



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

April 18, 2002

EA-02-036

Mr. Paul D. Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION NO. 50-458/02-05; PRELIMINARY YELLOW FINDING

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

On March 20, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection which were discussed with Mr. D. Mims, General Manager - Plant Operations, during a telephonic conference on March 20, 2002.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed implementation of the onsite emergency preparedness program, selected documents and procedures, observed facilities, and interviewed personnel.

This report discusses a finding that was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance. As described in Section 1EP4.1 of this report, the finding involves the failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), the failure to meet emergency planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and the failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV(G), in that: (1) a range of protective actions were not developed and maintained for members of the public who routinely used facilities located in the River Bend Station owner controlled area, (2) emergency response information was not periodically made available to members of the public who routinely used facilities located in the River Bend Station owner controlled area, and (3) the River Bend Station emergency plan was not reviewed and updated as members of the public were given access to facilities located in the owner controlled area. This finding was assessed using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP) and was preliminarily determined to have a significance of Yellow. Yellow findings have a substantial importance to safety and may require additional NRC inspection.

The finding also appears to involve three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV(G), and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy),

NUREG-1600. The current Enforcement Policy is available on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/enforcement.html.

Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the significance of the finding, the basis for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent violations. If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the Regulatory Conference.

Please contact Ms. Gail M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, at (817) 860-8215 within 7 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Arthur T. Howell III, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-458/02-05

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-458
License No.: NPF-47
Report No.: 50-458/02-05
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: River Bend Station
Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Dates: January 28 through March 20, 2002
Inspector: Paul J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved: Gail M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

River Bend Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-458/02-05

IR05000458-02-05, on 1/28-2/01/2002 (onsite) and 2/4 through 3/20/2002 (in-office), Entergy Operations, River Bend Station. Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes.

The inspection was conducted by a regional emergency preparedness inspector. This inspection identified one preliminary finding, and three apparent violations associated with this finding. The significance of the finding is still being determined but has preliminarily been assessed as Yellow. The significance of issues is indicated by its color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html>.

Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

- TBD. The inspector identified one preliminary finding involving the failure to develop a range of protective actions, disseminate emergency response information, and maintain the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), planning standards §50.47(b)(10) and (7), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV(G) pertaining to members of the public located in the owner controlled area. Three apparent violations are associated with the finding. The issues involved: (1) a failure to establish effective means or provisions for warning, advising, evacuating, and monitoring members of the public during an owner controlled area evacuation, (2) a failure to disseminate emergency response information to the public using facilities in the River Bend Station owner controlled area, and (3) a failure to update the emergency plan and procedures after the public was permitted access to facilities in the owner controlled area. The licensee has entered these issues into its corrective action program in CR-RBS-2001-1713 and CR-RBS-2002-0183.

This issue was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance (Yellow) because it represented a failure to meet a risk-significant emergency preparedness planning standard (Section 1EP4.1).

Report Details

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)
- 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
- .1 Owner Controlled Area Evacuation
- a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency plan, selected documents, and procedures related to the evacuation of the owner controlled area against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and the planning standard evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, to verify that the licensee continued to meet planning standards 50.47(b)(10) and 50.47(b)(7) and requirements in Appendix E.

The inspector also toured the following areas of the licensee's owner controlled area to which the public had been given access: the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation; the security firing range; the activity center; the outage recreational vehicle (RV) campground; the Sportsman's Association base camp; the primary, back-up, and alternate assembly areas; and the river access road which provided the primary hunting and fishing access in the owner controlled area.

The inspector interviewed licensee personnel, including members of the emergency preparedness staff, key emergency response organization members, security management and officers, and the administrative staff responsible for scheduling at the activity center and RV campground, to determine if there was an effective means to warn and evacuate members of the public in the owner controlled area. The inspector also interviewed three members of the public located within the owner controlled area to determine their level of knowledge concerning the methods for notification, evacuation, and monitoring that would be used in an emergency.

