;								
アーション	٢			RECORD	S MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT			
ţ	T0:	c.	GLENN			NRC HEADQUARTERS	DATE:	12/06/2002
	FROM:	D.L.	HORTON	A0C-21	TEL: 716 942-4300		PAGE:	1
	TRANSI	AITTA	L NUM: 00	0018853				

CONTROLLED COPY TRANSMITTAL / RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Attached is a CONTROLLED COPY of the following document(s) and its applicable index. Add or replace your existing copy with the attached.

CONTROLLED				ISSUE	ISSUE				
COPY#	PROC ID	REV#	FC#	DATE	PROCEDURE TITLE				
006	PSR-1	2		12/06/2002	REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUID TRANSFERS OF				
					FISSILE MATERIAL				

Copies made from a controlled document MUST be marked UNCONTROLLED before distribution. Signature below signifies all previous revisions, if applicable, have been destroyed or marked superseded.

I have complied with the above instructions:

Signature (BLACK INDELIBLE INK ONLY)

۶.

Date

RETURN BY: 12/20/2002

FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, A SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE HAS BEEN INCLUDED.

NN 250)

* •

PAGE: 1

.

Υ.

DATE: 12/06/2002 TIME: 08:57

PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS WVDP-218 ~ INDEX

•

						ISSUE	
PROC_ID	• -	REY	EC	PROCEDURE_TITLE	STATUS 1	DATE	COGNIZANT MANAGER
WVDP-218	۰.	11		PREFACE FOR PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	06/12/2002	CHILSON,L.J.
PSR-2		2		MAIN PLANT STACK AIRBORNE EFFLUENT	ACTIVE	09/12/2000	POTTS,W.J.
	•		. ^	SAMPLING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS	۱.,		* T
PSR-1		2		REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUID TRANSFERS OF	ACTIVE	12/06/2002	POTTS,W.J.
	6.	۰.	•	FISSILE MATERIAL	•	ġ.	·.
PSR-3		2		BUILDING AND VESSEL VENTILATION SYSTEM	ACTIVE	01/03/2001	POTTS,W.J.
			+ 2	REQUIREMENTS		Σ_	
PSR-3		2	1	BUILDING AND VESSEL VENTILATION SYSTEM	ACTIVE	06/29/2001	POTTS,W.J.
000-4		. 2		SPENT EVEL CASK STACTING AND HANDI THE	ACTIVE	05/30/2002	POTTS.W.J.
FOR-4	r .	9		CONTREMENTS	1	4	
P59-6	~ •	ंद	1	SPENT FUEL CASK STAGING AND HANDI ING	ACTIVE	12/02/2002	POTTS,W.J.
F3R-4		5	•	REQUIREMENTS			
PSR-5		2		STANDBY AND BACKUP POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	11/05/1999	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-5		2	1	STANDBY AND BACKUP POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	11/23/1999	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-5		2	2	STANDBY AND BACKUP POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	02/17/2000	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-5		2	3	STANDBY AND BACKUP POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	06/29/2001	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-6		2		FISSILE MATERIAL PACKAGING AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	06/12/2002	KOMASARA,S.M.
PSR-7		2		EMERGENCY PAGING SYSTEM AND SHELTERING	ACTIVE	10/13/2000	POTTS,W.J.
8-929		3		FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	07/20/2001	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-10		3		HIGH-LEVEL WASTE TANK LEAK DETECTION	ACTIVE	02/12/2001	MEESS,D,C.
				AND RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	03/15/100/	MEESS D.C.
PSR-11		1		HIGH-LEVEL WASTE TANK SPARE CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	03/15/1996	meess,D,C.
PSR-11		1	1	HIGH-LEVEL WASTE TANK SPARE CAPACITY Requirements	ACTIVE	03/26/1997	MEESS,D,C.
PSR-12		3		VITRIFICATION FACILITY VENTILATION AND	ACTIVE	02/21/1997	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-12		3	1	VITRIFICATION FACILITY VENTILATION AND	ACTIVE	11/03/1998	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-12		3	2	VITRIFICATION FACILITY VENTILATION AND	ACTIVE	03/03/1999	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-12		3	3	OFF-GAS SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS VITRIFICATION FACILITY VENTILATION AND	ACTIVE	05/20/1999	POTTS,W.J.
				OFF-GAS SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS			
PSR-13		2		VITRIFICATION FACILITY STANDBY POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	03/28/1996	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-13		2	1	VITRIFICATION FACILITY STANDBY POWER REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVE	05/24/1996	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-13		2	2	VITRIFICATION FACILITY STANDBY POWER	ACTIVE	07/11/1996	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-15		3		NOX MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION	ACTIVE	09/30/1998	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-15		3	1	REQUIREMENTS NOX MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION	ACTIVE	11/23/1999	POTTS,W.J.
PSR-16		6		REQUIREMENTS ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MONITORING	ACTIVE	11/12/1998	POTTS,W.J.
				INSTRUMENTATION AND STORAGE			
PSR-16		6	1	ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MONITORING	ACTIVE	06/27/2000	POTTS,W.J.
				INSTRUMENTATION AND STURAGE			

