

Gary B. Fader Vice President Technical Services

SEP 1 3 2002

ET_02-0034

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Letter ET 02-0032, dated August 2, 2002, from Gary B. Fader, WCNOC, to the NRC

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2002-004-01

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2002-004-01 is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) regarding an unanalyzed condition from a cable separation issue that could potentially affect post-fire safe shutdown equipment availability at Wolf Creek Generating Station.

This event is the second cable separation issue discovered as a result of validating the post-fire safe shutdown analysis, and is submitted as a supplement to LER 2002-004-00. Any reportable conditions identified similar to this issue will be also be reported by supplementing LER 2002-004.

Commitments made by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation in the enclosed LER are identified in the Attachment.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4034 or Mr. Tony Harris, Manager Regulatory Affairs, at (620) 364-4038.

Very truly yours,

IE22

Gary B. Fader

GBF/rlr

Enclosure Attachment

cc: J. N. Donohew (NRC), w/e D. N. Graves (NRC), w/e E. W. Merschoff (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e

> PO. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HC/VET

										_							
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY (7-2001) COMMISSION Es ho ind LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) US				APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to													
(See reverse for required number of (3150-0104), Office (3150-0104					to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Anairs, NEOB-10202 of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose on does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection												
1. FACILITY N	AME							2. DO	2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE								
WOLF CR	EEK GE		ATI	NG	STATION				050004	482	2				1 OF	6	
4. TITLE																	
Cable Sepa	aration I	ssue	Tha	at Co	ould Potenti	ially <i>i</i>	Affect	Post	Fire Sa	fe S	Shutdown I	Equipm	ent	Avai	lability		
5. EVE	NT DATE		Ι	6	LER NUMBER		7.1	REPORT	DATE		8.	OTHER F	ACILI	TIES IN	VOLVED		
мо	DAY	YEAR	Y	EAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	мо	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME			DOCKET NUMBER				
07	19	2002	2 2	002	004	01	09	13	2002	FA	CILITY NAME		DOCł	KET NU	IMBER		
Q OPERATING 11 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CER · (Check all that apply)							annivì										
MODE 1		1	20.2201(b) 2		20 220	20 2203(a)(3)(ii)		X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B))(B)	5	50 73(a)(2)(IX)(A)					
10. POWER			20 2	201(d)		20.220)3(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(III)		50.73(a)(2)(x)					
LEVE	L.	100		20 2	203(a)(1)		50 36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(IV)(A)		/)(<u>A)</u>	73.71(a)(4)				
城水 。合批			′ 	20 2	203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)	(A)	ļ	50 73(a)(2)(v)(A)	7	3.71(a)(5)		
				20 2	2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36((c)(2)		<u> </u>	50 73(a)(2)(v)(B)		-1s	Specify in Abstract below or in			
			Thurst New	20.2203(a)(2)(III)			50.46(<u>(a)(3)(ii)</u>		<u> </u>	50 73(a)(2)(v)(C)		Ň	NRC Form 366A			
2011년 11년 11년 11년 11년 11년 11년 11년 11년 11년		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	2	20 2	2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)	<u>A)</u>		50 73(a)(2)(v	<u>)(D) [</u>	7.4		• 24 v. 584 -	1 - 1	
127년·불월(12 11 개조는		~~,14,19 	1-	20 2	2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)	<u>B)</u>	┣─	50.73(a)(2)(v						
		17 - 131 1-2-15	<u>}</u>	202	2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73	a)(2)(1)	<u>()</u>		50.73(a)(2)(V	111)(A) 111)(A)			is a the latest of the second s		
	- w-r :			20.2	2203(a)(3)(1) 12	LICE	NSEE C		T FOR TH	IIS I	ER	<u> </u>		100 T 3.M	y	17 2 800 - 1947 - 2 E	
NAME										TE	LEPHONE NUM	BER (Inclu	de Are	ea Code	e)		
Karl A. (Ton	v) Harris	. Man	ade	r Red	oulatory Affa	irs						(620) 36	4-40	38		
		13. C	OMI	PLET	E ONE LINE FO	DR EA	сн сом	PONE	NT FAILU	REI	DESCRIBED I	N THIS RI	EPOF	۲T			
						1		33. 8	_	Т							
CAUSE	SYSTEM		MPON	IENT	MANU- FACTURER	REI	PORTABLE	17 14 17	CAUSE		SYSTEM (ONENT		ANU-	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
						YEAR											
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)					10		SUBMISS DATE	SION		0	05	2002					
16. ABSTRAC	(Limit to	1400 si	baces	s, i.e.,	approximately	15 sin	gle-spac	ed type	written line	es)							

