Environmental issues associated with postulated accidents are discussed in the *Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants* (GEIS), NUREG-1437, Volumes 1 and 2 (NRC 1996, 1999a).<sup>(a)</sup> The GEIS included a determination of whether the analysis of the environmental issue could be applied to all plants and whether additional mitigation measures would be warranted. Issues were assigned a Category 1 or a Category 2 designation. As set forth in the GEIS, Category 1 issues are those that meet all of the following criteria:

- (1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants having a specific type of cooling system or other specified plant or site characteristic.
- (2) Single significance level (i.e., SMALL, MODERATE, or LARGE) has been assigned to the impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from high-level waste and spent fuel disposal).
- (3) Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures are likely not to be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation.

For issues that meet the three Category 1 criteria, no additional plant-specific analysis is required unless new and significant information is identified.

Category 2 issues are those that do not meet one or more of the criteria for Category 1, and therefore, additional plant-specific review of these issues is required.

This chapter describes the environmental impacts from postulated accidents that might occur during the license renewal term.

# 5.1 Postulated Plant Accidents

Two classes of accidents are evaluated in the GEIS. These are design-basis accidents (DBAs) and severe accidents, as discussed below.

<sup>(</sup>a) The GEIS was originally issued in 1996. Addendum 1 to the GEIS was issued in 1999. Hereafter, all references to the "GEIS" include the GEIS and Addendum 1.

### **Design-Basis Accidents**

In order to receive approval from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to operate a nuclear power facility, an applicant must submit a safety analysis report (SAR) as part of its application. The SAR presents the design criteria and design information for the proposed reactor and comprehensive data on the proposed site. The SAR also discusses various hypothetical accident situations and the safety features that are provided to prevent and mitigate accidents. The NRC staff reviews the application to determine whether the plant design meets the Commission's regulations and requirements and includes, in part, the nuclear plant design and its anticipated response to an accident.

DBAs are those accidents that both the licensee and the NRC staff evaluate to ensure that the plant can withstand normal and abnormal transients, and a broad spectrum of postulated accidents without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. A number of these postulated accidents are not expected to occur during the life of the plant but are evaluated to establish the design basis for the preventive and mitigative safety systems of the facility. The acceptance criteria for DBAs are described in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 100.

The environmental impacts of DBAs are evaluated during the initial license process, and the ability of the plant to withstand these accidents is demonstrated to be acceptable before issuance of the operating license (OL). The results of these evaluations are found in license documentation such as the applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and the Final Environmental Statement (FES). The licensee is required to maintain the acceptable design and performance criteria throughout the life of the plant including any extended-life operation. The consequences for these events are evaluated for the hypothetical maximum exposed individual; as such, changes in the plant environment will not affect these evaluations. Because of the requirements that continuous acceptability of the consequences and aging management programs be in effect for license renewal, the environmental impacts as calculated for DBAs should not differ significantly from initial licensing assessments over the life of the plant, including the license renewal period. Accordingly, the design of the plant relative to DBAs during the extended period is considered to remain acceptable and the environmental impacts of those accidents were not examined further in the GEIS.

The Commission has determined that the environmental impacts of DBAs are of SMALL significance for all plants because the plants were designed to successfully withstand these accidents. Therefore, for the purposes of license renewal, design-basis events are designated as a Category 1 issue in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The early resolution of the DBAs make them a part of the current licensing basis of the plant; the current licensing basis of the plant is to be maintained by the licensee under its current license and,

therefore, under the provisions of 10 CFR 54.30, is not subject to review under license renewal. The issue applicable to Catawba is listed in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Category 1 Issue Applicable to Postulated Accidents During the Renewal Term

ISSUE—10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1	<b>GEIS Sections</b>
POSTULATED ACCIDENTS	
Design-basis accidents (DBAs)	5.3.2; 5.5.1

Based on information in the GEIS, the Commission found that

The NRC staff has concluded that the environmental impacts of design basis accidents are of small significance for all plants.

Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) stated in its Environmental Report (ER; Duke 2001a) that it is not aware of any new and significant information associated with the renewal of the OLs for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Catawba). The staff has not identified any significant new information during its independent review of the Catawba ER, the staff's site visit, the scoping process, or its evaluation of other available information. Therefore, the staff concludes that there are no impacts related to this issue beyond those discussed in the GEIS.

### Severe Accidents

Severe nuclear accidents are those that are more severe than DBAs because they could result in substantial damage to the reactor core, whether or not there are serious offsite consequences. In the GEIS, the staff assessed the impacts of severe accidents during the license renewal period, using the results of existing analyses and site-specific information to conservatively predict the environmental impacts of severe accidents for each plant during the renewal period.

Severe accidents initiated by external phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, and fires have not traditionally been discussed in quantitative terms in FESs and were not specifically considered for the Catawba site in the GEIS (NRC 1996). However, in the GEIS, the staff did evaluate existing impact assessments performed by NRC and by the industry at 44 nuclear plants in the United States and concluded that the risk from beyond design-basis earthquakes at existing nuclear power plants is SMALL. Additionally, the staff concluded that the risks from other external events are adequately addressed by a generic consideration of internally initiated severe accidents.

Based on information in the GEIS, the Commission found that

The probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives.

Therefore, the Commission has designated mitigation of severe accidents as a Category 2 issue in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The issue applicable to Catawba is listed in Table 5-2.

ISSUE—10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A Appendix B, Table B-1	, GEIS Sections	10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii) Subparagraph	SEIS Section
	POSTULATED ACCIDENTS		
Severe Accidents	5.3.3; 5.3.3.2;	L	5.2
	5.3.3.3; 5.3.3.4;		
	5.3.3.5; 5.4; 5.5.2		

 Table 5-2.
 Category 2 Issue Applicable to Postulated Accidents During the Renewal Term

The staff has not identified any significant new information with regard to the consequences from severe accidents during its independent review of the Catawba ER, the staff's site visit, the scoping process, or its evaluation of other available information. Therefore, the staff concludes that there are no impacts of severe accidents beyond those discussed in the GEIS. However, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L), the staff has reviewed severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) for Catawba. The results of its review are discussed in Section 5.2.

# 5.2 Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives

10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) requires that license renewal applicants consider alternatives to mitigate severe accidents if the staff has not previously evaluated SAMAs for the applicant's plant in an environmental impact statement (EIS) or related supplement or in an environmental assessment. The purpose of this consideration is to ensure that plant changes (i.e., hardware, procedures, and training) with the potential for improving severe accident safety performance are identified and evaluated. SAMAs have not been previously considered for Catawba; therefore, the remainder of Chapter 5 addresses those alternatives.

### 5.2.1 Introduction

Duke submitted an assessment of SAMAs for Catawba as part of the ER (Duke 2001a). The assessment was based on Revision 2b of the Catawba Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) (Duke 2001b), which is a full scope Level 3 PRA that includes the analysis of both internal and external events. The internal events analysis is an updated version of the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) model (Duke Power Company 1992), and the external events analysis is based on the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) model (Duke Power Company 1994). In identifying and evaluating potential SAMAs, Duke took into consideration the insights and recommendations from the Catawba PRA, as well as other studies, such as the Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternative (SAMDA) analysis for Watts Bar (NRC 1995a) and NUREG-1560 (NRC 1997c). In the ER, Duke concluded that none of the candidate SAMAs evaluated were cost-effective for Catawba.