:

 \checkmark

سبہ

DATE: 12/06/2002 TIME: 08:57

. '

. .

PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS WYDP-218 INDEX

ISSUE PROC_ID REV EC PROCEDURE_TITLE STATUS DATE COGNIZANT_MANAGER PSR-17 MINIHUM STAFFING LEVELS FOR SAFE FACILITY 4 ACTIVE 09/24/1999 CURCIO, J.P. OPERATION -PSR-17 4 1 MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS FOR SAFE FACILITY ACTIVE 05/11/2000 CURCIO,J.P. OPERATION . PSR-17 4 2 MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS FOR SAFE FACILITY ACTIVE 10/13/2000 CURCIO,J.P. OPERATION PSR-17 4 3 MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS FOR SAFE FACILITY ACTIVE 10/26/2000 CURCIO,J.P. OPERATION PSR-18 D COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND STORAGE ACTIVE 06/12/2002 COVERT,B.C. REQUIREMENTS FOR FISSILE-BEARING DEBRIS PSR-18 0 1 COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND STORAGE ACTIVE 11/14/2002 COVERT,B.C. REQUIREMENTS FOR FISSILE-BEARING DEBRIS

PAGE: 2

"

۰ ـ ـ ·	
West Valley Demonstration Project	Doc. ID Number <u>PSR-1</u> Revision Number <u>2</u> Revision Date <u>12/06/2002</u>
PROCESS SAFETY RI REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUID TRANSI	EQUIREMENTS FERS OF FISSILE MATERIAL
APPROVED BY: Manager	Date Il/11/02
APPROVED BY: Radiation and Safe	ty Committee Chairman
APPROVED BY: Site Services Mana	Date <u>12-2-02</u> ger
·	
τνπτα	\sim
West Valley Nuclear Serv 10282 Rock Sprin	vices Company ngs Road

WV-1816, Rev. 5

٠

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 7

PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENT - 1

j**h**

j

,

	TITLE: Requirements for Liquid Transfers of Fissile Material							
	CRITERIA: Prevention of inadvertent criticality due to liquid transfers. (PSR Criterion 3.a.)							
 	UNACCEPTABLE EVENTS: Combination of process streams resulting in an inadvertent criticality.							
	Process Safety Requirement - 1 Page No.							
	APPLICABILITY							
	OBJECTIVE							
	SPECIFICATIONS							
1	BASES							
ł	ATTACHMENT							
	REFERENCES							
 	TABLE 1 -Criteria for Determining the Allowable FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILEPLUTONIUM Concentrations for Liquid Transfers 6							

•

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 7

1.1 . . .

1 .

: •

1

ł

1

ł

L

PROCESS SAFETY REQUIREMENT

REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUID TRANSFERS OF FISSILE MATERIALS

APPLICABILITY

This Process Safety Requirement (PSR) applies to tank-to-tank transfers of liquids containing greater than 1 gram total uranium or 0.06 Ci (Pu-239 + Pu-240).

