

NPS	SEVERITY LEVEL A. <input type="checkbox"/> 3 working days B. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 10 calendar days C. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 30 calendar days D. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	CONDITION REPORT DUE: <u>2-25-02</u> Date	CR NO. <u>02-0138</u> PTN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PSL <input type="checkbox"/> JB <input type="checkbox"/> PAGE 1 OF <u>9</u>	CR Administrator	
	1. SYSTEM #/NAME <u>N/A</u> UNIT <u>N/A</u> COMPONENT ID <u>N/A</u> COMPONENT NAME <u>N/A</u> LOCATION (BLDG/ELEV) <u>N/A</u> DISCOVERY DATE/TIME <u>1-28-02, 1600</u> EVENT DATE/TIME <u>1-28-02, 1400</u> CR ORIGINATOR <u>W. Johns</u> DEPT/PHONE <u>PS 1, 6605</u>				
ORIGINATOR	2. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES AS NECESSARY) (A) CONDITION DESCRIPTION <u>NAC PRESENCE WAS COMMUNICATED IN VIOLATION OF 10 CFR 50.70 (b)(4).</u>				
	(B) CAUSE <u>UNKNOWN</u>				
	(C) IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN <u>C/A WRITTEN.</u>				
	(D) RECOMMENDED ACTIONS/SUGGESTED ASSIGNEE <u>SECURITY TO INVESTIGATE, DETERMINE CAUSE, AND CORRECT.</u>				
	(E) ADDITIONAL REFERENCES (PWO number(s), Procedure Number(s), Persons Contacted, etc.) <u>10CFR50.70 (b)(4)</u>				
NPS	3. ORIGINATOR REQUESTS COPY OF CLOSED CONDITION REPORT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO SUPERVISOR NOTIFICATION: <u>Gary Hollinger</u> <u>[Signature]</u> <small>PRINT SIGNATURE</small>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		
	4. OPERABILITY/REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION: <input type="checkbox"/> A. OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT REQUIRED (3 WORK DAYS) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B. POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE (ATTACH ENS WORKSHEET, IF USED) <input type="checkbox"/> C. NO OPERABILITY CONCERN/MCCT REPORTABLE <input type="checkbox"/> D. OTHER _____ COMMENTS: _____		OUTAGE RELATED? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO MODE HOLD? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO FOR ENTRY INTO MODE _____		
NPS	NPS/VPNE <u>Sam Sharfer</u> <u>[Signature]</u> <small>PRINT SIGNATURE</small>		DATE/TIME <u>1/29/02, 0715</u>		
	5. CONDITION REPORT ASSIGNED TO: <u>LICENSING, SECURITY</u> COMMENTS: _____				
in this record was deleted accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 6		<input type="checkbox"/> Significance Level 1 - Root Cause Analysis <input type="checkbox"/> Significance Level 2 - Apparent Cause <input type="checkbox"/> Significance Level 3 - Correction Only			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PGM Closeout <input type="checkbox"/> Trend Only <input type="checkbox"/> Repeat Condition
PGM/VPNE <u>[Signature]</u>		DATE <u>1/29/02</u>			

PGM CLOSEOUT

CP20

CONDITION REPORT # 02-0138 PAGE 2 OF 9

6. NONCONFORMANCE (NCR): YES NO BY: Wesley [Signature]
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE: YES NO PRINT SIGNATURE

7. INVESTIGATION, ANALYSIS, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, GENERIC IMPLICATIONS, DISPOSITION DETAILS, WORK INSTRUCTIONS (ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES AS NECESSARY)

SEE ATTACHED PAGES.

