



OCT 01 2002

LRN-02-0332  
LCR S01-02

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR LICENSE CHANGE REQUEST S01-02  
REGARDING NORMAL AND EMERGENCY POWER  
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311  
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 AND DPR-75**

Reference: Letter LRN-01-0200, *Request for Change to Technical Specifications 3.0.5 and 3.8.1 - Normal and Emergency Power*, dated November 1, 2001

PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG) hereby provides additional information regarding the referenced request for amendment of the Technical Specifications (TS) and supporting Bases for Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

The referenced amendment proposed to modify the provisions under which equipment may be considered operable when either its normal or emergency power source is inoperable. Technical Specification 3.0.5 will be deleted under this proposal, and appropriate conditions incorporated into TS 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources – Operating, consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev. 2, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants."

This letter provides the camera-ready technical specification pages and includes an administrative change to the index reflecting updated page numbers. Incorporation of the proposed changes into the technical specifications necessitated an additional page. To accommodate insertion into hardcopy binders without affecting subsequent pagination, a blank "backside" is also included.

A001

OCT 01 2002

Document Control Desk  
LRN-02-0332

-2-


Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), a copy of this additional information supporting a request for amendment has been sent to the State of New Jersey.

The material contained herein is administrative in nature and does not affect the prior no significant hazards considerations review under 10 CFR 50.91, and it remains excluded from the requirements for an Environmental Impact Statement under 10CFR51.22(c)(9).

The camera-ready technical specification pages are provided in Attachments 1 and 2 for Salem Units 1 and 2, respectively.

Should you have any questions regarding this information, please contact C. Berger at (856) 339-1432.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gabor Salamon', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Gabor Salamon  
Manager - Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Attachment 1: Salem Unit 1 Revised Technical Specification Pages  
Attachment 2: Salem Unit 2 Revised Technical Specification Pages

OCT 01 2002

Document Control Desk  
LRN-02-0332

-3-

C Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. R. Fretz, Licensing Project Manager - Salem  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
One White Flint North  
Mail Stop 0882  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852

USNRC Resident Inspector Office (X24)

Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV  
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering  
P. O. Box 415  
Trenton, NJ 08625

**SALEM UNIT 1  
REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES**

The following camera-ready pages for Salem Unit 1, Facility Operating License DPR-70, are provided with this supplement:

<u>Technical Specification</u>	<u>Page</u>
Index	XIV
3.0.5	3/4 0-2
3.8.1.1	3/4 8-1, 8-2
	3/4 8-2a, 2b (new pages)
Bases 3.0.5	B 3/4 0-4, 0-4a
Bases 3.8.1	B 3/4 8-1, 8-2, 8-3, 8-4

INDEX

BASES

=====

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE . . . . .	B 3/4 7-1
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . .	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM . . . . .	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION . . . . .	B 3/4 7-5
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM . . . . .	B 3/4 7-5
3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM . . . . .	B 3/4 7-5c
3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . .	B 3/4 7-5c
3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS . . . . .	B 3/4 7-6
3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM . . . . .	B 3/4 7-8
 <u>3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.8.1 A. C. SOURCES. . . . .	B 3/4 8-1
3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . . .	B 3/4 8-1
3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES . . . . .	B 3/4 8-4

APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.0.5 DELETED

3.0.6 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

### 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

#### 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

##### OPERATING

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two physically independent A.C. circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (vital bus system), and
- b. Three separate and independent diesel generators with:
  1. Separate day tanks containing a minimum volume of 130 gallons of fuel, and
  2. A common fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks, each containing a minimum volume of 23,000 gallons of fuel, and two fuel transfer pumps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

##### ACTION:

- a. With an independent A.C. circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:
  1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and
  2. Within 24 hours, declare required systems or components with no offsite power available inoperable when a redundant required system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
  3. Restore the inoperable independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:
  1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and
  2. Within 4 hours, declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable diesel generator inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION (Continued)

---

3. Determine the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators are not inoperable due to common cause failure or perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 24 hours. If the diesel generator is inoperable for preventive maintenance, the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators need not be tested nor the OPERABILITY evaluated; and
  4. In any case, restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one independent A.C. circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least two independent A.C. circuits and three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With two of the above required independent A.C. circuits inoperable:
1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours, unless the diesel generators are already operating; and
  2. Within 12 hours, declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable offsite circuits inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
  3. Restore at least one of the inoperable independent A.C. circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; and
  4. With only one of the independent A.C. circuits OPERABLE, restore the other independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.



ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION (Continued)

---

- e. With two or more of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- f. With one of the above required fuel transfer pumps inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- g. With one of the above required fuel storage tanks inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPLICABILITY

BASES

---

Specification 3.0.5

DELETED

## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

---

Specification 3.0.6 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of testing required to restore and demonstrate:

- a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or
- b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the testing required to restore and demonstrate the operability of the equipment. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the testing required to restore and demonstrate OPERABILITY.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of testing required to restore OPERABILITY of another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of testing required to restore and demonstrate the OPERABILITY of another channel in the same trip system.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES

---

3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of one onsite A.C. source.

When a system or component is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may still be considered OPERABLE, provided the appropriate Actions of 3.8.1.1.a.2, b.2 or d.2 are satisfied.

Action 3.8.1.1.a.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required systems. Failure of a single offsite circuit will generally not, by itself, cause any equipment to lose normal AC power. Action 3.8.1.1.b.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. Action 3.8.1.1.d.2, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

These systems are powered from the redundant AC electrical power train. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, may not be included. Redundant required system or component failures consist of inoperable equipment associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG or offsite power.

The completion time for these actions is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This completion time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time clock, starting only on discovery that both:

- a. One train has no offsite power supplying its loads, one DG is inoperable or two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required system or component on the other train is inoperable.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES (Continued)

---

If at any time during these conditions a redundant required system or component subsequently becomes inoperable, this completion time begins to be tracked. Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System, or one required DG inoperable, coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported systems or components that are associated with the other train that has power, results in starting the completion times for the Action. The specified time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE AC supplies (one offsite circuit and three DGs for Condition (a), two offsite circuits and two DGs for Condition (b), or three DGs for Condition (d)) are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required system or component's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The completion time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required system or component. Additionally, the completion time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The completion time for Condition d (loss of both offsite circuits) is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Action 3.8.1.1.a.2). The rationale is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 allows a completion time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required system or component failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter completion time of 12 hours is appropriate.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Applicability of specifications 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4, and 3.8.2.6 includes the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This will insure adequate electrical power is available for proper operation of the fuel handling building ventilation system during movement of irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are based upon the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977. Regulatory Guide 1.108 criteria for determining and reporting valid tests and failures, and accelerated diesel generator testing, have been superseded by implementation of the Maintenance Rule for the diesel generators per 10CFR50.65. In addition to the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.2, diesel preventative maintenance is performed in accordance with procedures based on manufacturer's recommendations with consideration given to operating experience.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES (Continued)

---

The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the Surveillance Requirements (SR) are those necessary to ensure the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) can accept Design Basis Accident (DBA) loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. Stable operation at the nominal voltage and frequency values is also essential in establishing EDG OPERABILITY, but a time constraint is not imposed. The lack of a time constraint is based on the fact that a typical EDG will experience a period of voltage and frequency oscillations prior to reaching steady state operation if these oscillations are not dampened out by load application. In lieu of a time constraint in the SR, controls will be provided to monitor and trend the actual time to reach stable operation within the band as a means of ensuring there is no voltage regulator or governor degradation that could cause an EDG to become inoperable.

"Standby condition" for the purpose of defining the condition of the engine immediately prior to starting for surveillance requirements requires that the lube oil temperature be between 100 °F and 170 °F. The minimum lube oil temperature for an OPERABLE diesel is 100 °F.

The thirteen second time requirement for the Emergency Diesel Generator to reach rated voltage and frequency was originally based on a Westinghouse assumption of fifteen seconds that included the delay time between the occurrence of the incident and the application of electrical power to the first sequenced safeguards pump (BURL-3011, dated November 13, 1974) and included an instrument response time of two seconds (BURL-1531, dated July 27, 1970). The times specified in UFSAR Section 15.4 bound the thirteen seconds specified in the TS.

The narrower band for frequency specified for testing performed in steady state isochronous operation will ensure the EDG will not be run in an overloaded condition (steady state) during accident conditions. Steady state is assumed to be achieved after one minute of operation in the isochronous mode with all required loads sequenced on the bus.

The narrower band for steady state voltage is specified for operation when the EDG is not synchronized to the grid to ensure the voltage regulator will protect driven equipment from over-voltages during accident conditions. Procedural controls will ensure that equipment voltages are maintained within acceptable limits during testing when paralleled to the grid.

The wider band for frequency is appropriate for testing done with the governor in the droop mode. Likewise the wider band for voltage is appropriate when paralleled to the grid.