For background, between 1985 and January 2002, members of the public were given access to the following areas in the licensee owner controlled area: the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation; the security firing range; the activity center; the outage RV campground; the Sportsman's Association base camp; and the river access road which provided the primary access for hunting and fishing in the owner controlled area. This access continued through January 2002. Based on information provided by the licensee, the daily capacities of the individual locations routinely used by the public varied between 12 and 200 persons, and the total number of members of the public who could have been present on any given day, had all of these locations been in simultaneous use, was between 300 and 400 persons. Actual usage of the facilities varied greatly during the year based on the change of seasons, special events, and conduct of meetings outside normally scheduled times. All of the above facilities were

actively used by members of the public during the time frame above. Offsite audible sirens activated at a general emergency classification to warn the emergency planning zone may be heard in portions of the owner controlled area but are not described in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures as a method for warning occupants of an owner controlled area evacuation.

b. Findings

One finding was identified with potentially substantial safety significance (Yellow) involving: (1) a failure to establish effective means or provisions for warning, advising, evacuating, and monitoring members of the public during an owner controlled area evacuation, (2) a failure to disseminate emergency response information to the public using facilities in the River Bend Station owner controlled area, and (3) a failure to update the emergency plan and procedures after the public was permitted access to facilities in the owner controlled area. This finding also constitutes apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, IV(G).

The inspector determined that between 1985 and January 2002 the licensee failed to develop a range of protective actions for members of the public: (1) working at the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation; (2) using the security firing range, the activity center, the outage RV campground, and the Sportsman's Association base camp; and (3) hunting and fishing in the owner controlled area as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 50.47(b)(10). Also, the licensee did not provide, on a periodic basis, information to members of the public routinely using facilities in the River Bend Station owner controlled area which described the process used to warn occupants of an owner controlled area evacuation, the designated evacuation assembly areas, the evacuation route(s) used to travel to the evacuation assembly areas, the radiological monitoring and decontamination process, and other protective measures such as sheltering, respiratory protection, and radioprotective drugs as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 50.47(b)(7). Additionally, the licensee did not effectively implement provisions that ensured the emergency plan and its implementing procedures were maintained up to date as changes were made to the station and its owner controlled area as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E IV(G).

The Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR 50.47, 50.54, and Part 50, Appendix E (45 FR 55402, August 19, 1980, "Emergency Planning") state, in part, that: "...two guidance documents were published for public comment and interim use. These are NUREG-0610... and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1... It is expected that versions of these documents, revised on the basis of public comments received, will be issued to assist in defining acceptable levels of preparedness to meet this final regulation." NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, provides planning bases for licensees and offsite authorities, and contains guidance for implementing planning standards. Section I.H, "Nuclear Facility Licensee Response Organization," states, in part, "...licensees of nuclear facilities have a primary responsibility for planning and implementing emergency measures within their site boundaries. These emergency measures include...protective measures and aid for persons onsite."

- A. Criteria for implementing §47(b)(10) are found in NUREG-0654 Planning Standard J, "Protective Response." The following four evaluation criteria from Planning Standard J did not appear to be developed and incorporated into the licensee's emergency plan:
1. Evaluation Criterion 1 states, in part, "Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including . . . (b) visitors . . . (d) other persons who may be in the public access areas on or passing through the site or within the owner controlled area." The NRC determined that this evaluation criterion was not met because:
 - a. The licensee's emergency plan and procedures relied on security personnel to warn and advise personnel in the owner controlled area. These security sweeps would not have been completely effective for members of the public because:
 - i. Licensee procedures and bulletins contained partial listings of outlying plant buildings and did not include all the locations routinely occupied by the public. Security management interviewed in January 2002 stated that security officers would sweep along the river access road but would not sweep off-road fishing locations.
 - ii. Five security officers, responsible for performing owner controlled area evacuation sweeps, who were interviewed in December 2001, described processes for warning station employees but did not discuss any actions to warn members of the public of an evacuation.
 - iii. Station procedures did not specify how an evacuation message was to be delivered by security officers. The expectation that security officers stop at outdoor areas and remain stationary while delivering an evacuation message was not written in procedures, security bulletins, or training lesson plans.
 - iv. The skills required of the security coordinator and security shift supervisor included coordination of the evacuation of personnel from the owner controlled area but did not include warning or evacuating the public. Lesson plans for security officers specifically discussed the evacuation of River Bend Station employees during an owner controlled area evacuation but did not discuss evacuation of the public. As described during interviews with emergency response organization members and used in lesson plans, "personnel" was understood to mean licensee staff and contractors.