t

At 0815 on June 7, 2002, the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Shift Manager was notified of a postulated fire event that could cause a cable-to-cable hot short. If cable-to-cable hot shorts are assumed to occur, this event has the potential to cause water in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to drain to the containment recirculation sump. It was discovered that the control cables for two redundant motor operated valves are routed in the same electrical raceway. The two valves are in the same electrical separation group, but are redundant in their function of conserving water inventory in the RWST. Further investigation determined that the control cables for motor operated valves in the opposite electrical separation group have the same configuration. The cause of this condition is that cable-to-cable interactions were not considered in the initial design of the plant.

At 0945 on July 19, 2002, the Shift Manager was notified of conditions where a postulated fire event could lead to the loss of motor control centers that power post-fire safe shutdown equipment in both trains due to inadequate horizontal separation in conjunction with improper breaker coordination.

The safety significance of these events is low.

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION									
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)									
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	LER NUMBER		3. PAGE				
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER					
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000482	2002	004	- 01	2	OF	6		
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	166A)							
Background:									
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) is in the process of performing an analysis of fire areas as part of a post fire safe shutdown (PFSSD) project to determine whether a fire in a single area could adversely affect the safe shutdown of the plant. During the fire area inspection phase of the project, WCNOC personnel discovered that potential problems exist with the separation of cables for redundant components required for post-fire safe shutdown. The first condition was identified on June 7, 2002, and was described in LER 2002-004-00, dated August 2, 2002. This supplement describes a second condition, which was discovered on July 19, 2002.									
Condition 1:									
Valves EJHV8811A [EIIS Code: BP-ISV] ar that supply Residual Heat Removal (RHR) recirculation sump and from the refueling w plant, it is the function of valves EJHV8811 RWST to the containment recirculation sum the "A" safety injection pump room (Fire Are elevation 1974 ft. (Fire Area A-1) and the co A-8). The same condition exists with the co opposite train. Control circuits for these two room (Fire Area A-4) and also in the auxilia pump room or in the auxiliary building corric in inadvertently draining the water in the RW available from the RWST to be used for the to occur.	nd BNHV8812 System [EIIS (vater storage ta A and BNHV8 np. Control cir ea A-2), the co orridor of the a ontrol circuits f o valves are ro ry building cor dor at elevation VST to the con e core cooling	A [EIIS Co Code: BP] ank (RWS 812A to pr cuits for th pridor of th nuxiliary bu or valves I outed toge ridor at ele n 1974 ft. o ntainment injection p	de: BP-ISV] pump suction T), respective rovide a barri- nese two valv ne auxiliary be ilding at elev EJHV8811B at ther in the "B evation 1974 could cause a recirculation hase would r	are moto n from the ely. Durin er to drai res are ro uilding [E ration 200 and BNH " safety in ft. A sing a hot sho sump. V not be av	r oper e cont ng a fin ning w outed to IIS Cc 00 ft. (I V8812 njectio gle fire vater r ailable	ated va ainmen re in the vater in ogether ode: NF Fire Are 2B in th n pump in eithe could r normally e if this	lves t the in] at I e e e e sult y were		
Condition 2:									
The RHR pump room coolers and the Cent Service Water (EJ) [EIIS Code: BI] as the these room coolers to provide adequate roo in order to maintain the plant in a safe shut	trifugal Chargin cooling medium om cooling for down condition	ng Pump (m. During the contin n.	CCP) room c a fire in the j ued operatio	oolers ut plant, it is n of their	ilize E the fu respe	ssentia unction ctive pi	l of umps		
A postulated fire in the auxiliary building co of motor control centers (MCCs) NG01A ("/ PFSSD equipment such as "A" and "B" trai	rridor at eleva A" train) and N n pump room (tion 1974 f G02A ("B" coolers an	it. (Fire Area . ' train). Thes d miscellane	A-1) coul e MCCs ous valve	ld cau: supply es.	se the logical sector is the logical sector is the sector	oss dant		
Plant Conditions Prior to Each Event:									
MODE – 1 Power – 100 Percent Normal Operating Temperature and Pressu	ure								

r 7

-

F

.