CAUSE CODES: 1) A3 2) H4 3) L6

8. DOCUMENTATION INITIATED: (=N/A if not applicable) EVALUATION REQUIRED FOR:
PWO N/A EQ YES NO
RTS N/A 10CFR50.59 YES NO
PMAI N/A 10CFR21 YES NO
ASME SECTION XI YES NO

9. NCR DISPOSITION: N/A REWORK REPAIR USE AS-IS OTHER _____

10. DISPOSITION SIGNATURES: (N/A if not applicable)
PREPARER William S. Jones [Signature] 6605 DATE 2-11-02
OTHER DEPT. HEAD CONCUR _____ N/A SIGNATURE _____ DEPT. PHONE _____ DATE _____
ANI/SEC XI REVIEWER _____ N/A SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____
PNSC/FRG REVIEW YES NO
DEPARTMENT HEAD Gag Holligan [Signature] DATE 2-13-02
NUCLEAR NETWORK YES NO MODE RESTRICTION YES NO
FRG/PNSC REVIEW (if required in Block 10) MTG# N/A CHAIRMAN _____ DATE _____

APPROVAL:
PGM / VPNE / MGR [Signature] DATE 2/28/02

EVENT CODES: 1) 01 2) _____ 3) _____ CORNERSTONE AFFECTED: _____

CONDITION REPORT REVIEW CHECKLIST

This checklist is provided as an aid in dispositioning and reviewing Condition Reports. Personnel preparing the CR disposition should review the checklist to ensure that CR program requirements are met. Personnel performing the independent review shall verify that required CR disposition attributes have been addressed by completing the applicable portions of the checklist. CRs that have not addressed all program requirements shall be corrected prior to closeout.

ALL CONDITION REPORTS:			
ENSURE THAT:	YES	NO	N/A
All blocks and spaces are filled in	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
All pages identify the CR and page number (consecutively)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The disposition addresses the identified condition	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The disposition addresses requirements specified in Block 5 by the PGM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Concurrence has been obtained by all affected departments (note: Planning concurrence required for open WO used to track corrective action)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cause codes are appropriate	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Open corrective actions are tracked by PMAI or WO and traceable to the CR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Work Orders properly reference the CR and are attached	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
50.59 screening has been completed for NCR use-as-is or repair dispositions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ISI/IST/ANII review have been obtained if required	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Corrective Actions are timely based upon the significance of the event	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 1 CONDITION REPORTS:			
ENSURE THAT:	YES	NO	N/A
Root Cause Analysis completed in accordance with procedure requirements	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
If RCA not completed, then PMAI assigned for completion (example: a detailed metallurgical analysis is necessary to determine root cause)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The problem is clearly stated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The data and evidence considered is identified	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Industry Operating Experience is appropriately considered	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Potential failure modes are identified, if applicable	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tools and techniques used are appropriately selected and identified	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Root cause and contributing causes are identified and appear appropriate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Corrective actions address the root cause and contributing causes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Corrective actions are timely	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Generic implications are addressed, and corrective actions assigned as appropriate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Monitoring and follow-up is addressed to ensure that corrective actions are effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Root cause analysis is performed by qualified individuals (Ref: RCA Training Matrix)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 2 CONDITION REPORTS:			
ENSURE THAT:	YES	NO	N/A
The disposition addresses the problem identified in Block 2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The apparent cause of the problem is clearly identified	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Corrective actions address the immediate problem and prevent recurrence	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Generic implications are adequately addressed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 3 CONDITION REPORTS:			
ENSURE THAT:	YES	NO	N/A
Corrective actions adequately address the immediate concern	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

REPEAT CONDITION REPORTS:			
ENSURE THAT:	YES	NO	N/A
The disposition clearly identifies the CR as a Repeat Condition and evaluates previous occurrences, or provides an adequate basis for determination that a Repeat Condition does not exist	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
The disposition addresses ineffectiveness of previous corrective actions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
The disposition identifies how additional corrective actions will prevent recurrence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Review performed by: JAMES W. DIXON  Ext 7771 Date: 2-11-02
 Print/Signature

CR 02-0138

page 4 of 9

Block 7

Condition:

On January 28, 2002 at approximately 1400, the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) called the Main Truck Gate (MTG) to inform the security officers working in the area that a visiting NRC inspector may be in the area asking security questions. The officers were to respond to all questions honestly and professionally. At the time of the phone call, a NRC resident inspector was in the MTG final access control cubicle and overheard the phone conversation. The NRC resident inspector viewed this as a potential violation, in that security personnel were notified of the presence and arrivals of resident NRC inspectors. If this were the case, the condition would be classified as a violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4), which states:

"The licensee or construction permit holder (nuclear power reactor only) shall ensure that the arrival and presence of an NRC inspector, who has been properly authorized facility access as described in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, is not announced or otherwise communicated by its employees or contractors to other persons at the facility unless specifically requested by the NRC inspector."

