

## NRC Perspectives on Design and Testing for the Resolution of GSI-191

### John Lehning

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission

> GSI-191 Progress Meeting December 12, 2002 Rockville, M.D.





# **Motivation for NRC Test Program**

- Determine the potential extent of ECCS blockage vulnerabilities
  - Focus data collection on the predominant materials/configurations etc.
  - Characterize transport properties and head-loss behavior to the extent needed to demonstrate credible concern
  - Apply best available information to parametric evaluation
  - Pursue identified concerns (cal-sil, chemical effects, etc.)
- Support the regulatory evaluation of licensee submittals
  - Establish knowledge base of important physical effects
  - Understand the complexities of a detailed plant analysis
  - Understand the rigor necessary to conduct a test program
- Never intended as a comprehensive evaluation of all material properties and technical concerns
  - Though all NRC test data is openly shared with industry, there are obvious gaps that must be filled either with supporting data or convincing conservatism





## **Historical Position**

- NRC regulation has always been based heavily on empirical evidence obtained from conditions as close as possible to reality
  - Complexity of phenomena and systems makes it difficult to intuit interactions that may affect the progression of an accident scenario
  - The cost of an incorrect assumption regarding a designated safety system is generally regarded as being higher than the cost of obtaining data
  - Precedent of incorrect assumptions with important safety implications
  - Examples of past test programs:
    - Containment design, coatings qualification, BWR debris generation, BWR and PWR debris transport, BWR strainer design
- Primary role of the NRC is not to solve technical problems
  - Cooperative test programs have benefitted mutual understanding
    - NRC materials tests ⇔ Industry strainer design
  - Must default to conservatism when faced with uncharacterized conditions





## **Motivation for Continued Testing**

- Primary Objective is to Ensure Long-Term Recirculation
  - Design basis challenge must be properly determined
    - Amount and type of debris loading
      - Debris generation and transport
    - Pool characteristics
      - Flow rates, depth, temperature, chemistry
    - Head-loss behavior of debris bed
      - Specific to combination of materials
  - Sump screens must perform as designed
    - Design collection mechanism of parallel flow with sufficient area
    - Understand head loss and loading as debris bed forms
    - Ensure mechanical integrity under pressure drop
    - Validate filtration performance
    - Maintain proper vortex suppression as bed forms
- Fill knowledge base to avoid penalty of overconservatism
  - Prioritized approach to gain greatest benefit





# **Existing Data Base Not Comprehensive**

- Much of the existing data is based on BWR strainer designs and debris loadings
  - Horizontal cylindrical strainer surfaces designed for homogenous pools of well-mixed debris when PWR sumps may have unique debris impingement angles along the floor
  - Particulate head loss investigations dominated by iron oxide sludge
- Transport and head loss data still needed for specific materials
  - High density fiber, mineral wool, min K, asbestos, resident fiber
- Particulate characterization still needed
  - Material density, packed density, porosity, particle size, head-loss contributions in mixed debris beds
    - Cal-sil, resident PWR dust





# **Extent of Current/Proposed NRC Tests**

- Closed loop head-loss testing (report forthcoming)
- Chemical effects on head loss (summer '03)
- Proposed supplemental tests (concurrent)

Test Type	Fibrous Material	Particulate Material	Number of Tests
Thin-Bed	LDFG	PWR-Surrogate	4
Thin-Bed	LDFG	Add calcium silicate to PWR-Surrogate	2
Mixed Beds	Miscellaneous Fiber Samples	PWR-Surrogate	4
Transient Beds	LDFG	PWR-Surrogate	2
Material Property		PWR-Surrogate Calcium silicate	2

### Matrix of Proposed NRC Tests





- 1. Demonstrate and quantify the 'thin-bed' effect for PWR types of debris using a 'PWR-particulate' surrogate and LDFG fibers.
- 2. Obtain material property data that can be used to ascertain the appropriate head loss parameters for the NUREG/CR-6224 correlation for beds of fibers and 'PWR-particulate' surrogate
- 3. Demonstrate and quantify material property data for the 'thin-bed' effect with calcium silicate added to LDFG/particulate debris bed.
- 4. Demonstrate and quantify head loss associated with samples of resident debris typical of materials potentially found in PWR containments.
- 5. Obtain head loss data and material property data that can be used to ascertain the appropriate head loss parameters needed to apply the NUREG/CR-6224 for beds of miscellaneous fibrous/particulate materials.
- 6. Investigate transient bed effects like adding particulate over fiber bed.