~		1 1 1					
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS	ion						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							
	2. DOCKET		6. LER NUME	3ER		3. PAG	iΕ
		YEAR		IAL REVI R NUN	ISION MBER		
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000482	2002	004	(01 3	OF	6
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form (366A)					
Condition Descriptions:					i.		
Condition 1:					,		
cause a cable-to-cable hot short. This ever containment recirculation sump. During the project, it was discovered that the control ca and BNHV8812A, are routed together in the corridors at elevations 1974 ft. and 2000 ft. are redundant in their function of conserving determined that the control cables for moto electrical separation group have the same of injection pump room and in the auxiliary but areas has the potential to damage the cont spuriously open due to a hot short. Fire da result in the valves not responding to a clos water in the RWST to drain to the containm	nt has the pote is fire area insp ables for two r is "A" safety inj The two valve g water invent r operated val configuration s ilding corridor rol cables to the amage to the c is signal due t nent recirculati	ential to ca ection ph edundant ection pu es are in the ves EJHV since they at elevation the EJHV8 control cal o an oper on sump.	ause the R ase of the motor ope mp room a the same of RWST. F (8811B an are routed on 1974 ft. 811A/B va bles to the n circuit. T	WST to Post-Fin arated value and in the electrica urther ir d BNHV d togeth A fire i alves can BNHV8 his cond	drain to the re Safe S alves, EJH re auxilian al separation rvestigation /8812B in rer in the " in any one using the 3812A/B v dition wou	the hutdow HV8811 y buildir on grou on the oth B" safe e of thes valves co alves co ild caus	n A ng ip, but ip, but ty se to ould se the
At 0945 on July 19, 2002, the Shift Manage lead to the loss of MCCs that power post fir horizontal separation in conjunction with im phase of the Post Fire Safe Shutdown proje supplied from MCCs NG01A and NG02A for adequate horizontal separation or proper bit PFSSD components are both trains of RHF non-PFSSD components are both trains of Containment Spray Pump room coolers. T elevation 1974 ft. A fire in this area has the	r was notified e safe shutdo proper breake ect, WCNOC por various non reaker coordir Qump room of Safety Injectic hese cables a potential to c	of conditi wn equipu or coordina oersonnel -PFSSD a ation as s coolers ar on Pump i re located lamage th	ons where ment in bo ation. Dur discovere and PFSSI specified ir d both tra room coole d in the au be power c	e a postu th trains ing the f id that th D room o n 10 CFI ins of C ers and I xiliary bu ables to	ulated fire due to in fire area in power coolers do R 50 Appe CP room both train uilding cor these roo	event of adequa rspection cables to not hat endix R coolers s of rridor at cool	could ate on ave . The . The lers,

· · · · · ·

۳.

elevation 1974 ft. A fire in this area has the potential to damage the power cables to these room coolers, resulting in loss of MCCs NG01A, NG02A and room cooling for the RHR pumps and CCPs. This issue has the potential to cause the RHR and Chemical and Volume Control (BG) [EIIS Code: CB] systems to become unavailable to perform their post-fire safe shutdown functions.

Initial evaluation has indicated that existing breaker coordination is acceptable based on IEEE 242-1986, IEEE 603 Appendix A and IEEE Transaction on Industry Applications, Vol. 1A-8, No. 3, May/June 1972. Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2002-1670 tracks completion of this evaluation and any resultant plant modification required to ensure adequate breaker coordination for the subject fire area (A-1). These actions will be completed on or before December 15th, 2002.

Basis for Reportability:

Condition 1:

- 4

Ę

A fire in any one of the subject fire areas (A-1, A-2, A-4 and A-8) has the potential to damage the control