After reviewing Duke's SAMA assessment, the staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) to Duke by letter dated November 19, 2001 (NRC 2001). Key questions concerned (1) further information on several candidate SAMAs, especially those that mitigate the consequences of a station blackout (SBO) event; (2) details on the PRA used for the SAMA analysis, including results as they pertain to containment failure and releases; and (3) the impact of including elements of averted risk that were omitted in the ER. Duke submitted additional information by a letter dated February 1, 2002 (Duke 2002a), which provided details on the updated PRA, the requested PRA results, and other information identified in the RAI (NRC 2001). Duke provided additional information in a telephone conference call with the staff on February 25, 2002 (NRC 2002a). In these responses, Duke included supplemental tables showing the impacts of including averted replacement power costs for SAMAs that have the potential to reduce core damage frequencies and averted offsite property damage costs for SAMAs that have the potential to improve containment performance - both of which were omitted in the original analysis. Also, Duke presented its position on the value of providing back-up hydrogen control capability during SBO events. Duke's responses addressed the staff's concerns and reaffirmed that none of the SAMAs would be cost-beneficial. However, based on review of the cost and benefit information provided by Duke, the staff concludes that two SAMAs are costbeneficial under the assumptions presented. One cost-beneficial SAMA involves plant and procedure modifications to enable the existing hydrogen control (igniter) system to be powered from an ac-independent power source in SBO events. Duke has not implemented this SAMA at Catawba; this issue is currently being addressed by the NRC as part of the resolution of Generic Safety Issue 189 - Susceptibility of Ice-Condenser and Mark III Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion During a Severe Accident (NRC 2002b). The other costbeneficial SAMA involves installing a watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers in the basement of the turbine building. Duke has not implemented this SAMA at Catawba; this issue has been identified for follow-up as a current operating plant issue at Catawba. By letter

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dated August 8, 2002, Duke committed to designing and scheduling the installation of flood protection for the 6900/4160 V transformers (Duke 2002c).

The staff's assessment of SAMAs for Catawba follows.

## 5.2.2 Estimate of Risk for Catawba, Units 1 and 2

Duke's estimates of offsite risk at Catawba are summarized below. The summary is followed by the staff's review of Duke's risk estimates.

### 5.2.2.1 Duke's Risk Estimates

The Catawba PRA model, which forms the basis for the SAMA analysis, is a Level 3 risk analysis; that is, it includes the treatment of core damage frequency, containment performance, and offsite consequences. The model, which Duke refers to as PRA, Revision 2b (Duke 2001b), consists of an internal events analysis based on an updated version of the original IPE (Catawba PRA, Revision 1; Duke Power Company 1992) and an external events analysis based on the current version of the IPEEE (Duke Power Company 1994). The calculated total core damage frequency (CDF) for internal and external events in Revision 2b of the Catawba PRA is  $5.8 \times 10^{-5}$  per year.

The Catawba PRA is a "living" PRA. The original version of the IPE has been updated to reflect various design and procedural changes, such as those related to the improvements identified in the IPE and to reflect operational experience. The CDF for internal and external events was reduced from 7.8×10<sup>-5</sup> per year (Revision 1) to 5.8×10<sup>-5</sup> per year (Revision 2b). The Level 1 PRA changes associated with the Catawba PRA Revision 2b model included:

- incorporation of updated data for component reliability, unavailabilities, initiating event frequencies, common cause failures, and human error probabilities
- conversion from a sequence-based solution to a single-top fault tree
- modifications to reflect changes to the plant configuration.

The most significant plant enhancement incorporated was providing back-up cooling to one of the two high-head charging pumps. In an event in which normal cooling to the high-head charging pumps is lost, a means to provide back-up cooling from the drinking water supply was implemented to reduce the likelihood of a reactor coolant pump seal loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Another important change occurred in the interfacing systems LOCA (ISLOCA) evaluation. The generic database adopted for the Revision 2b analysis had significantly higher

failure rates for valve ruptures. This resulted in a significant increase in the CDF contributed by the ISLOCA, an important risk contributor.

The breakdown of the CDF from Revision 2b to the PRA is provided in Table 5-3. Internal event initiators represent about 80 percent of the total CDF and are composed of transients (24 percent of total CDF), LOCAs (29 percent of total CDF), internal flood (24 percent of total CDF), and reactor pressure vessel rupture (2 percent of total CDF). Remaining contributors together account for less than 3 percent of total CDF. External event initiators represent about 20 percent of total CDF and are composed of seismic initiators (15 percent of total CDF), tornado initiators (4 percent of total CDF), and fire initiators (2 percent of the total CDF). Although not explicitly reported in Table 5-3, SBO events account for 43 percent of the total CDF for internal and external events in Revision 2b of the PRA (Duke 2002a).

Initiating Event	Frequency (per year)	Percent of Total CDF
Transients	1.4x10⁻⁵	24
Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)	1.7x10⁻⁵	29
Internal flood	1.4x10⁻⁵	24
Anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)	3.0x10 <sup>-7</sup>	<1
Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR)	3.6x10⁻ <sup>8</sup>	<1
Reactor pressure vessel rupture	1.0x10 <sup>-6</sup>	2
Interfacing system LOCA (ISLOCA)	2.5x10⁻ <sup>7</sup>	<1
CDF from internal events	4.7x10⁻⁵	81
Seismic	8.5x10⁻ <sup>6</sup>	15
Tornado	2.1x10 <sup>-6</sup>	4
Fire	1.2x10 <sup>-6</sup>	2
CDF from external events	1.1x10 <sup>-5</sup>	19
Total CDF	5.8x10⁻⁵	100

Table 5-3.	Catawba Core	Damage	Frequency	(Revision 2	2b of PRA)
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The Level 2 (also called containment performance) portion of the Catawba PRA model, Revision 2b, is essentially the same as the IPE Level 2 analysis. However, the following changes were made:

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- modification of the containment event tree (CET) logic regarding the potential for corium contact with the containment liner
- recognition that the refueling water storage tank inventory would drain through a failed reactor vessel in some sequences (e.g., SBO); this was factored into the CET logic.

These changes resulted in a slight increase in the potential for early containment failure as a result of corium contact with the containment liner and a reduction in basemat melt-through due to reactor cavity flooding via the reactor vessel breach.

The offsite consequences and economic impact analyses (i.e., Level 3 PRA Analyses) were carried out using the NRC-developed MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) code. Inputs for this analysis include plant and site-specific input values for core radionuclide inventory, source term and release fractions, meteorological data, projected population distribution, and emergency response evacuation modeling.

Duke estimated the dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) of the Catawba site from all initiators (internal and external) to be 0.314 person-sieverts (Sv) (31.4 person-rem) per year (Duke 2001a). The breakdown of the total population dose by containment end-state is summarized in Table 5-4. Internal events account for approximately 0.21 person-Sv

Containment End State	Percent of Total Dose – Internal Initiators	Percent of Total Dose – External Initiators	Percent of Total Dose – All Initiators
STGR <sup>(a)</sup>	0.2	<0.1	0.2
ISLOCA <sup>(a)</sup>	8.3	0.0	8.3
Containment isolation failure	<0.1	1.0	1.0
Early containment failure	13.2	9.9	23.1
Late containment failure	45.1	22.1	67.2
Basemat melt-through	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
No containment failure	0.1	<0.1	0.1
Total	66.9	33.1	100

# **Table 5-4**. Breakdown of Population Dose by Containment End-State<br/>(Total dose = 0.314 person-Sv [31.4 person-rem] per year)

(a) Containment bypass events

(21.0 person-rem) per year, and external events account for approximately 0.104 person-Sv (10.4 person-rem) per year. As can be seen from this table, early and late containment failures account for the majority of the population dose.

### 5.2.2.2 Review of Duke's Risk Estimates

Duke's determination of offsite risk impacts at Catawba is based on the Revision 2b of the Catawba PRA and a separate MACCS2 analysis. For the purposes of this review, the staff considered the Catawba study in terms of the following major elements:

- the Level 1 and 2 risk models that form the bases for the September 1992 IPE submittal (Duke Power Company 1992)
- the major modifications to the IPE models that have been incorporated in Revision 2b of the PRA (Duke 2001b)
- the external events models that form the basis for the June 1994 IPEEE submittal (Duke Power Company 1994)
- the analyses performed to translate fission product release frequencies from the Level 2 PRA model into offsite consequence measures (Duke 2001a).

