Official Transcript of Proceedings ACRST-3224

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

498th Meeting

PROCESS USING ADAMS TEMPLATE: ACRS/ACNW-005

Docket Number:

(not applicable)

Location:

Rockville, Maryland

Date:

Friday, December 6, 2002

ORIGINAL

Work Order No.:

NRC-676

Pages 320-536

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

Committee

TROY

1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3	+ + + +
4	498TH MEETING
5	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
6	(ACRS)
7	+ + + +
8	FRIDAY,
9	DECEMBER 6, 2002
10	+ + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	+ + + +
13	The Advisory Committee resumed at the Nuclear
14	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
15	T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Dr. George
16	Apostolakis, Chairman, presiding.
17	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
18	GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS, Chairman
19	MARIO V. BONACA, Vice Chairman
20	F. PETER FORD, Member
21	THOMAS S. KRESS, Member
22	GRAHAM M. LEITCH, Member
23	DANA A. POWERS, Member
24	VICTOR H. RANSOM, Member
25	STEPHEN L. ROSEN, Member
1	1

COMMITTEE MEMBERS: (cont.)
WILLIAM J. SHACK, Member
JOHN D. SIEBER, Member
GRAHAM B. WALLIS, Member
ACRS STAFF PRESENT:
JOHN T. LARKINS, Executive Director
SHER BAHADUR, Associate Director
SAM DURAISWAMY, Technical Assistant
PAUL A. BOEHNERT, Staff Engineer
HOWARD J. LARSON, Special Assistant
ALSO PRESENT:
ROBERT J. BUDNITZ, Lawrence Livermore
FAROUK ELTAWILA, NRC
TOM KING, NRC
TAD MARSH, NRC
MOHAMMED SHUAIBI, NRC

I-N-D-E-X

2	AGENDA PAGE
3	Opening Remarks - Chairman Apostolakis 323
4	Status of the Development of the Review
5	Standard for Power Uprates
6	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman 325
7	Briefing by and discussions with 326
8	representatives of the NRC Staff
9	Proposed Options for Resolving Policy Issues
10	for Future Non-Light Water Reactors
11	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman 380
12	Briefing by and discussions with 381
L3	representatives of the NRC Staff
14	Final Draft ANS External Events Methodology:
15	Remarks by Dana Powers 458
16	NRC Briefing and Discussion 463
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2.2

8:32 a.m.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The meeting will now come to order. This is the second day of the 498th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. During today's meeting, the Committee will consider the following: Proposed ACRS plan for reviewing safeguards and security activities, future ACRS activities, report of the Planning and Procedures Subcommittee, reconciliation of ACRS comments and recommendations, proposed options for evolving policy issues for future non-light water reactors --

MEMBER POWERS: Does that mean we're going to turn them around?

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I don't understand
-- revolving policy is actually more accurate, is it
not? Draft final ANS external events methodology
standard, election of ACRS officers and proposed ACRS
reports.

This meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Mr. Sam Duraiswamy is the Designated Federal Official for the initial portion of this meeting. We have received no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members

of the public regarding today's sessions. A transcript of a portion of the meeting is being kept, and it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarify and volume so that they can be readily heard. And I'm pleased to say this is the last time I read this. Please wipe the tears away.

(Laughter.)

2.2

But there is one thing I want to say since we are talking about it. First of all, I appreciate the honor that the members made me by electing me twice as Chairman, but I would like to point out to say something that you already know. We have an excellent staff here. I don't think that a part-timer like me or anyone else could run a Committee like this without the help of a superb staff that we have working for Dr. Larkins, who's not paying attention right now.

MEMBER POWERS: Because he knows all this stuff.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So I really think we should recognize this in public, on the record, because we tend to take it for granted sometimes that the help we get is the natural thing to do, and it is not. Everybody's really very dedicated and they're

1	doing an excertent job supporting the Committee.
2	(Applause.)
3	Okay. Now, we have to make a few changes
4	in the agenda because of the weather yesterday and so
5	on. So we'll start with me briefing you regarding the
6	security and safeguards reviews that we will do. Then
7	we'll go on to the election and reconciliation of
8	comments and let's try to finish these things by nine
9	o'clock, is that all right?
10	MR. BOEHNERT: At nine o'clock, you're
11	going to have the briefing on the review standard.
12	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Nine a.m., right?
13	MR. BOEHNERT: Yes, sir, 9 a.m.
14	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Let me start
15	with the security and safeguards.
16	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
17	the record at 8:36 a.m. and went back on
18	the record at 9:09 a.m.)
19	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We're back in
20	session. The next item is left over from yesterday:
21	Status of the Development of the Review Standard for
22	Power Uprates. The cognizant member is Professor
23	Wallis.
24	MEMBER WALLIS: Let's move right along.
25	We have reviewed a handful of power uprates and we

suggested to the Staff and they came up in a meeting with a Commission, and there should actually be a review plan or review standard for these power uprates. The Staff has been working on it, and Mohammed is going to tell us the results that he's produced.

MR. MARSH: Good morning. I have a few opening comments this morning too. My name is Tad Marsh, and I'm the Deputy Director of the Division of Licensing Project Management in the Office of NRR. And good morning and congratulations to our new Chairman and our new member-at-large. I enjoyed the parliamentary procedures -- and the Vice Chairman, I beg your pardon.

Before we get to discussions of the review standard for the extended power uprates, I'd like to remind the Committee of some of the reasons that led to this initiative. First, we are experiencing, as many organizations are, a loss of institutional knowledge due to retirements and transfers of senior staff, and we believe that the review standard will provide a mechanism for retaining some of this loss of knowledge. Essentially, it will become a legacy file.

Second, as a result of this attrition and this loss of institutional knowledge, we are expecting

NEAL R. GROSS

a large number of new Staff hires over the next few years; in fact, we have some very large intern classes that are coming in. We believe that the review standards will provide the necessary guidance for use by these new hires in carrying out the Agency's mission.

Third, much of the current Staff review criteria is organizationally out of date and review standards will provide a mechanism for updating this information. Fourth, we believe that the review standards will provide sustainable legacy of review criteria, methods and procedures for the Staff. Fifth, we believe that the concept of review standard will make our activities consistent with the vision of having a centralized and fully operational work planning center for the purpose of scheduling and monitoring NRR work.

And it's in that context that the review standard that you're going to hear a lot about will add efficiency and effectiveness, we believe, to the review. In the course of going through and constructing this review standard, which Mohammed will describe, you'll see that we've looked very carefully at the underlying standard review plans, generic letter, information notices and asked ourselves what

needs to be reviewed for the purpose of extended power uprates. We believe that this effort will add an efficiency and effectiveness in our reviews.

Now, the initial focus of this activity has been placed on extended power uprates and on early site permits. Our work in these areas will be a pilot for many of the Staff in determining the proper approach to be applied in developing review standards for other areas. So this then, the EPU review standard and also the early site permits, is the first effort, the first chance we've had to really put this concept in place, and I hope you get a feeling for what it is and how it will guide us.

I also hope you've had a chance to get a presentation on centralized work planning and how that organization is working, how they will use review standards and what this concept will embody.

Let me now turn to power uprates and the timing for this review standard. As you may already know, we conduct semi-annual surveys of licensees to obtain information related to expected power uprates. The results of the last survey, which was conducted in July of this year, indicate that applications of 20 extended power uprates should be expected over the next five years. Discussions with vendors indicate

that the number may even be larger. In light of this information, we believe that the development of the review standard is timely to help with the review of these applications.

We last briefed the Committee on the status of the review standard in July this year, and during that briefing we provided our schedule for issuing the draft review standard for public comment by the end of this year. My staff has also briefed Dr. Kress, Dr. Bonaca and Dr. Larkins and Mr. Boehnert in October about the status of the review standard. I'm pleased to say that we have made significant progress since then and expect to meet our goal for issuing the draft review standard by the end of this Although the review standard is essentially complete, however, it is going through official concurrence process, and NRR Management has not yet had a chance to review it. The leadership team, which is made up of the division directors in NRR, scheduled to be briefed on this review standard this Tuesday, December 10.

Based on the feedback we received in July from you, we are proceeding with our plan to issue the review standard, and we do plan on coming back to brief you following the public comment period. We are

NEAL R. GROSS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.0

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	not seeking a letter from the Committee today but
2	would welcome, of course, any comments or suggestions
3	you may have that you'd like to share with us. As
4	you'll see from the presentation, we have incorporated
5	comments that we have received from you and welcome
6	any further comments you may have.
7	With that, I'd like to turn to Mohammed
8	who will lead us through the presentation.
9	MEMBER LEITCH: Just one question before
10	you get started.
11	MR. MARSH: Sure.
12	MEMBER LEITCH: The audience for the
13	review standard is primarily internal, that is for the
14	reviewers.
15	MR. MARSH: Yes.
16	MEMBER LEITCH: Is it the intention also
17	to share this document with the licensees?
18	MR. MARSH: Absolutely. Absolutely.
19	That's public comment period. We've also met with the
20	industry and got comments from them. But you're
21	right, this is primarily a Staff review guidance, but
22	it bears a lot, of course, on what licensees submit
23	and give to us because it will guide them in scope and
24	content. So they're anxious about this review
25	standard; it should help.

MEMBER LEITCH: Okay. Thanks.

MR. MARSH: Thank you. Mohammed?

MR. SHUAIBI: Thanks, Tad. Again, my name is Mohammed Shuaibi. I'm the Lead Project Manager for Power Uprates at NRR. I apologize about the slides saying December 5. We were scheduled to come here yesterday, and unfortunately we couldn't make it.

I had a presentation ready to go over some of the background and other material leading up to this effort; however, we discussed this quite a bit last time, and what I propose to do today is to skip through some of these slides to save some time and get right to the review standard itself if that's okay with the Committee. Okay.

Turning your attention to Slide Number 8, we discussed this at great length during the July 11 meeting, and the reason I wanted to bring this back up again is to inform you of two changes. Two changes to this diagram. If you notice up at the upper right and upper left corners, we've added two boxes, one for inspection guidance and one for a review of past RAIs. The inspection guidance is there to indicate that this review standard will provide references in material for -- to provide inspection guidance or for people to inspection guidance that exists. The review of past

NEAL R. GROSS

RAIs, we've conducted a review of past RAIs, and we wanted to make sure that the review standard adequately addresses the areas that we've been asking questions on in the past. And that's about the extent that I want to discuss this diagram; we discussed it at great lengths last time. So unless there are any other questions on this diagram, I'd like to get into the review standard itself.

The review standard is going to be made up of four sections. The first section is going to cover procedural guidance for the Staff. The second section is going to cover technical review guidance or technical review criteria to be used during the reviews. The third section will cover the documentation of power uprate review. And the last section will be the inspection guidance.

What I'd like to do is hand out some of that material that's going to be in the review standard. As Tad indicated, this is still being reviewed by Management, but I'd like to share it with you just to give you a feel for what it's going to look like.

MEMBER LEITCH: A couple questions that we wrestle with concerning the license renewal process.

One of those questions is the influence, if any, that

NEAL R. GROSS

1	the current standing a licensee has in the reactor
2	oversight process. Is that at all a factor in power
3	uprates? In other words, part of the standard, does
4	it involve looking at the current ROP status of that
5	particular licensee? Does that have any influence on
6	the process?
7	MR. SHUAIBI: At this point, no, we don't
8	have anything in here that goes back to the ROP to do
9	that.
10	MEMBER LEITCH: The same question, I
11	guess, relates to material condition of the plant.
12	This inspection guidance, I guess, is primarily
13	paperwork guidance. Is there any intention of going
14	out and looking at the plant to see whether the in
15	other words, does the material condition have any
16	bearing on the power uprate?
17	MR. SHUAIBI: I guess I'm not sure I
18	understand the question.
19	MR. MARSH: I think what you're asking, if
20	I could rephrase it, is if there were material issues
21	
22	MEMBER LEITCH: Exactly.
23	MR. MARSH: material condition issues
24	which would bear on the application information. In
25	other words, a licensee asserts that the flow induced

material degradation is such that it's covered by existing programs or existing systems, and would we ask ourselves if that is a statement that bears out by the material condition in the plant, in other words.

MEMBER LEITCH: Say you found very poor housekeeping practices, for example, and the plant was just plain not in good material condition, would that in any way influence the extended power uprate decision?

MR. MARSH: I doubt that aspect, but if there were corrective action program issues, such that there are material condition or design issues, then that would be part of the synthesis, I would think, of the review. I mean perhaps that's in the inspection area that we would feed that back into the review process. Mohammed, am I off on that?

MR. SHUAIBI: No. Actually, what we've done here, and I'll go through some of this a little bit later, in the documentation area -- I'm not sure how much this is going to answer your question, let me know if I need to go back -- in the documentation area, we do have places that direct the reviewers of the power uprate to highlight areas that they feel are important for the inspectors to consider when they choose what they look at. So that if they have an

area -- materials, degradation issue, flow-assisted corrosion issue, system pump valve, whatever -- that doesn't have a lot of margin and they want to point that out to the resident so that they could consider it as part of their inspections, we will have a place in the safety evaluation that directs the inspectors or that provides that guidance to the inspectors.

MEMBER ROSEN: I'm convinced that you'll look at the margins properly, but I think the thrust of Graham's question about the condition of the plant, let me give you another thing to think about. He asked about housekeeping. Let me ask about, let's say, main steam line vibration and the guy wants an -- the plant wants an uprate.

It seems to me it bears quite a lot on whether or not you'd be comfortable in uprate if you went out and found that the main steam lines from the stops inboard -- the turbine stop valves inboard to the main steam isolation valves was vibrating rather significantly compared to what you experience elsewhere. And one could say that that's clearly -- the forcing function is flow, and we're going to increase it.

Maybe you went out and stood by the turbine on the turbine deck and felt the whole turbine

moving a little -- the whole deck moving a little bit.

And, clearly, that's kind of driven by the generator being a little bit off magnetic center or something like that. You would have concerns about making it worse. It seems to me that the thrust of Graham's question is one that really I think came up during license renewal --

MEMBER LEITCH: Exactly.

MEMBER ROSEN: -- and by analogy power uprate. In license renewal, we asked would you extend this plant's license if you went out and found them in the red ROP area and the plant heavily degraded material-wise? I think you'd be derelict if you just went straight ahead with license renewal under those circumstances. And so I think the same thing applies here, maybe in a little bit different way but I think you really can't and shouldn't blind yourselves to just this process, we're just looking at this process, without thinking about the whole thing.

MR. MARSH: Synthesizing plant conditions or things of that sort. I think that's a fair comment.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, I guess I don't want to leave without this comment, if you go back to your Page Number 4. It was an issue we

NEAL R. GROSS

1	discussed before; in fact, you listed material
2	degradation now as a consideration. But one of the
3	concerns we have then, just looking back at how you
4	came to that, was this is not a new plant, this is not
5	a new plant. So when some of the applications for
6	power uprate do not address the fact that they're not
7	new plants. I mean you have an evaluation of design
8	capability toward components, which you do, and it
9	seems to me that you have to account for aging of
10	those components in the sense that if their capability
11	is degraded, right, they would have an impact on your
12	determination of how much margin you have left in a
13	component.
13 14	component. MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the
14	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the
14 15	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being
14 15 16	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact
14 15 16 17	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact of the higher fluence on the vessel, the impact of the
14 15 16 17	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact of the higher fluence on the vessel, the impact of the increased flow rates on the flow-assisted corrosion,
14 15 16 17 18	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact of the higher fluence on the vessel, the impact of the increased flow rates on the flow-assisted corrosion, that type of material degradation issue. That will be
14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact of the higher fluence on the vessel, the impact of the increased flow rates on the flow-assisted corrosion, that type of material degradation issue. That will be considered as part of this power uprate.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. SHUAIBI: The impact of aging and the impact of a power uprate on the plant that is being considered. Material degradation here it's the impact of the higher fluence on the vessel, the impact of the increased flow rates on the flow-assisted corrosion, that type of material degradation issue. That will be considered as part of this power uprate. VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Lock-up blowdown

MR. SHUAIBI: That's correct.