- v. The skills required of key emergency response organization members described in Emergency Plan Appendix A, did not include performing an owner controlled area evacuation, and these responders were not trained on methods for the evacuation of the owner controlled area.
 - vi. There were no emergency response functions listed in Emergency Plan Appendix A for security officers. Lesson plan "Advanced Security Skills," Section D, "Responsibilities During Emergencies," did not include an owner controlled area evacuation among seven listed security responsibilities.
 - vii. The security shift supervisor and security officers did not demonstrate essential skills related to an owner controlled area evacuation through the annual protected area evacuation, because the protected area evacuation did not demonstrate elements such as: (1) obtaining sufficient security officers to accomplish simultaneous security emergency tasks, (2) developing and communicating routing instructions for the security officer assigned to security sweeps, (3) developing and briefing the evacuation message for evacuees, (4) providing appropriate radiological protection and briefings for the security officer assigned to the security sweep, and (5) simultaneously managing multiple security priorities and officers.
 - viii. River Bend Station did not test or validate the process for performing an owner controlled area evacuation prior to January 2002.
- b. Licensee procedures and training lesson plans did not contain a specific time requirement for completing the warning or notification of an owner controlled area evacuation. Based on the text of Section 13.3.5.4.1.1.4 of the Emergency Plan ("Evacuation Times") states, in part: "The estimated elapsed times, measured from the time of initial warning to persons required to evacuate identified areas of the site are as follows...(3) owner controlled area evacuation (30 to 60 minutes)." This section discusses the time for evacuation without reference to the time permitted for the warning to occur.
 - c. Prior to January 2002, loudspeaker equipment used by security personnel during owner controlled area evacuations was not part of a defined maintenance program. The inspector was unable to determine the functionality of the loudspeakers prior to January 2002 due to the lack of maintenance and testing records.

2. Evaluation Criterion 2 states, in part, "Each licensee shall make provisions for evacuation routes and transportation for onsite individuals to some suitable offsite location." The NRC determined that this evaluation criterion was not met because:
 - a. Procedures did not establish the emergency response organization position responsible for developing evacuation instructions pertaining to evacuation routing and transportation for evacuees outside the protected area. During inspection interviews, personnel assigned to the technical support center did not describe having this responsibility when asked to describe their duties in carrying out an owner controlled area evacuation.
 - b. Procedural direction did not ensure that evacuation instructions and evacuation routing messages were developed for each area of the owner controlled area where members of the public could be located.

3. Evaluation Criterion 3 states, "Each licensee shall provide for radiological monitoring of people evacuated from the site." Criterion 4 states, "Each licensee shall provide for the evacuation of onsite nonessential personnel in the event of a Site or General Emergency and shall provide a decontamination capability at or near the monitoring point specified in J.3." The NRC determined that these evaluation criteria were not met because:
 - a. Members of the public using the security firing range, the activity center, the outage RV campground, and the Sportsman's Association base camp, were not informed that they would be monitored as part of an evacuation under adverse radiological conditions. Public information brochures were not made available at these locations. Brochures sent to the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation did not address radiological monitoring for persons in the owner controlled area.
 - b. Members of the public using facilities in the owner controlled area were neither provided advance information about radiological monitoring locations nor were they provided directions or maps. Brochures sent to the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation did not address radiological monitoring locations for persons in the owner controlled area.
 - c. The primary and back-up evacuation assembly areas were each provided with one decontamination shower and limited decontamination supplies. A pre-positioned decontamination capability was not available at the alternate assembly area, and licensee procedures did not require that radiological monitoring and decontamination equipment or supplies be dispatched to the

