



Westinghouse Electric Company
Hematite Facility
3300 State Road P
Festus MO 63028
U.S.A.

October 25, 2002

Monte Phillips
NRC Region 3
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Dear Monte:

Enclosed or your information regarding IFI 2002-004-01 is a copy of the critique for the HEPA bank fire response, document EHS02/085. Please call me at (636) 937-4691, extension 464, with any comments or questions regarding this information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "K. Hayes".

Kevin R. Hayes CHMM
EH&S Manager

CC: K. Craig
A. J. Nardi

Proprietary Class 2
EHS02/087

A BNFL Group company

OCT 29 2002



October 23, 2002

To: K. Craig C. Horton A. Noack
T. Dent P. Malich L. Routhier
R. Griscom A. J. Nardi C. L. Werner

Cc: EHS Chronological file

From: K. Hayes

Subject: Critique of June 30, 2002 HEPA Bank Fire Response

A critique of the facility's response to the HEPA bank fire was conducted on 7/12/02 with personnel that responded to the incident. Those participating were Cliff Christopher (Process Engineer), Cort Horton (Safety), Arlon Noack (Emergency Director), Toby Price and Glenn Rector (Operators), Hewitt Smith (Health Physics), and Bill Smith (Guard). Not present was Russ Parks (Supervisor) and Brian Williams (Health Physics). The meeting was facilitated by Kevin Hayes (EH&S Manager), and began with a review of the incident timeline provided in Attachment 1. This was followed by open discussion of positive and negative aspects of the response. These aspects were noted on a whiteboard, and are transcribed in Attachment 2.

The general consensus of the participants is that the facility's response was effective and timely, but that there are opportunities for improvement. I have summarized those opportunities in Attachment 3. Actions taken, underway, or pending to address those opportunities are also identified.

Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2
EHS02/085

ATTACHMENT 1

To: Kevin Hayes
Tom Dent
Ron Land

6-20-2002

From: A.J. Noack

Subject: Report on the Filter Bank Fire

Following is a report on the fire that occurred in the Building 240 filter bank #242.

- 0927 -The first fire alarm sounded.
- 0934 -The second fire alarm sounded which is the one I observed when I reached the alarm panel.
- 0945 - Dispatched two operators to the filter bank to observe what the problem could be causing the alarm.
- 0947- The team reported back that there was smoke coming out of the doors of the #242 filter bank, which is in the attached ventilation room on the West side of building 240.
- 0948- I notified the guard to call the fire department and have them standby at the gate for further instructions.
- 0949- Shutdown all of the ventilation blowers located in the room where the fire was located.
- 0950- Cleared the rest of the personnel from the plant using the telephone and paging system. This involved only 4 people who were not already involved in the incident.
- 0950- Declared the incident to be an ALERT.
- 0952- Personnel accounted for and no injuries reported.
- 0953- Security began calling additional Health Physics Tec's, and additional guards.
- 0955- Called the NRC at 301 816 5100 and reported the incident. An open line was held with them until the incident was resolved.
- 1000- Hematite Fire Department was on site and staged outside fence.
- 1005- The Fire Chief was escorted into the plant to the 253 Emergency Area, to allow the Emergency Director to consult with him, as assistance in extinguishing the fire.
- 1012- Security began calling the Site Manager, Plant Manager, Emergency Director, Bill Sharkey.
- 1015- Continued to look at and try different ways to extinguish the fire.
- 1015 -1105 Continued to extinguish the fire by removing some of the filters and placing them in 55 gallon drums with permission from our consultant on site Cort Horton.
- 1030- The State Office of the DNR was contacted and notified of the incident. Around the same time Kevin Hayes was contacting other agencies while on his way to the plant.
- 1105- The fire was extinguished and team was asked to remove the rest of the filter frames from the bank and assure that we did not have any embers that could cause the fire to continue to smolder and flame up again.
- 1120- Kevin Hayes arrived on site and I filled him in on where things stood at that point and he took command.
- 1135- Kevin Hayes declared the ALERT terminated and the NRC was contacted with that information and additional information requested.

EHS02/085

ATTACHMENT 2

POSITIVE	NEGATIVE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Classifications and notifications, except to the fire department, were timely and according to procedure • Buddy system (2-in, 2-out) was effective • Good teamwork and coordination of effort • Entry teams were well-supported • Additional HP and guard personnel were recalled in a timely manner, arrived quickly • Management notifications by security • No injuries • No significant dose or release • Blowers and dampers were promptly secured and verified • Entry team rehabilitation was timely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire department notification was not conducted according to procedure • Outside calls from well-meaning personnel were forwarded by Security to the command post, distracting response personnel from their tasks • Perimeter control was weak – the site was not fully evacuated and occupants were in the way • Operation of the wheeled, 50-lb CO₂ fire extinguisher caused a static discharge to the HEPA enclosure • The positive pressure switch on a SCBA was open when the unit was turned on, causing an air leak, but was able to be closed • Training/qualifications not all current • Fire much harder to fight than expected • NRC demands for constant feedback on plant & fire status distracted Emergency Director and Safety Officer from their tasks • Number of available responders relative to full EPIP structure • Stack 242 (involved unit) duct smoke detector never alarmed • Too many senior personnel gone at one time

ATTACHMENT 3

OPPORTUNITY	ACTION
Everyone was surprised at how difficult the fire was to suppress.	The cause of the fire load was identified in the Root Cause Analysis, and corrected as noted in CAPs Issue #02-003072. COMPLETE
The reduced number of responders left on site was a challenge, particularly due to several key management personnel being away.	The number of personnel remaining on-site has made it inappropriate for the facility to handle anything beyond minor emergencies without off-site support. The Hematite Fire Protection District has been informed of that change. They and their mutual aid agencies attended training and a site tour on 8/20/02, and conducted additional training several times in September. More training and tours are expected. Off-site agencies have previously had been trained and invited to tour the facility. HAYES, HORTON
Training for all on-site responders was not current.	Remaining site personnel will be trained to support the fire department's command structure, and to act as escorts. HAYES, HORTON
The fire department's arrival was delayed by failure to follow procedure.	Security guards were re-instructed regarding their notification procedures. COMPLETE
Maintaining an open line with NRC, and several calls from off-site personnel offering assistance, resulted in the Emergency Director and Safety Officer being distracted from directing the response; most other informed personnel were tactically engaged.	Security has been informed not to forward calls except those cleared by the Emergency Director or his designee. The change in strategy for the use of remaining on-site personnel should provide sufficient resources to prevent distracting the facility's command staff. Procedures clarifying that change are being drafted. HAYES