

ENCLOSURE 4

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNITS 1 AND 2

PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORTS (PTLR)

Contractor from any part of the responsibility for the correctness of design, details and dimensions.

Letter No. N10004

Date: June 06, 2002

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SOEP (N) BY D. L. Lundy

**Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah Unit 1**

**Pressure Temperature Limits Report
Revision 3, May 2002**

PROJECT Sequoyah DISCIPLINE N
CONTRACT 91NNP-86305B UNIT 1
DESC. RCS Pressure-Temperature Limit Report
DWG/DOC NO. PTLR-1
SHEET - OF - REV. 03
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RIMS, WTC A-K

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This report affects TS 3.4.9.1, RCS Pressure/Temperature Limits (P/T) Limits. All TS requirements associated with Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) are contained in TS 3.4.12, RCS Overpressure Protection System.

2.0 RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits

The limits for TS 3.4.9.1 are presented in the subsection which follow and were developed using the NRC approved methodologies specified in TS 6.9.1.15 with exception of ASME Code Case N-640^[14] (Use of K_{1c}), WCAP-15315^[15] (Elimination of the Flange Requirement), 1996 Version of Appendix G^[16] and the revised fluences^[17]. The operability requirements associated with LTOPS are specified in TS LCO 3.4.12 and were determined to adequately protect the RCS against brittle fracture in the event of an LTOP Transient in accordance with the methodology specified in TS 6.9.1.15.

2.1 RCS Pressure/Temperature (P/T) Limits (LCO - 3.4.9.1)

2.1.1 The minimum boltup temperature is 50°F

2.1.2 The RCS temperature rate-of-change limits are:

- a. A maximum heatup rate of 100°F in any one hour period.
- b. A maximum cooldown rate of 100°F in any one hour period.
- c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any one hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

2.1.3 The RCD P/T limits for heatup, cooldown, inservice hydrostatic and leak testing, and criticality are specified by Figures 2-1 and 2-2.

3.0 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LCO 3.4.12)

The lift setpoints for the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are presented in the subsection which follow. These lift setpoints have been developed using the NRC-approved methodologies specified in Specification 3.4.12.

reactor midplane/beltline or for instrument inaccuracies. The pressure difference between the pressurizer transmitter and the reactor vessel midplane/beltline with four reactor coolant pumps in operation is 68.3 psi (Ref. 12).

Note: These setpoints include allowance for the 50°F thermal transport effect for heat injection transients. A demonstrated accuracy calculation (Reference 13) has been performed to confirm that the setpoints will maintain the system pressure within the established limits when the pressure difference between the pressure transmitter and reactor midplane and maximum temperature/pressure instrument uncertainties are applied to the setpoints.

3.2 Arming Temperature

The LTOPS arming temperature is based upon the methodology defined in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications Administrative Controls Section 6.9.1.15. The arming temperature shall be $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$.

4.0 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties. The removal schedule is provided in Table 4-1. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 3-1.

The pressure vessel steel surveillance program (WCAP-8233^[1]) is in compliance with Appendix H to 10 CFR 50, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements"^[2]. The material test requirements and the acceptance standard utilize the reference nil-ductility temperature RT_{NDT} , which is determined in accordance with ASTM E208^[3]. The empirical relationship between RT_{NDT} and the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel steel is developed in accordance with Code Case N-640 of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure"^[4]. The surveillance capsule removal schedule meets the requirements of ASTM E185-82^[5]. The removal schedule is provided in Table 4-1.

Table 5-2 shows calculations of the surveillance material chemistry factors using surveillance capsule data. Note that in the calculation of the surveillance weld chemistry factor, the ratio procedure from Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 was followed. The ratio in question is equal to 0.90.

Table 5-3 provides the required Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel toughness data.

Table 5-4 provides a summary of the fluence values used in the generation of the heatup and cooldown limit curves and the PTS evaluation.

Table 5-5 and 5-6 show the calculation of the 1/4T and 3/4T adjusted reference temperature at 32 EFPY for each beltline material in the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. The limiting beltline material was the lower shell 04.