All voltages and frequencies specified in SR 4.8.1.1.2 are representative of the analytical values and do not account for postulated instrument inaccuracy. Instrument inaccuracies for EDG voltage and frequency are administratively controlled.

Preventive maintenance includes those activities (including pro-test inspections, measurements, adjustments and preparations) performed to maintain an otherwise OPERABLE EDG in an OPERABLE status. Corrective maintenance includes those activities required to correct a condition that would cause the EDG to be inoperable.

### 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

#### BASES (Continued)

---

Surveillance requirement 4.8.1.2 is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during performance of the surveillance requirement, and to preclude de-energizing a required ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of surveillance requirements. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these surveillance requirements must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE. During Startup, prior to entering Mode 4, the surveillance requirements are required to be completed if the surveillance frequency has been exceeded or will be exceeded prior to the next scheduled shutdown.

#### 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The surveillance frequency applicable to molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers provides assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers. Each manufacturer's molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case or lower voltage circuit breakers, it is necessary to further divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

Containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device information is provided in the UFSAR.



**SALEM UNIT 2  
REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES**

The following camera-ready pages for Salem Unit 2, Facility Operating License DPR-75, are provided with this supplement:

<u>Technical Specification</u>	<u>Page</u>
Index	XIV
3.0.5	3/4 0-2
3.8.1.1	3/4 8-1
3.8.1.1	3/4 8-2
Bases 3.0.5	B 3/4 0-4, B 3/4 0-4a
Bases 3.8.1	B 3/4 8-1 thru 4

INDEX

BASES

=====

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE .....	B 3/4 7-1
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION .....	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM .....	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM .....	B 3/4 7-4
3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION .....	B 3/4 7-5
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM .....	B 3/4 7-5
3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM .....	B 3/4 7-5c
3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION .....	B 3/4 7-5c
3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS .....	B 3/4 7-6
3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SYSTEM .....	B 3/4 7-8
<u>3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS</u>	
3/4.8.1 A. C. SOURCES.....	B 3/4 8-1
3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS .....	B 3/4 8-1
3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES .....	B 3/4 8-4

APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.0.5 DELETED

3.0.6 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two physically independent A.C. circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system (vital bus system), and
- b. Three separate and independent diesel generators with:
  1. Separate day tanks containing a minimum volume of 130 gallons of fuel, and
  2. A common fuel storage system consisting of two storage tanks, each containing a minimum volume of 23,000 gallons of fuel, and two fuel transfer pumps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With an independent A.C. circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:
  1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and
  2. Within 24 hours, declare required systems or components with no offsite power available inoperable when a redundant required system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
  3. Restore the inoperable independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable:
  1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and
  2. Within 4 hours, declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable diesel generator inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION (Continued)

---

3. Determine the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators are not inoperable due to common cause failure or perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 24 hours. If the diesel generator is inoperable for preventive maintenance, the two remaining OPERABLE diesel generators need not be tested nor the OPERABILITY evaluated; and
  4. In any case, restore the inoperable diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one independent A.C. circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining independent A.C. circuit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours; restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore at least two independent A.C. circuits and three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With two of the above required independent A.C. circuits inoperable:
1. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within 8 hours, unless the diesel generators are already operating; and
  2. Within 12 hours, declare required systems or components supported by the inoperable offsite circuits inoperable when a required redundant system or component is inoperable, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and
  3. Restore at least one of the inoperable independent A.C. circuits to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; and
  4. With only one of the independent A.C. circuits OPERABLE, restore the other independent A.C. circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION (Continued)

---

- e. With two or more of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two independent A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- f. With one of the above required fuel transfer pumps inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- g. With one of the above required fuel storage tanks inoperable, either restore it to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPLICABILITY

BASES

---

Specification 3.0.5

DELETED



## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

---

Specification 3.0.6 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of testing required to restore and demonstrate:

- a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or
- b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the testing required to restore and demonstrate the operability of the equipment. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the testing required to restore and demonstrate OPERABILITY.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of testing required to restore OPERABILITY of another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of testing required to restore and demonstrate the OPERABILITY of another channel in the same trip system.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES

---

3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of one onsite A.C. source.

When a system or component is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may still be considered OPERABLE, provided the appropriate Actions of 3.8.1.1.a.2, b.2 or d.2 are satisfied.

Action 3.8.1.1.a.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required systems. Failure of a single offsite circuit will generally not, by itself, cause any equipment to lose normal AC power. Action 3.8.1.1.b.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. Action 3.8.1.1.d.2, which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

These systems are powered from the redundant AC electrical power train. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, may not be included. Redundant required system or component failures consist of inoperable equipment associated with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable DG or offsite power.