alternate assembly area when it was used. This limited decontamination capability, especially at the alternate assembly area, would have caused significant delays in performing decontamination and monitoring for events which resulted in more than minor amounts of contamination.

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, "A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this part." 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires, in part, "A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public." The failure to develop a range of protective actions for members of the public using facilities located in the River Bend Station owner controlled area is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 50.47(b)(10).

The apparent violation has a credible impact on safety because of the potential to expose members of the public to radiation and/or radioactive material in the event of an emergency if they are not provided with the appropriate protective actions. The apparent violation was assessed through the "Failure to Meet Regulatory Requirement" branch of the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process because it was an apparent violation of the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The finding was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance (Yellow) because it represented a failure to meet a risk-significant emergency preparedness planning standard as defined by NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix B §2.a. The licensee has entered this issue into its corrective action program as part of CR-RBS-2001-1713 (AV 458/0205-01).

- B. The criteria for implementing 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) are found in NUREG-0654 Planning Standard G, "Public Education and Information." The following evaluation criteria from this planning standard were not developed and incorporated into the licensee's emergency plan:
1. Criterion 1 states, in part, "Each organization shall provide a coordinated (at least annually) dissemination of information to the public regarding how they will be notified and what their actions should be in an emergency. This information shall include, but not necessarily be limited to...(c) protective measures; e.g., evacuation routes and relocation centers, sheltering, respiratory protection, radioprotective drugs..." The NRC determined that this evaluation criterion was not met because:
 - a. Public information signs regarding an owner controlled area evacuation were not posted at any of the locations in the owner controlled area to which the public had routine access prior to December 2001.
 - b. Between 1985 and 2001, written rules and material provided to users of the activity center and outage RV campground did not

contain: (1) basic radiological information, (2) information about the notification process for owner controlled area evacuation, (3) information about protective measures, such as onsite evacuation routes and relocation centers, sheltering, and respiratory protection, or (4) information about radioprotective drugs. Also, information was not provided about the radiological monitoring and decontamination process.

- c. Basic radiological information, information about the notification process for an owner controlled area evacuation, and information about protective measures, such as onsite evacuation routes and relocation centers, sheltering, respiratory protection, or radioprotective drugs, were neither provided to members of the Parish Sheriff's Department training at the security firing range between 1992 and 2001 nor to members of the Sportsman's Association hunting and fishing in the owner controlled area between 1990 and 2001.
- d. The public information brochure sent to the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation between October 1999 and December 2001 did not describe the notification process for an owner controlled area evacuation and did not include information about onsite protective measures, such as onsite evacuation routes, relocation centers, and sheltering.

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, "A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this part." 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) requires, in part, "Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency." The failure to periodically make information available to the public about how they will be notified during an emergency and what their initial actions should be, is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 50.47(b)(7).

The apparent violation has a credible impact on safety because of the potential to expose members of the public to radiation and/or radioactive material in the event of an emergency if they are not provided with appropriate information about how they will be warned and advised during an emergency and what their actions should be. The apparent violation was assessed through the "Failure to Meet Regulatory Requirement" branch of the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process because it was an apparent violation of the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The finding was preliminarily determined to represent a failure to meet an emergency preparedness planning standard as defined by MC 0609, Appendix B §2.a. The licensee has entered this issue into its corrective action program as part of CR-RBS-2001-1713 (AV 458/0205-01).