Table 5-7 provides a summary of the adjusted reference temperature (ART) values of the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel beltline materials at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations for 32 EFPY.

Table 5-8 provides RT_{PTS} values for Sequoyah Unit 1 at 32 EFPY.




Figure 2-1 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (w/Margins for Instrumentation Error of 10°F and 60 psig)
(Plotted Data provided on Table 2-1)




Figure 2-2 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations (Cooldown Rates up to 100°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (w/Margins for Instrumentation Error of 10°F and 60 psig) (Plotted Data provided on Table 2-2)

T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	288	0	272	2000
50	525	288	525	288	2485
55	525	288	525		
60	525	288	525		
65	525	288	525		
70	525	288	526		
75	525	288	528		
105	525	288	557		
110	525	288	566		
115	525	288	577		
120	525	288	589		
125	525	288	603		
130	526	288	618		
135	528	288	635		
140	531	288	654		
145	536	288	675		
150	542	288	698		
155	549	288	724		
160	557	288	752		
165	566	288	784		
170	577	288	819		
175	589	288	858		
180	603	288	900		
185	618	288	948		
190	635	288	1000		
195	654	290	1057		
200	675	295	1121		
205	698	300	1191		
210	724	305	1269		
215	752	310	1354		
220	784	315	1449		
225	819	320	1531		
230	858	325	1617		
235	900	330	1712		
240	948	335	1817		
245	1000	340	1933		
250	1057	345	2060		

T	P	T	P
260	1191	355	2357
265	1269		
270	1354		
275	1449		
280	1531		
285	1617		
290	1712		
295	1817		
300	1933		
305	2060		
310	2201		
315	2357		

T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	552	50	503	50	457	50	408	50	305
55	553	55	505	55	458	55	409	55	306
60	555	60	507	60	459	60	410	60	307
65	556	65	509	65	460	65	411	65	308
70	558	70	510	70	462	70	412	70	309
75	560	75	512	75	464	75	414	75	311
80	561	80	514	80	465	80	416	80	313
85	564	85	516	85	468	85	418	85	315
90	566	90	518	90	470	90	420	90	318
95	569	95	521	95	473	95	423	95	321
100	571	100	524	100	476	100	426	100	325
105	575	105	527	105	479	105	430	105	329
110	578	110	531	110	483	110	434	110	333
115	582	115	535	115	487	115	438	115	338
120	586	120	540	120	492	120	443	120	344
125	591	125	545	125	497	125	449	125	351
130	596	130	550	130	503	130	456	130	358
135	602	135	556	135	510	135	463	135	367
140	608	140	563	140	517	140	471	140	376
145	616	145	571	145	525	145	479	145	387
150	623	150	579	150	534	150	489	150	399
155	632	155	588	155	544	155	500	155	412
160	642	160	599	160	556	160	512	160	427
165	652	165	610	165	568	165	526	165	443
170	664	170	623	170	582	170	541	170	461
175	677	175	637	175	597	175	558	175	482
180	691	180	652	180	614	180	577	180	505
185	707	185	669	185	633	185	597	185	530
190	724	190	688	190	654	190	620	190	558
195	743	195	709	195	677	195	646	195	590
200	764	200	733	200	702	200	674	200	624
205	788	205	759	205	731	205	705	205	663
210	814	210	787	210	762	210	740	210	706
215	843	215	819	215	797	215	779	215	754

Steady State									
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
220	874	220	853	220	836	220	821	220	806
225	909	225	892	225	878	225	869	225	863
230	948	230	935	230	925	230	921	230	930
235	991	235	982	235	978	235	979		
240	1038	240	1034	240	1036				
245	1090								
250	1148								
255	1212								
260	1283								
265	1360								
270	1447								
275	1542								
280	1647								
285	1763								
290	1892								
295	2034								
300	2191								
305	2364								

	Setpoint (psig)	Setpoint (psig)
50	490	465
100	500	475
135	540	510
175	575	540
200	610	570
250	745	685
280	745	685
405	745	685
450	2350	2350




Figure 3-1: Sequoyah Unit 1 LTOPS Selected Setpoints (Plotted Data provided on Table 3-1)