This PSR does not apply to transfers of liquids between tanks 7D-2 and 3D-2 for the purpose of sampling tank 7D-2. This PSR does not apply to transfers of liquids within or between any of the following tanks or components within the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System (IRTS): 8D-1, 8D-2, 50D-001, STS Ion Exchange Columns, 8D-3, 5D-15B, 31017 (LWTS evaporator), 5D-15A1, 5D-15A2, the Distillate Surge Tank (71-D-005), and the Waste Dispensing Vessel (70-D-001). This PSR does not apply to transfers of liquids within or between any of the following tanks or components within the Waste Tank Farm and Vitrification Facility (VF): 8D-1, 8D-2, 8D-3, 8D-4, Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank, Melter Feed Hold Tank, Slurry Fed Ceramic Melter, Submerged Bed Scrubber, Neutralizing Tank, and the Decontamination Tank.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this PSR is to ensure that all liquid transfers of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM are conducted in a manner such that a subcritical condition exists at all times.

-1 - 27

، به	~ - 4		1 <i>31</i> 117 - 5	• 1	1_ 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
SPECIFICATIONS	-	t	аргуж — — Сана с а	- 	-	a ga da an an an an A da an

1. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

The FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM concentrations in liquids in both the "sending tank" and "receiving tank" involved in a liquid transfer shall be in compliance with the limits listed in Table 1.

ACTION

If sample analysis or documented process knowledge indicates that the FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM concentrations of either the sending tank or receiving tank are not in compliance with the limits specified in Table 1, the transfer shall not proceed, the tank(s) shall be left in its as discovered state, and the Radiation and Safety Committee Chairman shall be notified.

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 7

Disposition of the tank contents shall be in accordance with a written plan that is approved by the Radiation and Safety Committee.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

Before initiating tank-to-tank transfers of liquids containing FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM, the FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM concentrations in both the sending tank and the receiving tank shall be determined in accordance with the requirements of an approved IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE.

2.

1

1

F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM in solution shall not be precipitated.

ACTION

If it is determined that conditions exist such that the precipitation of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM is possible, the transfer shall not proceed and the Radiation and Safety Committee Chairman shall be notified. Disposition of the tank contents shall be in accordance with a written plan that is approved by the Radiation and Safety Committee.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

Before initiating tank-to-tank transfers of liquids containing FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM and before neutralization of solutions containing FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM, analyses shall be performed to ensure that FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM will not precipitate.

BASES

Ŧ

| Basis of Applicability

1 This PSR has been prepared to control the transfer of liquids containing FISSILE
1 URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM between tanks in facilities at the WVDP. Due to the
1 nature of activities at the WVDP, many waste streams, including streams meeting
1 environmental discharge requirements, contain some quantity of FISSILE URANIUM and
1 FISSILE PLUTONIUM. The thresholds specified in the Applicability of this PSR (i.e.,

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 7

. . . .

1945 T *END 3EC

ł

ł

ł

Ł

Т

1

I

I

1

1

ł

1

ł

1

1 gram TOTAL URANIUM, or 0.06 Ci Pu-239 + Pu-240) have been selected to exclude waste streams containing very low masses of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM. This threshold is consistent with DOE Order 420.1, DOE G 421.1-1, ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983, and ANSI/ANS-8.10-1983. DOE G 421.1-1 specifically addresses the concept of "Exempt quantities of fissionable materials" in section 5.6.2.12." This concept allows for each facility to document the quantities of fissionable material's that do not require Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations and do not require criticality safety controls. Based upon process knowledge and sampling history, the tanks to which this PSR applies are not expected to contain quantities of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM such that the 'exempt' quantity' would result in 'a meaningful 'increase' in the K_{eff} of any of the tanks. Further, this practice is also applied at Savannah River and Hanford.

\$ * 7

The analysis documented in Reference 1 has determined that the tanks to which this PSR applies (i.e.; Tanks:13D-8, 7D-2, 3D-2. [except when sampling 7D-2], 7D-8, 7D-14, 4D-10, 7D-1, 4D-2) are critically safe when the limits of Table 1 are met. The criticality safety of operations within the IRTS and Vitrification Facility are documented in References 2 and 3. These systems process waste streams with " inherently safe FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM concentrations. Therefore, liquid transfers of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM in the IRTS and and the second second Vitrification Facility need not be addressed in this PSR.