## **Potential Categories of Industry Sponsored Testing**

- Validation of new sump screen designs
- Testing of debris bed compositions not previously investigated
- Quantification of specific unknown aspects of debris generation, transport, and head loss
  - Resident debris in PWR containment
  - Decomposition of fibrous debris in sump pool
  - Effectiveness of curbs in trapping volumes of debris





# **Testing of New Sump Screens and Strainer Designs**

- Each new design put in operation should be supported by applicable test data
  - Tests specific to the design with appropriate debris loadings and pool conditions
  - Head loss predictions depend on design of screen/strainer, e.g., stacked disk vs. cone shaped strainers
  - A new design may behave differently than those tested previously
- Must ensure that debris bed growth under shallow pools does not induce vortex air ingestion (bed effectively changes the geometry)
- Representative sections of a regular strainer array may be sufficient to demonstrate performance characteristics
- Demonstrate effective design principles based on an understanding of debris-bed head loss:
  - increased area, parallel flow, low velocity flow, artificial porosity, bed morphology (avoid thin-bed effect/avoid compaction)





## **Debris Bed Characteristics**

- Full NUREG/CR-6224 head loss correlation is flexible enough to treat a variety of bed compositions and constituent debris properties
- However, proper application of head loss correlations requires debris-specific parameters as input
  - particle density, packing density, specific surface area, particle size and shape, bed porosity, compaction behavior
- Proper application also requires knowledge of interstitial flow velocities and turbulence regime
- These parameters have been characterized for only selected types of debris
- Debris bed formation over the surface of a complex geometry can greatly affect the maximum volume of debris accommodated





## **Quantification of Resident Debris**

- Need to quantify composition and rough estimate of quantity for fiber and particulates typically found in PWR containment. No data exist presently. NRC surrogates provide only useful ranges of behavior but no specifics.
- BWR particulates dominated by iron oxide sludge. BWR estimates of dust was not critical, so had no firm basis. Scaling BWR estimate to PWR surface area is suspect
- Recent walk down of volunteer plant containment shows that, while remarkably clean, typical conditions include
  - dust in low traffic areas, cable trays and tops of equipment and pipes,
  - bits of thread, cloth, paper, silicon, and paint flakes found,
  - equipment hatch open for weeks at a time
  - visible accumulation of dirt and lint around drains
- Fiber blanket removal for pipe inspections may release some amount of individual fibers. Other special characteristics of PWR 'dirt'?





## **Quantification Strategies for Resident Debris**

- Microscopic examination of sweepings to confirm presence of glass fiber, concrete dust, pollen, etc. Meaningful surrogates could then be 'manufactured' for head loss testing
- Find visible accumulations of dust, characterize thickness and scale to surface area as bounding estimate (lamp shades near equipment hatch, cable trays, tops of steam generators)
- Systematically vacuum debris from specific areas of containment(s)
  - Characterize collected debris
  - Correlate with volume/area data to provide containment wide estimates
- Systematically wash a section of containment and filter the sump drain effluent
  - Water spills during outage maintenance may provide this opportunity





- Decomposition of fibrous debris in sump pool due to turbulence has been observed (e.g., NUREG/CR-6773), but not quantified in terms of rates and turbulence thresholds
- Decomposition of fiber flocks in stagnant zones not confirmed but continued fiber collection observed for many hours
- Decomposition important because individual fibers transport nearly completely to sump screen and form uniform debris bed across entire screen
- For volunteer plant analysis, NRC currently plans to conservatively assume that degradation is an important mechanism when directed flows circulate in containment and cascading water enters the pool
- Potential savings in conservatism to accurately quantify these phenomena



### HPSI Throttle Valve Clogging Path Forward

- optimize the accumulated knowledge base to support resolution of GSI-191
- considering the viability of constructing a logic model that would screen plants for HPSI throttle valve clogging, example parameters:

relative flow path dimensions at sump screen and throttle valve

☞ sump configuration (new sump Mod at Davis-Besse)

Rectain the second seco

debris types (does the type of debris present in a plant containment tend to favor or preclude clogging?) -"debris composites"

further evaluation only at plants "screened in"











































#### Nuclear Energy Institute PWR Sump Performance Task Force Program to Address Degradation of ECCS Performance c / Sump Blockage

#### Evaluation Mathodology Ground Rules ORAFT 12-12-2011

#### I Objective

This document establishes programmatic and teconical ground rules for the development of an evaluation methodology to appress the potential for containment sump screen blockage following a design basis event. This evaluation methodology (EM) will be used in support of plant specific evaluations that address concerns identified in NRC Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191

The evaluation methodology and associated evaluation tools are intended to provide utilities with guidance to quantitatively determine plant susceptibility to the potential for degraded ECCS performance by debris accumulation on the containment sump screen with consequential loss of ECCS/Containment Spray NPSH. The evaluation methodology will also provide utilities with general guidance on actions that can be taken to ensure ECCS operability during design basis events.

