



Entergy Nuclear Northeast  
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc  
Indian Point Energy Center  
295 Broadway, Suite 1  
PO Box 249  
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249

October 9, 2002  
NL-02-131

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Mail Stop O-P1-17  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
License No. DPR-26  
Licensee Event Report # 2002-004-00  
**Security Weapon Stored in Locked Safe in the Owner Controlled Area  
Discovered Missing During Pre-Assignment Review**

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2002-004-00 is the follow-up written report submittal required by 10 CFR 73.71(d). This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73, Appendix G (I)(a)(3), as clarified by Regulatory Guide 5.62, for an event recorded in Entergy's corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP2-2002-08393.

Entergy is making no new commitments in this LER.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John T. Herron".

Mr. John T. Herron  
Senior Vice President  
Indian Point Energy Center  
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

cc: See next page

JE74

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller  
Regional Administrator  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406-1415

Mr. Patrick D. Milano, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop O-8-C2  
Washington, DC 20555

INPO Record Center  
700 Galleria Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Resident Inspectors' Office  
Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 38  
Buchanan, NY 10511-0038

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

<b>1 FACILITY NAME</b> Indian Point Unit 2	<b>2 DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000- 247	<b>3 PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Security Weapon Stored in a Locked Safe in the Owner Controlled Area Discovered Missing During Pre-assignment Review

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	11	2002	2002	- 004 -	00	10	09	2002	Indian Point 3	05000-286
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b> N	<b>11 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50 (Check all that apply)</b>											
	20.2201(b)		20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b> 100	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(4)	
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		73.71(a)(5)	
	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		20.2203(a)(2)(vii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		OTHER	
	20.2203(a)(2)(viii)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(D)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
	20.2203(a)(2)(ix)		20.2203(a)(2)(x)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
	20.2203(a)(2)(xi)		20.2203(a)(2)(xii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

<b>NAME</b> Jeffery Cooper, Entergy Senior Security Coordinator	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)</b> 914-736-8042
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b>				<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

**16 ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On September 11, 2002, a contract security sergeant discovered a security weapon (handgun) was missing from a locked safe located in the contract security office. The contract security office is located in the Service Center Building within the Owner Controlled Area. The weapon was discovered missing during an inventory of unassigned weapons used for assignment to new security force personnel. A search for the weapon was performed but it failed to locate the weapon. An investigation was initiated and is in progress. The NRC, Local Law Enforcement and state police were notified. The apparent cause of the event was theft made possible by inadequate weapon control of unassigned weapons. A contributing cause was a lack of procedural guidance for control of unassigned weapons. Corrective actions included: a change to the safe lock combination, relocation of the safe to a more controlled area, new limits on personnel access to the safe, implementation of a requirement for logging safe access, an inventory of all weapons, and communication of management expectations on securing and control of weapons. An existing action plan for integration of the contract and proprietary force will provide for a site armory within the protected area. An assessment of the adequacy of procedural guidelines will be performed and necessary corrective actions implemented. The event had no effect on public health and safety since no potential threat to the plant existed. The normal barriers required by 10 CFR 73 to prevent the introduction of a weapon into a protected or vital area remained intact.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Indian Point Unit 2	05000-247	2002	- 004	- 00	2 OF 3

**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

On September 11, 2002, at approximately 1300 hours, while at 100% steady state reactor power, a contract security sergeant discovered a security weapon (handgun) was missing from a locked safe in the contract security office. The contract security office is located in the Service Center Building that is within the site Owner Controlled Area (OCA). The event was recorded as a condition report for Indian Point 2 in the Indian Point corrective action program (CR-IP2-2002-08393).

Entergy is currently the owner of Indian Point Units 1, 2, and 3. Under previous owners the Unit 1 and 2 onsite security force was a contract force and Unit 3 was a proprietary force. The security force is in the process of integrating into a one-site organization. The event occurred with respect to the contract force unassigned weapons.