25

That will

all be considered as part of the review of the power 1 2 uprate. MR. MARSH: To the extent that issues have 3 been communicated to the industry via generic 4 communications, those are rolled into this review 5 standard. So it doesn't quite answer the question 6 7 because you're in a plant-specific aspect as opposed to a generic aspect, but many of these issues come up 8 9 generically. Those are part of the review the Staff would go into. But in terms of the plant condition as 10 it deviates or as it's unique and it differs from the 11 generic part, that's worth thinking about, so let us 12 do that. 13 14 MEMBER ROSEN: Well, yes. I think just for your own sanity. I mean you can be assured that 15 certain members of this Committee will ask you how the 16 plant's doing when you come in for EPU. 17 18 MR. MARSH: And have asked us, sure. 19 MEMBER ROSEN: Well, you want to be able to say something more than, "Well, we don't look at 20 21 that in this process." 22 MR. MARSH: Right. 23 VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Specifically, on some of the BWR uprates, I mean we ask questions about 24 25 you have a lot of blowdown and then now you're evaluating the capability of a component versus the stress imposed by the blowdown on the component. there was always an assumption that the component was I mean you only evaluate increasing the as new. blowdown forces on a component and you look at the margin you have there. The question at the time is the component still as capable as when it was designed and implemented? Maybe 40 years after implementation it's not as capable as it used to be, so you should look at what margin you have. And that involves two factors: One is the component itself and capability, the other one is the increasing blowdown forces on the component. Just an example of what you have to look at.

MEMBER SIEBER: I think you would hard pressed to use an application for a change in the licensee license to some cause a to correct housekeeping condition. For example, the inspection and enforcement process is supposed to take care of that, and if you have bad housekeeping that's a fire protection issue perhaps or an internal flooding issue, blocked drains or a sump blockage issue if it's inside containment and so forth, that's the place where those things should be take care of.

MR. MARSH: To that extent, that's right.

NEAL R. GROSS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 MEMBER SIEBER: And you cannot withhold 2 approval of an application for a change in the license for an issue that's not relevant to the matters at 3 hand in that license amendment. 4 5 MR. MARSH: Nor should you exclude issues 6 that are relevant to the review at hand. 7 MEMBER SIEBER: For example, in the case of the vibrating steam line during extended power 8 9 uprate, I think that if there is a real concern, you know, an inspector probably would not have the tools 1.0 or equipment to measure the extent of the vibration, 11 but they can certainly issue an RAI that asks the 12 licensee to look at the extent of the vibration and as 13 14 to whether that's satisfactory and where they figure it will go under EPU conditions. 15 I mean that's probably a fair question to ask. 16 MR. MARSH: But I think that would be the 17 intent if the Staff were aware of there being an issue 18 19 or if it's part of their review guidance in the first 20 place. 21 That's right. MEMBER SIEBER: 22 MR. MARSH: But the thrust of the question 23 is are there plant-specific conditions that are there 24 of which the Staff may be unaware at the outset of the

review that would then drive a question or would drive

1 an extra effort to look at? And that's the part that we'll think about. If there are many -- the guidance 2 that we've got has been thought through a lot to the 3 extent that it's synthesized generic communication, 4 5 synthesized reg guides or issues that have come up, 6 reactor vessel internal vibration issues, things of 7 that sort, which are generic, okay, and which we're now aware of. But it doesn't probe corrective action 8 9 issues, it doesn't probe inspection findings, doesn't look for that link, as many amendments don't 10 You know, licensing space is -- the link between 11 licensing space and inspection enforcement space is 12 13 not a very tight link. They're basically separate 14 aspects. 15 MEMBER LEITCH: Perhaps a better --16 MEMBER SIEBER: What I'm saying is that I

MEMBER SIEBER: What I'm saying is that I would have a hard time putting something in an ACRS letter or voting for a letter if it held the licensee hostage on some kind of an amendment for some issue that didn't directly bear on that amendment. There's go to be --

MR. MARSH: Right. Oh, right.

MEMBER LEITCH: An example of where that linkage may exist, for example, is suppose a licensee had a couple of yellow findings in emergency planning.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

1	Would it then be appropriate to issue a license for
2	power uprate where you were increasing the inventory
3	of radioactive products?
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
5	MR. MARSH: Good question. I don't have
6	an answer.
7	MEMBER LEITCH: Just something to think
8	about.
9	MR. MARSH: And we will.
10	MEMBER LEITCH: That's an area where there
11	might be linkage, I guess, is all I'm saying.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, and on the other
13	hand, the action matrix is supposed to take care of
14	the yellow findings, and you have to that's an
15	example of holding the licensee hostage, in my view.
16	MR. MARSH: Okay.
17	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, it seems to me that
18	you did not disagree, Jack I'm trying to get the
19	sense of your disagreement you did not disagree
20	with the example raised of a steam line that was
21	vibrating and judged to be okay at the current power
22	level, but that the question is raised
23	MEMBER SIEBER: But there's no
24	additional analysis maybe be required or a test
25	program to assure its adequacy under uprate conditions.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: Clearly, your higher power
2	level you're going to have more forcing function for
3	the vibration. And they might say they could come
4	back and say
5	MEMBER SIEBER: I think that's pertinent.
6	MEMBER ROSEN: Yes, and I think so. But
7	the answer could easily go the other way. They could
8	easily say at higher velocities, we'll come out of the
9	resonance we're in and it will be better.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: So that's the way it goes.
11	MR. MARSH: Let me add a little
12	DR. RANSOM: Am I missing something? I
13	would think this whole process would start very early
14	on with an engineering inspection that specifically
15	looks for is this plant suitable for uprating?
16	MR. MARSH: No, that's not.
17	DR. RANSOM: Why wouldn't you do that?
18	MR. MARSH: No. We don't have that type
19	of program. This program is driven by the licensee's
20	amendment request with suitable documentation meeting
21	the Staff's regulations, and the burden is on the
22	licensee to give you the information that would allow
23	us to make a finding of meiculation, not being driven
24	by an inspection.

DR. RANSOM: I think a lot of these points

1	that are being brought up would be brought out.
2	MR. MARSH: I understand, I understand
3	that, but just
4	DR. RANSOM: And I would think that would
5	go on quite early in the process.
6	MR. MARSH: It's not. At this stage, it's
7	not part of the process. What we're asking is the
8	linking between the review of an amendment to
9	inspection findings or plant conditions as they exist
10	at the plant, not having been disclosed by a
11	systematic inspection, which is what you're
12	describing.
13	DR. RANSOM: Well, the problem I have with
14	that is you'd be the previous inspections would be
15	from the standpoint is it
16	MR. MARSH: Material condition.
17	DR. RANSOM: does it call for continued
18	operation under its licensing basis?
19	MR. MARSH: Right.
20	DR. RANSOM: I would think that you'd want
21	a specific inspection which you began to look is this
22	really is it suitable for uprating?
23	MR. MARSH: Well, there's post-review,
24	post-approval inspection efforts, okay, but not pre,
25	okay?
	t e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

1	DR. RANSOM: It seems like that's
2	backwards.
3	MR. MARSH: Well, you're asking the
4	licensee to assert on the docket that they meet the
5	regulations. It's up to them to make that assertion
6	and to prove it to you. So the burden's on them to do
7	that, and now the Agency is in the position of once we
8	review that, by questioning, by meeting the
9	regulations, then after the fact, we'll go and find
10	out whether that in fact is true, as opposed to
11	interrupting the review to find out whether the
12	assertions they've made are incorrect and the level of
13	knowledge the Staff may have.
14	DR. RANSOM: I'd be surprised that the
15	applicant wouldn't prefer to actually have you come in
16	at the initiation of the process and if you have any
17	real concerns, identify them so that they don't waste
18	their time.
19	MR. MARSH: It's done through questioning
20	as opposed to through inspection.
21	MEMBER SHACK: I mean he has to
22	demonstrate that his plant
23	MR. MARSH: Absolutely.
24	MEMBER SHACK: can take the uprate.
25	MR. MARSH: Right.

1 MEMBER SHACK: That's the whole point of his application. 2 MEMBER WALLIS: Well, I think we've made 3 the point now. I think the Staff knows what the point 4 5 is, and they will take it under consideration. Yes. I think it's worth MR. MARSH: 6 7 thinking about, the connection between -it's a tutorial for us. 8 MEMBER SIEBER: MEMBER WALLIS: But I'd like to move on, 9 because we've spent too long on this. I think we've 10 made the point. 11 MR. MARSH: Thank you. Okay. Mohammed. 12 13 MR. SHUAIBI: For our procedural quidance, we decided to go with a graphical representation of 14 We believe a flow chart is easier to 15 the process. 16 follow and more useful for the users. The flow chart 17 that was distributed shows the process for the power It shows the -- the green path is the 18 It shows the different steps 19 technical review path. 20 in the technical review path. You've got a path for 21 environmental the assessment, a path for the proprietary review and a box there for the noticing of 22 23 the amendment in the Federal Register. You'll notice 24 that under each one of those boxes we include a

reference to an office instruction or a guidance

1	document that gives the reviewer or the project
2	manager a reference to the guidance that they would
3	use in completing that step. So this goes back to the
4	idea of the review standard being a road map document.
5	MEMBER WALLIS: I think in terms of
6	procedures it's easy to make a road map. When we get
7	to the next slide, technical review, it's not quite so
8	clear because it depends a lot of the experience of
9	the reviewer to raise the right technical questions.
LO	MR. SHUAIBI: Let me go to that slide
L1	next. We're going back to Slide Number 4, it's not
L2	allowing me to get this purple slide off the screen.
L3	But I think going to the next slide in your handout,
L4	the technical review guidance is provided in matrices,
L5	not a flow chart, so let me distribute that now.
16	MEMBER WALLIS: Is there anyone who's an
L7	expert on this computer who can release you from your
18	predicament?
L9	MR. SHUAIBI: I can reboot it. It will
20	allow me to do that, not reboot the computer but take
21	this off and bring it back.
22	MEMBER WALLIS: Is this an approved
23	computer for this use?
24	(Laughter.)
25	MR. SHUAIBI: It's an NRC computer.

1 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: What's wrong with 2 the computer? How come this is not fancy? 3 MEMBER WALLIS: It's Bill Gates trying to 4 help you is the problem. You've got to go right back 5 to the beginning and start again every time you get out of order or something? 6 7 MR. SHUAIBI: I had to pick up the slide itself. 8 9 MEMBER WALLIS: You want to go to 11. Oh, your numbers are different from my numbers, that's 10 another problem. 11 Well, I had to generate 12 MR. SHUAIBI: slides for handouts that are different than the 13 The computer automatically takes 14 presentation. 15 figures off the page, that's why the numbers are 16 different. 17 MEMBER WALLIS: It's helping you again. Just go on, we need to move on. 18 technical 19 MR. SHUAIBI: For review 20 quidance, we've developed matrices that cover the 21 areas that need to be reviewed for a power uprate. 22 identifies the responsible NRR review branch, the 23 quidance to be used when performing the review, and every matrix has an Attachment 1 with it that would 24 25 identify either guidance or areas where the Staff

would do independent calculations. Independent calculations is something that's come up here with the ACRS.

We've also added a glass column to the matrix. This was based on the feedback we got in the last meeting with a couple of the members about having an acceptance review, a formal acceptance review done of the application. So we have that last column that would -- and guidance to go with it that would tell the reviewers, "Look at these areas and the matrix, let us know if there's enough information to proceed with this review."

MEMBER WALLIS: I think we're going to be interested in what you've actually written for this guidance for independent analysis when you get a final version of this thing.

MR. SHUAIBI: Okay. Every group -- in developing these matrices and the independent calculations guidance, we went back to the groups and asked them, of course, to put that together. group decided the best approach for their portions of the review. Some groups already know which areas they want to do independent calculations for, other groups have criteria that they will use in determining when So the different to do independent calculations.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

matrices will have a different way of doing this. The last page --

I'm a little concerned MEMBER LEITCH: that we may get a little mixed up between a license renewal application and extended power uprate running through our review processes simultaneously. that happen or do you have to do one and then the other? I guess my concern is if there is an extended power uprate -- let's think the other way. there's a license renewal application coming along and in that license renewal application, nil ductility transition temperature is very close to the margin at 60 years but just barely within the margin, and we approve that extended power uprate. Then there's a --I mean we approve the license renewal, I should say. And then the extended power uprate is coming through the pipeline for that plant shortly afterwards. Would you be aware of the license renewal and review it on the basis of 60 years?

MR. SHUAIBI: I think the example that you gave, I think we would be looking at it for power uprates. If the plant was going to be going for 60 years, or I guess whatever the plant is licensed for, we would be looking at that in terms of what the tech specs have for PTU limits and what the PTS criteria

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

are and whether they meet that or not. If the plant decides to go higher than the power level that they're licensed to, they would have to come back in and justify those again. It would be a tech spec change or it would be demonstrating again that they still meet those.

For power uprates, we would do it based on the license power level. In license renewal, if a plant wants to come in and extend their license, we would do the review there for license renewal or the Staff would do the review for license renewal. I think it would be captured, I don't think it would be missed. Are we aware that we have both of these applications at the same time? Of course we're aware because we have project managers on the plants that keep track of what licensing actions are in-house.

MEMBER LEITCH: Yes. It seems to me the only potential would be if they were coming through at the same time and you're reviewing on the basis of 40 years and yet we were taking action on the basis of 60 years, so there could be some confusion there.

MR. MARSH: These are very, very big applications. Each one of them are major applications, so they require major resources by the Agency, and it would be closely coordinated. Brown's

Ferry is being faced with this very same issue. They've got a license renewal and power uprate. They both are occurring at about the same time. And so we're aware and in communication with the organizations and keeping apprised of that.

MEMBER SIEBER: It would seem to me, though, that in the event of either a license renewal or a power uprate that the PTS rule would not directly bear on that, because the licensee is required to report whether the PTS rule is adequately implemented at their plant. And whether they upgrade or not or if they extend the license or not, they're required to take remedial action or shut down if they fall outside the additional analysis that would occur beyond the screening criteria.

So it would seem to me that it's possible, even though you may ask for a lot of RAIs, it is possible that you could renew a license or grant an upgrade even if the current data on PTS would show that you would exceed the screening criteria prior to the end of the license term or whether you had an upgrade or not. That would be my impression of how this works, and to try to mingle all of these effects together when each one is covered by a separate rule, I think probably is not appropriate. Maybe you can

1 comment on that, because I think that will help us all get straight on how you play the game, so to speak. 2 MR. SHUAIBI: Well, I think that's exactly 3 true because the PTU limits, the PTS criteria I think 4 those are time-dependent things. 5 That's right. 6 MEMBER SIEBER: 7 MR. SHUAIBI: It's not that we'll have licensed a plant at 20 percent more power and now the 8 plant could operate indefinitely and we won't go back 9 and look at PTS or PTU limits or transition nil 10 ductility temperatures. We would go back and look at 11 that, because they have in their tech spec PTU limits 12 that are only good for so long. 13 That's right. MEMBER SIEBER: 14 15 MR. SHUAIBI: That are good for what demonstrated to be adequate. Those 16 they've temperatures, I believe, in the limiting material are 17 identified in the tech specs, so I don't see how a 18 19 plant could do that. MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. The chart is in 20 there. The chart's in there. 21 22 MR. SHUAIBI: Right. 23 MEMBER LEITCH: I can just foresee a 24 situation occurring downstream where a plant has to 25 make a decision whether they run at a higher power

level or run for longer time.

