harassment which were brought to the attention of Wackenhut management. Mr. [REDACTED] acknowledged receiving most of the complaints. He stated that Information Reports on sensitive matters, such as EEO complaints are not always logged in until after the investigation is complete. If someone files a complaint on a plain white sheet of paper, then it would not be logged in at all. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he has people place their concerns on a plain white sheet of paper for privacy reasons. If the concerns are placed on an Information Report or Incident Report, the reports are logged and published, available for anyone to read. He does not maintain a central log for EEO complaints.

While Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he has never received an EEO complaint on Mr. [REDACTED] he indicated that there has been criticism, but no formal complaints. However, [REDACTED] stated that she filed a written complaint about Mr. [REDACTED] with Mr. [REDACTED]. She has also had several conversations with [REDACTED] supervisor, Mr. [REDACTED]. She believes that the issues are currently under review and being currently addressed by [REDACTED].

Several security officers noted that they have been told to write their concerns on plain white sheets of paper instead of Information Reports. They noted that issues raised in this manner would not be logged in and their concerns would be lost. [REDACTED] acknowledged that he has asked people to do this, but stated that it was only to protect their privacy. This method, whatever the stated basis, can lead to the loss of concerns/complaints and could also be easily abused. All concerns/complaints

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<sup>14</sup> A request was made of [REDACTED] to review the investigations and discipline records relating to sexual harassment complaints. The reporting investigator was told that they could not be located and were, therefore, not available for review. However, several Wackenhut employees recalled complaints that they made. While some action was taken, the discipline did not result in any terminations.

should be reported, receipted, and logged, with a reporting number provided to the person raising the concern. This will ensure the integrity of the reporting process.

A Sergeant (#6) stated that Wackenhut has a "problem with diversity" and he raised several EEO issues with Mr. [REDACTED] on December 13, 2001. He complained about the statements and conduct of other officers and will be documenting his concerns in a letter to Mr. [REDACTED]. He agreed to provide a copy of that letter to Mr. [REDACTED].

#### Failure to Report Guard Complaints:

A Sergeant (#7) raised an issue about being directed by Mr. [REDACTED] to write his complaints on a plain white sheet of paper instead of using an Information Report (IR), which would be numbered and documented. Other officers acknowledged being given plain white paper on which to document their concerns as opposed to the use of a form (such as an Information Report). Mr. [REDACTED] admitted doing this but only with regard to private matters, where the person would prefer not to have their issues in a log for everyone to read. Mr. [REDACTED] noted that an EEO issue would be an example of something that he believes a person would not want to see published in an Information Log Book. As noted above, Mr. [REDACTED] was asked to make the EEO files available for review, but none were provided.<sup>15</sup>

#### E5 Issue: 5. Is there a Failure to Provide Adequate Security for Safeguards Information?

Conclusion: Yes.

In response to a concern about security for Safeguards Information, 4 (~7%) security officers identified a problem in this area. One problem dated back to 2000 and related to the security of training modules and exams, and the handling of those documents by one Lieutenant. When the problem was reported to management (Wackenhut and ConEd) in October 2000, it was not perceived as a Safeguards issue and no action was taken.

The problem occurred at a time when exams were being administered by Sergeants and Lieutenants, and the former Training Coordinator was seriously ill. A Sergeant (#8) reported that the Watchperson (Requalification) Exams, which were labeled as Safeguards Information, had been taken off-site by Lieutenant [REDACTED]. He

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<sup>15</sup> See also the resignation letter of [REDACTED], received on October 5, 2001.

recalled that Lieutenant [REDACTED] took Exam 1205A<sup>16</sup> and the answer key home. He had to ask Varga to return the exam so he could administer it.

In an e-mail dated October 16, 2000 to Messrs. [REDACTED], Lieutenant [REDACTED] wrote of the "disarray" she found in the training department. She noted that "additional training sheets LP4100 ...are missing and that when she "looked in the safe for test #4107.1A it was missing"; she indicated that Lieutenant [REDACTED] "had mixed it in with his paperwork at home."

In 2001, there was a new Training Coordinator and none of the comments by the security officers reflected problems with his management of the program. However, in trying to determine which of the identified training modules were safeguards and which were not, it took several attempts to locate the questioned modules and identify their appropriate markings.<sup>17</sup> Another officer indicated that on one occasion, he saw unprotected Safeguards material and then secured it.<sup>18</sup> There was also a Security Officer who believed there was a failure to provide adequate security when "plans or blueprints were found inside the...desk of someone who left the plant," and that a CR was written on the incident.

**E.6 Issue: 6.** Was false information provided in the Wackenhut Chilling Report which was presented to Indian Point #2 management?

**Conclusion:** Yes. The results of this investigation are inconsistent with the results of the Wackenhut report on the issue of chilled environment. This is based on (1) the recollections of the security officers of what they told to the interviewers and not on the notes/records of those interviews, (2) the witness statements during this investigation on whether a chilled environment existed, and (3) the conclusions of this report.