Investigation:

The method of communication utilized was determined to be inappropriate. It was also concluded that there was no intent by security supervision to violate the Code of Federal Regulation. This conclusion is based on the investigations conducted by both site and corporate security personnel.

During the week of January 7, 2002 Protection Services was notified by the NRC resident and the PTN Licensing Department, that a visiting NRC Inspector would be on-site January 28 and 29, 2002. The purpose of this visit would be to conduct a review of NRC Recommended Actions (dated October 6, 2001) subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001. This visiting inspector would be auditing FPL Turkey Point reviews and any subsequent actions that may have been taken. No audit scope or criteria was available for planning purposes.

On Monday, January 28, 2002 at approximately 1200 the Security Supervisor instructed the SSS to ensure that all officers were aware that a visiting NRC inspector was expected to be on-site and would be asking questions pertaining to security issues. Officers were to be reminded to act professionally and answer all questions honestly. No time frame for this activity was provided. More appropriately, this message should have been presented at the initial Shift Briefing.

CR 02-0138

page 5 of 9

Security supervision conducted interviews of individuals involved with this condition. No evidence was found to indicate that security personnel were being notified of specific NRC inspector activities or that security personnel should monitor NRC inspector activities. The requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4) are covered during security officer initial training and will be included in annual security officer requalification as a reminder of these requirements. [See attached pages.]

Additionally, FPL Corporate Security also conducted an independent investigation of this condition. Similarly, no indication was found that PTN personnel were alerted to NRC inspectors' specific movements or that the inspectors' movements were being monitored. [Reference Corporate Security Report 17-001-02]

Security Computer System Capabilities:

The computer system used by security personnel has the capability to and does record personnel ingress and egress into areas of the plant that are card reader controlled. This capability is used during emergency or contingency events to assist in personnel accountability. This capability is required by NRC regulation [10 CFR 73.70. (d)].

Security personnel are not instructed nor requested, and interviews indicate that personnel do not monitor the activities or movements of any plant employee, at any time, using this capability.

Reportability Determination:

This event is not considered reportable, since the appropriate Reportability guidelines outlined in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G – Reportable Safeguards Events have not been met.

Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event is human error attributable to a Security organizational failure in that information was communicated in a manner different from standard practice. This type of information is normally communicated during shift turnover. Although there was no intent to announce the arrival or presence of a NRC inspector, security supervision misjudgment led to an inappropriate message overheard by the resident NRC inspector.

CR 02-0138

page 6 of 9**Generic Implications:**

This regulation applies to all plant personnel.

Plant Management has briefed department managers and supervisors regarding this event. - The expectations were re-emphasized and made clear that all personnel would comply with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4).

Corrective Action:

The following corrective actions are designed to prevent recurrence.

1. Security Management and Supervisor were counseled on the proper time and manner of disseminating information to personnel regarding daily activities. [Completed 02/01/02]
2. The Security Supervisor briefed and reminded all shifts of the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4). [Completed 01/31/02]
3. FPL security staff personnel were briefed on this condition report and reminded of the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4). [Completed 01/30/02]
4. The requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4) have been added to annual security officer requalification as an annual reminder. [Completed 02/07/02]
5. Plant Management has briefed department managers and supervisors regarding this event. Managers and supervisors were reminded of, and the expectations were made clear, that all personnel as required to comply with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation 50.70 (b) (4). [Completed 02/07/02]
6. Plant Access Training and requalification will be revised to include the requirements of 10 CFR 50.70 (b) (4). Training concurs with this change and coordination with PSL will be accomplished. [Assign PMAI to Training, due date 05/31/02.]

CR 02-0130

PAGE 7 of 9 P. 2

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
 SECURITY TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
 LESSON PLAN WP-106
 PLANT TURKEY POINT
 10/13/00

4. 1974

ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974 (ERA) AS AMENDED THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND CREATED THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (ERDA) AND THE NRC. ERDA IS NOW THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE).