- C. The NRC concluded that the licensee did not effectively implement provisions that ensured the emergency plan and its implementing procedures were maintained up to date as changes were made to the station and its owner controlled area. Specifically, the public use of the West Feliciana Community Development Foundation, the security firing range, the activity center, the outage RV campground, and the Sportsman Association, and, more generally, public bow hunting and fishing within the owner controlled area, were not evaluated for their effect on station emergency preparedness as each use was established or permitted.

10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, "A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in §50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this part." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV(G), requires, "Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described." The failure to maintain the River Bend Station Emergency Plan and implementing procedures up to date following the establishment of facilities in the owner controlled area which were routinely used by members of the public is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q).

This apparent violation has a credible impact on safety because of the potential for risk significant and other important emergency preparedness program elements, such as emergency classification, notification of emergencies to offsite authorities and the public, and protective action decision-making, to degrade if changes to the plant and its environs are not adequately reviewed for their impact on emergency preparedness. The finding was assessed through the "Failure to Meet Regulatory Requirement" branch of the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process because it was an apparent violation of the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The finding was preliminarily determined to not represent a failure to meet an emergency preparedness planning standard as defined by MC 0609, Appendix B §2.a. The licensee has entered this issue into its corrective action program in CR-RBS-2002-0183 (AV 458/0205-01).

Because the NRC has preliminarily determined that 3 apparent violations occurred, as previously discussed, Unresolved Item 50-485/0104-02 is closed.

.2 Review of Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed Revision 24 to the River Bend Station Emergency Plan, submitted November 1, 2001, against the previous revision of the emergency plan and against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Drill and Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following information and documents related to the drill and exercise performance (DEP) indicator against the requirements of NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," Revisions 0 and 1, in order to verify the accuracy of the licensee's reported data for the second through fourth quarters of calendar year 2001. The inspector reviewed data for 100 percent of the drills included in the DEP statistics during this period.

- Drill schedules for calendar year 2001
- Evaluation reports for drills included in DEP statistics
- Drill scenarios for drills included in DEP statistics
- Drill-related offsite notification forms, participant logs, checklists, and documents
- Drill evaluation worksheets
- Drill evaluation records
- Performance indicator summary sheets
- Performance indicator reports

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following records related to emergency response organization participation against the requirements of NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," Revisions 0 and 1, in order to verify the accuracy of the licensee's reported data for the second through fourth quarters of

calendar year 2001. The inspector verified drill participation data for a sample of six emergency responders to verify the accuracy of the licensee's tracking database.

- Emergency response organization rosters for the second through fourth quarters of Calendar Year 2001
- Quarterly summaries of emergency responder drill participation dates over the previous eight quarters, including a review of the participation dates in each quarter for 100 percent of the key emergency response organization positions
- List of key emergency response organization positions
- Performance indicator summary sheets
- Performance indicator reports

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Alert and Notification System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed siren testing records against the requirements of NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," Revisions 0 and 1, in order to verify the accuracy of the licensee's reported data for the second through fourth quarters of calendar year 2001. The inspector also reviewed a sample of 12 siren trouble tickets to verify the licensee's characterization of siren problems and failures against the requirements of EPP-2-701, "Prompt Notification System Maintenance and Testing," Revision 14.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Mims, General Manager - Plant Operations, and other members of licensee management during a telephone conference call on March 20, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

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P. Hinnenkamp, Vice President, Operations
A. James, Supervisor, Security Operations
R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
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A. Howell, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, DRS
D. Powers, Senior Technical Analyst, DRS
R. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-458/0205-01	AV	Preliminary finding based on apparent violations of 50.54(q), emergency planning standards 50.47(b)(10) and (7), and Appendix E, section IV(G)
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Closed

50-458/0104-02	URI	Adequacy of procedures to notify members of the general public who routinely occupy facilities within the OCA of an OCA evacuation
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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspector to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support the findings:

Plant Procedures:

AD-101, "Nuclear Management Manual Process," Revision 7
EIP-2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," Revision 11
EIP-2-002, "Classification Actions," Revision 21
EIP-2-007, "Protective Action Recommendation Guidelines," Revision 18
EIP-2-018, "Technical Support Center," Revision 23
EIP-2-020, "Emergency Operations Facility," Revision 23
EIP-2-024, "Offsite Dose Calculations," Revision 18
EIP-2-102, "Training, Drills, and Exercises," Revisions 21 & 22
EPP-2-703, "Performance Indicators," Revision 1
SPI-30, "Security Motor Patrol," Revision 18
SPI-32, "Gate 5 (Industrial Area)," Revision 5
TQ-110, "Emergency Preparedness Training Program," Revision 0

Other Documents:

River Bend Station Emergency Plan, Revision 24
River Bend Station Initial Position Paper, "Owner Controlled Area Evacuations"
River Bend Station Initial Position Paper, Attachment 1, "Regulatory Implementation Matrix"
River Bend Station Position Paper, "Notification of Members of the Public within the River Bend Station Owner Controlled Area"
River Bend Emergency Planning Information Brochure, 2002 Calendar
Security Bulletin 519, April 30, 2001
Security Bulletin 541, December 26, 2001
Security Lesson Plan: "Advanced Security Skills"
Emergency Preparedness Emergency Team Training, Lesson Plan Number LEC-EP-091 (ETT-091-5, "Emergency Preparedness Training for Security Personnel")
Emergency Preparedness Emergency Team Training, Lesson Plan Number LEC-EP-083.11, "Management Control of Emergencies (RM/ED/TSC MGR/EOF MGR)"
Letter EP-M-01-059, "Evacuation of the Public Within the Owner controlled Area"
Briefing Package for the Louisiana National Guard, October 2001
Charter, River Bend Sportsman's Club, revision dated May 19, 2001
Memorandum, from R. Roberts to RF10 Campground Occupants, "Recreational Vehicle Accommodations during Outages," August 20, 2001
(Sample) Memorandum, from S. Williams to Persons reserving the RB Activity Center, February 6, 2001
River Bend Activity Center Calendar: June 14, 1999 through January 31, 2002
Condition Report 2001-1713
Condition Report 2002-0182
Condition Report 2002-0183
Condition Report 2002-0187

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

River Bend Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-458/2002-005
January 28 to March 20, 2002

IR05000458-02-05, on 1/28-2/01/2002 (onsite) and 2/4 through 3/20/2002 (in-office), Entergy Operations, River Bend Station. Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes.

The inspection was conducted by a regional emergency preparedness inspector. This inspection identified one preliminary finding, and three apparent violations associated with this finding. The significance of the finding is still being determined but has preliminarily been assessed as Yellow. The significance of issues is indicated by its color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html>.

P. Elkmann (4640)

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

PIM NRC FIN EP March 20, 2001 71114.04

Failure to develop a range of protective actions, disseminate emergency response information, and maintain the emergency plan for members of the public located within the owner controlled area.

- TBD. The inspector identified one preliminary finding involving the failure to develop a range of protective actions, disseminate emergency response information, and maintain the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), planning standards §50.47(b)(10) and (7), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, section IV(G) pertaining to members of the public located in the owner controlled area. Three apparent violations are associated with the finding. The issues involved: (1) a failure to establish effective means or provisions for warning, advising, evacuating, and monitoring members of the public during an owner controlled area evacuation, (2) a failure to disseminate emergency response information to the public using facilities in the River Bend Station owner controlled area, and (3) a failure to update the emergency plan and procedures after the public was permitted access to facilities in the owner controlled area. The licensee has entered these issues into its corrective action program in CR-RBS-2001-1713 and CR-RBS-2002-0183.

This issue was preliminarily determined to have substantial safety significance (Yellow) because it represented a failure to meet a risk-significant emergency preparedness planning standard (Section 1EP4.1).