It was alleged that the results of this report were "false," that there is and was a

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<sup>16</sup> Although the 1200 series lesson plans and exams were labeled as Safeguard, upon further review, the labels were inappropriate. In December 2001, Mr. [REDACTED] reviewed the material and stated that the markings would be removed.

<sup>17</sup> When comparing earlier training plans/exams with later versions, the trainers could not explain why the markings of the earlier documents were not carried over to the later ones. They proffered that these were marking errors. They agreed to check the markings with [REDACTED]

<sup>18</sup> There have been other safeguards violations, such as CR #s 200100285 and 200100443, but they were not identified by the security officer respondents during this investigation.

chilled environment, and that security officers are concerned about retaliation. The alleged proffered that they are not willing to go forward because the Wackenhut Report did not truthfully report what the security officers said and a fair investigation will not be done.

During their interviews, most of the security officers were critical of the results of the Wackenhut Chilling Report conducted in March 2001 by TWC. This was done to "evaluate if a 'chilling effect' existed, or resulted from, a June 2000 human resources management action involving the termination of a security officer" at Indian Point #2. Over an eight day period, two auditors interviewed 80 (95.2%) TWC personnel from each of the functional work groups. Their conclusion was that "No chilling effect was indicated from the candid responses received during the interview process, nor a hesitation to report any concern or safety issue in the past, or future." This determination was based on the results of a Wackenhut protocol which used three questions:

- Are you aware of the various programs available to bring concerns and issues forward, including going directly to the NRC?
- Are you comfortable in using any of the programs? If not, Why?
- Have you ever brought any issues forward to TWC management?

The interviewers never asked the direct question of whether the security officers believed that a "chilled environment" or a "chilling effect" existed among the security force or was a result of the termination of Mr. [REDACTED]. In addition, there were not any questions within the protocol on the issue of "retaliation," a significant factor when determining if a "chilled environment" exists.

During this investigation, several officers recalled telling TWC auditors that they thought that a chilled environment did exist as a result of that termination. Others indicated that there was a reluctance to raise issues as a result of the termination of Mr. [REDACTED]. Most of the officers who saw the report stated that they did not believe that their concerns were adequately addressed by the TWC report. Others stated that they were reluctant to be open and candid to the interviewer, when he told them of a close personal relationship with Mr. [REDACTED]. One security officer reported that comments he made to Mr. [REDACTED] during the investigation came back to him in a conversation with management.<sup>19</sup>

The officers further indicated that their responses in March were similar to the responses that they provided during this investigation. On the issue of a chilled environment, 59% believe that a chilled environment exists. However, the report did

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<sup>19</sup> The Security Officer believed that officers' comments were passed on to management. He was told that such comments were not welcomed as criticism.

identify several problems which are also relevant to the comments made and the results of this investigation. The Wackenhut report indicated that

- some of the TWC supervisory cadre are not trusted by the security force to properly and professionally address issues or concerns;
- perceived problem behaviors were the result of feedback/communication, lack of understanding, or lack of personnel management skills by supervision;
- security officers are "more often 'in the dark' about emerging issues and changes that affect their performance on the job"; and
- the lack of feedback caused a perception that "management did not care."

#### Concern About the ECP:

An allegor did not believe that there was a fair outcome of either the ECP investigation of SSS [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] or Wackenhut's evaluation of a chilled environment (as noted above). Because of these two facts, the allegor felt that the other security officers would be concerned about retaliation by Wackenhut.

The ECP investigation of SSS Finnigan was based on concerns raised in an anonymous letter, dated August 6, 2001, to Mr. [REDACTED] Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations, ConEd. The ECP investigation related to the lack of supervisory skills on the part of SSS Finnigan and SSS [REDACTED] and the effect of this deficiency on the security force. The recommended action was supervisory training for both individuals, without any disciplinary action. Because this was an anonymous concern, there was not any feedback to an allegor nor was the outcome of this investigation published.<sup>20</sup> While the allegor has some concern about the validity of the Wackenhut Chilling Report (above), neither the allegor nor the interviewed security officers alleged that there was an act of retaliation which resulted from comments that were made to the two Wackenhut auditors. However, one security officer noted that he believed that his comments were passed on to management, and he was told that such comments were not welcomed. In addition, there were not any comments that if an issue were raised to the ECP that some form of retaliation would result. However, it is noted that 4 officers were asked about what they may have said to the ECP or the NRC.

There was no evidence developed during this investigation to indicate that there was any concern about raising an issue to the ECP or that there has been any retaliation for having gone to the ECP or participated in an ECP investigation.

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<sup>20</sup> It should also be noted that as an anonymous concern, there were not any issues relating to the identification of the allegor or retaliation.