The staff reviewed each of these analyses to determine the acceptability of Duke's risk estimates for the SAMA analysis, as summarized below.

The staff's review of the Catawba IPE is described in a staff report dated June 7, 1994 (NRC 1994). In that review, the staff evaluated the methodology, models, data, and assumptions used to estimate the CDF and characterize containment performance and fission product releases. The staff concluded that Duke's analysis met the intent of Generic Letter 88-20 (NRC 1988), which means the IPE was of adequate quality to be used to look for design or operational vulnerabilities. The staff's review primarily focused on the licensee's ability to examine Catawba for severe accident vulnerabilities and not specifically on the detailed findings or quantification estimates. Overall, the staff concluded that the Catawba IPE was of adequate quality to be used as a tool in searching for areas with high potential for risk reduction and to assess such risk reductions, especially when the risk models are used in conjunction with insights, such as those from risk importance, sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses.

The staff's review of the Catawba IPEEE is described in a safety evaluation report dated April 12, 1999 (NRC 1999b). Duke did not identify any fundamental weaknesses or vulnerabilities to severe accident risk with regard to the external events. In the safety evaluation report, the staff concluded that the IPEEE met the intent of Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 (NRC 1991), and that the licensee's IPEEE process is capable of identifying the most likely severe accidents and severe accident vulnerabilities.

The staff reviewed the process used by Duke to extend the containment performance (Level 2) portion of the IPE to the offsite consequence (Level 3) assessment. This included consideration of the source terms used to characterize fission product releases for each containment release category and the major input assumptions used in the offsite consequence analyses. This information is provided in Section 6.3 of Duke's IPE submittal. Duke used the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) code to analyze postulated accidents and develop radiological source terms for each of 29 containment release categories used to represent the containment end-states. These source terms were incorporated as input to the MACCS2 analysis. The staff reviewed Duke's source term estimates for the major release categories and found these predictions to be in reasonable agreement with estimates of NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990) for the closest corresponding release scenarios. The staff concludes that the assignment of source terms is acceptable.

The plant-specific input to the MACCS2 code includes the Catawba reactor core radionuclide inventory, emergency response evacuation modeling based on Catawba evacuation time estimate studies, release category source terms from the Catawba PRA, Revision 2b, analysis (same as the source terms used in the IPE), site-specific meteorological data, and projected population distribution within a 80-km (50-mi) radius for the year 2040.

MACCS2 requires a file of hourly meteorological data consisting of wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability category, and precipitation. For the Catawba SAMA analysis, the meteorological data was obtained from the meteorological tower located on the Catawba site; the meteorological data used in MACCS2 contained data for one year, January 1 through December 31, 1991.

The Catawba PRA, Revision 2b, and the SAMA offsite consequence analyses use three distinct evacuation schemes in order to adequately represent evacuation time estimates for the permanent resident population, the transient population, and the special facility population (schools, hospitals, etc.). The three groups are defined by the time delay from initial notification to start of evacuation. For each evacuation scheme, the fraction of the population starting their evacuation is included. For the permanent resident evacuation schemes, it was assumed that 5 percent of the population would delay evacuation for 24 hours after being warned to evacuate. The delay time and fraction of population for the remaining two schemes was developed from information given in the latest update to the Catawba evacuation time estimate study for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The evacuation speed, sheltering, and shielding considerations. In the Catawba evacuation model, only the 10-mile EPZ is assumed to be involved in the initial evacuation. The MACCS2 model assumes that persons outside of the 10-mile EPZ will wait 24 hours before evacuating (provided that radiological conditions warrant evacuation).

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The staff reviewed the Duke responses (Duke 2002a) to questions regarding meteorological data, population data, and emergency planning. The responses confirmed that Duke used appropriate values for the consequence analysis.

The staff also reviewed the Duke responses (Duke 2002a) to questions regarding the low frequency of steam generator tube ruptures (SGTR) accidents (3.6×10<sup>-8</sup> per year). Duke explained the low value as largely due to the use of IPE success criteria, under which sequences are categorized as successes if core damage occurs beyond 24 hours, an assumption not in accordance with current, generally accepted industry practice. Duke indicated that the next revision of the Catawba PRA will reflect this correction. The staff notes that the impact of this correction can be sizable, as demonstrated in Duke's revision to the McGuire PRA, in which the frequency of SGTR accidents increased by a factor of 600 (NRC 2002d). However, even with the higher SGTR frequency, the maximum benefit associated with completely eliminating SGTR events at McGuire was estimated to be about \$100,000 (present worth for the 20-year license renewal period). Previous analyses of severe accidents mitigation alternatives (e.g., for advanced light water reactors) have shown that implementation costs for alternatives to prevent or mitigate SGTR events would be expensive (on the order of several million dollars). The staff concludes it is unlikely that a cost-beneficial alternative could be implemented to substantially reduce SGTR risk given the low expected benefits and the high implementation costs.

The staff concludes that the methodology used by Duke to estimate the CDF and offsite consequences for Catawba provides an acceptable basis from which to proceed with an assessment of the risk reduction potential for candidate SAMAs. Additionally, the risk profile used is similar to other PWRs with ice-condenser containments. Accordingly, the staff bases its assessment of offsite risk on the CDF and population doses reported by Duke.

## 5.2.3 Potential Design Improvements

This section discusses the process for identifying potential design improvements, the staff's evaluation of this process, and the design improvements evaluated in detail by Duke.

## 5.2.3.1 Process for Identifying Potential Design Improvements

Duke's process for identifying potential plant improvements consisted of the following elements:

• The core damage cut sets from Revision 2b of the Catawba PRA were reviewed to identify potential SAMAs that could reduce CDF.

- The Fussell-Vesely (F-V) importance measures were evaluated for the basic events (including initiating events, random failure events, human error events, and maintenance/testing unavailabilities), and the importance ranking was examined to identify any events of significant F-V importance.
- Potential enhancements to reduce containment failure modes of concern for Catawba (including early containment failure, containment isolation failure, and containment bypass) were reviewed for possible implementation.

In addition, Duke reviewed the Watts Bar SAMDA analysis (NRC 1995a), and insights from the staff's generic report on the IPE (NRC 1997c) to identify additional SAMAs.

As a starting point for the core damage cut set review, Duke developed a listing of the top 100 cut sets (severe accident sequences) based on internal initiators and the top 100 cut sets for external initiators. These 200 sequences include all potential core damage sequences with at least a 0.08 percent contribution to the total CDF. Additionally, some cut sets contributing as little as 0.01 percent to the total CDF were considered. Duke reviewed the cut sets to identify potential SAMAs that could reduce CDF. A cutoff value of  $5.8 \times 10^{-7}$  per year (for internal and external event initiators) was used to screen events. To account for the cumulative effect of cut sets below this cutoff value, the basic events importance measure was also used to identify potential enhancements, as discussed below. Duke indicated in response to the requests for additional information (RAIs) that the estimated CDF for the 200 cut sets is  $4.1 \times 10^{-5}$  per year, which is about 71 percent of the total CDF (Duke 2002a).

For each seismic initiator cut set, Duke calculated the associated offsite risk based on the population dose and CDF for the plant damage states (PDSs) attributable to the seismic initiator. Duke conservatively assumed that the implementation of plant enhancements for seismic events would completely eliminate the seismic risk and calculated the present worth of the averted risk based on a \$2000 per person-rem (\$200,000 per person-Sv) conversion factor, a discount factor of 7 percent, and a 20-year license renewal period. This process was repeated for each of the remaining seismic initiator cut sets above the cutoff frequency. The present worth of averted risk for all of the seismic cut sets combined was estimated to be about \$316,000 (not including the cost of replacement power and offsite property damage, the significance of which is discussed in Section 5.2.6.2). On the basis of the small risk reduction achievable (0.08 person-Sv [8.0 person-rem]) and the large costs associated with substantial seismic upgrades (estimated at several million dollars), Duke eliminated seismic SAMAs from further consideration.