The weapon was discovered missing during non-routine inventory of unassigned weapons for assignment to new contract security force personnel. A contract sergeant who is not the assigned custodian of the missing weapon, but is an authorized weapon coordinator, made the discovery. A search for the weapon was performed but it failed to locate the weapon. The NRC, Local Law Enforcement (Buchanan N.Y. Police) and state police were notified. An investigation was initiated and is in progress. The investigation is a joint effort between the Entergy site investigator and local law enforcement agencies (LLEA).

An evaluation of the event was made by security under the Indian Point 2 corrective action program. The missing weapon was an unassigned new weapon stored in a safe used to store unassigned weapons prior to assignment to a security force member. The missing weapon was one of eleven new and still unassigned weapons purchased by the contract security company for Entergy and received on April 8, 2002. The 11 unassigned weapons were accounted for on June 25, 2002 by a weapons inventory. Security concluded that the process to ensure weapon control and accountability did not provide adequate requirements for unassigned new weapons. Unassigned new weapons controlled by the contract security force did not have procedural guidance for their storage and distribution. There are procedural controls for assigned weapons. The opportunity for undetected weapon removal was provided because the safe for storage of unassigned weapons was poorly located in a general area of the contract security office rather than in a lockable security supervisor's office, access to unassigned weapons was not formally controlled, and the verification of inventories was not scheduled. The incident has received media attention through local and tri-state news articles.

**CAUSE OF EVENT**

The apparent cause of the event was theft made possible by inadequate weapon control of unassigned weapons. A contributing cause was a lack of procedural guidance for control of unassigned weapons.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

The following corrective actions have been or will be performed under Entergy's corrective action program to address the causes of this event.

- 1) The lock combination to the safe used for storage of unassigned weapons was changed.
- 2) The safe for storage of unassigned weapons was relocated to an area with more limited accessibility and better oversight.

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**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

- 3) Personnel access to the safe for storage of unassigned weapons has been limited to a few personnel.
- 4) A requirement for logging access to the safe for storage of unassigned weapons has been initiated.
- 5) An inventory of weapons was performed with no missing items.
- 6) Management expectations regarding the securing and control of weapons has been communicated to the appropriate security force personnel.
- 7) An existing integration action plan will provide for a site armory for all weapons within the protected area. Establishment of the site armory is scheduled for the end of 2002.
- 8) An assessment of procedural guidelines will be performed by October 31, 2002. and necessary corrective actions implemented.

**ANALYSIS OF EVENT**

The event is reportable under 10 CFR 73.71(d), Appendix G (I)(a)(3) which requires a licensee to report any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause; interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system. Regulatory Guide 5.62, Section C, 2.2, Item 24 states that loss of a security weapon at the site is reportable under 10CFR73, Appendix G, Paragraph I(a)(3). This event meets the reporting criteria because on September 11, 2002, a security weapon was discovered missing from the locked safe where it was stored.

**PAST SIMILAR EVENTS**

A review of Licensee Event Reports (LER) for the previous three years identified no similar events.

**SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE**

This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

There were no actual safety consequences for the event because there have been no safeguard events associated with the missing weapon. No safety systems were potentially affected directly or indirectly since the event occurred in the OCA, remote from plant safety equipment. The loss of a weapon in the OCA has no potential to effect plant safety because vital and protected area boundaries would have prevented anyone with the gun from reaching safety related equipment. Access to vital and protected areas is controlled by plant security and was maintained to control all points of personnel and vehicle access to the protected area (PA). This includes identification and search of all individuals entering the PA in order to assure identification of anyone attempting to bring in a firearm. When reporting for duty, security guards must also adhere to the search requirement for entry to the PA. Security force personnel authorized for site access and going on duty are issued their weapon(s) after entering the PA and prior to assignment. Therefore, the normal barriers required by 10 CFR 73 to prevent the introduction of a weapon into a protected or vital area remained intact.