I-09

# Commissioners TA Briefing Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head

## AGENDA March 14, 2002

Introduction	. Brian Sheron
Status at Davis-Besse	Region III
Technical Issues	Ken Karwoski
Risk Implications	Steve Long
Communication Activities	Tony Mendiola
Summary	. Brian

## STATUS AT DAVIS-BESSE

#### Licensee Activities

Shutdown in February 2002 Vessel head penetration nozzle inspections Inspection results Root cause team

## Region III Activities

Augmented inspection team Confirmatory Action Letter

AIT activities/issues

# **TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS**

Boric acid-like-material covering reactor pressure vessel head for several cycles

3 leaking vessel head penetration nozzles including nozzles 2 and 3

Two cavities - one near nozzle 2 and one near nozzle 3

Largest cavity - nozzle 3

Length: approximately 5-inches

Width: approximately 4 to 5-inches at widest point

Depth approximately 6-inches

Root cause investigation is on-going

Either the deposits on the top of the head, the leaking penetration, or both could contribute to the degradation

Boric acid may be a contributor

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## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Boric acid corrosion well documented

Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants"

Industry assessment of wastage at top of head as a result of a leaking nozzle - 1993

Water will flash to steam leaving dry boric acid crystals which have a slow corrosion rate

Maximum wastage rate of 6.4 in<sup>3</sup>/yr

RPV boric acid corrosion experience at Salem 2

3 feet by 5 feet by 1 foot high pile of boric acid crystals

9 corrosion pits ranging from 1 to 3 inches in diameter and to a depth of 0.4-inch

#### **CURRENT STATUS**

Monitoring results at Davis-Besse to assess generic implications

#### **RES Activities**

NRR and RES developing near- and long-term plan to address structural integrity, corrosion mechanism/mitigation, and NDE issues

RES is also planning to look at thermal hydraulic response

Developing models for assessing structural integrity of degraded area and repair proposals

Preliminary calculations underway

Reviewing boric acid operating history

Supporting review of licensee and MRP activities

RES staff member participating on AIT

### GENERIC TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES

Issued letter to industry on March 11, 2002 documenting prior phone calls

Requested justification for continued operation for plants that have not inspected

Requested risk assessment

Industry provided preliminary results on March 13, 2002 and will provide detailed results next week

Visual exam of 100% of head?

If not 100%, can external corrosion be ruled out?

If UT or other approach used during most recent inspection was UT capable of detecting cavity?

Plans for Spring 02 outages?

Preparing Bulletin and associated Information Paper

## **RISK IMPLICATIONS**

Rupture of the exposed clad area would create a medium LOCA

Conditional probability of core damage for a medium LOCA is 7E-3 in Davis Besse IPE

Conditional probability for large early release for medium LOCA core damage events is about 0.006 for large, dry containments in NUREG-1150 PRAs

#### Bottom line:

CDP appears to be about E-3;

LERP appears to be about E-5.

#### **COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES**

Initiated daily status briefings between licensee, Region 3, and NRR 03/06/02

Issued Preliminary Notification of Event 03/08/02

Initiated Communication Plan 03/11/02

Issued NRC Information Notice (IN-02-0011) 03/12/02

Issued AIT Press release 03/12/02

Initiated NRC website for public information 03/13/02

Issued Confirmatory Action Letter 03/13/02

Commissioner's TA Briefing 03/14/02

CRGR Briefing for draft NRC Bulletin 03/18/02

Public Meeting between NRC and Industry Representatives 03/19/02

Public Meeting for NRC Stakeholders 03/20/02

ACRS Subcommittee Briefing on Event 04/09/02