Duke reviewed the F-V Basic Event Importance Ranking presented in the Catawba PRA report, Revision 2b, and identified several basic events for further consideration. These included seismic-related events, initiating events, equipment failures, and human-error events. Seismic-related events were not evaluated further for reasons discussed above. Five potential enhancements for reducing CDF were identified through this process and are presented in Table 5-5.

In the ER, Duke stated that two design options – installing a watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers in the turbine building basement and moving the 6900/4160 V transformers – were evaluated as part of a previous design study for Catawba to address concerns raised in the IPE over a turbine building flood causing an extended loss of offsite power. Neither of these options were considered cost-effective at that time. At the staff's request (NRC 2001), Duke provided further information regarding the addition of a watertight wall as a potential SAMA (Duke 2002a; NRC 2002a). This plant modification is included as an additional SAMA in Table 5-5.

Duke also considered potential alternatives to reduce containment failure modes of concern for Catawba. These alternatives included nine containment-related improvements evaluated as part of the staff's assessment of SAMDAs for Watts Bar (NRC 1995a) and five containment-related improvements (e.g., procedures for reactor coolant system depressurization, procedures to cope with and reduce induced SGTR) derived from the staff's generic report on the individual plant examination program (NRC 1997c). Duke eliminated those alternatives that were either (1) already implemented at Catawba or (2) not applicable to the Catawba containment. Based on the screening, Duke designated nine of the containment-related SAMAs for further study. The list of the potential enhancements to improve containment performance is presented in Table 5-6.

In the Catawba ER, Duke identified the installation of back-up power to the igniters and the installation of back-up power to air-return fans as two separate SAMAs. However, in responses to staff RAIs, Duke indicated that the availability of air-return fans would be essential to the effective operation of igniters in an SBO; therefore, Duke treated the combined modification as a single SAMA. Accordingly, these two hydrogen control related SAMAs are shown as a single SAMA in Table 5-6. This effectively reduces the number of containment-related SAMAs to eight.

			Risk Reduction		
Potential Alternative	Sequences/Failures Addressed	CDF <sup>(a)</sup>	Population Dose <sup>(b)</sup> (person-rem <sup>(c)</sup> )	Total Benefit (per unit)	Cost of Enhancement (per unit)
Man standby shutdown system (SSS) 24 hours/day with trained operator	Turbine building flood with a failure of diesel generators to run and operators fail to initiate SSS seal injection following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event	5.4 x10 <sup>-6</sup>	4.1	\$241,000	>\$2.5 M <sup>(d)(e)</sup>
Install automatic swap-over to high pressure recirculation	LOCA cut sets with failure of operators to establish high pressure recirculation	1.5 x10⁻⁵	1.1	\$448,000	>\$1 M
Replace reactor vessel with stronger vessel	Failure of reactor pressure vessel with failure to prevent core damage following a reactor pressure vessel breach	1.0 x10⁻ <sup>6</sup>	< 0.1	\$30,000	>\$1 M
Install third diesel generator	LOOP events, which includes turbine building flood and LOOP initiators.	1.6 x10⁻⁵	14.0	\$754,000	>\$2 M
Install automatic refill to upper storage tank	Loss of instrument air with a failure of nuclear service water system sources and operators fail to refill UST from condensate grade sources	4.0 x10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.3	\$120,000	>\$1 M
Install watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers in turbine building basement	Turbine building flood causing an extended loss of offsite power	1.4 x10 <sup>-5</sup>	12.4	\$663,000	\$250,000

### Table 5-5. SAMA Cost/Benefit Screening Analysis – SAMAs that Reduce CDF

(a) Total CDF =  $5.8 \times 10^{-5}$  per year

(b) Total population dose = 31.4 person-rem per year

(c) One person-Sv = 100 person-rem

(d) Cost estimates for manning the standby shutdown system apply on a per site rather than per unit basis. In order to provide a consistent basis for comparison with the estimated benefits (which are per unit), the estimated site costs were divided by two.

(e) M = million

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	Risl	k Reduction		
Potential Alternative	CDF	Population Dose (person-rem) <sup>(a)</sup>	Total Benefit (per unit)	Cost of Enhancement (per unit)
Install independent containment spray system	N/A	28.4	\$918,000 <sup>(b)</sup>	>\$1 M <sup>(c)</sup>
Install filtered containment vent system	N/A	28.4	\$918,000 <sup>(b)</sup>	>\$1 M
Install back-up power to igniters and install back-up power to air-return fans	N/A	28.4	\$918,000 <sup>(b)</sup>	\$540,000
Install containment inerting system	N/A	28.4	\$918,000 <sup>(b)</sup>	>\$1 M
Install additional containment bypass instrumentation (ISLOCA)	N/A	2.6	\$84,000	>\$1 M
Add independent source of feedwater to reduce induced SGTR	N/A	< 0.1	< \$3,200	>\$1 M
Install reactor cavity flooding system	N/A	7.3	\$239,000	>\$1 M
Install core retention device	N/A	< 0.1	< \$3,200	>\$1 M

# Table 5-6. SAMA Cost/Benefit Screening Analysis – SAMAs that Improve Containment Performance Containment Performance

(a) One person-Sv = 100 person-rem

(b) Total benefit based on eliminating all early and late containment failures

(c) M = million

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### 5.2.3.2 Staff Evaluation

24 It should be noted that Duke has made extensive use of PRA methods to gain insights 25 regarding severe accidents at Catawba. Risk insights from various Catawba risk assessments have been identified and implemented to improve both the design and operation of the plant. 26 27 For example, using the IPE process, Duke identified and implemented modifications to procedures to (1) provide back-up cooling water to the centrifugal charging pumps, (2) improve 28 plant personnel's awareness of the standby shutdown system importance, (3) improve standby 29 shutdown system availability by administratively controlling and limiting the times when the 30 31 standby shutdown system may be taken out of service, and (4) decrease the time required for service water system and component cooling water system maintenance. Examples of plant 32 improvements being planned for implementation by Duke based on IPEEE findings are: 33

- 35 (1) addition of spacers and stiffening of side rails on the diesel generator battery racks
- 37 (2) relocation of an instrument to avoid a potential seismic interaction with adjacent piping
- (3) replacement of a valve to eliminate seismic spatial interaction with a nearby spent fuelcooling line
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(4) addition of instructions in the pre-fire plan for the electrical bus switching area

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- (5) replacement of reciprocal air compressors with centrifugal compressors, and routing cables 2 for the new compressors to give sufficient redundancy in case of fires
- 4 (6) reinstallation of missing door bolts in the auxiliary shutdown panel cabinets (NRC 1999).