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		РА 137 11. т.						
~	terret a d		3					
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS	NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE					
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER						
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000482	2002 004 01	4 OF 6					
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	966A)						
cables for valves EJHV8811A/B in a manner corresponding control cables for valves BN to a signal to close. This would result in a f containment recirculation sump. The post-f RWST function is required for hot shutdown	F that causes HV8812A/B in low path from fire safe shutd n.	the valve to spuriously open and a manner that causes the valve the RWST through the open val own function would be affected	d damage the to not respond ves and into the because the					
Based on information known at the time of a System call in association with 10 CFR 50.7 Further evaluation and a review of NUREG determined that this condition is reportable 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) for any event or condition condition that significantly degraded plant s	discovery, WC 72(b)(3)(ii)(B) a -1022, "Event pursuant to 10 that resulted in afety.	NOC made an eight hour Emerg and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.) CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) / 10 CFB n the nuclear power plant being	gency Notification 3) and (D). .72 and 50.73," २ in an unanalyzed					
This condition does not meet the reporting 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), (B) or (D), since there is a water from draining from the RWST would fire.	requirements o a reasonable e have been fulf	of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) expectation that the safety function illed by valves EJHV8811A/B in	or (D), or 10 CFR on of preventing the event of a					
Condition 2:								
Due to inadequate cable separation in conj the subject fire area (A-1) could result in the function would be affected because the Res functions are required to maintain the post- inventory control functions. Based on the a Notification System call in accordance with	unction with po > loss of PFSS sidual Heat Re fire safe shutd lbove informat 10 CFR 50.72	otential improper breaker coordin D components. The post-fire same moval and Chemical and Volun own decay heat removal, reactive ion WCNOC made an eight hou 2(b)(3)(ii)(B).	nation, a fire in afe shutdown ne Control vity control and Ir Emergency					
A review of NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting separation condition is reportable pursuant event or condition that resulted in the nucle significantly degraded plant safety.	g Guidelines 1 to 10 CFR 50. ar power plant	0CFR50.72 and 50.73," determi .72(b)(3)(ii)(B) / 10 CFR 50.73(a t being in an unanalyzed conditio	ned that the cable)(2)(ii)(B) for any on that					
Root Cause:			_					
Condition 1:								
The control cable configuration for valves E Cable-to-cable hot shorts associated with th Fire Hazards Analysis. Therefore, the caus considered in the initial plant design and sp injection pump rooms and in the auxiliary b	JHV8811A/B he event in qua se of this cond pecifically in rel uilding corrido	and BNHV8812A/B are per origination were not analyzed as partition is due to cable-to-cable interation to the routing of cables in the routing at elevations 1974 ft. and 200	inal plant design. t of the Bechtel eraction not being the safety 00 ft.					
Condition 2:			1					

The improper breaker coordination for the room coolers has existed since plant startup. The cable configuration for the room coolers is per original plant design. The improper coordination necessary for the occurrence of a ground fault of the impedance required to open an upstream breaker prior to opening the

Ĭ

	1	· · ·						
(1-2001)	SION							
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		5. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE				
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER				
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000482	2002	004	01	5	OF	6	
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	166A)						
load breaker is of very low probability and was not considered as part of the Bechtel Fire Hazards Analysis. Therefore, the cause of this condition is due to improper breaker coordination and inadequate consideration of horizontal separation in the initial plant design.								
Corrective Actions:								
Condition 1:								
A continuous fire watch was established in Fire Areas A-1, A-2, A-4 and A-8 until procedure OFN KC-016, "Fire Response," was changed to add steps 11 through 21 to prevent draining the water in the RWST to the containment recirculation sump. After the procedure was changed, an hourly fire watch was established to monitor the safety injection pump rooms and the auxiliary building corridors at elevations 1974 ft. and 2000 ft.								
Condition 2:								
An hourly fire watch was established in Fire Area A-1. A corrective action plan was developed within the WCNOC corrective action program to address this issue.								
Evaluation and corrective actions for the improper breaker coordination condition are being addressed in PIR 2002-1670. The evaluation and disposition or plant modification will be completed to ensure adequate breaker coordination for Fire Area A-1 by December 15, 2002.								
Corrective actions for cable separation issues identified during the post-fire safe shutdown review are being addressed by PIR 2000-2378. These corrective actions are scheduled for implementation prior to the completion of Refuel 13, currently scheduled for November 21, 2003.								
Safety Significance:								
The safety significance of each event is low	v based on the	following:						
Condition 1:								
Once the control rods insert during a reactor shutdown, the plant is immediately in a safe shutdown condition (i.e., hot standby). In order to maintain a safe shutdown condition in the plant, the Chemical and Volume Control System [EIIS Code: CB] is required for boration and inventory makeup with the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) taking suction from the RWST.								
If the RWST inventory were lost to the consult of suction path to the water. Makeup from the would only be required to maintain the plan decreasing or if positive reactivity was added isolating the reactor such that very little mathematical substances.	tainment recirc le RWST to the at in a hot stand ed. The safe s keup water wo	ulation su e Reactor dby conditi hutdown r uld be nee	mp, the CCF Coolant Sys on if the pre nethodology eded and as	P would no item [EIIS essurizer le at WCGS sumes no	ot have Code: evel wa S relies RCS	e a dire AB] (F as s on cooldo	ect RCS) wn.	
Time would be available to take compensa EJHV8811A or EJHV8811B were to inadve	tory measures ertently open, i	if the RW t would tak	ST water lev e approxim	vel was de ately 55 m	ecreasi iinutes	ing. If for the	e	