The programmatic ground rules described in Section II are the principle set of considerations upon which the evaluation methodology will be based. These high level considerations help define the boundaries within which the methodology applies.

Section III presents the principal technical considerations and assumptions upon which the evaluation methodology will be developed. Detailed technical assumptions and quantitative correlations based on these technical considerations will be established as part of the methodology development effort.

#### II Program Ground Rules

#### 1 Initiating Events Considered within EM Scope

The evaluation methodology will be developed in consideration of all design basis initiating events that require ECCS operation in the recirculation mode to successfully mitigate that design basis event. The program methodology recognizes that LOCA is the principal initiating event and that sump function is necessary to comply with the evaluation criteria of 10CFR50 46. Other design basis events, such as Main Steam Line Break, which necessitate recirculation flow from the containment sump, will be evaluated using methods, assumptions, and inputs typical for those analyses. Events that are beyond design basis will not be addressed as part of the evaluation methodology

The methodology includes the consideration of all events that require ECCS operation in the recirculation mode, but focus is upon LOCA events. This is warranted since LOCA events are the most risk-significant due to their

December 12, 2002

1

combination of the requirement to cool the core with the potential for release of significant radionuclides

2 Application of Single Failure Assumption

Consideration of the initiating event will be rised on nurrent dasign analysis principles. Component and system tailure in the imiter the used be single tailure scenarios. On a trial miting failure in be applied to the initial beam of the initial single unalysis and the effects of that tailure will be consistent viscol of the number of the plant resubmer Expected no - aulted system invariant database timing, and operating characteristics will be assumed.

3 EM Scope to Address Containment Sump Performance

The evaluation methodology will assess the effect of debris accumulation on the containment sump screen relative to the operation of the ECCS and containment spray system. Other considerations (e.g., structural integrity, fuel performance) are beyond the scope of the evaluation methodology.

4 EM Scope to Address Materials Typically Used in Industry Applications

The evaluation methodology will address materials typically used in the industry as insulation and coating materials. The guidance will not necessarily explicitly consider or assess the generation, transport, or accumulation characteristics of non-traditional materials (i.e., materials used in a single plant or rare applications).

5. Application of Risk-Informed Considerations

Program methodology will be developed primarily using deterministic methods Risk-informed considerations, where practical and defensible, may also be used. It is anticipated that such considerations may be employed in establishing initial conditions, timing and operating characteristics of plant systems and components.

6 Validity of Supporting Data

Data employed in the development of the EM or applied directly through the EM may not have been produced under a 10CFR50, Appendix B program. Such data will be carefully evaluated through a validation and verification process that may include analytical methods such as comparison to theoretical predictions or to other similar but independent empirical results

#### **III** General Technical Considerations

Outlined in this section are the working level assumptions and inputs to be used to develop the methodology with which to assess, on a plant specific basis, the potential for degraded ECCS performance. These assumptions and inputs are based on the current knowledge basis and existing research activities. The assumptions and inputs are categorized based on the phenomena associated with generation, transport, debris deposition and head loss, and the potential for margin recovery

For the purposes of this document, a Zone of Destruction (ZOD) will be defined as follows:

2

	·	DRAFT	
Zone o	of Destruction	The region surrounding a post which the energy of the fluid re cause sufficient damage to ma insulation and protective coatin pehris is generated	uiated break location in Breaked from the break will aterials (for example ngs) in that area such that
This define Condition	tion is consisti Assessment (	ent with that revelope to intrused Guide ines: Debris Shur i schose	olinia al n'i priNE-21 i 1 19 P. Ri Cuntainments
' Debris	s Generation		
: Pipe f	Break Location	IS	
Deter	mination of all stent with MEB	potential ZODs will be based on 3 3-1	i pipe break criteria
The b used an ite includ	reak location v for the plant ev rative process led in the brea	with the most limiting consequen valuation. Choice of the most lim since debris generation and trar k choice	ices for sump function will be hiting break location will be hsport will have to be
12 Break	Location Excl	lusions	
Dyna genei analy fluid s desig	mic effects ass ration) may be ses reviewed a system piping i n basis for the	sociated with postulated pipe rup excluded from consideration wh and approved by NRC demonstr rupture is extremely low under co piping	otures (including local debris ien piping system design rate that the probability of onditions consistent with the
13 Zone	Of Destruction	n (ZOD) Geometry Definition	
131	The shape of for double-er unless robus	f the ZOD for each postulated br nded breaks and hemispherical f t barriers are present, as descrit	reak location will be spherical for single-ended breaks bed below
13.	The size of the determined to destruction p	he ZOD will be defined in terms based on the pressure contained pressure of the insulation surrou	of pipe diameters, and will be d by the piping and the nding the break site
	Two recomm	nended methods for determining	the ZOD are
	1 The size insulation containe becomes	of the spherical ZOD can be ca n with the lowest destruction pre d within the ZOD is assumed to s debris, regardless of insulation	Iculated based on the essure, and all insulation be damaged such that it i type
	2 For each	n insulation type, a spherical ZO	D is calculated
		3	December 12, 2002