The implementation of such improvements reduced the risk associated with the major 6 contributors identified by the Catawba PRA and contributed to the reduced number of candidate 7 SAMAs identified as part of Duke's application for license renewal. 8

- 9 10 Duke's effort to identify potential SAMAs focused on areas found to be risk-significant in the Catawba PRA. The list of SAMAs generally coincide with accident categories that are dominant 11 CDF contributors or with issues that tend to have a large impact on a number of accident 12 sequences at Catawba. Duke made a reasonable effort to use the Catawba PRA to search for 13 14 potential SAMAs and to review insights from other plant-specific risk studies and previous SAMA analyses for potential applicability to Catawba. The staff reviewed the set of potential 15 enhancements considered in Duke's SAMA identification process. These enhancements 16 include improvements oriented toward reducing the CDF and risk from major contributors 17 specific to Catawba and improvements identified in the previous SAMDA review for Watts Bar 18 (NRC 1995a) that would be applicable to Catawba. 19
- 21 The staff notes that most of the SAMAs involve major modifications and significant costs and that less expensive design improvements and procedure changes could conceivably provide 22 similar levels of risk reduction. The staff requested additional information (NRC 2001) from 23 Duke on less expensive alternatives that would yield similar benefits. In response, Duke 24 25 provided additional information on (1) the cost to provide alternative power to hydrogen igniters for SBO, (2) the cost to provide passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) as an alternative to 26 27 igniters, (3) the cost to install a dedicated line from the Wylie hydroelectric station as an 28 alternative source of ac power, and (4) the cost to install a watertight wall around the 6900/ 29 4160 V transformers. This information was responsive to the staff's requests and provided additional depth to the SAMAs considered. These additional alternatives are further evaluated, 30 along with the other SAMAs, in the sections that follow. 31
- The staff concludes that Duke has used a systematic process for identifying potential design 33 improvements for Catawba and that the set of potential design improvements identified by Duke 34 is reasonably comprehensive and, therefore, acceptable. 35
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## 5.2.4 Risk Reduction Potential of Design Improvements

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39 Section 4.3 of Attachment H to the Catawba ER describes the process used by Duke to determine the risk reduction potential for each enhancement. 40

For each seismic initiator cut set, Duke calculated the associated offsite risk based on the 1 2 population dose and CDF for the PDSs attributable to the seismic initiator. Implementation of the plant enhancement was assumed to completely eliminate the seismic risk associated with 3 4 the cut set. For each (non-seismic) sequence/enhancement, Duke evaluated the severe 5 accident sequences. In general, where an alternative impacted more than one severe accident sequence, Duke determined the cumulative risk reduction achievable by each SAMA. This was 6 performed by identifying which basic events in the cut sets would be affected by the 7 implementation of the particular SAMA and assuming that implementation of the basic event(s) 8 would be completely eliminated by the SAMA. For each containment-related improvement, 9 Duke assumed that all of the population dose associated with the release categories impacted 10 by the SAMA would be eliminated. For those alternatives that benefit more than one 11 containment failure mode (i.e., independent containment spray system, filtered containment 12 13 vent, back-up power to igniters, back-up power to air-return fans, containment inerting system, and reactor cavity flooding system), the total population dose for all affected failure modes was 14 15 assumed to be completely eliminated by implementing the alternative. For example, installation of a standpipe in containment for reactor cavity flooding, which could reduce the likelihood of 16 17 both early containment failure associated with reactor vessel breach and late containment failure due to basemat melt-through, was assumed to completely eliminate the associated early 18 19 and late containment failures.

The staff questioned Duke (NRC 2001) regarding the estimated risk reduction associated with 21 addition of a third diesel generator (DG). This SAMA was estimated to provide about a 22 60 percent reduction in the CDF for SBO sequences (from 2.5×10<sup>-5</sup> per year to 9.0×10<sup>-6</sup> per 23 year). Duke indicated that the risk reduction was based on eliminating all failures to start, 24 failures to run, and common cause failures of the existing two DGs. However, it was assumed 25 that the third DG would not be seismically qualified; therefore, it would not be effective in 26 27 seismic events. Since seismic events account for approximately one-third of the SBO CDF, the 28 limited risk reduction estimated for the third DG appears reasonable. Duke also considered the additional benefit if the third diesel were seismically qualified similar to the existing DGs. Duke 29 estimated that an additional reduction in CDF of about 4.0×10<sup>-7</sup> per year would be achieved by 30 eliminating all random failures of DGs in seismic events. This risk reduction is limited because 31 the seismic results are dominated by seismic failures in the 4-kV power system for which 32 improving diesel generator availability provides no benefit. The staff concludes that Duke's risk 33 reduction estimates for this SAMA are reasonable. 34

An estimate of the risk reduction for the SAMA involving installation of a dedicated power line to the Wylie hydroelectric station was not provided in Duke's RAI response. However, the risk reduction would be comparable to that for adding a third DG, because the seismic fragility of the hydroelectric unit is expected to be similar to that for the seismically qualified DGs.

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The staff notes that Duke evaluated the risk reduction potential for each SAMA in a bounding
fashion. Each SAMA was assumed to completely eliminate all sequences that the specific
enhancement was intended to address; therefore, the benefits are generally overestimated and
conservative, including SAMAs related to SGTR events. Accordingly, the staff based its
estimates of averted risk for the various SAMAs on Duke's risk reduction estimates.

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# 5.2.5 Cost Impacts of Candidate Design Improvements

9 Duke's estimated costs for each potential design enhancement are provided in Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 5-1 of Attachment H to the ER. For most of the SAMAs, Duke estimated the cost of 10 implementation to be greater than \$1 million based on cost estimates developed in previous 11 12 industry studies. For one SAMA, which involved installing a third DG, Duke developed plantspecific cost estimates because there was no readily available information on the estimated 13 cost to implement similar alternatives and because the basic events associated with this 14 alternative were found to have a high importance in the Catawba PRA. Because the safety 15 benefits (\$754,000) of the potential SAMA was significantly less than the estimated 16 17 implementation costs (\$2 million), the cost estimate was not further refined.

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19 The staff compared Duke's cost estimates with estimates developed elsewhere for similar 20 improvements, including estimates developed as part of the evaluation of SAMDA for operating 21 reactors and advanced LWRs. The staff notes that Duke's estimated implementation costs of 22 \$1 million or greater are consistent with the values reported in previous analyses for major 23 hardware changes of similar scope and are not unreasonable for the SAMAs under consideration, given that these enhancements involve major hardware changes and impact 24 safety-related systems. For example, Duke estimated the cost to install a third DG to be 25 approximately \$2 million; this value is less than the cost estimates reported in previous SAMDA 26 27 analyses for a similar design change.

28

Duke's estimate of the cost to install a dedicated line from the Wylie hydroelectric station as an alternate source of ac power also appears reasonable. This line would be buried to eliminate weather-related common cause failures. The estimated cost (\$8 million) is greater than, but comparable to the cost estimates for a similar modification provided by Duke (Duke 2002b) for the McGuire Nuclear Station (\$3 million) and by Dominion Power (NRC 2002c) for the Surry Nuclear Power Station (\$2 to 5 million). Even the lowest of these estimates is far greater than the calculated benefit of \$750,000 for Catawba.

36

The staff questioned Duke regarding the costs of less expensive alternatives that could offer
similar risk reduction benefits, particularly with regard to installation of a watertight wall to
address turbine flooding events and to improvements to control hydrogen in SBO events.
Duke's estimate of the cost to install a watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers in
the turbine building basement is \$250,000 per unit (NRC 2002a). The estimated cost

breakdown is \$75,000 for engineering, \$25,000 for materials, and \$150,000 for installation
labor. These costs appear reasonable given the constraints in installing the modification in an
existing plant.

4

In a February 1, 2002, response to staff RAIs (Duke 2002a), Duke provided additional
information on the costs associated with installing a passive hydrogen control system based on
the use of PARs in lieu of the present ac-dependent hydrogen igniters and the costs of
powering a subset of the current hydrogen igniters from a back-up generator. For scoping
purposes, Duke provided supplementary information regarding the cost of back-up power to the
igniters and air-return fans in response to a follow-up RAI (NRC 2002a).

11

Duke's estimate of the cost to establish a capability to power a subset of igniters from a back-12 13 up generator was \$205,000 for each unit. This modification, as defined by Duke, would involve pre-staging a single, dedicated generator for each unit outdoors on a concrete pad (for 14 15 ventilation and exhaust considerations), and supplying the necessary power cables and circuit breakers to enable connection to the igniter branch circuits. The breakdown of this cost is 16 \$5,000 for engineering, \$50,000 for materials, \$110,000 for installation labor, and \$40,000 for 17 maintenance and operation. This cost estimate does not include an enclosure, tornado 18 protection for the generator, or any seismic design. Duke further noted that providing electric 19 20 power to hydrogen igniters during a SBO will not be effective without also powering at least one of the containment air-return fans and that this will further increase the cost of this option. 21 22 When one air-return fan is added to this estimate, the combined cost is \$540,000 per unit. The breakdown of this cost is \$50,000 for engineering, \$210,000 for materials, \$240,000 for 23 24 installation labor, and \$40,000 for maintenance and operation. Duke points out there will be 25 additional costs not included in these estimates. 26

The staff requested additional information on PARs because PARs are to be installed in French PWRs by 2007 to mitigate the consequences of hydrogen combustion events. In response (Duke 2002a), Duke estimated that the installation of PARs would cost more than \$750,000 per unit, which is well above the estimated benefit (see Table 5-7, Section 5.2.6.2). This cost estimate is consistent with independent staff cost estimates for installing PARs.

