



NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

Anthony R. Pietrangelo
DIRECTOR, RISK & PERFORMANCE-
BASED REGULATION
NUCLEAR GENERATION

December 18, 2002

Dr. William D. Beckner, Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: TSTF-418 Errata

PROJECT NUMBER: 689

Dear Dr. Beckner:

Minor editorial corrections have been made to three pages of TSTF-418, Revision 1, *RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times (WCAP-14333)*. The revised pages are attached:

- Insert 13, last line

Add a space between "O" and "applies."

- Insert 20, last line of first paragraph, and fourth line of third paragraph

Change the number "4" to "6." This makes the Bases consistent with the markup of the improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) that was submitted with TSTF-418, Revision 1, in my letter to you dated October 29, 2002.

- Page B 3.3.1-42, Bases for new Condition N, first full paragraph

Change "4" hours to "12" hours in the second and third lines. This makes the Bases consistent with the ISTS markup submitted on October 29, 2002.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Anthony R. Pietrangelo". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Anthony R. Pietrangelo
Enclosure

Dr. William D. Beckner

December 18, 2002

Page 2

c: Robert L. Dennig, NRC
Leslie A. Hill, NRC
Paul Infanger, B&WOG
Steve Wideman, WOG
Tom Silko, BWROG
David Bice, CEOG
Donald Hoffman, EXCEL Services Corporation

INSERT 11

The [4] hour time limit for testing the RTS Automatic Trip Logic train may include testing the RTB also, if both the Logic test and RTB test are conducted within the [4] hour time limit. The [4] hour time limit is justified in Reference 7.

The [4] hour time limit for the RTS Automatic Trip Logic train testing is greater than the 2 hour time limit for the RTBs, which the Logic train supports. The longer time limit for the Logic train ([4] hours) is acceptable based on Reference 10.

INSERT 12

Note 1 applies to RTB testing that is performed independently from the corresponding Logic train testing. For simultaneous testing of the Logic and RTBs, the [4] hour test time limit of Condition O applies.

INSERT 13

Note 3 applies to RTB testing that is performed concurrently with the corresponding Logic train testing. For concurrent testing of the Logic and RTB, the [4] hour test time limit of Condition O applies. The [4] hour time limit is justified in Reference 7.

INSERT 20

M.1 and M.2

Condition M applies to the RCP Breaker Position (Two Loops) reactor trip Function. There is one breaker position device per RCP breaker. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within [6] hours. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the [6] hours, then THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-7 setpoint within the next 6 hours.

This places the unit in a MODE where the LCO is no longer applicable. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint because other RTS Functions provide core protection below the P-7 setpoint. The [6] hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status and the 6 additional hours allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-7 setpoint are justified in Reference 9.


The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition for up to [4] hours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other channels. The [4] hour time limit is justified in Reference 9.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed for reducing power are justified in Reference 7.

[The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 4 hours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other channels. The 4 hour time limit is justified in Reference 7.



1
INSERT 7


12

Condition 1 applies to the SI Input from ESFAS reactor trip and the RTS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for these Functions. With one train inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status (Required Action N.1) or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours (Required Action N.1) is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. The Completion Time of 6 hours (Required Action N.2) is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

24

INSERT 10

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.



INSERT 11

Condition 2 applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for the RTBs. With one train inoperable, 1 hour is allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function. Placing the unit in MODE 3 results in ACTION C entry while RTB(s) are inoperable.

The Required Actions have been modified by three Notes. Note 1 allows one channel to be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other channel is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be

three
INSERT 12