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NP-33-02-005-00

Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

November 4, 2002

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

LER 2002-005
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1
Date of Occurrence – September 4, 2002

Enclosed please find the abstract to Licensee Event Report 2002-005, which is being submitted to provide written notification of the subject occurrence. This abstract is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii). The abstract contains the requested information in accordance with Section 5.2.6 of NUREG-1022, Revision 2.

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company is currently performing a detailed review of this occurrence and the results of our evaluation will be reported in a supplement to this License Event Report prior to restart. The supplement will include: A clear, specific, narrative description of what occurred including the apparent cause of the event; an assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event including availability of systems that could have performed the same function; a description of any corrective actions planned as a result of the event including those to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future; and references to any previous similar events at the plant that are known.

Submission of this abstract was discussed with the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Very truly yours,



AWB/s

Enclosure

IE22

Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
NP-33-02-005-00
Page 2

cc: Mr. J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III
Mr. C. S. Thomas, DB-1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Utility Radiological Safety Board

Docket Number 50-346
License Number NPF-3
NP-33-02-005-00
Attachment
Page 1 of 1

COMMITMENT LIST

The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Davis-Besse. They are described only as information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at Davis-Besse of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS

DUE DATE

A supplement to this LER shall be submitted prior to restart after the review of the emergency sump clogging issue is complete.

Prior to Restart

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hrs Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503 If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection

FACILITY NAME (1) Davis-Besse Unit Number 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000346	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4)
Potential Clogging of the Emergency Sump Due to Debris in Containment

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	04	2002	2002	-- 005 --	00	11	04	2002		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9) DF	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20 2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)					
	20 2201(d)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20 2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50 73(a)(2)(iii)		50 73(a)(2)(ix)(A)					
	20 2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		50 73(a)(2)(x)					
	20 2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	50 73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73 71(a)(4)					
	20 2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50 73(a)(2)(v)(B)		73 71(a)(5)					
20 2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50 73(a)(2)(v)(C)		OTHER						
20 2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME Aaron W. Bless, Engineer - Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (419) 321-8543

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 4, 2002, with the reactor defueled and the unit in mode 6, investigations determined that a gap existed in the sump screen that exceeds the existing design basis (greater than 1/4-inch openings) and the existing amount of unqualified paint used inside containment could potentially block the emergency sump intake screen, rendering the sump inoperable, following a loss of coolant accident. With the emergency sump inoperable, both independent Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and both Containment Spray (CS) systems are inoperable due to both requiring suction from the emergency sump during the recirculation phase of operation. This could result in neither train of ECCS being able to remove residual heat from the reactor nor could CS remove heat and fission product iodine from the containment atmosphere. This condition is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) where a single cause or condition caused two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system. Review of the emergency sump is ongoing and a supplement report will be submitted prior to restart. The emergency sump strainer has been removed and construction of a new strainer system with greater surface area is in progress.