MEMBER WALLIS: Well, that's up to them.

MR. MARSH: And they would have to justify and meet the regulations and their tech specs that are in place at the time. And whatever choice they make they have to justify it, it has to be approved, then the burden's on us to make sure that their submittals and their tech specs are being met for whatever the licensing bases is at the time. So there are -- these are major overlapping and there are technically overlapping issues involved in license renewal and in power uprates and other technical issues as well. We try to keep -- project managers try to keep aware of these things by looking carefully at the tech specs and by the submittals.

The extent that licensees meet commitments is an issue as well. This came out as part of the Lessons Learned Task Force in Davis-Besse, and it's something that we're looking at as well. So they may make commitments on the docket to support a license renewal or a power uprate submittal which doesn't rise to the level of being a tech spec. And then to the extent that that commitment has been met is something that we're looking at in terms of that effort.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: I have a question

NEAL R. GROSS

on -- these are technical areas of review.

2.0

MR. SHUAIBI: That's right.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Do you require the licensee to provide you with operating experience, a description of what happened to that plant in the past 20 years? For example, I'm focusing on BWR and they may have had a cracked shroud that now is repaired in some way. There are some plants out there with those kind of repairs. They're not equivalent to the exact new component that was originally installed. Spargers that have been cracked and bolted. I mean there are many plants out there which have been repaired that way. Are you asking for the information so that when the person performs the mechanical evaluation he understands --

MR. SHUAIBI: Well, the licensee is required by rule to submit full and accurate information describing the areas that are affected by this uprate. That's a 50.9 issue.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, this is not only the uprate. I'm talking about the operating experiences as far as component performance so that there is an understanding on the part of the reviewer. My concern here is that you have a technical person going through the pressure-temperature limit. He's

checking to see from these guidances here whether or not it's met, and he just moves on. This plant, again, is not a new plant, and there is a history of that, and I've seen personally plants which have those kinds of repairs that did not restore the original capability in the components.

MR. SHUAIBI: I understand your question, but I think when we go back to these uprates that -these extended power uprates are 4,000-hour reviews in NRR. And while there are a lot of technical people involved, there are also project people involved, project managers that are assigned to that plant. Those project managers are usually on phone calls with the region on a daily basis getting status of what the plant has gone through overnight, what the plant is going through, what sort of inspection activities the plant has had, what the results of those inspection activities are.

It's the responsibility of the project manager to keep track of the status of the plant and the shape of the plant and the material condition of the plant and that sort of information. The project manager gets all these inputs and he coordinates all these -- he coordinates all these reviews and in the end gets the inputs and generates the safety

NEAL R. GROSS

357 evaluation that you see in the safety evaluation that 1 2 goes out. So it's not just a technical reviewer 3 sitting in a cube doing a review, there is also the project manager that coordinates these things, that is 4 aware of all these things. 5 6 VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: But you know very 7 well that your quidance will be read by the licensees and if you have a section that says request 8 licensee to describe the physical conditions, the 9 10 operating history, et cetera, et cetera, they will be paying attention and provide you that information if 11 you don't. 12 MR. MARSH: Sounds kind of like the first 13 question we were going to think more about, right, 14

which is the plant conditions, site-specific issues.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: They are two different -- I mean one thing is housekeeping, one thing is --

MR. MARSH: Yes. We were construing the question as only housekeeping. Wе were construing the first issue as plant-specific issues which may not be part of something generic which is identified in the guidance. But Mohammed did say something that's real important: It's up to the licensee to meet the regulations. They must meet the

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	regulations. To the extent of the information they
2	give you to prove that to you, the extent of the
3	review that you do to assure yourself that they do
4	meet the regulations is the review process, but they
5	must meet the regulatory criteria, they must. And if
6	they have an issue, a vibration issue, a repair issue,
7	a degradation issue, it's incumbent on them by
8	regulation to bring the plant into compliance with the
9	regulations. It's not up to the Agency to make them
10	do that unless something is broken, some process is
11	fallen down.
12	MEMBER WALLIS: Can we move on? I want to
13	see if you can manipulate this computer.
14	MEMBER ROSEN: I don't want to move on out
15	of technical review and get into documentation
16	MEMBER WALLIS: Maybe technical is the
17	most interesting part of this.
18	MEMBER ROSEN: For me. And I haven't
19	touched on my issue yet, which is what we raised and
20	there were differing I understand differing
21	professional reviews on this, transient testing.
22	Where is that covered here?
23	MR. SHUAIBI: We have a section in the
24	review standard for testing. It covers steady-state
25	power ascension testing and large transient testing,

1 which was the issue that was raised. We're developing a standard review plan specifically to cover testing. 2 So that will be in this 3 MEMBER ROSEN: technical review guidance section or a reference to 4 ìt. 5 MR. SHUAIBI: A standard review plan will 6 be issued for public comment at the same time as its 7 review standard. The matrix for the testing group 8 will have that standard review plan referenced as 9 their guidance for reviewing all licensee applications 10 related to testing. 11 MEMBER SIEBER: But that may not solve 12 13 your problem, Steve. Well, I only want MEMBER ROSEN: 14 15 I mean I may or may not agree with what the matrix says, but at least it's been addressed. 16 17 That was part of the DPV MR. MARSH: resolution was that a standard would be developed in 18 19 order to decide when there should or should not be 20 large transient or other types of power ascension 21 testing. So that was a charge that we were given, and that is being done or has been done at this stage. 22 23 It's a specific tab in that three-ring binder that 24 Mohammed has there, which is the draft of the review 25 standard.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: And that's not something
2	we're looking at today.
3	MR. MARSH: No.
4	MEMBER ROSEN: So I'm only asking if it's
5	covered, and your answer is yes.
6	MR. MARSH: Yes, sir.
7	MR. SHUAIBI: Yes. The purpose of today's
8	meeting is basically a status update on where we are.
9	MEMBER WALLIS: And to learn where you're
10	going to get the most questions when you come back.
11	MR. SHUAIBI: Right.
12	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We will finish this
13	by ten o'clock, won't we?
14	MEMBER WALLIS: That is the objective, Mr.
15	Chairman.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: And that's entirely in
17	their hands.
18	MEMBER WALLIS: But if the members have
19	some really pressing questions that are important, I
20	think they should be permitted to ask them.
21	MEMBER FORD: Well, I have a pressing
22	question. This format for materials degradation is
23	very prescriptive and yet materials degradation is a
24	continuous state of flux of knowledge, especially for
25	the internals. Where in this document or this

quideline does it take into account that science is 1 2 moving forward? We are understanding and coming up with new problems, potential problems. 3 Would a reviewer address the state of knowledge? 4 MR. SHUAIBI: I guess I'll address that by 5 б two comments. First, we expect this to be a living 7 We do not expect that once we issue this document. review standard that it's done. We will continue to 8 update it, we will continue to keep it up-to-date with 9 new information such as the experience we had with 10 Quad Cities and whatever experience we'll have and 11 whatever new information is gained through --12 MEMBER FORD: So that somewhere in this 13 decision process it tells the reviewer, "Hey, is there 14 15 anymore information to come up, scientific or 16 operation information to come up in the last five 17 months?" MR. SHUAIBI: I addressed what we're going 18 19 to do with this document. The other comment that I 20 had is we are not limiting the reviewers to what's in 21 here. 22 MEMBER FORD: Okay. 23 MR. SHUAIBI: As a way of controlling our 24 reviews we're saying that if there is an area that 25 needs to be addressed that is not covered in here,

that we would go to Management and identify that and make sure that we would pursue that through approval by Management. But we are not limiting the reviewer to what's in here. If there's an area that needs to be covered, if there's a plant that has a unique feature that is not in this review standard, we are not limited to what's in here.

MEMBER ROSEN: For example, if the guidance was so bold as to require large transient testing and that transient testing was therefore done in some unexpected -- the results were obtained, that would be the kind of thing you'd put in the book, right?

MR. SHUAIBI: That would be as part of it being an update and a living document if we learn something new as a result of whether it's transient testing or whether it's an actual event.

MR. MARSH: We just have to ensure that whatever new thing that we pursue is covered by the regulations. That means that if it's not, then you have to go through your approval process, your backfit process if you're changing scope. If it's within scope, absolutely, follow it. If it's outside scope, then you have to -- you have Agency procedures for that. If large transient tests were done and

something unacceptable occurred, the licensee has to address that as part of their recovery program, as part of their complying with the regulations program. And it gives us the latitude to ask questions about that to find out how they do meet the regulations associated with that test.

MEMBER WALLIS: Can we move on now or do we have another question on technical review guidance? It appears that we can move on if you can make the computer do so.

MR. SHUAIBI: I was going to very quickly go over some of the material in here just to show you how it's laid out. The matrix in front of you the first column identifies the area of the review. The second column, every matrix, again, because of the groups that are involved and the way they do the reviews and the material that's going to be reviewed, that identifies what's applicable, and in different matrices you may find different ways of identifying this. Sometimes it's just applicable to all EPUs because of the area that's being reviewed. Sometimes it would be applicable if such a change -- if a change that would make a difference here was made at the plant for this power uprate, but that identifies when that area of review would be done by the Staff.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

when they do the review.

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The next two columns identify the groups within NRR that do the reviews. The first is a primary review branch; second are the other groups that may be involved in doing this technical review. The next three columns is where we provide the guidance for the Staff in terms of where they go to find the information they need to do the review. We identify the SRP section. SRP sections may identify -- may discuss more areas than we need for a power uprate, so the focus of SRP usage column identifies which areas in the SRP section they need to focus on

The next column identifies other guidance documents that are out there, generic communications that we found as part of the work that we did for this review standard that needs to supplement information in the SRP. The next two columns are the sections in the boilerplate safety evaluations where those areas would be covered. For consistency, we'd like future safety evaluations to look the same and have the same formatting with the same numbering. And the last column I already discussed, that's the acceptance review column.

MEMBER SHACK: I'm sort of surprised flowinduced vibrations doesn't deserve a --

1	MR. SHUAIBI: Flow-induced vibrations is
2	covered by the Mechanical Group. We're looking at the
3	materials and chemical engineering area.
4	MEMBER SHACK: So that's under reactor
5	coolant pressure boundary materials?
6	MR. SHUAIBI: There's another matrix.
7	This is just one of the matrices.
8	MEMBER SHACK: Oh, this is just one of the
9	matrices.
10	MR. SHUAIBI: We actually have 11
11	matrices, and this is a small one compared to some of
12	the other ones that we have. There's a group that has
13	40 section or about 40 sections in the SC that they
14	would have to
15	MR. MARSH: This is a really I hope you
16	get a chance to look at this document. This is a very
17	good product. This has each branch, what their areas
18	are, then there are matrices for acceptance criteria.
19	It's been a very well laid out structured document, so
20	I hope you come to that conclusion.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: And the three major
22	categories are BWRs, PWRs and everybody, right? As
23	far as I can see here.
24	MR. SHUAIBI: Well, you mean in
25	applicability?

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. You don't 1 2 distinctive within the PWR, I presume. 3 MR. SHUAIBI: Sometimes --MEMBER SIEBER: Combustion, Westinghouse 4 and --5 6 MR. SHUAIBI: No. Actually, to give you an example of applicability, sometimes when it's -- in 7 this case, it's an easy one where it's applicable to 8 all plants. In some cases, and I'll give you just an 9 internal flooding, 10 example, flooding, there if these things 11 specific criteria that says affected, volumes and tanks, or other things that 12 affect the flooding analysis, that's when we will do 13 the review. 14 15 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Okay. The licensee is to 16 MR. SHUAIBI: address that, is to say that there was no impact or 17 there was no increase in volume. But if they say that 1.8 and they demonstrate that, we're not going to do a 19 20 detailed review of the flooding analysis, because, obviously, the old flooding analysis continues to be 21 22 bounding. So in some areas, we are more specific than 23 what you see here. 24 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. And so the 25 "applicable to" section could be generic other than

PWR and BWR.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. MARSH: Right.

MR. SHUAIBI: Right.

MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SHUAIBI: Okay. Ιf other questions, I'll move on to the next slide. The next slide is a documentation of review. I'll have a I'll move through this quickly. Consistent with our office instructions, we wanted to make sure that we identified the regulatory basis for every area that we cover, and as I discussed earlier, we wanted future safety evaluations to have a standard format and same content or similar content. You'll see in the handout that's being passed out we have drafted a generic regulatory evaluation section for every area covered in the matrices that we have. You have the section that goes along with the matrix that we handed We have a regulatory evaluation section, we have conclusion section as well. The technical evaluation section will of course be provided at the time of the review.

Now, there will be guidance in the review standard to say that if a plant is not a GDC plant or if a plant is not an SRP plant, that you're to go back and rewrite this using the same format and content

NEAL R. GROSS

that we've used here to generate a regulatory evaluation that's similar to what we have here. But every area will be addressed the way that you see in this handout. This will give you an idea. In the past, we've combined certain things and that's led to some confusion and some feedback on the safety evaluations. I think this will be more specific in terms of what areas were covered and how they were covered.

MEMBER ROSEN: Now, Mohammed, just recall, I'm sure Tad recalls, that the Committee views on safety evaluation reports in terms of rather than just stating the conclusion stating the conclusion and saying why the Staff reached the conclusion, so that

MR. MARSH: Yes, you bet. Yes. That's one big gain we hope we're going to get is to steer the statements that we make towards the bases for saying why we're saying things as opposed to just it's okay, it's okay, it's okay.

