

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

November 14, 2002

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 02- 643
NLOS/ETS
Docket Nos.: 50-338/339
License Nos.: NPF-4/7

Gentlemen:


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2
CORRECTION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
BASES PAGE ISSUED WITH AMENDMENTS 232 AND 214

On November 29, 2001 (Serial No. 01-684), Dominion proposed changes to the North Anna Technical Specifications which revised the containment operating regime. In that submittal, we provided marked-up and typed pages for both current Technical Specifications (TS) and draft Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) because our ITS conversion submittal was under review by the NRC Staff. The ITS were issued as Amendments 231 and 212 on April 5, 2002. The NRC subsequently approved the revised containment operating regime and issued Amendments 232 and 214 on September 5, 2002. During our review of the issued amendments and their associated Bases for implementation, we noted that one paragraph in the Bases section of 3.6.7 (Page B 3.6.7-2) was inadvertently omitted.

Dominion failed to recognize that a revision made as part of the ITS review process affected Bases Section 3.6.7 included in the submittal on containment operating regime. Therefore, to correct this omission, we are providing a corrected Bases page for the NRC's copy of the North Anna TS Bases.

No new commitments are intended by this letter. If you have any questions concerning these results, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



Stephen P. Sarver
Director - Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support

Attachment

Aool.

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

cooling tank. The casing cooling pumps are considered part of the outside RS subsystems. Each casing cooling pump is powered from a separate ESF bus.

The inside RS subsystem pump NPSH is increased by reducing the temperature of the water at the pump suction. Flow is diverted from the QS system to the suction of the inside RS pump on the same safety train as the quench spray pump supplying the water.

The RS System provides a spray of subcooled water into the upper regions of containment to reduce the containment pressure and temperature during a DBA. Upon receipt of a High-High containment pressure signal, the two casing cooling pumps start, the casing cooling discharge valves open, and the RS pump suction and discharge valves receive an open signal to assure the valves are open. After a 400 ± 5 second time delay, the inside RS pumps start, and after a 210 ± 5 second time delay, the outside RS pumps start. The RS pumps take suction from the containment sump and discharge through their respective spray coolers to the spray headers and into the containment atmosphere. Heat is transferred from the containment sump water to service water in the spray coolers.

The Chemical Addition System supplies a sodium hydroxide (NaOH) solution to the RWST water supplied to the suction of the QS System pumps. The NaOH added to the QS System spray ensures an alkaline pH for the solution recirculated in the containment sump. The resulting alkaline pH of the RS spray (pumped from the sump) enhances the ability of the spray to scavenge iodine fission products from the containment atmosphere. The alkaline pH of the containment sump water minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to the fluid.

The RS System is a containment ESF system. It is designed to ensure that the heat removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained. Operation of the QS and RS systems provides the required heat removal capability to limit post accident conditions to less than the containment design values and depressurize the containment structure to subatmospheric pressure in < 60 minutes following a DBA.

The RS System limits the temperature and pressure that could be expected following a DBA and ensures that containment leakage is maintained consistent with the accident analysis.