5. 1977

REGULATIONS REQUIRING SECURITY MEASURES AT COMMERCIAL POWER REACTORS WERE PUBLISHED BY THE NRC AND ARE FOUND UNDER 10 CFR 73.55.

II. NRC REGULATIONS.

A. THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES THE NRC WRITES REGULATIONS. REGULATIONS HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND MUST BE COMPLIED WITH BY THE PRIVATE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. THEY ARE PUBLISHED IN THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR).

B. REGULATIONS WRITTEN BY THE NRC.

THE NRC'S REGULATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO ABOUT 30 PARTS. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CFR ARE IDENTIFIED IS 10 CFR 73.50, WHICH MEANS THE PROVISION IS FOUND IN THE CODE, TITLE 10 PART 73, PARAGRAPH 50.

C. PHYSICAL SECURITY REGULATIONS.

THE NRC REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO PHYSICAL SECURITY ARE PUBLISHED IN 10 CFR PART 50 AND 73. PART 50 IS TITLED "LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES," AND PART 73 IS TITLED "PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS."

D. A NEW NRC REGULATION (10 CFR 50.70(b)(4)) HAS BEEN ISSUED THAT PROHIBITS ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF NRC INSPECTORS.

1. THE NEW REGULATION STATES:

THE LICENSEE OR CONSTRUCTION PERMIT HOLDER (NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR ONLY) SHALL ENSURE THAT THE ARRIVAL AND PRESENCE OF AN NRC INSPECTOR, WHO HAS BEEN PROPERLY AUTHORIZED FACILITY ACCESS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (b)(3) OR THIS SECTION, IS NOT ANNOUNCED OR OTHERWISE COMMUNICATED BY ITS EMPLOYEES OR CONTRACTOR TO OTHER PERSONS AT THE FACILITY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE NRC INSPECTOR.

C/A 02-0138

PAGE 8 of P. 3 9

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
 SECURITY TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
 LESSON PLAN WP-106
 PLANT TURKEY POINT
 10/13/00

2. THE NRC'S FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INTENT OF THE NEW RULE:

- a. THE INTENT OF THIS RULE IS TO PREVENT SITE AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL FROM WIDE-SPREAD DISSEMINATION OR BROADCASTING THE PRESENCE OF AN NRC INSPECTOR. BROADCASTING, AS USED HERE, IS DEFINED AS UNSOLICITED ONE-WAY COMMUNICATIONS.
- b. RECOGNIZING THE POSSIBILITY OF INADVERTENT COMMUNICATION OF AN INSPECTOR'S THE NRC EXPECTS TO RESERVE ENFORCEMENT ACTION FOR SIGNIFICANT INTENTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF THE RULE. AN HONEST RESPONSE BY AN EMPLOYEE TO AN INNOCENT INQUIRY THAT HE/SHE JUST SAW AN NRC INSPECTOR IS NOT WITHIN THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIMETER OF THE RULE. THEREFOR, AN EMPLOYEE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO LIE, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF AN NRC INSPECTOR.
- c. IT IS THE LONG-STANDING POLICY AND PRACTICE OF FPL TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH NRC INSPECTORS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. ALL FPL PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES WILL CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THIS POLICY AND TO THE NEW RULE. NO ONE SHOULD ANNOUNCE THE PRESENCE OF AN NRC INSPECTOR UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO DO SO BY THE INSPECTOR.

III. 10 CFR PART 73. "PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS."

A. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

1. 10 CFR 73.(1)

THIS SECTION OUTLINE THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE. THE THREAT WHICH THE TURKEY POINT SECURITY SYSTEM MUST BE PREPARED TO COUNTER IS DEFINED AS:

- a. A DETERMINED VIOLENT EXTERNAL ASSAULT, ATTACK BY DECEPTIVE ACTIONS OF PERSONS WITH THE FOLLOWING ATTRIBUTES, ASSISTANCE, AND EQUIPMENT.
 - (1) WELL TRAINED (INCLUDING MILITARY TRAINING AND SKILLS) AND DEDICATED INDIVIDUALS.
 - (2) INSIDE ASSISTANCE WHICH MAY INCLUDE A KNOWLEDGEABLE INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTEMPTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A PASSIVE ROLE (eg: PROVIDE INFORMATION), AND ACTIVE ROLE (eg: FACILITATE ENTRANCE AND EXIT, DISABLE ALARM COMMUNICATIONS, PARTICIPATE IN VIOLENT ATTACK), OR BOTH.