MR. SHUAIBI: One of the reasons why we did this this way is to address the comment that we've been getting. This is what you've seen in the past. The comment that we've received is this is what you've seen documented in the past. Well, now we've got a

NEAL R. GROSS

1	plank section in here that needs to be covered, that
2	needs to be addressed, that needs to be provided, so
3	stating that it's acceptable like we have in that
4	bottom paragraph isn't sufficient anymore. We have to
5	provide some technical evaluation of what we looked
6	at, what the criteria were, why it was acceptable.
7	And then we come to the bottom paragraph that says,
8	well, therefore it meets the regulations.
9	MEMBER WALLIS: So in some cases this
10	middle section might be quite lengthy if it needed to
11	be.
12	MR. SHUAIBI: It could be. It depends on
13	
14	MEMBER ROSEN: So it wouldn't be here if
15	it wasn't acceptable.
16	MR. SHUAIBI: In some cases, it may be
17	lengthy. In other cases where the area may not be
18	applicable to the plant, the whole section may be
19	deleted. The number would
20	MEMBER WALLIS: It would be one sentence
21	or something.
22	MR. SHUAIBI: That's correct, "This is not
23	applicable because."
24	MEMBER WALLIS: All right.
25	MR. SHUAIBI: Period.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: Let me amend what I just
2	said. You wouldn't be at the ACRS unless you thought
3	it was acceptable, you believed it was acceptable.
4	MR. SHUAIBI: That's correct.
5	MEMBER ROSEN: So all you're asking us is
6	to agree with you that it's acceptable. And our
7	question is why do you think it's acceptable.
8	MR. SHUAIBI: Right.
9	MEMBER ROSEN: That's what the dialogue's
10	about.
11	MR. SHUAIBI: And we're hoping this format
12	will bring it out in a technical evaluation portion so
13	that when it comes to you you could look at that
14	technical evaluation portion and see what was done and
15	what the Staff thought about when they decided that
16	this thing was acceptable.
17	MEMBER WALLIS: That might focus our
18	questions better perhaps too. We might get through a
19	meeting quicker.
20	MR. SHUAIBI: We hope.
21	MR. MARSH: We want to.
22	MR. SHUAIBI: Let me go to the last
23	section in the review standard. The last section,
24	again, references an inspection procedure that was
25	already written for power uprates. It also refers

1	back to the safety evaluation. I handed out only a
2	section of the safety evaluation. There's a section
3	in there that talks about recommended areas for
4	inspection, and this section in the review standard
5	refers the reviewer and the inspector back to the
6	safety evaluation or it provides a link to the safety
7	evaluation that would have a discussion of what areas
8	were recommended as part of the review that we went
9	through.
10	In terms of schedule, I think Tad already
11	covered this. We are on track to issue the draft
12	review standard for interim use and public comment by
13	the end of the year, that's the end of this month.
14	The review standard currently has not reviewed by
15	Management. We hope to have that done very soon.
16	MEMBER WALLIS: When it goes out for
17	public comment it will come automatically to us, so if
18	we want to do our reading, we can do it.
19	MR. SHUAIBI: We will that's correct.
20	We will send you a copy and we also plan on coming
21	back and briefing you.
22	MEMBER WALLIS: Will this be a CD or a
23	pile of paper?
24	MR. SHUAIBI: We could do it either way.

MEMBER ROSEN: Yes, do a CD.

1	MEMBER WALLIS: Do a CD.
2	MR. SHUAIBI: Okay.
3	MR. MARSH: We could do that. I think we
4	could do that, right? We can do that.
5	MR. SHUAIBI: Yes, we can do that. And
6	the last bullet on here of course, we'll come back
7	to ACRS after the public comment period for the
8	official review of the review standard. The last
9	bullet on here says that final issuance will be early
10	2004. Of course, there's a lot of uncertainty here.
11	If we don't get a lot of comments, it could be
12	earlier; if we get a lot of comments, we'll have to go
13	back and look at the schedule.
14	MR. MARSH: What we don't show in this
15	schedule, though, is the CRGR review. We will have to
16	go through the CRGR in this as well.
17	MR. SHUAIBI: That's correct. And the
18	last slide is I think you've seen most of these words
19	before and basically we are nearing completion on this
20	review standard and hope to have it done by the end of
21	the year.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Does this review standard
23	or any other initiative right now proclaim what the
24	power uprate level will be submitted to ACRS for
25	review? You know, we had customarily had not reviewed

1 || -

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. MARSH: Measurement uncertainty uprates or stress power uprates, things of that sort.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, stretch up to five percent.

MR. MARSH: Right.

MEMBER SIEBER: Understand there's a rumor floating about that folks would like something different than five percent.

MR. SHUAIBI: I think this goes back to --I had discussed with Paul Boehnert possibly revising the five percent or changing the five percent to go to stretch and extended where we would come to the Committee for extended power uprates. I've indicated to Paul that I will need to discuss this. I got some feedback, initial feedback that it may not be a good idea. I'm not really sure. I think maybe we could explain a little better what we meant by that. definition of stretch power uprate I believe is the intent -- I believe it meets the intent of why the five percent was established. I think five percent was based on the power uprate being within the original design capacity of a plant, and definition of stretch is exactly that.

MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, if you

NEAL R. GROSS

ı	go to like eight percent and you look at the last
	plant that did that, which was ANO 2, the way they did
	it was to change steam generators. Everybody I think
	now that's looking at steam generator change-out in
	PWRs is looking to increase heat transfer surface,
	which automatically gives you as much as eight
	percent. I would not be favorably impressed if those
	kinds of uprates bypassed ACRS scrutiny. On the other
	hand, if you don't change the plant at all except
	perhaps put a leading-edge flow meter in there, then
	I don't think that that's particularly pertinent to us
	because we reviewed the leading-edge flow meter as an
	entity and understand its improved accuracy and
	MEMBER WALLIS: I think what will happen
	is this proposal will come to us
	MEMBER SIEBER: It's not clear to me that
	it will if it gets hidden in a Staff
	MR. BOEHNERT: Well, in fact, if I may
	comment. Based on our discussions, I had suggested to
	Mohammed that the Staff come to the Committee and make
ļ	its case, present the case and let you guys decide
	what you think. I think that's the way to handle
	this. You may be like Jack said, some of them you
	may think is okay, some you may not, but I think you

need to give it consideration. Commenting also on the

б

five percent issue, I think it was also, besides what Mohammed said about being a stretch case, I think there was also the Committee had some consideration about risk impact and felt at the time that five percent was about what they were willing to pass on without a detailed review. Now, again, maybe you'll think different later, but anyway --

MEMBER SIEBER: I'm not aware of any stretch cases that went beyond five percent so far.

MR. SHUAIBI: We don't have any that have gone beyond five percent at this point. When we do surveys, Tad indicated we do surveys twice a year, we get information on power uprates and until this point we've been saying five percent and above. When we internally keep track of which ones we expect to be We're basically marking anything that's over five percent extended. But we have had discussions with a licensee that's going to submitting a power uprate of about six and a half percent in the near future, and their discussions they say that they are not going to be making changes to the plant, many changes to the plant. The types of changes that fit under the stretch they're not the types of changes that you would see when we came in here with ANO or when we came in here with some of the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

boilers where they were going 15, 20 percent. 1 2 MEMBER POWERS: It seems to me offhand 3 that that's really the criterion rather than an absolute magnitude of the power uprate: Are we making 4 5 significant changes? I know it's a little more 6 difficult to characterize what a significant change 7 rather than a nice number, but I mean it's yourself willing to trust your judgment. 8 9 MR. MARSH: It just seems like we should maybe put some words around this. 10 Then come back to 11 MEMBER WALLIS: Yes. 12 us. 13 MR. MARSH: Yes. The same way we try to put words around when we would do a confirmatory 14 15 calculation or when we would do something. We need to Ιf 16 wrap some thoughts around this. there's 17 significant plant changes or there's significant 18 change in risk or there's well beyond the licensing 19 bases which requires significant new calculation or 20 new technologies, new methodologies, something we can 21 I'd be careful about how 22 MEMBER POWERS: 23 much new because new is a little bit in the eyes of 24 the beholder, what a change is. But it seems to me 25 that you guys are pretty good at judging whether

something is like one of these one and a half to two percent -- I mean it might happen to be eight percent power change but it's like that in the magnitude of plant change versus something where I'm really having to worry about stuff.

MR. MARSH: You know, I just think we need to write something down, because we're going to go away and you're going to go away and there's going to be new people coming, and we need to have some thoughts so we can guide other people. We're going to get wrapped in other jobs and maybe miss a mark.

MEMBER WALLIS: I think also we need to see your thoughts written down so if we approve it, we know what we approved.

MR. SHUAIBI: Right. And that's the action I took back from my discussions with Paul. We discussed this, and I explained to Paul that we will do that. Right now we're focusing on getting this review standard done, so it's a little bit on the back burner. Once we're done with this review standard, we may put together, of course go through Management concurrence and approval, and then send it over to you for your consideration, but that's the approach that we're taking.

MEMBER SIEBER: That would satisfy my

NEAL R. GROSS

1	concern.
2	MEMBER POWERS: It seems to me that minor
3	changes it's just kind of a waste of your time to
4	prepare to come here, it wastes our time to listen to
5	it, especially since you've kind of got those in
6	better shape because of you're doing so many. And I,
7	quite frankly, am willing to trust your judgment.
8	MR. MARSH: I appreciate that, of course.
9	We need to write some thoughts down, I think, because
10	there will be others who will need a plan beyond us,
11	and so I think it's worthwhile doing.
12	MEMBER WALLIS: No, I think I agree that
13	you would.
14	MR. MARSH: Yes. We'll be glad to.
15	MEMBER WALLIS: So we don't need to
16	discuss it anymore, perhaps. Are we ready to finish,
17	Mohammed? No more questions? I pass it back to you.
18	MR. MARSH: Can I say something?
19	MEMBER WALLIS: Sure.
20	MR. MARSH: I want to thank you for your
21	time, and I sincerely appreciate the comments and the
22	feedback and the discussions that we had, I really do.
23	That helps us in our thinking, that helps us in coming
24	up with the right kind of a product, and it's

worthwhile conversation that we have. I appreciate

that. We're excited about this product. This is new, and as such, it won't be -- you know, there will bumps along the way as we implement this.

One thing we've asked ourselves and continue to ask ourselves, is this going to be more or less work in the end? Is this going to be a reduction in Staff effort or increase in Staff effort? Is this going to require more or less hours worth of work? We don't know the answer to that at this point. Isn't our goal, of course, to have a more efficient and effective program, but anytime we write down our guidance that we have been using and try to systemize it, it will probably be a greater effort at the end. So I wouldn't be surprised if schedules are impacted and Staff hours are impacted while this thing gets implemented and gets rolled out.

But we're very excited about the structure of that document, and Staff has got a lot of effort to put it together in a nice cogent way, color-coding things, and it's well thought out. So we really appreciate your comments and your thoughts. We'd be glad to come back in this forum if you want or if you want to discuss it individually, we'd be glad to do that too. So thank you very much.

MEMBER WALLIS: Thank you too.

NEAL R. GROSS

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. We'll recess 1 2 until 10:30. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 3 the record at 10:13 a.m. and went back on 4 the record at 10:30 a.m.) 5 6 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Back in session. 7 The next item is proposed options for resolving policy issues for future non-light water reactors. 8 Dr. Kress. 9 MEMBER KRESS: Thank you. That was all 10 the introduction I was going to make. I think Farouk 11 wants to make a few words before we start, so I'll 12 turn it over to him. 13 MR. ELTAWILA: Okay. Thanks, 14 Mr. 15 I'm sorry that I'm not going to be here. 16 I have another meeting, and because of the snow and 17 things like that, we doubled the meetings today. But 1.8 what I would like to just bring one point to your attention which is related to three of the items that 1.9 20 -- policy issues that Tom is going to address today. 21 The three policy issues that we're talking about is the selection of the event selection, which is going 22 to be on PRA and the source term associated with these 23 24 accident scenarios and the option whether we use a

confinement or a containment.

now.

apologize for leaving.

What we would like to do as they are presented right now in the draft paper that you have in front of you, they are presented as separate issues, but in reality we are planning to deal with them as an integral -- as a single issue with three subissues associated with them. You make the selection of the scenarios and you look at the associated source term, and this on that you determine whether you need a confinement or containment to mitigate the consequences of that accident. So we are not going to be presenting them as a single issue, but they are going to and integral issue, and I hope that Tom will be discussing that in more details today, but that's the direction that we are heading towards right

MR. KING: Okay. Thanks, Farouk. For the record, my name's Tom King. I'm with NRC's Office of Research and have been working for the past six months or so on the subject we're going to talk about today. This is really a follow-up to a briefing we had given you at your October full Committee where we talked about what the issues were and what some of the options were for the resolution. We did not get into recommendations. What's happened since then is we

That's all the opening remarks I have, so I

1	have had a public workshop, we have had a lot more
2	internal discussions.
3	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I don't understand
4	the title, "Technical-Related Pulse Issues." What
5	does that mean?
6	MR. KING: Well, I put the word
7	"technical-related" in to distinguish from the other
8	paper that's gone to the Commission several months ago
9	on legal and financial policy issues.
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So it's just
11	technical policy issues.
12	MR. KING: Yes. The paper we talked about
13	last October was the SECY-02-0139 that had gone up in
14	July and laid out the seven issues for Commission
15	information. It was an information paper. Those
16	issues resulted from our pre-application work to date
17	on PBMR and GTMHR, but recognized that there's also
18	other non-light water reactor work going on elsewhere
19	in the world, particularly that associated with the
20	Generation IV Program.
21	The purpose of the paper that we're
22	working on today and we're going to talk about today
23	is to get the Commission to give some guidance, some
24	direction on these seven issues. Those issues we
25	think are key to the licenseability of future non-

1	light water reactors and consistent with the
2	Commission's advance reactor policy statement. Even
3	though we don't have any applications in front of us,
4	the idea is to get early feedback to designers so that
5	they can prepare their applications and know what the
6	ground rules are, as well as have the Staff know what
7	the ground rules are.
8	MEMBER ROSEN: It's more than just their
9	application isn't it? It starts so they can prepare
10	their designs. I mean this impacts their design, not
11	just the application.
12	MR. KING: Yes, their designs. Their
13	designs, their research programs and all the things
14	that go along with it, that's right. That's right.
15	The scope of the issues is reactor design
16	and operation. We have not identified to date any
17	fuel cycle issues, and security is being handled
18	separately, recognizing that security issues may
19	impact some of these things.
20	As Farouk said, many of these issues are
21	linked, and we'll talk about that linkage
22	MEMBER KRESS: Were these options
23	presented at the workshop you talked about?
24	MR. KING: Yes.
25	MEMBER KRESS: Okay. And you had lots of

1 industry participation? 2 MR. KING: We had 19 non-NRC participants. 3 One of those was from Green Peace, the rest were from industry or reporters. Industry National Labs was --4 5 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: When was workshop? 6 7 MR. KING: It was October 22, 23. And what I'll do is as we hit the issues, I'll summarize 8 the feedback we got at the workshop on each of the 9 10 issues. 11 Ι also recognize that these issues resulted from non-LWR pre-application work, but some 12 of these issues, depending on what the Commission 13 decides, could have a bearing on future light water 14 15 reactors as well, and I'll mention that where that's a possibility as we hit the various issues. 16 Four of the issues had been looked at 17 previously by the Commission back ten years ago when 18 19 we were doing pre-application work on the light water 20 reactors. What this paper does is revisit those 21 issues because things have changed in the past ten 22 The major changes have to do with the emphasis on risk-informed regulation, which was kicked off with 23 24 policy statement PRA in **′**95 and also the

Commission's strategic plan, which lays out goals for

the Agency. So we think it's appropriate to revisit those.

The schedule is we owe the paper to the Commission at the end of this month. We provided you with a draft of that paper, stamped it pre-decisional because it is still under review, still going through concurrence. And there are probably some changes that are going to take place before the final paper goes up. Farouk talked about one maybe trying to package three of the issues together, and I'll talk about another one, modify somewhat our recommendation on one of the issues.

We're here today to talk about the background and the issues, the key questions that we looked at in reviewing the issues, the options, the feedback at the workshop and the recommendations. We are requesting a letter from the Committee at this point after this meeting or as soon as you feel you're able to write one. So that is a difference from the October meeting, which was just an information status briefing.

Okay. In looking at the issues, we sort of laid out some ground rules or general guidelines that we followed. We wanted to make sure that in recommending a position on these issues that we were

NEAL R. GROSS

consistent with the safety goal policy, which states
that the population around a site should be consistent
or the risk to the population around a site should be
consistent with the safety goal policy. We wanted to
take a risk-informed performance-based approach
wherever we could. We wanted to recommend resolution
of these issues on a technology-neutral basis
recognizing that they could have implications for LWRs
We considered the Commission's strategic plan which
has performance goals in it and the previous
Commission guidance. And we also considered
practicality. We don't want to recommend something
that's just too resource-intensive or too complicated
to implement.
Okay. Now what I'd like to do is go
through the issues one by one in the order they were
listed on the earlier slide, starting with what we
call expectations for enhanced safety.
MEMBER KRESS: Do they come out of a

policy statement or events to reactors?