33 The staff asked for further information on the basis for the greater than \$1 million cost estimate for installing an automatic swap-over to high pressure recirculation. Duke (NRC 2002a) 34 35 referenced NUREG-0498, Supp. 1 (NRC1995a), which estimated a cost of about \$2.1 million for a similar alternative (i.e., "automate the alignment of emergency care cooling system 36 [ECCS] recirculation to the high-pressure charging and safety injection pumps"). This would 37 38 reduce the potential for related human errors made during manual realignment. This cost 39 estimate is considerably higher than the estimated averted risk benefit for Catawba of about \$448,000. (Benefits are discussed further in Section 5.2.6.) 40

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1 The staff concludes that the cost estimates provided by Duke are reasonable and adequate for 2 the purposes of this SAMA evaluation. As noted in Section 5.2.6.2, further attention will be 3 placed on the costs associated with SBO-related plant improvements by the NRC as part of the resolution of Generic Safety Issue 189 (GSI-189) - Susceptibility of Ice-Condenser and 4 Mark III Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion During a Severe Accident 5 (NRC 2002b). Also, as noted in Section 5.2.6.2, the need for additional evaluation and possible 6 7 implementation of the watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers has been identified as a current operating plant issue. Duke has made a commitment to design and install flood 8 protection around these transformers (Duke 2002c). 9

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# 5.2.6 Cost-Benefit Comparison

The cost-benefit comparison as evaluated by Duke and the staff evaluation of the cost-benefitanalysis are described in the following sections.

### 5.2.6.1 Duke Evaluation

In the analysis provided by Duke in the ER, Duke did not include the following factors in its cost-18 19 benefit evaluation: replacement power costs for SAMAs that have the potential to reduce CDF 20 and averted offsite property damage costs for SAMAs that have the potential to improve containment performance. In view of the significant impact of these averted costs on the 21 22 estimated benefit for a SAMA, the staff requested that Duke include these factors in the cost-benefit analysis for each affected SAMA. In response to the RAI (Duke 2002a), Duke 23 24 updated the benefit estimates to include averted replacement power costs and averted offsite 25 property damage costs.

The methodology used by Duke was based primarily on NRC's guidance for performing costbenefit analysis (i.e., NUREG/BR-0184, *Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook* [NRC 1997b]). The guidance involves determining the net value for each SAMA according to the following formula:

31			
32			Net Value = (APE + AOEC +AOE + AOSC) - COE
33			
34		where	APE = present value of averted public exposure (\$)
35	Ì		AOEC = present value of averted offsite property damage costs (\$)
36			AOE = present value of averted onsite exposure costs (\$)
37			AOSC = present value of averted onsite cleanup costs (\$)
38			COE = cost of enhancement (\$)
39			

1	If the net value of a SAMA is negative, the cost of implementing the SAMA is larger than the	
2	benefit associated with the SAMA, and it is not considered cost-beneficial. Duke's derivation of	
3	each of the associated costs is summarized below.	
4		
5	Averted Public Exposure (APE) Costs	
6		
7	The APE costs were calculated using the following formula:	
8		
9	APE = Annual reduction in public exposure (person-rem/year)	
10	x monetary equivalent of unit dose (\$2000 per person-rem)	
10	x present value conversion factor (10.76 based on a 20-year period	I
12	with a 7-percent discount rate)	
13 14	As stated in NUREG/BR-0184 (NRC 1997b), it is important to note that the monetary value of	
15	the public health risk after discounting does not represent the expected reduction in public	
16	health risk due to a single accident. Rather, it is the present value of a stream of potential	
17	losses extending over the remaining lifetime (in this case, the renewal period) of the facility.	
18	Thus, it reflects the expected annual loss due to a single accident, the possibility that such an	
19	accident could occur at any time over the renewal period, and the effect of discounting these	
20	potential future losses to present value. Duke used the following expression when calculating	
21	the APE for the 20-year license renewal period:	
22		
23	APE = \$2.20×10 <sup>4</sup> x (Change in public exposure)	
24		
25	Averted Offsite Property Damage Costs (AOC)	
26		
27	For SAMAs that reduce CDF, the AOCs were calculated using the following formula:	
28	AOC - Appuel CDE reduction	
29	AOC - Allitudi CDF reduction	
3U 31	x present value conversion factor	I
32	x present value conversion factor	I
33	Duke derived the values for averted offsite property damage costs based on information	
34	provided in Section 5.7.5 of NUREG/BR-0184 (NRC 1997b) A discount factor of 7 percent and	
35	a 4-percent rate of inflation were used. Duke used the following expression when calculating	
36	the AOC for the 20-year license renewal period:	
37		
38	AOC = \$3.92×10 <sup>9</sup> x (Change in annual CDF)	
39		'
40	Originally, as part of the ER, Duke did not include the AOC for containment-related SAMAs. In	
41	response to staff RAIs (Duke 2002a), Duke incorporated AOC as follows.	

1	For containment-related SAMAs (which impact population dose but not CDF), Duke estimated
2	the combined AOC and APE costs based on a conversion factor of \$3000/person-rem, which
3	Duke attributed to NUREG/CR-6349 (NRC 1995b). Duke used the following expression when
4	calculating these costs (for containment-related SAMAs) for the 20-year license renewal period:
5	
6	AOC + APE = \$3.23×10 <sup>4</sup> x (Change in public exposure)
7	
8	Averted Occupational Exposure (AOE) Costs
9	
10	The AOE costs were calculated using the following formula:
11	
12	AOE = Annual CDF reduction
13	x occupational exposure per core damage event
14	x monetary equivalent of unit dose
15	x present value conversion factor
16	
17	Duke derived the values for averted occupational exposure based on information provided in
18	Section 5.7.3 of NUREG/BR-0184 (NRC 1997b). Best estimate values provided for immediate
19	occupational dose 33 person-Sv (3300 person-rem) and long-term occupational dose
20	[200 person-Sv (20,000 person-rem) over a 10-year cleanup period] were used. The present
21	value of these doses was calculated using the equations provided in NUREG/BR-0184 in
22	conjunction with a monetary equivalent of unit dose of \$2000 per person-rem, a discount rate of
23	7 percent, and a time period of 20 years to represent the license-renewal period. Duke used
24	the following expression when calculating the AOE for the 20-year license renewal period:
25	
26	AOE = \$3.1×10 <sup>8</sup> x (Change in annual CDF)
27	
28	Averted Onsite Cleanup Costs (AOSC) (Not Including Replacement Power Costs)
29	
30	The AOSCs, as calculated by Duke, include averted cleanup and decontamination costs.
31	NUREG/BR-0184, Section 5.7.6.2 states that long-term replacement power costs must also be
32	considered (NRC 1997b). Duke did not include this cost in the ER. However, Duke did add it in
33	the responses (Duke 2002a) to the staff's RAIs.
34	
35	Averted cleanup and decontamination costs (ACC) are calculated using the following formula:
36	
37	ACC = Annual CDF reduction
38	x present value of cleanup costs per core damage event
39	x present value conversion factor
40	