The completion time for these actions is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This completion time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time clock, starting only on discovery that both:

- a. One train has no offsite power supplying its loads, one DG is inoperable or two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A required system or component on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during these conditions a redundant required system or component subsequently becomes inoperable, this completion time begins to be tracked. Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System, or one required DG inoperable, coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported systems

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES (Continued)

---

or components that are associated with the other train that has power, results in starting the completion times for the Action. The specified time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE AC supplies (one offsite circuit and three DGs for Condition (a), two offsite circuits and two DGs for Condition (b), or three DGs for Condition (d)) are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required system or component's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The completion time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required system or component. Additionally, the completion time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The completion time for Condition d (loss of both offsite circuits) is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Action 3.8.1.1.a.2). The rationale is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 allows a completion time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required system or component failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter completion time of 12 hours is appropriate.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Applicability of specifications 3.8.2.2, 3.8.2.4, and 3.8.2.6 includes the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This will insure adequate electrical power is available for proper operation of the fuel handling building ventilation system during movement of irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are based upon the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977. Regulatory Guide 1.108 criteria for determining and reporting valid tests and failures, and accelerated diesel generator testing, have been superseded by implementation of the Maintenance Rule for the diesel generators per 10CFR50.65. In addition to the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.2, diesel preventative maintenance is performed in accordance with procedures based on manufacturer's recommendations with consideration given to operating experience.

The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the Surveillance Requirements (SR) are those necessary to ensure the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) can accept Design Basis Accident (DBA) loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. Stable operation at the nominal voltage and frequency values is also essential in establishing EDG OPERABILITY, but a time constraint is not imposed. The lack of a time constraint is based on the fact that a typical EDG will experience a period of voltage and frequency oscillations prior to reaching steady state operation if these oscillations are not dampened out by load application. In lieu of a time constraint in

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES (Continued)

---

the SR, controls will be provided to monitor and trend the actual time to reach stable operation within the band as a means of ensuring there is no voltage regulator or governor degradation that could cause an EDG to become inoperable.

"Standby condition" for the purpose of defining the condition of the engine immediately prior to starting for surveillance requirements requires that the lube oil temperature be between 100 °F and 170 °F. The minimum lube oil temperature for an OPERABLE diesel is 100 °F.

The thirteen second time requirement for the Emergency Diesel Generator to reach rated voltage and frequency was originally based on a Westinghouse assumption of fifteen seconds that included the delay time between the occurrence of the incident and the application of electrical power to the first sequenced safeguards pump (BURL-3011, dated November 13, 1974) and included an instrument response time of two seconds (BURL-1531, dated July 27, 1970). The times specified in UFSAR Section 15.4 bound the thirteen seconds specified in the TS.

The narrower band for frequency specified for testing performed in steady state isochronous operation will ensure the EDG will not be run in an overloaded condition (steady state) during accident conditions. Steady state is assumed to be achieved after one minute of operation in the isochronous mode with all required loads sequenced on the bus.

The narrower band for steady state voltage is specified for operation when the EDG is not synchronized to the grid to ensure the voltage regulator will protect driven equipment from over-voltages during accident conditions. Procedural controls will ensure that equipment voltages are maintained within acceptable limits during testing when paralleled to the grid.

The wider band for frequency is appropriate for testing done with the governor in the droop mode. Likewise the wider band for voltage is appropriate when paralleled to the grid.

All voltages and frequencies specified in SR 4.8.1.1.2 are representative of the analytical values and do not account for postulated instrument inaccuracy. Instrument inaccuracies for EDG voltage and frequency are administratively controlled.

Preventive maintenance includes those activities (including pro-test inspections, measurements, adjustments and preparations) performed to maintain an otherwise OPERABLE EDG in an OPERABLE status. Corrective maintenance includes those activities required to correct a condition that would cause the EDG to be inoperable.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS  
BASES (Continued)

---

Surveillance requirement 4.8.1.2 is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during performance of the surveillance requirement, and to preclude de-energizing a required ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of surveillance requirements. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these surveillance requirements must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE. During Startup, prior to entering Mode 4, the surveillance requirements are required to be completed if the surveillance frequency has been exceeded or will be exceeded prior to the next scheduled shutdown.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The surveillance frequency applicable to molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers provides assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers. Each manufacturer's molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case or lower voltage circuit breakers, it is necessary to further divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

Containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device information is provided in the UFSAR.