MR. KING: They come out of really three things that I've listed here, the first three subbullets. The first one was the severe accident policy statement, which said that for future plants we expect safety higher standard of accident severe

1	38,
1	performance than prior designs. Then a year later the
2	advance reactor policy statement came out, which said
3	we expect future designs to have enhanced safety
4	features, but it also went on and said we are as a
5	minimum, the level of safety of advanced designs
6	should be the same as current designs. So it said we
7	have an expectation but we're not making that a
8	requirement. The SRM Staff requirements memo that
9	implemented the safety goals also basically said that
10	same thing.
11	MEMBER KRESS: Maybe you'll cover it but
12	let me ask you about the last bullet, about the
13	expectation that it has the same degree of protection

for current iteration LWRs. If you look at existing plants, there is a spectrum on distribution of risk statuses if you count CDF and LERF, or status with respect to prompt fatalities. When you make a statement like we want the advanced plants to have the same level of protection --

MR. KING: As a minimum.

MEMBER KRESS: -- as a minimum, does that mean that it has to be as good as the worst one, the mean, or the best?

MR. KING: I think the way that's No. been interpreted is, and that actually gets to the

NEAL R. GROSS

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

last bullet here, we had that same question when we went through the ALWR design certifications. We had to implement these policies when we did those. We've derived a core damage frequency goal and a large early release frequency goal from the safety goals that have been applied to today's plants and were applied during the ALWR design certifications. So my view on that question is what we're shooting for is the goals that we've derived from the safety goals that apply to today's plants. We're not looking at the whole spectrum and looking at the worst one.

MEMBER KRESS: Even though the ALWR exceeds those.

MR. KING: Yes.

MEMBER KRESS: We're not shooting for the ALWR as a --

MR. KING: Not as a requirement. Remember what the reactor policy statements says, "Hey, we expect safer designs." The ALWR has come in and said, "We're giving you safer designs, and here's all the things we've done to improve the designs and here's what it's done to core damage frequency and so forth." The Staff looked at that. Where there were some areas that they felt maybe because of additional uncertainty or concerns, they may have added a few extra things,

NEAL R. GROSS

but they didn't turn around -- we didn't turn around and change the entire body regulations to now raise the bar to this new level of safety that the designers were offering up. We accepted it with some additional enhancements, and for those particular designs we codified that in the design certification rulemakings. But we haven't made generic changes across the board in the regulations to raise the bar for everybody else. So that's the process on the ALWRs.

MEMBER WALLIS: So on these safety goals I think I understood in past discussions of safety goals that these are not requirements, these are some sort of thing which you aim at and hope to achieve. But it would seem to me that was a very strange way to set a goal, but that seemed to be the way they were interpreted. There were requirements and then there were goals, and you sort of strove to get somewhere close to the goal, but all you had to do is really satisfy some requirements which are considerably less. So they don't really tell you what you're going to require.

MR. KING: It's not as simple as that.

The safety goals have shown up in various places.

They've shown up in the regulatory analysis guidelines, which are what were used to set new

NEAL R. GROSS

regulations or to change regulations. They've shown 1 2 up in the ALWR design certifications as part of the review criteria that the Staff used in looking at 3 those designs. Do they meet the safety goals? That 4 was one way to see --5 6 MEMBER WALLIS: So it became a requirement rather than one of these goals that you don't quite 7 reach but you hope to get close to? 8 9 MR. KING: The goals were used to help 10 establish a basis for new requirements, either through the regulatory analysis guideline approach, which 11 affects the regulations and the reg guides, or through 12 13 the design certification process. 14 MEMBER KRESS: Tom, when I asked this same question once to a different set of people from the 15 16 Staff, I got an answer that went like this, and I 17 wonder what your reaction to it is, that if it didn't meet the safety goals, some plant that they were 18 19 either looking to make a change in the licensing basis or new license or whatever, if it didn't meet the 20 21 safety goals, to quote -- now I'm quoting, "This would 22 question the presumption of into adequate

MR. KING: No.

MEMBER KRESS: Is there any validity to

NEAL R. GROSS

protection." That was the answer I got from them.

23

24

that?

MR. KING: That's not consistent with the way we're using safety goals or I think the way the Commission intended safety goals. The safety goals are supposed to define where you stop regulating, how safe is safe enough, not the minimum in terms of regulations. So I guess I would take issue with that statement.

MEMBER WALLIS: It's a very strange kind of safety goal. I've said this before, but I mean for the public to understand that strange idea that you have a safety goal but you don't really meet it, it's something where you stop regulating, it's the wrong end of the scale. You've got to set the minimum standard. I don't really care where you stop with anything, it's the minimum standard I care about.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: You don't really stop regulating, I don't think.

MR. KING: Well, we can always say, yes, we make some judgments based upon uncertainties and so forth, but some people might think it's really beyond the safety goals. But the intent is to stop there. You may disagree with some of the numbers or some of the judgments that are --

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But we stop even

NEAL R. GROSS

for plants that are above the goals.

MEMBER WALLIS: Yes, but the guy who's next to the plant doesn't care. He wants to know what the minimum standard is.

MR. KING: If you're looking at existing plants, you're looking at backfit, and the safety goals give you, through the reg analysis guidelines, give you some guidance on should you backfit or not. There's some criteria. And, in effect, if you're not making a substantial improvement in safety, you're not going to pass the backfit test, and the safety goals have been used to help define what that substantial improvement in safety is. So you can say, well, some existing plants may not meet the safety goals but may not also pass the backfit test, so they're caught in a position where, yes, they don't meet the safety goals, but it's not cost beneficial or they're close enough that it doesn't make sense to make them spend money to do anything else.

For future plants, you know, we're not talking backfit, we're talking forwardfit. It's easier to design safety in in the beginning, so we're not going through the backfit process on future plants, but we are still using the goals through the subsidiary objectives that have been developed to help

define a gauge as to how safe do these things have to be?

MEMBER WALLIS: If they're the same safety goals and the old plants' requirements are based on them, how are you going to get any kind of enhanced safety?

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, it seems to me that where you go from a goal to a requirement is in the certification process, and to get to the design that is acceptable for the certification process, that's where you apply the safety goals. Now, the safety goals came after the designs of the current generation of plants, and so some plants make it and some don't. Most of them do make it, and so you're stuck with that, and since they were all designed under a deterministic regulations, system of they adequate protection standards, even if they don't meet the safety goals. So it seems to me where the regulatory punch comes is in the certification Is that a good way to look at it or not? process.

MR. KING: I think that's a good way to look at it. And, again, it gets back to these policy statements where the Commission has said, "The way we're going to get enhanced safety is we're going to put the burden on the industry to come forward and

NEAL R. GROSS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	volunteer it."
2	MEMBER KRESS: As a practical matter, I
3	can't imagine somebody will come forth with something
4	that doesn't meet
5	MR. KING: No design has come forward and
6	said
7	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. And I don't think
8	they will.
9	MR. KING: No.
10	MEMBER KRESS: But just as a hypothetical
11	statement, what if one did come forth and had a CDF
12	greater than ten to the minus four or a LERF greater
13	than ten to the minus five? I think the regulatory
14	system would really question that very strongly.
15	MR. KING: I do too.
16	MEMBER KRESS: And I just don't think it
17	would get certified, even though there's no such
18	requirement in the regulations, but I just don't think
19	it would get through anyway.
20	MR. KING: I tend to agree with you, and
21	you'd pull out these policy statements and say, "What
22	are you guys doing? We told you 15 years ago that we
23	don't want to see that approach anymore and you're not
24	following it." So I agree with you, they'd have a
25	tough time.

1

2

3 4

5

7

6

8

9

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MEMBER KRESS: I don't think it's a problem because I can't imagine anybody coming forth with one that won't well meet the safety guidance.

MR. KING: No. I mean you look at the advanced designs, whether they're the HTGRs or the Generation IV, all of them have as goals enhanced safety and all of them are promoting enhanced safety, not just because they want to make us happy but because it makes their investors happy, investment protection. High reliability means better economic performance and so forth, so they do it for a number of reasons, so I really don't think it's a -- from a practical standpoint it's an issue.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Before the reactor safety study the estimates -- I mean if you go to conferences and find the proceedings and look at the numbers that people were coming up with for unavailability of safety systems and so on, we're talking about estimates that were about two orders of magnitude lower than what is accepted now and has been supported by data. So people were a little more optimistic in the beginning. In fact, one of the lessons from the reactor safety study is that people were a little shocked when they were told that the core damage frequency is about once every 10,000

years. They thought it was much, much lower than that.

Are we going to have the same thing here? I mean we start with ten to the minus seven as being optimistic again, and then we build one of those and with time we learn that it's not ten to the minus seven but it's ten to the minus five? I mean we can figure out now -- I mean I remember when we were looking at the AP600 the numbers were very low, people tried very hard. They couldn't find a failure mode that would raise that number. They couldn't find anything. But on the other hand, there were things like digital I&C, there were all sorts of controls and -- who knows? Are we going to have a repetition of this historical fact and learn from experience?

MR. KING: I have no doubt we're going to learn from experience and people are going to find out the reliabilities they put forth in their PRA maybe don't turn out to be as good. I think that's a fundamental question on how you implement whatever your safety goals or criteria are for future plants.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Is that influencing your thinking at all when you develop these?

MR. KING: Yes. Yes. It has gone through our thinking.

NEAL R. GROSS

1.3

1	MEMBER KRESS: It has something to do with
2	defense-in-depth.
3	MEMBER ROSEN: I think you need to look at
4	history again to answer your question. Remember that
5	one important person in the history of nuclear power
6	said that paper reactors are always cheaper to build,
7	you can build them quicker, and safer than real
8	reactors.
9	MR. KING: So one of the questions is how
10	do you compensate for that? Do you require additional
11	testing, put more stringent goals on so that maybe
12	that compensates for some of these areas where you
13	really don't know as you much as you'd like?
14	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: But you would
15	expect that the same situation would happen as normal
16	coolant reactors which is you learn from experience,
17	you're improving them and you're bringing them back to
18	where they really were expected to be on paper.
19	MR. KING: Yes.
20	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: But that the
21	experience we've had.
22	MR. KING: But that's also part of the
23	risk-informed process. Remember, one of the five
24	elements is the feedback element, and when you're
25	using a PRA to help certainly guide your design and

guide your operation, as you learn from experience, you can feed that back in and see what it means. So I think there's a way to try and accommodate that. I agree with you, initially, you're going to have some surprises probably.

Let me say one other thing that applies to all these issues. These are pretty fundamental issues. We're not trying in this paper to figure out how to implement all the details that go along with each of these issues. What we're trying to do is get the first step in front of the Commission to make a decision do we go this way or do we go that way? And depending on that decision, then we can go and start developing details. And whether that has to do with defining defense-in-depth or figuring out what the right criteria are for event selection, you won't find that in this paper. What you'll find is just trying to get the direction from the Commission.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We haven't even discussed the options for the very first issue yet. It's been 25 minutes.

MEMBER KRESS: He'll get to that.

MR. KING: Okay. I'll speed it up. First issue has to do with enhanced safety, how do we handle that? And, again, the things we looked at in going

NEAL R. GROSS

through this issue we were we're going to additional plants, both possibly on a site as well as nationwide, how do we factor that into looking at the level of safety we need? What's the Commission's performance goal to maintain safety? It probably means don't raise the bar, generically, but we still need to look at what do we want to do for future plants?

That third bullet has to do with getting back to the question of would it make sense to raise the bar in some areas to account for larger An example being maybe we ought to uncertainties? stress prevention more because we know less about severe accidents on some of these new technologies. And then the implications for LWRs.

Okay. The options we looked at, and I think these are -- we talked about these before -- are basically three. Let's continue to do like we did on the ALWR design certification process, we're expecting applicants will come in with designs with enhanced safety. We would codify that applicant-proposed enhanced safety feature in the design certification or if it's a COL through some license condition, and then we may add some additional things on there if we feel through engineering judgment the uncertainties were

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	large enough to warrant that.
2	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Now, the goals, as
3	they have been stated, are in terms of rates, aren't
4	they? One-tenth of one percent of the accident rate,
5	right?
6	MR. KING: Yes, reactor year basis,
7	usually.
8	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: And this refers now
9	to a particular site or to the nation? What I'm
10	getting at is if the NEI and DOE are thinking about
11	the future and it turns out to be true and we're going
12	to start building reactors again, crazy, would that
13	affect the enhanced safety part, the fact that now you
14	have many more reactors than you thought you would
15	have, because your criteria are in terms of per year
16	probabilities rather than absolute?
17	MR. KING: Yes. There's two aspects
18	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think you address
19	it somewhere else, don't you? But I think here it's
20	probably relevant here too.
21	MR. KING: Yes. It comes up in this issue
22	in the next slide or two. There's two issues:
23	There's a modular plant issue where you've got maybe
24	eight or ten smaller reactors that add up to one big
25	reactor in terms of electrical production. The

designers have all proposed that they will account for 1 the integrated risk for those eight or ten modules so 2 that the integrated risk is equivalent to one big 3 So I think that's -plant. 4 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But that's at the 5 6 site. 7 MR. KING: At the site. CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: about How 8 nationwide? 9 Nationwide, I think at this 10 MR. KING: point there's nothing being proposed because of 11 additional plants nationwide. My view is all these 12 13 future designs, whether they're modular or big plants, 14 we expect them to be safer. And if you look at the 15 ALWRs, they're probably an order of magnitude safer, 16 if you're looking at CDF or LERF. So if you start to 17 add one or two additional ones on a site, it's a small incremental risk for that site. If you start to add 18 19 them nationwide, yes, I mean if you have 1,000 plants 20 nationwide, you might want to start to rethink things. 21 But I think from a near-term practical standpoint, I 22 don't think it's an issue we need to worry about right 23 now. 24 MEMBER KRESS: The quantitative safety

goals are all on an individual risk basis, and it

wouldn't account for nationwide in the totals. 1 Right. And today they don't 2 MR. KING: account for multiple units on a site either. 3 MEMBER KRESS: That's right. 4 MR. KING: I mean we have some sites that 5 6 have three units on them when we did --7 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The question is whether that's appropriate. 8 9 MR. KING: Yes. Our view is, at this 10 point, if you have a three-unit site and you add Unit 4 and 5 but Unit 4 and 5 are of an order of magnitude 11 12 safer than the units that are there, it's not a 13 problem. 14 MEMBER KRESS: It doesn't add much to it. 15 MR. KING: No. It doesn't add much. Like 16 in Reg Guide 1.174, we said ten percent change 17 increments were okay. 18 MEMBER KRESS: In principle, the prompt 19 fatality safety goals say on a LERF there ought to be 20 a site criteria. But practically speaking, it's not 21 going to change much if you add one or two or more 22 plants. I guess if you started getting ten or more on 23 a site, which is not likely, you'd have a problem. 24 But practically speaking, it's not going to be a

problem.