, M -

No. Contraction of the second se

Bases of Limiting Conditions for Operation

1. Reference 1 calculates the safe concentration of Pu-239 corresponding to a given concentration of U-235. The analysis in Reference 1 assumed a moderated, unreflected system containing only U-235 and Pu-239. Other fissile 1 nuclides at the WVDP include U-233 and Pu-241. Although the analysis in 11 Reference 1 considered these nuclides, it concluded that these nuclides would not contribute significantly to the reactivity of systems in which they are present due to the relatively small fraction (less than 5%) of the total fissile mass that these nuclides represent. Table 1 of this PSR has been adapted, and independently reviewed, from Table 5.3 of Reference 1 to present 11 limits in units provided by Analytical and Process Chemistry.

2.

The analysis of Reference 1 assumes that the FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 7

PLUTONIUM is homogeneously distributed within the solution. Precipitation of FISSILE-URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM in a plant tank could result in an unanalyzed condition. Standard criticality safety references such as Reference 4 indicate that heterogenous moderated systems are more reactive than similar homogeneous systems. It is therefore necessary to identify and evaluate conditions that could result in the precipitation of FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM:

ATTACHMENT

Table 1 - Criteria for Determining the Allowable FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE
 PLUTONIUM Concentrations for Liquid Transfers

REFERENCES

Ŧ

- FB:85:0150, Allowable Fissile Material Solution Concentration for Liquid Transfers, Revision 1, K. A. O'Ahoofe memo to C.J. Roberts dated July 2, 1985.
- WVNS-SAR-001, Safety Analysis Report for Waste Processing and Support
 Activities.

Paxton, H. C., and N. L. Pruvost. July, 1987. Critical Dimensions of Systems
 Containing ²³⁵U, ²³⁹Pu, and ²³³U (1986 Revision). Los Alamos National
 Laboratory. Report No. LA-10860-MS.

4) DOE Order 420.1. "Facility Safety."

- J DOE G 421.1-1. "DOE Good Practices Guide: Criticality Safety Good Practices
 Program Guide for DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities."
- ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983. "Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable
 Materials Outside Reactors." 1983.
- ANSI/ANS-8.10-1983. "Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls in
 Operations with Shielding and Confinement." 1983.

PSR-1 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 7

ł

1

I

1

ł

L

L

T

L

TABLE 1

<u>Col</u>	<u>umn 1</u>		- <u>Column 2</u>
Concent Total I	ration of Jranium ²	Corresponding Maximum Plutonium Concentration (Pu-239 + Pu-240)	
μg	ſ/mL		i juli viela vi
Greater Than or	But-Less	Than	
		-	Greater than 190 ³
0.	50		190 ³
50	500		170
500	1,000		140
1,000	2,000		94
2,000	2,500		71
2,500	3,000		46
3,000	3,500		20
3,500 ³			

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE ALLOWABLE FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATIONS FOR LIQUID TRANSFERS ¹

- 1. Column 1 is the concentration of total FISSILE URANIUM and Column 2 is the corresponding allowable concentration of FISSILE PLUTONIUM. For a sample containing total uranium in the range shown in Column 1, the corresponding value in Column 2 provides the concentration limit for Pu-239 plus Pu-240.
- 2. The total uranium limits in Table 1 correspond to 100 weight percent (w/o) U-233 + U-235 enriched solutions. Although such streams do not exist at the WVDP, laboratory analyses for specific uranium isotopes are typically not provided. However, if isotopic data are available, the values for U-233 + U-235 may be compared to the values of Table 1.
- 3. Written authorization of the Radiation and Safety Committee is required for processing liquids at these concentrations.

PSR-1 Rev. 2

•

WVNS RECORD OF REVISION

		Revision On	
<u>Rev. No.</u>	Description of Changes	Page(s)	Dated
2	This revision of the PSR has been prepar clarify the applicability of the PSR and limit its applicability to transfers of containing greater than 1 gram of total URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM. The revi also introduces a new Limiting Condition Operation to address FISSILE URANIUM and FISSILE PLUTONIUM precipitation. Table been modified to present the limits in t of units received from the analytical lal PSO and the A&PC Lab. are affected by the	ed to All to liquids FISSILE sion for 1 has erms boratory. ese changes.	12/06/02
	DOE approval contained in Letter DW:2000 dated January 14, 2000.	:0026,	

WV-1807, Rev. 8

1

.