**F. Investigator's Note**

Entergy has retained consultants to review and improve security at Indian Point #2; preliminary changes to the defensive positions and strategy have already been made. Entergy has also organized a team to consolidate the security plans of the two units and ensure that the technical systems and strategies are compatible. The security officers favorably commented on the new support and respect they have received from the Vice President Operations. As noted above, a majority of the officers have articulated improvements which they feel are necessary to present a strong defense and repel any threat. They believe that Entergy management is concerned about security and noted that the time that was taken to listen to their concerns during this investigation is evidence of that. The officers appear optimistic that changes will occur and look to Entergy to effect some of those changes over the next several months.

G.

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit

Witnesses

- 1 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 12, 2001
- 2 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 13, 2001
- 3 Interview of [REDACTED] and W. Ratschki, dated December 11, 2001
- 4 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2001
- 5 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 27, 2001
- 6 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 20, 2001
- 7 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 28, 2001
- 8 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 30, 2001
- 9 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 2, 2001
- 10 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 21, 2001
- 11 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 30, 2001
- 12 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 21 and 28, 2001
- 13 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 26, 2001
- 14 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 18, 2001
- 15 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 11, 2001
- 16 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 21, 2001
- 17 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 29, 2001
- 18 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2001
- 19 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 3, 2001
- 20 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 11, 2001
- 21 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 19, 2001
- 22 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 27, 2001
- 23 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2001
- 24 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 30, 2001
- 25 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 20, 2001
- 26 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 4, 2001
- 27 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 21, 2001
- 28 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2001
- 29 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 30, 2001
- 30 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 29, 2001
- 31 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 1, 2001
- 32 Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 19, 2001
- 33 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 2, 2001
- 34 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 3, 2001
- 35 Interview of [REDACTED] dated December 4, 2001



36 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 2, 2001  
37 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 28, 2001  
38 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 20, 2001  
39 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 27, 2001  
40 Memorandum for the Record, re: P. [REDACTED], dated December 7, 2001  
41 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 30, 2001  
42 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 28, 2001  
43 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 3, 2001  
44 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 19, 2001  
45 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 1, 2001  
46 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 21, 2001  
47 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 29, 2001  
48 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 25, 2001  
49 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 4, 2001  
50 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 4, 2001  
51 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 20 and December 4, 2001  
52 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 3, 2001  
53 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 25, 2001  
54 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 28, 2001  
55 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 25, 2001  
56 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 28, 2001  
57 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 29, 2001  
58 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 26, 2001  
59 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 25, 2001  
60 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 3, 2001  
61 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 2, 2001  
62 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 5, 2001  
63 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 30, 2001  
64 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 1, 2001  
65 Interview of [REDACTED], dated December 12, 2001  
66 Interview of [REDACTED], dated November 21, 2001

## Documents

### Exhibit

- 67 Base Question Summary Table
- 68 Security Officer Response Table
- 69 Letter from G. [REDACTED] to J. [REDACTED], dated September 6, 1994
- 70 ECP Investigation by K. Finucan, dated August 9, 2001
- 71 Wackenhut Nuclear Services Division, Procedure Manual, Number 108  
Revision 0, "Progressive Discipline," dated October 15, 1999
- 72 Wackenhut Nuclear Services Division, Procedure Manual, Number 110  
Revision 0, "Incident Investigation," dated January 2, 1999
- 73 E-mail from R. [REDACTED] to L. [REDACTED] and J. [REDACTED], re: Training Disarray,  
dated October 16, 2000
- 74 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], re: Continued Harassment from  
[REDACTED], dated May 31, 2000
- 75 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], undated
- 76 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #4 Revision 4 Revision 1, "Weapons  
Qualification Policy," dated March 31, 1992
- 77 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #7 Revision 1, "Promotion Policy,"  
dated March 31, 1997
- 78 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #14 Revision 4, "Safety Policy," dated  
November 14, 2001
- 79 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #15 Revision 0, "Watchperson  
Requalification Challenge Test," dated January 1, 1997
- 80 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #16 Revision 0, "Employee Concerns  
Policy," dated May 1, 2001
- 81 TWC Indian Point Station Policy #17 Revision 0, "Employee Suggestion  
Program," dated June 7, 2001
- 82 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], re: Snowball Incident  
1/12/01, dated January 15, 2001
- 83 Surveillance Report No. 01-S-19-SC, "Security Training & Qualification  
Program," dated December 12, 2001
- 84 Letter from [REDACTED], re: DOL OSHA Finding, dated March  
22, 2001, with Audit Report Number 01-CED-011-02 (dated March 20,  
2001) attached
- 85 Memorandum from [REDACTED], re: Accusations Against a  
Supervisor, dated February 9, 2001, with attachments
- 86 Wackenhut Security Officer Handbook, dated November 10, 1997
- 87 Supervisors Disciplinary Action Log 2001
- 88 Security Officer Disciplinary Action Log 2001

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Month & Year-To-Date Attrition Form for Calendar Year - 2001  
Condition Reporting System, Nuclear Security CRs:

- CR# 200100285,
- CR# 200100443, and
- CR# 200100518

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Wackenhut Suggestion List

Resignation Letter from [REDACTED], dated October 5, 2001

Memorandum for the Record, re: [REDACTED] dated December 21, 2001