MR. KING: Our view in this paper is 1 2 that's not a near-term problem. 3 MEMBER KRESS: I think that's a valid 4 view. 5 MR. KING: The other options are raise the 6 bar generically in terms of level of safety. And the 7 third option is we may want to require some additional testing or oversight in areas where we do have large 8 9 uncertainty to deal with those. So those are sort of 10 the three areas we looked at. 11 Advantages, disadvantages, certainly 12 requiring enhanced safety can compensate for less 1.3 experience and compensate for the integrated risk, 14 multiple units situation. Disadvantages, the big one 15 I see is it results in a set of dual regulations, 16 which, you know, is a practicality issue. 17 MEMBER KRESS: We shouldn't worry too much 18 about that sub-bullet issue, just the second one. 19 MR. KING: Right, right. So that leads to 20 what are we going to recommend, and what we're going 21 to recommend, and this is modified a little bit from 22 what's in the draft paper, but it still is let's use 23 a process similar to what we used on the ALWR 24 certifications, because we do expect all these designs 25 are going to come in with enhanced safety in their

1	proposals. The modular designs should account for
2	integrated risk modules, they're all saying they're
3	going to do that. And let's not worry at this point
4	about the incremental risks from additional plants on
5	a site because it's going to be in the near term a
6	small factor. We think this is practical, it's
7	certainly is consistent with the ALWR approach, so
8	we're not getting into a dual regulation type
9	situation.
10	MEMBER KRESS: Now, the ALWR approach does
11	allow you to think about areas of high uncertainty
12	MR. KING: Yes.
13	MEMBER KRESS: and you might want to do
14	something like that. So that's implied in that
15	statement.
16	MR. KING: Yes, yes. And from an
17	implementation standpoint, if the Commission agrees
18	with this direction, then through this framework
19	effort that's underway to develop a framework
20	MEMBER KRESS: Option 3?
21	MR. KING: Well, this would be the follow-
22	on to Option 3, developing a framework for future
23	plants, would be the way to implement this process.
24	That's where you would develop risk metrics and
25	criteria for non-LWRs and talk about how you would

look at each design and apply the framework to each design. So those are sort of the implementation issues that would need to be dealt with as a follow-on activity.

Okay. Defense-in-depth, second issue. We talked before about -- defense-in-depth is talked about in a lot of places but it's not really defined. Dr. Powers pointed out it was talked about in Appendix R, and, yes, it is in terms of fire protection. We found one other place in the regulations it's mentioned too, and that's in the siting regulations. Part 100.1 where it says -- it basically makes the statement that siting away from densely populated areas is an element of defense-in-depth. So those are the two places we found in the regulations.

The Commission's white paper on risk-informed performance-based regulation had a short definition. To me it read more like a goal of defense-in-depth, and I thought it was a pretty good goal.

MEMBER KRESS: Yes. It was more like a goal of defense-in-depth.

MR. KING: Right. So in looking at this issue, you know, the key questions we thought were would it make a sense to develop a description of

NEAL R. GROSS

defense-in-depth? What value would it have? And, basically, the answer was we think it would have some It would certainly help implement all these value. places where we talk about the defense-in-depth philosophy or preserving defense-in-depth would add some consistency and transparency as to what we mean. It would be something we could put in the regulatory analysis quidelines because that's a document that's sort of weak when it comes to defense-in-depth and I think should be certainly a key factor in making regulatory decisions. And a good definition of defense-in-depth could form the foundation for this new licensing framework depending on --

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think what you're going to end up with is more like on the next slide, that you have a description of what defense-in-depth means for programmatic issues and so on. Because it's really a philosophy, and I don't know how you define a philosophy. It's difficult to come up with a three-line definition of a philosophy, but I think what you do here with the key questions and give an example is probably the best way to do it.

MR. KING: Yes. This paper hasn't settled in on what defense-in-depth is, what that description would be, but at least the way the version that you

NEAL R. GROSS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

407 have in front of you has a couple of examples in to 1 give the Commission an idea of if we go ahead and 2 develop such a description, here's sort of the scope 3 and depth of what we're talking about developing. 4 We're not talking about a three-line definition, we're 5 talking about laying something out that has a little 6 7 more meat in it. CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. Stay away 8 9 from the conditions --10 MR. KING: Yes, yes. CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It's better to do 11 12

something like this with examples and descriptions.

MR. KING: Yes. But if the Commission says, "Yes, go do that," then we're going to have to decide, okay, what is in that description, and we sort of listed at a high level here some of the key elements that we will need to consider for putting in that description, and that can include programmatic items, physical features, is it a process just to treat uncertainties like NEI has proposed, exactly what's in there? So the paper tries to give the Commission an idea that, hey, we're going to wrestle If you say, "Go do that," that's the with these. stuff we're going to wrestle with.

> And also say maybe the reactor we

NEAL R. GROSS

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	cornerstones would be a good structure to start with
2	because we already have the oversight process that's
3	laid out in that fashion, and it might be nice to
4	start laying out other things in that fashion. So we
5	would look for some feedback from the Commission
6	whether they like that idea or not.
7	Okay. The options we considered are let's
8	not do anything, let's just continue case by case.
9	Let's develop the description. It would have we're
10	not sure exactly what it will have yet, but it could
11	have some elements in it that are independent of the
12	PRA, just some givens and some things that everybody
13	has to do as well as maybe some probablistic type
14	criteria. And then the third option
15	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Is there any reason
16	why the ROP cornerstones cannot be or could not be a
17	description?
18	MR. KING: In the argument against that?
19	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
20	MR. KING: The only argument I could see,
21	and it's just a hypothetical now, is if we actually
22	get into trying to describe defense-in-depth and we
23	find some better way to do it. At this point, I don't
24	I haven't thought any better way to do it.
25	MEMBER KRESS: Well, the cornerstones are

just a framework. They're too limited because they
don't get into the questions of things like how do you
allocate risk among sequences or how do you allocate
among the cornerstones, what do you about
uncertainties related to those? So it's a framework
MR. KING: Yes. The cornerstones are not
the definition, but they may provide the structure of
the seven top-level elements.
MEMBER KRESS: They provide structure
they're just incomplete as a DID.
CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I didn't mean that
they were complete, but it seems to me that having
those four I think there are four cornerstones,
we talk about accident initiation, protecting the
pressure boundary, safety systems, emergency planning,
are there any designs where these things don't apply?
I mean these are very high level.
MR. KING: Yes, but the cornerstones go on
and talk about
CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: And the moment you
say that you have to worry about these four things,
you have placed a major defense-in-depth element in
your analysis.

MEMBER KRESS: I don't disagree with that.

1	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: In fact, this is
2	what's missing I think from 1.174, is it not? My
3	colleague here on the left has complained that some of
4	the decisions we're making based on delta CDF and
5	delta LERF do not really reflect the intent of the
6	regulations. If you went back to these four
7	cornerstones, perhaps you would manage to do a better
8	job, right? The regulation are not there just to
9	protect the core damage. Of course they are there for
10	core damage but other things as well.
11	MR. KING: Yes, yes. But recognize the
12	cornerstones also have three other elements too. They
13	have the radiation protection of the worker, of the
14	public, and of safeguards and security.
15	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Sure.
16	MR. KING: Which at least the intent in
17	developing this defense-in-depth description would be
18	bring those in as well because they're important.
19	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. And somewhere in
20	there you have to address the structureless view of
21	just what if we're wrong in following deterministic
22	analysis and converse analysis, what do we do then?
23	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, he will come
24	to that, he will come to that. Are you asking
25	yourself, "What if I am wrong," every five minutes?

1 MEMBER SIEBER: But when you go back to the certification process --2 3 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: How often should he ask that, Mr. Powers? 4 POWERS: Well. Ι think 5 MEMBER the appropriate times to look at that is after you've 6 7 developed the major elements of your structures. problem you get into with defense-in-depth in a risk-8 9 informed regulatory structure is the same one we identified in the development of what became Reg Guide 1.0 11 1.174, that uninhibited defense-in-depth 12 considerations can be applied at too low a level and 13 they trump any considerations of risk. And our 14 suggestion has always been that defense-in-depth 15 should be applied at the higher levels. question of what if I'm wrong is a high-level question 16 17 over the overall structure, not about individual 18 pipes, individual meters, diagnostics and things like 19 that, because our general feeling is that these points 20 of quantitative analysis are legitimately applied to 21 those questions. Whereas the major omissions are 22 things that we just don't know about right now. 23 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So the cornerstone level would be --24 25 MEMBER POWERS: Well, I think that is

exactly the level to start thinking about these things. I mean --

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, by accepting the cornerstones in fact you have, as I said earlier, put a level of defense-in-depth there, because you say now you have --

MEMBER POWERS: See, the difference is that -- maybe there is no difference here. It is a different view of what the cornerstones are maybe between structuralists and rationalists there, though they're both very happy with cornerstones.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think they are.

MEMBER POWERS: But, yes, they -- and I've never come up with a nice way to articulate this difference between high-level and low-level application of defense-in-depth, but it's very clear to me, it was very clear to the whole Committee ion the discussion of what became Reg Guide 1.174 that the trumping issue always became -- arose because you applied defense-in-depth at too low a level. now what isn't at too low a level I think that's something you just have to mandate, because I haven't found a way to just describe it succinctly to But render under PRA that which PRA does somebody. well, render under defense-in-depth that

NEAL R. GROSS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	defense-in-depth does well.
2	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Whatever that may
3	be.
4	MEMBER POWERS: Well, I think it does very
5	well in protecting us against things that we simply
6	don't anticipate. That's where it's served us well
7	over the last 50 years. And so you want to use it
8	that way and
9	MEMBER KRESS: So you would necessarily
10	put a containment around the gas-cooled
11	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: They will address
12	this.
13	MEMBER POWERS: You know, when you come
14	down to the wrestling between containment and
15	confinement, I would surely look to have a barrier
16	there.
17	MEMBER KRESS: Let's ask the question of
18	no barrier at all.
19	MEMBER POWERS: Well, that's where I would
20	tend to come in and say I don't really care what your
21	calculations show, because there's this issue of what
22	if you're wrong, okay? Now, you ask me what kind of
23	barrier do I put in, containment or confinement
24	MEMBER KRESS: That's a different issue.
25	MEMBER POWERS: you know, that's where

1	your quantitative analyses come up, and I have written
2	a justification for confinements in DOE sites as
3	opposed to containments, so I can't say I throw out
4	containments or confinements automatically. They
5	have advantages over containments, they have
6	deficiencies over containments. But I would tend to
7	say, okay, make that a part of your quantitative
8	analysis, but the existence of a barrier there is part
9	of defense-in-depth.
10	MR. KING: I can envision other things
11	where you may just want to say, regardless of what
12	your PRA says, "I want two independent ways to shut
13	the reactor down. Don't give me a design that just
14	has one way." Have some fundamental things like that
15	as part of your defense-in-depth.
16	MEMBER KRESS: I think you could say that
17	about emergency cooling, "Give me at least two ways to
18	diverse emergency cooling."
19	MR. KING: Yes, yes.
20	MEMBER KRESS: Same thing with electric
21	power coming in, "Give me several sources." I think
22	those are defense-in-depth you can almost just mandate
23	without
24	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But you can use a
25	rationalist approach to see whether those things make

	sense.
2	MEMBER KRESS: You can see how good they
3	are, but I think you just mandate those.
4	MEMBER POWERS: I think what I would do,
5	Tom, is I would say the quantitative analysis is what
6	you do to say do we need to two sources of electrical
7	power or do I need three?
8	MEMBER KRESS: And how reliable do they
9	have to be?
10	MEMBER POWERS: Well, I mean that's what
11	they do is they go through the reliability and what
12	not. But going below two it doesn't matter what your
13	analyses are, because I know you haven't take into
14	account everything.
15	MR. KING: I think those are the kinds of
16	discussions where you get into a condition that says
17	go develop a description.
18	MEMBER KRESS: Now, your recommendation,
19	is that B or C?
20	MR. KING: The recommendation is
21	either/or. It's develop a description.
22	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Where is the
23	recommendation?
24	MR. KING: The bottom of Page 11. The
25	workshop everybody in the workshop was unanimously
	1

in favor of developing a description. What that 1 description would be there was some discussion about, 2 but that's an issue for the next phase of this 3 activity. 4 MEMBER KRESS: I'm sure people would like 5 to see defense-in-depth articulated to the point that 6 7 they have some expectations of what's going to be imposed on them. A good description would probably do 8 that for them. 9 MR. KING: Yes. And back on the previous 10 11 issue, the workshop -- I forgot to mention the 12 workshop summary there. All the industry representatives agreed with the recommendation to 13 follow the ALWR process. The only disagreement came 14 15 from the public interest group, Greenpeace, which liked the middle option of raising the level of 16 17 safety, requiring a higher level of safety across the 18 board. So that was the workshop results on that. 19 Anyway, what we're recommending to the Commission is 20 let's go forward and develop a 21 description or a policy statement of defense-in-depth, 22 and we'll do that through the normal public process 23 like we develop policy statements. 24 VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: You said C, right?

MR. KING: B or C. We're not sure --

1	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: You're not sure,
2	okay.
3	MR. KING: Both B and C talk about
4	developing a description or policy.
5	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: One of them is
6	process.
7	MR. KING: Yes. But we're not
8	distinguishing at this point which way. We've tried
9	to give an example in the draft paper of both options
10	just to give the Commission a feel for what we mean by
11	this.
12	MEMBER WALLIS: Do you have a feel for how
13	long this description is going to be?
14	MR. KING: How many pages?
15	MEMBER WALLIS: Is it going to be one
16	sentence?
17	MR. KING: No.
18	MEMBER WALLIS: One paragraph?
19	MR. KING: No. I would I mean
20	MEMBER WALLIS: Is it going to give
21	examples?
22	MR. KING: Well, the paper has two
23	outlines in it, one that goes with Option B and one
24	that goes with Option C. And the outline for the
25	Option B is about a page and a half, so I would

418 envision a policy statement would be ten pages or so 1 2 for that. I mean maybe it's five pages, maybe it's It's not 100 pages, but it's --3 ten pages. 4 MEMBER WALLIS: But you're looking at a 5 really thorough description. MR. KING: Yes. That's what I'm looking 6 Okay. And I guess I'd like the Committee's views 7 8 on whether it's useful to put those examples or outlines in there. 9 10 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think we have conflicts here. On the one hand, people want to have 11 flexibility, high-level goals be left alone, try to 12 13 meet them and so on. But then I have found that 14 consistently the industry wants the NRC to explain in detail what the NRC wants. Even 1.174 was criticized 15

would depend a lot on how it's stated, but this is a philosophy, this is an approach. I think it's going to go against risk informing the regulations if you

they were complaining that

prescriptive.

describe it too much.

MR. KING: So your view is maybe a page.

the Agency

Yes.