1	The total cost of cleanup and decontamination subsequent to a severe accident is estimated in	
2	NUREG/BR-0184 (NRC 1997b) as \$1.5×10 <sup>s</sup> (undiscounted). This value was converted to	
3	present costs over a 10-year cleanup period and integrated over the term of the proposed	
4	license extension. Duke used the following expression when calculating the ACC for the	
5	20-year license renewal period:	
6 7	$ACC = \text{ff} 19 \times 10^{10} \times (\text{Changes in annual CDE})$	
/ 8	ACC = \$1.10×10° X (Change in annual CDF)	I
9	Averted Power Replacement Cost (APRC)	
10		
11	The Duke estimate of the annual power replacement cost for Catawba is based on an assumed	
12 13	discount rate of 7 percent for the 20-year license renewal period.	
14	The estimated present power replacement costs of a severe accident occurring in each year of	
15	the license renewal period is given by (equation from NUREG/BR-0184, page 5.44):	
16		
17	$PV_{RP} = [\$1.2 \times 10^8 / 0.07][1 - exp(-0.07 \times 20)]^2$	
18		
19 20	$PV_{RP} = \$9.73 \times 10^{\circ}$	
20 21	Then to estimate the net present value of power replacement over the 20-year license renewal	
22	(equation from NUREG/BR-0184, page 5.44):	
23	(	
24	$U_{RP} = [PV_{RP}/0.07][1 - exp(-0.07 \times 20)]^2$	
25		
26	$U_{RP} = $7.89 \times 10^9$	
27		
28	APRC = U <sub>RP</sub> x (Change in annual CDF)	
29		
30	Since the APRC from the NUREG is in 1990 dollars, an assumption is made to include a	
31	4 percent inflation rate over 11 years to bring the value into 2001 dollars; therefore,	
32		
33	APRC = \$1.21×10 <sup>10</sup> x (Change in annual CDF)	
34		
35	Duke Results	
30	The total hanafit appaciated with each of the 14 SAMAs evaluated by Duke (aiv that reduce	
31 20	CDE and eight that improve containment performance) is provided in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Two	
30 30	of the SAMAs have a positive net value (i.e., the total hopefit is greater than the cost of the	
70 28	on the only of the a positive her value (i.e., the total benefit is greater than the COSt of the annual second the 6000/4160 V	
41	transformers and installing back-up power to igniters and air-return fans. All of the remaining	

1 SAMAs have a negative net value even given the bounding risk reduction benefits inherent in 2 these estimates.

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# 5.2.6.2 Staff Evaluation

5 6 The cost-benefit analysis provided by Duke (Duke 2001a; Duke 2002a) was based primarily on NRC's Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook (NRC 1997b). In the original 7 Catawba ER, Duke did not include averted replacement power costs for SAMAs that reduce 8 CDF and averted offsite property damage costs for SAMAs that improve containment 9 performance. However, the impact of these factors was included in supplemental analyses 10 provided by Duke in response to the staff's RAIs (Duke 2002a; NRC 2002a). The APRC were 11 12 assessed appropriately and the values calculated by Duke are consistent with independent staff 13 assessments.

14

15 Duke used a conversion factor of \$3,000/person-rem to determine the averted offsite property damage and APE costs. This effectively assumes a \$1,000/person-rem conversion factor as a 16 surrogate for averted offsite property damage, in addition to the accepted \$2,000/person-rem 17 conversion factor for averted offsite public exposure costs. Because offsite property damage 18 costs are plant and site-specific, it would be more consistent with standard practice to actually 19 calculate the property damage using the MACCS code. Nevertheless, the averted offsite costs 20 21 values (for health effects and property damage) calculated by Duke provide reasonably good agreement with typical site values and are acceptable for purposes of estimating the value of 22 containment-related SAMAs. Inclusion of averted replacement power and offsite property 23 damage costs did not result in identification of any additional cost-beneficial SAMAs, and would 24 25 not call into question Duke's decision to eliminate seismic SAMAs from consideration given the large costs associated with seismic SAMAs. 26

27

28 Based on the staff evaluation, two SAMAs (which involve installing a watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers and installing back-up power to igniters and air-return fans) are 29 potentially cost-beneficial and are discussed below. Several of the containment-related SAMAs 30 (Table 5-6) have total benefits that are only slightly less than the estimated cost to implement 31 the enhancement, specifically, installation of an independent containment spray system, a 32 filtered containment vent system, and a containment inerting system. However, the estimated 33 risk reduction in Table 5-6 is based on the bounding assumption that all early and late 34 containment failures would be completely eliminated. Realistically, only a small fraction of the 35 36 total risk would be eliminated by any one SAMA. Also, the cost to implement any of these three SAMAs would be substantially (i.e., a factor of 5) greater than \$1 million, as each SAMA would 37 involve a major hardware modification. Thus, these three SAMAs would not be cost-beneficial. 38 All of the remaining SAMAs have costs that are at least a factor of two higher than the dollar 39 equivalent of the associated benefits. This difference is considered to provide ample margin to 40 41 cover uncertainties in the risk and cost estimates since estimates for these factors were

1 generally evaluated in a conservative manner. This is true even when considering the 3-

- percent versus 7-percent discount rate sensitivity case or the use of a 40-year versus 20-year
   time period.
- 3 4

5 The positive net value of the watertight wall is due in part to the relatively large (approximately 24 percent) contribution of internal floods to total CDF. Duke assumed that the watertight wall 6 would completely eliminate the turbine building flood initiators. The net value of this SAMA is 7 approximately \$400,000 (the difference between the estimated benefit and estimated cost in 8 9 Table 5-5). This value is based on risk reduction estimates derived from PRA Revision 2b, and is consistent with the NRC's Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook (NRC 1997b): 10 the value assumes a 7-percent discount rate and includes averted onsite costs and averted 11 power replacement costs. 12

- Duke (NRC 2002a) provided a revised risk reduction estimate for the watertight wall based on
   an updated PRA model which accounts for recently installed reactor coolant pump seals that
- use O-ring materials that perform better at high temperature. This plant modification is
   expected to reduce the probability of a reactor coolant pump seal LOCA following a loss of seal
   cooling. Since a large fraction of the core damage sequences initiated by the turbine building
   flood involve seal LOCAs, the modification will reduce the CDF contribution from the flood and
   the risk reduction associated with the watertight wall. Using the revised PRA model, Duke
   estimates that the watertight wall will provide a CDF reduction of 1.0×10<sup>-5</sup> per year and a
   population dose reduction of 0.151 person-Sv (15.1 person-rem) per year.
- 23

24 Based on the revised risk reduction values, the watertight wall would have an estimated benefit 25 of \$550,000 (positive net value of \$300,000). Use of a 3-percent discount rate would increase the net value to about \$500,000. If averted onsite costs and averted power replacement costs 26 27 are neglected in the analysis, the estimated benefit would be approximately \$214,000 (negative 28 net value of \$36,000). However, using either a 3-percent discount rate or 40-year time period, the net value would remain positive even when averted onsite costs and averted power 29 replacement costs are neglected. Based on this information, the staff concludes that the 30 31 installation of the watertight wall would be cost-beneficial. The need for additional evaluation and possible implementation of the watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers will be 32 addressed as a current operating plant issue. Duke has made a commitment to design and 33 install flood protection around these transformers (Duke 2002c). 34

35

The positive net value of installing back-up power to igniters is due in part to the relatively high frequency of SBO events for Catawba (which account for 43 percent of the total CDF of 5.8×10<sup>-5</sup> per year based on Revision 2b of the PRA), combined with the vulnerability of ice-condenser containments to hydrogen combustion in SBO events, as described in NUREG/CR-6427 (NRC 2000). This NUREG provided a simplified Level 2 analysis for the purpose of investigating the importance of direct containment heating (DCH). The NUREG