1

I

The destruction pressure for each time of insulation is contained in the subsequent sections.

Pipe break raifial offset may be accommodated int in the lip outation of the spherical 201 size. Similarly pipe rus raints the lip inductmontdated for in the uniou of unull fitne scherical 2015 size.

The spherical ZOD should be oblisted to appropriate and count for robust barriers. Robust parriers consist of structures and equipment that are impervious to let implingement and prevent further expansion of the break jet.

If a robust barrier is encountered by a break jet, the ZOD created will have a spherical boundary with the exception of the volume beyond the robust barrier. The radius of the spherical boundary will be redefined such that the volume encompassed by the ZOD is equal to that encompassed by the spherical ZOD that would be created if the robust barrier were not present.

2.4 Purul reflection of break jets will not be considered. The use of the spherical ZOD is intended to address any jet reflection effects. Likewise, the effects of pipe whip and traveling jets are addressed by the spherical ZOD.

#### 1.4 Debris Generation by Washdown

•

For the purposes of this section, the following terms are defined

Encapsulated Insulation	Encapsulated insulation is insulation covered on all surfaces by metal sheets Examples of encapsulated insulation include RMI and calcium silicate cassettes.
Jacketed Insulation	Jacketed insulation is insulation that is covered on the outside of the pipe by a wide variety of materials. Examples of jacketed material include solid fiberglass and calcium silicate wrapped with aluminum foil

#### 1.4.1 Containment Sprays

Encapsulated insulation materials not within the ZOD are resistant to containment spray action and therefore are not a debris source. Containment spray impingement on insulation materials will have a low stagnation pressure Based on the experimental results in NUREG/CR-3170, the encapsulation on even the weakest of insulation blankets would not be susceptible to damage from containment spray

RMI is not affected by washdown effects as it is not soluble or easily penetrable by water

4

Calcium silicate with metal encapsulation will not become a debris source from the action of containment spravs

Jacketed insulation will be evaluated as a debris source.

Unlacketed and Countercapsulated insulation may be solveoticly to tamage as a resolit or containment Johans (Unial Knteur) sulation is typically used as the barrier material.

+ ... Pumped Break Flow Washdown

This is not considered to be a credible debris generation mechanism as the jet resulting from RCS depressurization will cause significantly more damage to insulation and will result in the distribution of the resulting debris about the containment away from the postulated break location

1.5 Post-Accident Containment Environment Outside The Zone of Destruction

Non-DBA qualified coating materials outside the effective ZOD are to be evaluated as debris sources

1 c Post-Accident Submergence

Insulation and non-DBA qualified coatings materials that are submerged are to be evaluated as debris sources

1 7 Debris Characteristics

The size distribution of the debris will be assumed for the ZOD If data is available, size distribution of the debris may be determined by the location of the material from the break location within the ZOD

1 - 1 Fibrous Insulation

Physical characteristics of debris generated from fibrous materials will be specifieid Not all generated fibrous debris will be assumed to be of a size that is transportable. The specifics of transportability will be discussed in the Debris Transport section

When fibrous insulation is damaged, a number of types of debris can be generated

5

- 1 Intact blankets
- 2 Large chunks (greater than 4 inches)

Medium chunks (1 - 4 inches)

Smatchunks less nan 1 kinn

Fines induid - ibersh

Calorum Suira + Lation

The debris generate vifrom Calcium Sticate insulation calculated based on size and material

Large pieces (over 3 inches)

- 2 Chunks (1 to 3 inches)
- Small pieces (less than 1 inch)
- L Dust

Data from the licensee's walkdown program may be used to determine the orientation of seams relative to the postulated break. The method of treating seam orientation is being developed. Data regarding distruction pressures for calcium silicate insulation materials is being collected

NRC confirmatory analyses performed to support resolution of strainer issues for BWRs indicate a destruction pressure of 150 psi for calcium silicate insulation with an aluminum jacket. Testing with calcium-silicate indicates that the destruction pressures can be less than 24 psid, depending on the orientation of the cladding seams.