I am afraid that by doing this,

is

25

23

24

16

17

18

19

NEAL R. GROSS

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:

as not being restricted enough when at the same time

especially if it's a policy statement, of course it

Give a few

1	examples where it will work well, what we mean by it
2	and so on. But that doesn't mean you have to do this
3	in the future plants. To go down to saying, "I need
4	two sources of electric power and this and that," I'm
5	a little uncomfortable with that. We're back to
6	prescribing everything.
7	MEMBER POWERS: Absolutely not, George.
8	I mean that's the whole point, that you don't
9	prescribe it at the levels of analysis.
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: You said below two
11	is non-negotiable. Two or three, I can look at the
12	numbers
13	MEMBER KRESS: But these are for very
14	limited functions that we all know are real safety
15	functions for nuclear power plants. You want to shut
16	down the power, you want to have emergency cooling,
17	you want to have electrical power coming in, and you
18	want to be able to get rid of the long-term decay
19	heat. Everybody agrees
20	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I'm not sure I want
21	to go beyond that and say we need two
22	MEMBER KRESS: Well, you may not have to
23	go further than that just for those.
24	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Anyway, I think
25	there is a downside to developing descriptions and

1	policy statements.
2	MEMBER KRESS: Well, I think we've gone
3	through this debate and argument for years on how much
4	DID is necessary and how much is sufficient and when
5	can we arbitrarily impose it on plants, and I think
6	the more of a description and the more of a definition
7	we give, the better we're going to put that in a box
8	at least and let people know what it is, and then
9	could make an arbitrary
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But, you know, Tom
11	said we have to be practical with these things. I
12	have yet to see anyone from the Agency or from the
13	industry who did not treat defense-in-depth with
14	respect. As a practical matter, it's really ingrained
15	in what we do, the way we think. So trying to define
16	it
17	MEMBER KRESS: AP600 certainly didn't like
18	us putting spray in their containment.
19	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That's an
20	individual
21	MEMBER KRESS: Well, but it's an example.
22	I mean you can find examples
23	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But that's a matter
24	of judgment there. I mean it's not
25	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, if you

make something very prescriptive, you're really tying 1 the hands of the designer. 2 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That's my problem. 3 MEMBER SIEBER: And it would seem to me to 4 5 avoid tying the hands of the designer you're better off being more conceptual in nature and then doing the 6 analysis as the design evolves to determine what 7 elements of defense-in-depth really make a difference 8 9 and which ones do not. VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: But I thought the 10 concept of implementing successive, what is it, layers 11 of protection, which is I think we all could agree 12 with that, that's a first step, and I think below that 13 you can put some other criteria on the type that is 14 15 general enough. It doesn't even tell you that you 16 have to use PRA or you don't have to use PRA. 17 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think that we 18 call the pragmatic approach in that paper, which for some reason people don't pay much attention to, does 19 a lot of what we're discussing. You apply defense-in-20 depth when the PRA has problems. Let's not forget 21 You apply defense-in-depth --22 23 MEMBER POWERS: That's a particular philosophy you have, and that's not one that --24 25 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think it's very

1	consistent with what you said earlier. At the lower
2	levels if there is something that's missing, you apply
3	defense-in-depth. At the higher levels, you don't
4	look at the PRA, you say, no, I want these things, the
5	structure of these.
6	MEMBER SHACK: Yes. We're talking about
7	what things we want, George.
8	MEMBER WALLIS: George, if I could
9	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think we all
10	agree that the cornerstones are a very good starting
11	point.
12	MEMBER WALLIS: George, if I'm going to
13	apply this defense-in-depth, I need to know what it
14	is.
15	MEMBER KRESS: Absolutely.
16	MEMBER WALLIS: And if I'm going to
17	regulate how people apply it, I need to know and they
18	need to know what it is.
19	MEMBER KRESS: You need to know how to
20	quantify it and put limits on it.
21	MR. KING: We don't have to decide today
22	what this description contains, but the question for
23	today is should we try and develop a description?
24	MEMBER WALLIS: Yes, you should. If you
25	find you can't you may fall back to the one-paragraph

description.
MEMBER ROSEN: I come down on the side of
wanting to have a description, but I am alarmed by the
idea that it would be ten pages long at this level.
MEMBER KRESS: That's triple-spaced.
MEMBER ROSEN: It comes off almost like a
procedure, and that would be conflict to the
objectives that I would see.
MR. KING: The ten pages is Tom King's
view on what this thing would say and how long it
would take to say it. It may be one page, I don't
know where we're going to end up, but that's next
year's discussion.
MEMBER ROSEN: And Steve Rosen's view is
that if it takes ten pages to say it, you're at too
low a level and you're not abstracting enough.
CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: There are certain
things that
MEMBER ROSEN: And you're tying the hands
too much.
CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: They are topical in
nature and they cannot be constrained by a single
definition.
MEMBER KRESS: I think we better get on to
the next issue.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: In what we know as 1 2 a deterministic world in the past 20 years, there is 3 a lot of examples of application of PRA to apply I really disagree with 4 defense-in-depth. 5 divergence of the two things. I mean you can go back 15 years and see designs that were being implemented 6 and the questions that came about, auxiliary feedwater 7 trains, how many should you have? Well, PRA gave a 8 9 lot of insights and I am convinced the NRC always looks at that that way too. So I'm saying that there 10 11 is some insights that come from experience that this document could benefit from. 12 13 MEMBER KRESS: I still believe defense-indepth needs to be tied somehow to the uncertainties 14 15 that you get out of the PRA analysis. I'm not sure 16 what that tie is. 17 MR. KING: If you look at what -- IAEA and INSAC have taken a stab at the finding, and they've 18 put two or three pages of description together, so 19 20 it's not all a paragraph. 21 MEMBER POWERS:

MEMBER POWERS: Tom, I think that the tie is at best conceptual in nature, because though there's often words about we've completely characterized the uncertainties in this PRA, it's not done, it's not doable.

22

23

24

MEMBER KRESS: And when I say it ought to be tied to the uncertainties, I implied that that has to be recognized, that character, that you can't really quantify fully the uncertainties, you can only do part of them. And that has to enter into your concept some way.

MEMBER POWERS: I think that's where this what if I'm wrong question comes about is that I'm quite certain that any analysis done with PRA or otherwise has left something out that I just don't know, and so now you're asking what if I'm wrong. The difficulty with it is it's too facile of a question to ask and you ask it at too low a level. And so I think you're running into something that's very akin to the growing possibility, is that you can't set up a completely unarbitrary political system here, that you've got to establish a constitution that just mandates and restricts certain things or --

MEMBER KRESS: That's why I say you use the uncertainties in the PRA where you can.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It's an uncertainty, Tom, that we never deal with, and that uncertainty is the one that I mentioned earlier. Look back in 1970, all the papers, unavailability of auxiliary feedwater system ten to the minus six. Ten

1	to the minus six was the magic number. Now it's two
2	orders of magnitude greater than that. Why? We
3	missed common cause failures, we missed this, we
4	missed that. It's this kind of uncertainty that we
5	are not dealing with, the uncertainty of the new.
6	See, I can't find a way to raise the number that the
7	AP600 gives me, but I know it's a new design.
8	MEMBER WALLIS: But "what if I'm wrong"
9	doesn't help.
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But that's where
11	you say
12	MEMBER WALLIS: But "what if I'm wrong"
13	doesn't help you at all. If I go out here and I push
14	the button to bring the elevator, I assume that
15	there's a high probability it will come, and worrying
16	about whether I'm wrong when I do that and all the
17	things I do every day based on the probability of
18	various things is silly. I only worry about big
19	things about where I'm wrong.
20	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It's also for new
21	designs. The elevator is not a new design.
22	MEMBER WALLIS: Then I don't have to worry
23	anymore. I don't keep asking. I don't keep asking
24	about when I'm wrong.
25	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: No, but when you

1	send a new spacecraft to the moon, then you should ask
2	that question.
3	MEMBER WALLIS: Well, that's because
4	MEMBER WALLIS: You have some reason to be
5	unsure. But most of the time you know pretty well.
6	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I think if you look
7	back at history, I repeat, it supports the view that
8	if you have a new design, you really can't figure out
9	everything.
10	MEMBER WALLIS: That's true.
11	MEMBER ROSEN: I think you're absolutely
12	naive to think otherwise.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Let me ask a fundamental
14	question before we try to develop the description for
15	you. Which of the three options will you concentrate
16	on in developing the description, A is probably out of
17	it, but B or C? One is process and the other one is
18	what I think of as the element.
19	MR. KING: Yes. I don't think
20	MEMBER SIEBER: And that determines what
21	the description looks like, to me.
22	MR. KING: I don't think we know yet, and
23	this paper is not intending to lean one way or the
24	other. All the paper is intending to get from the
25	Commission is direction to go develop such a

1	description, and then we'll consider B, we'll consider
2	C, we'll consider any other bright ideas that people
3	have.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, it
5	seems to me that we have discussed here a little bit
6	of both B and C. For example, when we say you have to
7	have two different power sources or you have to have
8	so many barriers between fission products and
9	somebody's nose, those are physical requirements.
10	Beyond that, though, you need some overarching set of
11	requirements that says when you put this whole thing
12	together here's the risk and here's the uncertainty
13	and here's all the things we've done to minimize the
14	uncertainty and fit this into the context of where we
15	want to be in risk base. And so I think there's a
16	little bit of that here.
17	MEMBER KRESS: We'd better move on to the
18	next issue.
19	MR. KING: All right.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, let's.
21	MR. KING: Five issues in 30 minutes, all
22	right.
23	MEMBER KRESS: That's easy enough.
24	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, what you need
25	to do is to go to your recommendations.

1	MEMBER KRESS: Could be.
2	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Let's go to the
3	accommodations and say why you're recommending a
4	particular option. I don't see how else you can do
5	it.
6	MEMBER KRESS: But he asks such wonderful
7	questions on each one of those.
8	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: He can raise them
9	as he discusses the accommodations.
10	MR. KING: All right. Third issue, use of
11	international codes and standards.
12	MEMBER KRESS: Let me ask you about that
13	before we get into it.
14	MR. KING: Okay.
15	MEMBER KRESS: When I think of codes and
16	standards I'm thinking of things like the ASME codes
17	and ISO 9000. Some people think of safety standards
18	and safety goals and risk acceptance criteria. What
19	are we talking about here?
20	MR. KING: We're talking about the design
21	codes
22	MEMBER KRESS: Design codes.
23	MR. KING: maybe some programmatic
24	codes like ISO 9000 and possibly some safety
25	standards, particularly the IAEA safety standards,

because all of those are being used to some degree in these advanced designs, and we're going to be faced with having to deal with those at some point. And this issue really deals with do we want to deal with that in a reactive mode or do we want to deal with that in a proactive mode. And the recommendation is let's figure out a way to deal with that in a proactive mode so we can, one, have some influence on what these standards say if they're still being written, and, two, be prepared to deal with them when the application comes in, and, three, let's use them to help our infrastructure and efficiency standpoint. So that's really the recommendation.

MEMBER ROSEN: The issue is also some, all or one. I mean are you talking about all international standards?

MR. KING: No, no. And, again, it's the ones -- certainly the ones that are going to be proposed in an application we need to look at, but also where our infrastructure doesn't have a standard to deal with, particularly use the HTGRs as an example, you know, graphite structures that were manufactured, we don't have any standards in our reg guides or anywhere else that deal with what's an acceptable design code for graphite.

NEAL R. GROSS

IV on

How about INSAC

2 safety codes, just as an aside. MR. KING: I'll skip that one. So the 3 idea is not everything but where it improves our 4 efficiency and where we know we're going to have to 5 deal with it in the future. And to me, 6 implementation issue is let's figure out a way to go 7 identify those and get some resource on reviewing or 8 9 participating in the development of those standards. 10 I think the issue -- certainly, one of the issues for the Commission is what's this going to take 11 12 resources, and that's a key thing, because you can't 13 start and stop this kind of thing. If you're going to 14 do it --15 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But don't 16 Germans have the DIN system, D-I-N, so they have a --17 like we have the ASME here producing all sorts of codes, they have the DIN. 18 19 MR. KING: The Germans have some 20 standards, and they have some HTGR standards. 21 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: So what do we do 22 We want to check whether their standards apply to us or we look only for standards for which there is 23 24 no American counterpart? I don't know. 25 MEMBER SIEBER: I think that what will

MEMBER ROSEN:

1	happen is that some foreign reactor vendor will come
2	in and say, "I want to certify my design and it's
3	built to these standards, ISO 9000 or what have you,"
4	and now you're going to have the job of reconciling
5	the standards that it was designed to and built to to
6	our standards and perhaps adopt or convert, as the
7	case may be.
8	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, but that's his
9	problem. Why should we do that?
10	MR. KING: I mean it's our problem.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: I'm not sure that it's his
12	problem.
13	MR. KING: Well, you mentioned a couple of
14	things. We have a Management Directive 6.5 that gives
15	the Staff direction to go use consensus standards
16	wherever it's practical to do that, and they
17	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I thought that was
18	domestic consensus standards.
19	MR. KING: No. There's a sentence in
20	there that says they make no distinction between
21	domestic and international standards.
22	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Oh.
23	MEMBER ROSEN: That's in response to the
24	OMB Circular
25	MR. KING: Right.

MEMBER ROSEN: -- A-119?

MR. KING: Right.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Correct. But that's very different from what Jack was just saying.

So as a matter of Commission MR. KING: policy, we're already expected to go take that approach wherever we can. So this is a way of saying to the Commission we need to do that for these future non-LWRs, not just because of the Management Directive but because we're going to get some applications that have this stuff in it. And the pre-application reviews are a good way to start to identify those, and that's another advantage of doing these preapplication reviews.

But in addition to that, we need to look at where do we want to have something on the books, because we don't have anything to deal with some of these non-LWR high-temperature materials, graphite, whatever it is, and how we actually go about identifying those I think is something that's part of the implementation. This paper doesn't say how we're going to do that other than we're going to have to look at the pre-application reviews and we're going to have to have to figure out what's the best way to go do that.

MEMBER SIEBER: It would seem to me that

1	if you're going to certify a design that utilizes
2	foreign standards, that you're going to have to adopt
3	a rule similar to 50.55(a) where the Staff has
4	analyzed the standards and finds that it's adequate
5	for the purpose intended, and before you invoke it as
6	part of the certification process. That's the way I
7	would see it.
8	MR. KING: That's one way to do it.
9	Another way to do it is to codify through the
10	certification process. Another way to do it is put it
11	in the there's a reg guide that implements 50.55(a)
12	that has a whole bunch of standards in it. I think
13	the trend is to get the standards out of the
14	regulation and into the reg guide and we could put
15	some of these things into the reg guide. So there's
16	different way to do it.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but they all amount
18	to the same thing. You have to do the work
19	MR. KING: We have to do the work.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: to understand the
21	standard and see whether it's applicable and then
22	endorse it somehow.
23	MR. KING: Yes.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
25	MR. KING: And maybe participate in the

1	development of the standard so it's, one, we
2	understand it better and, two, that it does what we
3	want it to do.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
5	MR. KING: So all of that's wrapped up in
6	there.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: And that's a good idea.
8	MR. KING: Yes. So what we're
9	recommending is let's go do that. We have to work out
10	the details to figure out how to do it, but that's the
11	recommendation.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Let's go do that.
13	MR. KING: All right. Fourth issue, now
14	we're into the issues that were looked at ten years
15	ago. I'll just go right to the recommendation. This
16	has to do with
17	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. That's very
18	good.
19	MR. KING: What, jumping right to the
20	recommendation?
21	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. Page 18,
22	right? You say you want to go to the recommendation?
23	MR. KING: Yes.
24	MEMBER WALLIS: I think we should read the
25	disadvantages or probablistic approach first.