١

• -	به ۱۹ ۲۰ و ۱۹ و ۱۹						
NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS	ION						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	LER NUMBER	1		3. PAGE	
• •		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION	05000482	2002	- 004 -	- 01	6	OF	6
17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co	pies of NRC Form 3	66A)					
RWST to drain to the lo-lo alarm set point a	and approxima	tely 94 mir	nutes for the	tank to co	omplete	ely drair	۱.
These times assume a flow rate of 4190 gallons per minute from the RWST to the containment recirculation sump as shown in calculation M-BN-21 revision 0.							
Use of the Chemical and Volume Control S which is approximately 10 hours after react	ystem for bora or shutdown.	ition is not	required unt	il xenon le	evels d	ecrease	э,
Condition 2:				۱.			
The affected fire area (A-1) contains no significant fire loading. Therefore, a significant fire is not expected to occur in this area. However, should a fire occur, operators would take actions necessary to extinguish the fire and restore equipment necessary for post fire safe shutdown.							
If a plant shutdown occurs, once the contro condition (i.e., Hot Standby (Mode 3)). The protection for the CCP room coolers is prov	I rods insert th CCP room co vided by:	e plant is i oler is req	immediately i uired for hot	in a safe s standby.	shutdo Adequ	wn uate	
 Thirty-five feet of horizontal separation between the "A" and "B" trains of CCP room cooler cables. (Since intervening combustibles are located within this separation, the requirement for greater than 20 feet of cable separation with no intervening combustibles is not met.) 							
 high personnel traffic, such that any fire 	e in the area w	ould be qu	iickly identifie	ed and ac	ted up	on; and	
overall low combustible loading in the a	area.				•		
These factors improve the likelihood that th in the event of a fire.	e CCP room o	oolers will	be available	for Hot S	Standby	/ condit	ions
During a reactor shutdown, if the RHR pump room coolers were unavailable due to a fire in area A-1, time would be available to take compensatory measures. The RHR system is not required until the decision is made to cool down the RCS from Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) to Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). Temporary ventilation units are available for use that could provide cooling for the pump motors. These units could be placed in service within two hours of the postulated fire, which is prior to the need for RHR system availability (a minimum of four hours following shutdown).							
Based on these considerations, the safety significance of each event is low.							
Previous Events:							
An occurrence of a similar event was report 009-00, it was determined that there was in for the volume control tank. In the event of centrifugal charging pump. While corrective additional corrective action for LER 1999-0 to provide necessary correction to the Upda two phases: phase one reverifies the desig analysis review. The conditions identified i in progress.	ted via license nadequate sep a fire, a poter ve actions have 09-00 was to ated Safety Ar gn criteria and n this LER we	e event re aration of tial existed been take validate the alysis Rep phase two re discove	port (LER) 1 cables for va d for gas intru- en to address e post fire sa port (USAR). o completes t red during ph	999-009- lves and usion into s these co fe shutdo The valio he post-fi nase two,	00. In level tr o the su ondition wn ana dation ire safe which	LER 19 ansmitt iction of ns, an alysis ar consists e shutdo is curre	99- ers the nd s of own ently

-1

ĉ

Ĭ

Attachment to ET 02-0034 Page 1 of 1

ł

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

1 L

7

1

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Tony Harris, Manager Regulatory Affairs at Wolf Creek Generating Station, (620) 364-4038.

COMMITMENT	Due Date/Event
A long-term resolution of this issue (which may include either re- routing of cable or wrapping the subject cable in fire retardant material) will be completed on or before the completion of Refuel 13 outage. The interim action of maintaining an hourly roving fire watches in the affected fire area remains in place until long- term resolution of this condition is implemented.	End of Refuel 13, currently scheduled for November 21, 2003.
Evaluation and disposition or plant modification for improper breaker coordination condition will be completed to ensure adequate breaker coordination for Fire Area A-1.	December 15, 2002

~