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1 found that early containment failure is dominated by hydrogen combustion events rather than 2 DCH events and that no ice-condenser plant is inherently robust to all credible DCH or 3 hydrogen combustion events in station blackout. The study concluded that all ice-condenser plants would benefit from reducing SBO frequency or from providing some means of hydrogen 4 control that is effective in SBO events. It should be noted that the NUREG contains several 5 assumptions that may be justified for purposes of dispositioning the DCH issue but are not 6 necessarily consistent with the best-estimate philosophy of PRA (such as a bounding 7 assumption that random ignition prior to vessel breach will not occur). Accordingly, the NUREG 8 is useful for understanding the uncertainties associated with early containment failure 9 10 probabilities, but should not be interpreted as providing a realistic or best-estimate evaluation of the potential for early containment failure as a result of hydrogen combustion during SBO 11 12 events. 13

14 In light of the issues raised in NUREG/CR-6427 concerning the likelihood of early containment 15 failure in SBO events, the staff requested Duke to provide a reevaluation of the benefits associated with the hydrogen control measures (install back-up power to igniters and air-return 16 fans) assuming a containment response consistent with the findings in NUREG/CR-6427 (i.e., 17 using the containment failure probabilities for DCH and non-DCH events reported in the study, 18 in place of the conditional failure probabilities implicit in the baseline PRA). Under these 19 assumptions, Duke estimated that the averted population dose from eliminating early 20 21 containment failures would rise from a base case value of 0.073 person-Sv (7.3 person-rem) 22 per year to 0.12 person-Sv (12.0 person-rem) per year. The benefit values based on use of the NUREG/CR-6427 containment failure probability for Catawba are reported in Table 5-7. Also 23 shown are the benefit values for the sensitivity case involving use of a 3-percent discount rate 24 25 instead of a 7-percent discount rate. All of the values in Table 5-7 include averted offsite property damage. 26

- A number of points are worth noting regarding the Duke base case results and these sensitivity assessments:
- 31 Not all early and late releases can be eliminated by providing hydrogen control. For 32 example, late failures due to long-term containment over-pressure could still occur. Also, the non-safety related, non-seismic back-up power source may not be available in large 33 seismic and tornado events if it is not designed to withstand such events. An upper bound 34 estimate can be provided by assuming that all containment failures, early and late, would be 35 36 eliminated. More realistically, most of the early and some of the late releases would be 37 eliminated. The assumption that hydrogen control would eliminate all early failures is 38 considered to provide a reasonable estimate of the risk reduction benefit. Accordingly, the 39 estimated benefits shown in Table 5-7 are based on eliminating all early containment 40 failures.
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Table 5-7.	Sensitivity Results for Hydrogen Control SAMAs
	(all benefits based on eliminating early failures only)

SAMA	Estimated Cost (per unit)	Estimated Benefits for Hydrogen Control SAMAs Under Various Assumptions (per unit)		
		Based on Revision 2b of the PRA	Based on conditional containment failure probabilities from NUREG/CR-6427	Based on a 3% discount rate compared to a 7% discount rate in the base case
Back-up power to igniters and air-return fans	\$540,000	\$236,000	\$387,000	\$329,000
PARs	\$750,000	\$236,000	\$387,000	\$329,000
Back-up power to igniters only	\$205,000	Duke: no benefit, since air-return fans are needed	Duke: no benefit, since air-return fans are needed	Duke: no benefit, since air-return fans are needed

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It is Duke's position that powering the igniters without also powering the air-return fans 13 14 would not achieve effective hydrogen control. According to Duke, in order to realize the stated benefits, the air-return fans must also have a back-up power source. More than half 15 of the cost of the SAMA to provide back-up power to igniters and air-return fans comes from 16 powering the fans. Based on available technical information, it is not clear that operation of 17 18 the air-return fans is necessary to provide effective hydrogen control. The need to also supply back-up power to the air-return fans is being further assessed by the NRC as part of 19 20 the resolution of GSI-189. If only the igniters need to be powered during SBO, a less-21 expensive option of powering a subset of igniters from a back-up generator, addressed by 22 Duke in responses to RAIs (Duke 2002a; NRC 2002a), is within the range of averted risk benefits and would warrant further consideration. 23 24

- If a 3-percent discount rate is assumed in contrast to the 7-percent discount rate assumed in the base case analysis, the SAMA is cost-beneficial if back-up power to the air-return fans is not needed. This further supports the position that the benefits are large and that a hydrogen-related SAMA may be cost-beneficial.
- The effect of implementing the SAMA in the near term rather than delaying implementation until the start of the license renewal period (i.e., use of a 40-year rather than a 20-year period in the value analyses) is bounded by the sensitivity study that assumed a 3-percent discount rate.

December 2002

1 The NRC has recognized that ice-condenser containments like Catawba's are vulnerable to 2 hydrogen burns in the absence of power to the in-place hydrogen ignitor system. This is 3 sufficiently important for all PWRs with ice-condenser containments that NRC has made the issue a Generic Safety Issue, GSI-189 - Susceptibility of Ice-Condenser and Mark III 4 Containments to Early Failure from Hydrogen Combustion During a Severe Accident 5 (NRC 2002b). As part of the resolution of GSI-189, NRC is evaluating potential improvements 6 to hydrogen control provisions in ice-condenser plants to reduce their vulnerability to hydrogen-7 related containment failures in SBO. This will include an assessment of the costs and benefits 8 of supplying igniters from alternate power sources, such as a back-up generator, as well as 9 10 containment analyses to establish whether air-return fans also need an ac-independent power source, as part of this modification. The need for plant design and procedural changes will be 11 resolved as part of GSI-189 and addressed for Catawba and other ice-condenser plants as a 12 current operating license issue. 13

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# 15 **5.2.7 Conclusions**

Duke completed a comprehensive effort to identify and evaluate potential cost-beneficial plant
enhancements to reduce the risk associated with severe accidents at Catawba. As a result of
this assessment, Duke concluded in the ER that no additional mitigation alternatives are costbeneficial and warrant implementation at Catawba. Based on its review of SAMAs for Catawba,
the staff concludes that two of the SAMAs are cost-beneficial under certain assumptions.
These SAMAs involve installing a watertight wall around the 6900/4160 V transformers and
providing back-up power to the hydrogen igniters for SBO events.

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Based on the analyses presented, the staff concludes that installing a watertight wall around the
transformer is cost-beneficial. However, as this SAMA does not relate to adequately managing
the effects of aging during the period of extended operation, it need not be implemented as part
of license renewal pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54. The staff intends to pursue this matter as a
current operating license issue. By letter dated August 8, 2002, Duke committed to designing
and scheduling the installation of flood protection for the 6900/4160 V transformers

- 31 | (Duke 2002c).
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33 Duke's position, regarding the SAMA that would establish hydrogen control in SBO events by 34 providing back-up power to igniters, is that this SAMA is not cost-effective because back-up power would need to be supplied to the air-return fans from ac-independent power sources in 35 order to ensure mixing of the containment atmosphere, and the cost of powering both the 36 igniters and the air-return fans would exceed the expected benefit. However, based on 37 38 available technical information, it is not clear that operation of air-return fans is necessary to 39 provide effective hydrogen control. If only the igniters need to be powered during SBO, a lessexpensive option of powering a subset of igniters from a back-up generator, addressed by Duke 40 41 in responses to RAIs (Duke 2002a; NRC 2002a), is within the range of the averted risk benefits

and would warrant further consideration. Even if air-return fans are judged to be necessary to
 ensure effective hydrogen control in SBOs, the results of sensitivity studies suggest that this
 combined SAMA might also be cost-beneficial.

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5 The staff concludes that the SAMA that would establish hydrogen control in SBO events by 6 providing back-up power to igniters is cost-beneficial under certain assumptions, which are 7 being examined in connection with resolution of GSI-189. However, this SAMA does not relate 8 to adequately managing the effects of aging during the period of extended operation. 9 Therefore, it need not be implemented as part of license renewal pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54. 10 The need for plant design and procedural changes will be resolved as part of GSI-189 and

11 addressed for Catawba and all other ice-condenser plants as a current operating license issue.

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# 5.3 References

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