1	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Look at the
2	recommendation. The rest is just
3	MR. KING: I'll mention on the previous
4	issue the workshop participants were in favor of us
5	going ahead and taking the proactive approach, so
6	there wasn't any disagreement there.
7	MEMBER KRESS: Let me ask one context
8	question here. Is it the assumption here that for
9	these new plants there will be a set of design basis
10	accidents, and you're dealing with now how to select
11	those?
12	MR. KING: For the pre-application review
13	so far, they've all taken that approach, and this is
14	a method and approach to how you select those.
15	MEMBER ROSEN: Why do you call them design
16	basis events?
17	MEMBER KRESS: Because they'll define the
18	licensing basis then.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you design features
20	into the plant to prevent design basis events from
21	having a safety impact on the public. The problem is
22	that when you do a PRA, what you end up finding as the
23	risky parts of the plants are the severe accident
24	things, which go beyond design basis. And the reason
25	why that happens is because when you define the design

1	basis events, you design at an impact.
2	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. I don't think there's
3	anything wrong with that.
4	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: And that's why you
5	have a safety goal.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: I don't either. On the
7	other hand, why not start with a clean piece of paper
8	and do a probablistic assessment to define what the
9	design basis events ought to be?
10	MEMBER KRESS: I think that's what he
11	says.
12	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That's what he
13	says.
14	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. I think that's
15	exactly what he's proposing.
16	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let me ask you a
17	question, and I agree with this anyway, but I have a
18	question. First of all, clearly, here you're talking
19	about the event selection, they are not going to be
20	
	anymore sooner events bounding because that's not the
21	anymore sooner events bounding because that's not the issue anymore. So I mean in the conditional accident
21	
	issue anymore. So I mean in the conditional accident
22	issue anymore. So I mean in the conditional accident analysis, you define the concern with some possible

ejection rate, very fast ejection rate, and that's how you got to bounding the particular effect. You're not talking about doing that, you're talking about identifying an event and making it -- okay. So you're going on a best estimate.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, he's not saying where he's going.

VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, I'm trying to understand it. And the other issue that I would like to touch on is take the PTS rule, for example, or the change we're doing right now. We eliminated as important events to be considered for those changes steam line breaks because we gave credit to the operators for preventing steam line breaks from causing the limiting overcooling. So therefore the steam line breaks are out of the table for that particular thing. How shall we treat the operator action here in plants that are new, new designs? We don't know really exactly how they'll respond.

MR. KING: Yes. What you're talking about is uncertainty. Again, the PRA is going to make assumptions on human performance and operator actions. If you don't believe it, that's where the engineering judgment and the deterministic overlay on what the PRA tells you is going to come into play. So this paper

doesn't lay out a detailed process as to how you do 2 that, but it says that's the concept behind this. VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: I understand. 3 quess I mean details, but they're very important 4 details and the devil is in the details. 5 6 MR. KING: I agree. I agree. Again, in 7 1993, what the Commission approved was a process that said let's deterministically said pick the design 8 basis accidents and then let's take a PRA and see if 9 10 we missed anything. What we're proposing now is something that flips that around and says let's start 11 12 with a PRA and then where we feel we've 13 uncertainties in the PRA, incompleteness or whatever, 14 let's then use our engineering judgment and supplement So this goes beyond what the 15 what the PRA says. Commission said in '93. The real question I think for 16 17 the Commission is does it go beyond the PRA policy statement, because the PRA policy statement says use 18 19 to complement the traditional deterministic 20 approach. What does complement mean? Does complement 21 mean --22 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That has to change. 23 MEMBER ROSEN: And that's what he's 24 proposing. 25 MEMBER KRESS: He's proposing to change.

1	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I would propose
2	that you rephrase the first bullet. The first bullet
3	should be rephrased, I think. It's not
4	MR. KING: Which one?
5	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: "Larger
6	uncertainties make PRAs less useful." I mean the
7	whole idea of a PRA is to look at uncertainties, not
8	the way the industry is doing them now but that's a
9	way .
10	MEMBER KRESS: Well, I think what he means
11	there is the difficulty in characterizing the
12	uncertainties for the non-LWRs.
13	MR. KING: What I meant is
14	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. But that
15	difficulty exists regardless of whether you do a PRA
16	or not.
17	MEMBER KRESS: No, it's more difficult
18	yes, but it's more difficult
19	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It's difficult to
20	quantify.
21	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. That's what
22	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That's what you
23	should say, that it's difficult to quantify.
24	MEMBER KRESS: But I think whether you use
25	the deterministic approach supplemented by PRA or PRA

supplemented by the deterministic, you end up at the same place.

MR. KING: Maybe.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MEMBER KRESS: Yes. And, you know, I don't think it matters whether -- let's say you select a set of design basis events just from judgment on what can go wrong and judgment on the frequency of them and say we'll look at this and then we'll impose an arbitrary source term based on the type of reactor it is, we'll impose a single failure criteria and the other kind of stylized things we do, and the you have a design based on that. Maybe you have to use the PRA and see if you meet your uncertainties, your defensein-depth, your safety goals or whatever you have. If you don't, you have to select -- do something more in design basis space. So you would end up the same way either way you go, but it just makes sense to me to have the design basis accidents first because that's what the designer designs to.

MR. KING: Well, I agree with that.

MEMBER ROSEN: Not true. My new vision is the designer designs to the PRA. He does a PRA and says this is unacceptable, and then he puts in more of

MEMBER KRESS: But you have to have a

NEAL R. GROSS

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	design before you do a PRA.
2	MEMBER ROSEN: You can lay out the
3	conceptual design.
4	MEMBER KRESS: Well, in any case, I think
5	they're iterative.
6	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It is iterative.
7	MEMBER KRESS: And you can't say these are
8	the design basis accidents
9	MEMBER ROSEN: I think it's iterative.
10	MEMBER KRESS: because you have to
11	iterate.
12	MEMBER ROSEN: I agree, I think it's
13	iterative, but I think this is a fundamental
14	improvement to the way we do business.
15	MEMBER KRESS: Oh, I do too.
16	MEMBER ROSEN: And it's a very high time
17	that we start to do and think this way and that I
18	don't think you'll end up in the same place. I think
19	you'll end up in a better place with this.
20	MEMBER KRESS: Well, you may end up in the
21	same place.
22	VICE-CHAIRMAN BONACA: You'll end up in
23	the same place because you'll iterate.
24	MEMBER ROSEN: You won't spend money
25	needlessly, that's Jack's point, is that there will

1	lots less false starts and going in the wrong
2	directions. But my point is more than that, you'll
3	end up not just half independent, you won't end up in
4	the same place. You'll end up in a place in the
5	design space that's better because you'll have
6	considered all the things and made rational choices
7	along the way about what's likely and what's not.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you spend the money
9	where you make the biggest impact on
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We seem to agree
11	with what Tom is proposing so we might as well move
12	on.
13	MEMBER WALLIS: Not just it's the
14	regulators, it's the designer of the reactor has to do
15	this.
16	MR. KING: Yes.
17	MEMBER WALLIS: Has to do the PRA as part
18	of the design process. Of course. That's where it
19	has the biggest effect, it seems to me.
20	MEMBER KRESS: So since we're regulating
21	that a PRA has to be part of the process, which is
22	interesting, we ought to move on to the next
23	MR. KING: All the industry
24	representatives at the workshop agreed with this
25	approach. The public interest groups said, no, they

1	don't trust PRA. That was basically the bottom line.
2	And there are a number of implementation issues
3	associated with this. It brings PRA more into the
4	licensing basis, so you've got the PRA quality
5	documentation.
6	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Is there another
7	name? Aren't you the public interest group?
8	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: You're a public
9	interest group.
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: You're a public
11	interest. In fact, you have responsibility, actually.
L2	You don't just talk. You are the NRC is the public
L3	interest group here.
L4	MR. KING: So if I work on this on my
L5	retirement time, I'm a public interest person, right?
16	(Laughter.)
L7	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well, I just don't
L8	know that we have to call those public interest
19	groups. Special interest groups. I'm sorry, that's
20	the way it is. You are the public interest group.
21	MEMBER POWERS: More risk-averse non-
22	owners.
23	(Laughter.)
24	MR. KING: All right. Source term.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Do it right unless you're

too tired and then do it inter-boundary way.

MR. KING: Well, again, this is an issue the Commission looked at ten years ago. What they approved was let's use scenario-specific source terms for licensing decisions, the two key ones being siting and containment performance. Again, there was some caveats that went with that in the sense that, hey, we better make sure we have sufficient understanding of fuel and plant performance and fission product transport before we go ahead and do that, which puts a burden on the licensee as well as the Staff to understand how those things perform.

It also said the events selected for source term evaluation should bound design-dependent uncertainties, that's fine, and severe accidents. Now, they didn't mean severe accidents in the sense of core melt, they met severe accidents in the sense of some low probability events that would bound these uncertainties. Now, Commissioner Rogers in the SRM in '93 did question this as is this really practical to do, but the SRM itself approved this.

To me the fundamental question is -- and we're recommending let's retain that guidance and the details in terms of conservative analysis and level of confidence and so forth will be an implementation

1	issue. To me the fundamental question on the source
2	term is for LWRs the source term is based upon an in-
3	vessel core melt, you know, a severe accident, severe
4	core damage type event. Should that be considered a
5	fundamental element of defense-in-depth that we always
6	want for siting decisions and containment decisions,
7	do we want to assume severe core damage? To me that's
8	the policy issue for the Commission to wrestle with.
9	They wrestled with it ten years ago, and we're
10	recommending that keep that position, but that's what
11	I see as the heart of the issue.
12	MEMBER KRESS: Now, when you talk about a
13	reactor-like prism, a big pool of molten salt, I mean
14	molten liquid metal, when you're talking about a
15	source term here and stuff has to get out of that
16	liquid metal before it goes into containment
17	MR. KING: Do you give credit for the
18	MEMBER KRESS: Yes, yes.
19	MR. KING: for the scrubbing or
20	whatever you want to call it?
21	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. Do you allow credit
22	for those kind of design features?
23	MR. KING: Yes. That's an implementation
24	issue, and this paper doesn't deal with that. But the
25	same with an HTGR, the graphite's going to retain

some, some is going to plate out on the vessel walls and so forth. How much credit you give for that, I'm not sure.

Now, the workshop did not have a consensus on this issue. There were some industry folks who -some industry folks suggested that maybe we ought to develop the equivalent of NUREG 1465 for HTGRs, that the Commission ought to just come out and say, "Develop one bounding source term for HTGRs and that's what we use." Others agreed with this recommendation. So there wasn't a -- I can't say there was a consensus in the workshop on this.

MEMBER POWERS: I'll bet you that if we have several gas-cooled reactors, that in the course of doing ordinary regulatory analysis that you will find a 1465-like source term becomes necessary just to carry out business. I mean it will be a regulator's tool. I don't know that you need to bring it up here in this, but I'll bet you that's the way it turns out, that you just need something to tell you what happens in an accident to kind of evaluate options and stuff like that.

MR. KING: Yes. You may be right.

MEMBER POWERS: It will naturally evolve that you just need something to conduct conversations

NEAL R. GROSS

1	with people rather than relying on some computer code
2	calculation and uncertainty bars this big and things
3	like that.
4	MR. KING: Yes. I mean Fort St. Vrain
5	used an adaptation of the old TID source term on
6	timing and some retention, but it was basically severe
7	core damage.
8	MEMBER POWERS: I mean you just need to do
9	it just to be able to talk, because you trip over
10	uncertainty bars and things like that. You know, when
11	you come down to quantify it, you come back to your
12	specific calculations.
13	MEMBER KRESS: I still think you've got a
14	lot of difficulties, because you could end up with a
15	WASH-740 source term. You've got all these fission
16	products in there, you might as well use all of them.
17	I mean that's a bounding source term. So you've got
18	to decide where to stop.
19	MR. KING: Yes. Do you assume the
20	graphite
21	MEMBER KRESS: And that ought to have
22	something to do with the design concept on top of the
23	reactor head.
24	MR. KING: That's the idea behind going
25	with this scenario specifically.

1	MEMBER KRESS: And you'll have to look at,
2	I think, frequencies and probabilities also.
3	MR. KING: If you want to add realism and
4	give credit to the designer and give him some
5	incentive to reduce core damage likelihood, then this
6	is the approach that would do that.
7	MEMBER KRESS: But I agree with Dana, you
8	may end up with some sort of a source term, but it
9	will have to be reactor type specific.
10	MR. KING: Okay. Next issue, containment
11	versus confinement. I'll say up-front there was no
12	consensus at the workshop on this, absolutely none, so
13	I'll just leave it at that. This was an issue the
14	Commission, again, looked at ten years ago. They
15	basically came out and said, "Okay, we're not going to
16	require a pressure retaining containment building.
17	We're going to develop some performance criteria."
18	MEMBER WALLIS: What's wrong with
19	pressure? You're trying to retain fission products.
20	MR. KING: Well, that's the idea of
21	pressure retaining
22	MEMBER WALLIS: Well, I know, but I mean
23	retaining pressure is there's nothing wrong with
24	pressure per se.
25	MR. KING: No, no. It leak-tight maybe

is a better way to say it, leak-tight.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MEMBER WALLIS: Right. That's better.

MR. KING: Okay. What the Commission said ten years ago was, "Here are some performance criteria that you can use. One, whatever building you have, you have to be able to show you can meet your release But, two, it said, "Okay, you need to limits." postulate a core damage event and then for 24 hours following the onset of that core damage event the building has to maintain that leak rate that's assumed in the analysis. In other words, the building can't have a hole develop in it. And then after 24 hours, you can take measures to reduce the pressure inside but don't have any uncontained release ofradioactivity. Basically, you have a vent system, you can have a filter system to help reduce stress on the building, but the building can't fall apart."

What we're proposing, and, again, the fundamental question for the Commission is should a leak-tight building be a fundamental aspect of defense-in-depth or not? What we're proposing is to supplement that guidance. We're proposing let's retain some set of performance criteria that will guide you as to whether you need pressure-retaining building or whether you can get away with a

confinement-type concept. But let's not automatically 1 2 assume we have to go to a core damage event. Let's use the results of the event selection and source term 3 process to decide what the challenges are. And as 4 Farouk said, these things are linked, so this is the 5 6 linkage. 7 But then add another criterion that says, okay, if you're coming in with a confinement building, 8 you ought to take a look at whether if you did add a 9 leak-tight building, a containment-type building, 10 11 would it really make a substantial improvement in 12 safety? And if so, then maybe we ought to consider --MEMBER WALLIS: The definition of that 13 substantial may be the same as in the regulatory 14 15 analysis definition? MR. KING: Yes. And Reg Guide 1.174, the 16 17 ten percent change. If it's greater than a ten 18 percent change for whatever metric you're using, LERF 19 or --20 MEMBER WALLIS: This concerns me a bit, 21 because when I looked at the SAMDAs for AP600 I came 22 to the conclusion that the containment building was 23 worth about \$1,400 in terms of the ten to the minus seventh and things they were predicting. 24 Then the

conclusion would be it's not worth building, and yet

They do have a containment building for 1 we did. 2 AP600, so this doesn't seem quite consistent with that logic. 3 MEMBER ROSEN: Well, maybe the numbers are 4 5 incorrect. 6 MEMBER WALLIS: Because you didn't believe 7 their numbers or something where the defense-in-depth and all that stuff comes in. 8 MEMBER KRESS: Are safeguard issues likely 9 to override this? 10 MR. KING: I don't know. This is not a 11 To me whether you have a leak-tight 12 security issue. 13 building or a confinement building, either one can be 14 strong to prevent or protect against external events, 15 so from a security -- I mean I don't know where the security issues are going to end up, and they could 16 17 have some impact on this, but this, to me, I think you can deal with the security issues separate from making 18 19 the leak-tight versus non-leak-tight decision. 20 MEMBER POWERS: Tom, when I look at 21 disadvantages of pressure retaining buildings and 22 think about this issue, the uncontrolled pressurized 23 release of radioactivity emerges as a disadvantage of the containment design. You can bust it and build up 24 25 all that pressure, you get a heck of a release.