Indiana Michigan Power Company 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, MI 49107 1395



December 13, 2002

AEP:NRC:2573-02

Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001

# Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 316/2002-004-02 UNANTICIPATED START OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled <u>Licensee Event</u> <u>Report System</u>, the following report is being submitted:

LER 316/2002-004-02: "Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump"

There are no new commitments identified in this submittal.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Brian A. McIntyre, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, at (269) 697-5806.

Sincerely,

h Z. Pollak

Joseph E. Pollock Site Vice President

RAM/jen

Attachment



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NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION								N - 1	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004										
(7-2001) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)									Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bis1@nrc gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affars, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503 if a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection										
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02-OHP-4021-001-003, Revision 15, "Power Reduction." Shortly thereafter, an automatic																			
start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) occurred as a result of a																			
valid low-low level indication in the steam generators. The automatic start of the TDAFP was determined to be an "unanticipated" engineered safety feature (FSF) actuation																			
Steam generator levels rapidly recovered Operators secured the TDAED and throttled the																			
flows from the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in accordance with plant procedures																			
for reactor trip response and recovery. Reactor coolant system cooldown and																			
depressurization proceeded normally. During the trip, pressurizer level shrank lower than procedurally anticipated, resulting in a reactor coolant system letdown isolation																			
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notification to the NRC (EN# 38640) per 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (A) for an																			
unanticipated ESF actuation. The cause of this event was inadequate procedural																			
guidance. Corrective actions included revision of the applicable procedures to																			
automatic start of the TDAFP.																			
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 NRC FORM 366A (7-2001) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	6. LER NUMBER					3. PAGE	
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2	05000-316	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3	
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17. TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form (366A)

#### Conditions Prior to Event

Unit 1 - 100 percent power Unit 2 - 22 percent power

#### Description of Event

At 00:01 hours on 01/19/02, in preparation for a Unit 2 refueling outage, Operations shift personnel initiated a planned manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from 22% power per Procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003, Revision 15, "Power Reduction." Shortly thereafter, an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) [BA] occurred as a result of valid low-low level indication in two of four Steam Generators.

The automatic start of the TDAFP was not specifically called out as an expected occurrence after manual reactor trip from 22% power in procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003. The reactor trip setpoint had been selected to avoid challenging ESF equipment (i.e., auto start of the TDAFP) both by industry benchmarking and validation in the plant simulator. However, based on simulator response, it was recognized that conditions may be possible where a start of the TDAFP could occur. During simulator training the operating crew had noted that steam generator levels had dropped to within a few percent of the TDAFP auto-start setpoint. Prior to the conduct of the unit shutdown, a pre-job briefing was held with the operating crew. During this pre-job briefing the potential for a TDAFP auto-start was discussed.

The automatic start of the TDAFP was determined to be an "unanticipated" engineered safety feature (ESF) [JE] actuation, in accordance with the guidance contained in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Paragraph 3.2.6.

Steam generator levels rapidly recovered. Operators secured the TDAFP and throttled flows from the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in accordance with plant procedures for reactor trip response and recovery. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] cooldown and depressurization proceeded normally. During the trip, pressurizer level shrank lower than procedurally anticipated, resulting in a reactor coolant system letdown isolation. The operating crew recovered from the letdown isolation in accordance with approved plant procedures.

At 07:56 on 01/19/02, the Shift Manager made an eight hour, non-emergency notification to the NRC (EN# 38640) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an unanticipated ESF actuation.

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### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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#### Cause of Event

With regard to the operational aspects of this event, it was acknowledged that a planned trip should not challenge the engineered safety features equipment to automatically start.

The manual trip set point of 22% reactor power was based on industry benchmarking of similar design/size units. Following the start of the TDAFP during reactor shutdown, CNP learned, based on additional benchmarking, that lowering the established manual trip set point to 17% reactor power was prudent. The lower manual trip set point minimizes the amount of shrinkage within the steam generators, thus providing adequate margin to prevent a start of the TDAFP. CNP has determined that the cause of this event was the establishment of a manual reactor trip set point in the station shutdown procedure that challenged the TDAFP to automatically start.

#### Analysis of Event

Although the automatic start of the TDAFP was not expected to occur after a manual reactor trip from 22% power, the system performed as designed.

There were no actual nuclear, radiological, or industrial safety consequences as a result of this event.

#### Corrective Action

Procedure 01-OHP-4021-001-003 was revised to reduce the planned power level trip set point from 22% power to less than 17% power.

Procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003 was revised to reduce the planned power level trip set point from 22% power to less than 17% power.

Previous Similar Events

None.