

## STATUS OF NRC STAFF REVIEW

## OF FENOC'S BULLETIN 2001-01 RESPONSE FOR DAVIS-BESSE

- Brief for the Commissioners' TAs
- November 30, 2001

- Comment Bulliden Regard

- Supplement Bulliden Regard

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## **AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION**

#### Purpose

- ► To discuss the results of the staff's ongoing assessment of FENOC's responses to Bulletin 2001-01 for Davis-Besse
- ► To discuss the change in the staff's decision regarding issuance of an Order

#### Success

- Commissioners' TAs understand the basis for the staff's decisions regarding responses to Bulletin 2001-01 for Davis-Besse
- Introduction and discussion of changes Larry Burkhart (5 minutes)
- Discussion of status of staff's review Jack Strosnider and Rich Barrett (15 minutes)



### CHANGE IN LICENSEE'S PLANS/COMMITMENTS

- The Licensee proposed changing its commitments to include
  - Commencing its refueling outage on February 16, 2002, vice March 31, 2002,
  - Perform a qualified visual inspection of 100% of the VHP nozzles and undertaking NDE of those nozzles that have indications of cracking,
  - Characterizing any cracks that are identified in VHP nozzles,
- Operating at a lower RCS hot leg temperature to reduce the head temperature effects on crack initiation and growth,
  - Maximizing the availability of the plant's redundant critical safety systems until shutdown, and
  - Providing increased human factors reliability through additional training, personnel, etc.



## **RISK ASSESSMENTS\***

-		Base Scenario	Alternate Scenario**
IE Fre	eq. (/ry)	4.0E-02	2.0E-02
CCDP	? (/ry)	2.7E-03	2.0E-03
Delta (	CDF (/ry)	1E-04	4E-05)
LERF	(/ry)	\1E-06	\delta 4E-07
Delta (	CDF (12/31/01)(/ry) 4 julied	out at the but convenient that it 77 1E-05	3E-06
Delta	CDF (3/31/02)(/ry)	4E-05	
Delta	CDF (2/16/02)(/ry)		8E-06
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<sup>\*</sup>Risk numbers are approximate due to the various uncertainties associated with this issue.

\*\*Includes some credit for past inspections, compensatory actions to reduce CCDP, and shortened duration of operation



# RISK-INFORMED DECISIONMAKING GUIDELINES

#### **RG** 1.174

- Intended for licensing basis changes (permanent changes)
  - $\Delta \text{CDF}$  less than 1E-06/ry: very small changes are allowed with tracking of cumulative inpacts on CDF
  - $\Delta \text{CDF}$  between 1E-06/ry and 1E-05/ry: small changes are allowed with tracking of cumulative impacts on CDF
  - ΔCDF>1E-05/ry are not normally allowed

#### RG 1.182

- Intended for managing risk associated with maintenance activities (short-duration)
  - ICDP<1E-06 and ILERP 1E-07: normal work controls apply
  - ICDP between 1E-06 and 1E-05 or ILERP between 1E-07 and 1E-06
    - Assess non-quantifiable factors
    - Establish risk management actions
  - ICDP>1E-05 or ILERP>1E-06
    - Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily



## **RG 1.174 SAFETY PRINCIPLES**

- Current Regulations are met
  - ► It is likely that, if inspections were performed today, the current regulations would not be met (TS requirements and GDC)
- Defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained
  - It is likely that one of 3 barriers is degraded
  - However, Davis-Besse has a large, dry containment (licensee states that conditional containment failure probability is 1.5E-03)
- Sufficient safety margins are maintained
  - It is likely that safety margins are reduced
- Only a small increase in CDF results
  - ► ∆CDF (assuming operation until 2/16/02 and crediting comp. actions) ► Baseline CDF is 6.6E- 05/ry (IPE) -500 Per for the basis of rick masses.
- The basis of risk measurement is monitored using performance measurement strategies
  - Will not occur until inspection is performed