C/R 02-0138

Page 9 of 9

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY TRAINING DEPARTMENT ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

02/07/02

NAME: _____ SSN: _____

LESSON TITLE/NUMBER	DATE COMPLETED	INSTRUCTOR
EMERGENCY PLAN OVERVIEW LPH 3200001		
EVACUATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY LPH 3200001		
WEAPON RETENTION		
FIREARMS TRAINING SYSTEM (F.A.T.S)		
ANNUAL SUPERVISOR TRAINING (IF REQUIRED)		
PLANT ACCESS TRAINING (PAT) REGUAL LPH 3400015		
RCAT REGUAL LPH 3400016		
BRIEFING CR 01-1431 (CONDUCTING FIRE WATCH ROYB)		
BRIEFING 10 CFR 50.70 (b) (4) (PROHIBITING ANNOUNCEMENT OF NRC'S PRESENCE ON SITE) LPH 106		

SECURITY OFFICER SIGNATURE _____

DATE _____

SECURITY TRAINING COORDINATOR _____

DATE _____

From: J. Rogerio Reyes
 To: [Redacted] 6,
 Date: 1/29/02 2:33PM
 Subject: Security walk down

The following are my notes on what occurred yesterday relating to the security issue we've been talking to the licensee about. Yesterday, 1/28, after 1:00 pm I was doing a general inspection at the security diesel room. I then walked over to the security main truck gate. I entered the guard area (requires badging in) and discussed a couple of items with two guards that were there, a male and a female. They asked me a couple of questions relating to whether I knew if the security force was going to become a government job, i.e., like at the airports, and if the current security force was going to get an opportunity to apply for the jobs. I told them I had not heard and I didn't know anything relating to that subject. The guards also asked if the present heightened security activity was going to become permanent. I told them I did not know. We engaged in a few minute conversation relating to other security items. I then asked if all the equipment, truck gate, badge readers, cameras, x-ray, sniffer, etc, was operable and if any equipment was broke. The guard told me that all the equipment was operable and that there was presently no issues at the truck gate. Soon after that, a call came in and the guard used the speaker phone to answer the call. I heard the caller say "NRC is walking around," and then the guard quickly picked up the handset and continued the conversation using the handset. I heard the guard say "yes, he is right here, Reyes is right here sitting in front of me." After the guard hung up the phone I asked him "what was the purpose of that call?" The guard told me "they know you are in here because you swiped your badge to get in," (not really answering my question). I asked two additional times what was the purpose of the call and why was the caller saying that NRC was walking around? The guards just repeated the same thing. I then asked the guard who was it that had called, and he replied that it was a supervisor, I believe he said Mr. Juan Garcia. As I was walking out of the room, the guard said, "I guess Juan is in trouble." I did not reply to that statement and badged out of the room. I then badge out the protected area through the turnstile and came back in through the regular security process to verify the equipment, i.e., turnstile, badge reader, x-ray equipment, sniffer, etc was in working order. I came back to the NRC office and communicated the above to [Redacted] 6,

David - david.wisham@dom.com

B. Garber
 2725

Announcement of Inspector at Truck Gate

On 1/28/02 in the afternoon, around 1:35 p.m. I went outside the protected area to get our mail. I remember the mail lady had previously said she would be out there from 2-4 p.m. I went a little early as I wanted time to go through the mail before our secretary came in the next day. After I returned Roger briefed me about the issue at the truck gate. I noted the time to be around 1:40 p.m. I discussed the issue with licensing.

I also discussed with Roger at the time that the call to the truck gate could have been about me walking outside to get the mail and coming back into the plant.