#### 173 Reflective Metallic Insulation (RMI)

RMI debris is assumed to be generated within the ZOD Typically, RMI is installed in pre-fabricated cassettes that conform to the piece of equipment being insulated Break jet impingement can dislodge RMI and possibly destroy cassettes, creating smaller pieces of debris

The following information will be used to evaluate the potential for debris generation from RMI cassettes

- latch mechanism types and characteristics

differences in destruction pressure for different insulation brands and types

modes of insulation detachment and destruction

pressure at which the destruction of the cassettes will occur

6

#### destruction of insulation adjacent to the break site

RMI destruction regimes are defined as

Dislodged casks tes

Damaged ups leites incluidual fill sipror licer

Complete destruction, shredded or a crumpled folis).

: 1 Coatings

All coating materials within the ZOD are assumed to disbond and contribute to the debris source term

DBA-qualified coatings outside the ZOD will not be included in the debris source term

Non-DBA qualified coatings outside the ZOD may disbond from the substrate and contribute to the debris source term. A quantity of disbonded non-DBA qualified coatings will be estimated from existing empirical data with consideration of location, standard application methods, general coatings conditions, etc. and included in the debris source term.

Non-DBA qualified coatings that are potential debris sources include coatings on equipment stored in containment or left behind after an outage

Physical characteristics of the disbonded coating materials will be addressed as input to the transport evaluation

#### 175 Tape, Stickers and Labels

All tape, stickers and labels located in the ZOD will contribute to the debris source term. This includes materials that are qualified for service in DBA conditions.

Duct, electrical, masking, and grip tape are potential debris sources but other types of adhesive tape can be used inside containment Equipment labels and tags secured by adhesives or other means are also potential sources of debris

All non-DBA qualified tape, stickers and labels outside the ZOD are assumed to become debris unless a technical justification to exclude them from the source term is available. Non-water soluble tape, stickers, and labels secured by adhesives located outside the ZOD will be assumed to become debris by peeling off the surface they are attached

7

to Water soluble tape, stickers, and tags secured by adhesives or other means will be assumed to dissolve under the action of containment sprays or other sources of water.

Fire Barrier, Itatena <

Fire partier material is the depisor of a fire barrier materials within the 20D will be evaluated as potential deprisors sources. Since fire barrier materials are typical unencapsulated, he destruction pressures for these materials will be ower than encapsulated RCS insulation of comparable composition. An example of a fire barrier material is discussed below.

Marinite<sup>™</sup> board debris is generated within the ZOD. According to NUREG/CR-6772, large amount of plastic deformation is necessary to break the board apart. Therefore, Marinite<sup>™</sup> board is assumed to be destroyed within the ZOD but left intact outside the ZOD. All destroyed Marinite<sup>™</sup> board will be assumed to be broken into large chunks.

Miscellaneous Debris Sources

This section discusses the generation of debris from sources inside containment other than piping and fire barrier insulation

Miscellaneous debris sources inside containment include, but are not limited to, the following:

8

Dust, dirt and lint

Fabric equipment covers

Fire hoses

Ropes

Ventilation system filters

Cloth

Wire ties

Plastic sheeting

Rust from unpainted surfaces

Concrete

December 12, 2002

1

Tools and tool bokes

Scaffolding

Auxiliary equipment left inside container ent

Caurking mastic primiler mail 148

1-Debris-Generation

1 1 Potential Pipe Break Locations

-1-2Debris-Types, Location Amounts

1-3-Break-Jet-Destruction-Model

1-4-Type, Volume and Size Distribution of Debris Generated

- -----Insulation
- -----Coatings

2 Debris Transport

- 2.1 Volume of Debris Introduced
  - 211 Insulation
  - 2.1.2 Coatings
  - 2.1.3 Other Particulates or Materials Present
- 2.2 Debris Transport Characteristics
- 2.3 Containment Flood-up Characterization
- 2.4 Intervening Structures

#### 3 Sump Blockage

- 3.1 Debris Materials Transported to Sump
- 3.2 Transient Buildup of Debris on Sump
- 3.3 Debris Pressure Drop
- 3.4 Head Loss Incurred Across Debris Bed
- 4 NPSH Calculation
  - 4.1 Containment Overpressure
- 5 Operator, Design and System Response Considerations
  - 51 ECCS Flow
  - 5.2 Event Duration

December 12, 2002

9