Capsule	Position	Depth (mm)	Area (cm ²)	Fluence (n/cm ²)
T	40°	3.39	1.03	2.61×10^{18} (c)
U	140°	3.47	3.00	7.96×10^{18} (c)
X	220°	3.47	5.27	1.32×10^{19} (c)
Y	320°	3.43	10.03	2.19×10^{19} (c,d)
S	4°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)
V	176°	1.08	Standby	(d,c)
W	184°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)
Z	356°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)

Notes:

- (a) Updated in Capsule Y dosimetry analysis (WCAP-15224^[7]).
- (b) Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) from plant startup.
- (c) Plant specific evaluation.
- (d) This fluence is not less than once or greater than twice the peak end of license (32 EFPY) fluence
- (e) Capsules S, V, W and Z will reach a fluence of 2.74×10^{16} (E > 1.0 MeV), the 48 EFPY peak vessel fluence at approximately 44 EFPY, respectively.

Material	Capsule	Fluence ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²)	30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shift		Upper Shelf Energy Decrease	
			Predicted (°F) ^(a)	Measured (°F) ^(b)	Predicted (%) ^(a)	Measured (%) ^(c)
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Tangential)	T	0.261	59.85	67.52	16	16
	U	0.796	89.3	109.7	20.5	21
	X	1.32	102.6	145.12	23	8
	Y	2.19	114.95	129.87	26.5	23
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Axial)	T	0.261	59.85	50.59	16	0
	U	0.796	89.3	67.59	20.5	19
	X	1.32	102.6	103.34	23	22
	Y	2.19	114.95	133.35	26.5	19
Weld Metal	T	0.261	111.13	127.79	35	30
	U	0.796	165.82	144.92	42	26
	X	1.32	190.51	159.02	45	21
	Y	2.19	213.44	163.8	48	28
HAZ Metal	T	0.261	--	45.48	--	20
	U	0.796	--	78.94	--	26
	X	1.32	--	95.89	--	3
	Y	2.19	--	73.3	--	10

Notes:

- (a) Based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology using the mean weight percent values of copper and nickel of the surveillance material.
- (b) Calculated using measured Charpy data plotted using CVGRAPH, Version 4.1^[8].
- (c) Values are based on the definition of upper shelf energy given in ASTM E185-82.

Lower Shell Forging 04 (Tangential)	T	2.61E+18	0.63	67.32°F	42.54°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	109.7°F	103.12°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	145.12°F	156.73°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	129.87°F	157.14°F	1.47
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Axial)	T	2.61E+18	0.63	50.59°F	31.87°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	67.59°F	63.53°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	103.34°F	111.61°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	133.35°F	161.35°F	1.47
				SUM:		7.82
				$CF_{94} = \sum (FF * RT_{NDT}) + \sum (FF^2) = (827.89) + (7.82) = 105.9^\circ F$		
Surveillance Weld Material ^{1b}	T	2.61E+18	0.63	115.0°F	72.5°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	130.4°F	122.6°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	143.1°F	154.5°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	147.4°F	178.4°F	1.47
				SUM:		3.91
				$CF_{Surv. Weld} = \sum (FF * RT_{NDT}) + \sum (FF^2) = (528.0^\circ F) + (3.91) = 135.0^\circ F$		

Notes:

- f = Calculated fluence from capsule Y dosimetry analysis results ⁽⁷⁾ ($\times 10^{18}$ n/cm², E > 1.0 MeV).
- FF = fluence factor = $f^{0.28 - 0.11 \log f}$
- ΔRT_{NDT} values are the measured 30 ft lb shift values taken from App. B of Ref. 7, rounded to one decimal point.
- The surveillance weld metal ΔRT_{NDT} values have been adjusted by a ratio factor of 0.90.

(Heat # 980807/281489)			
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Heat # 980919/281587)	0.13	0.76	73°F
Surveillance Weld ^(a, d, e) ⇒	0.387	0.11	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.30	---	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.25	---	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.46	---	---
Best Estimate of the Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam W05 ^(d, e)	0.35	0.11	-40°F

Notes:

- (a) The Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) These copper and nickel values are best estimate values for only the surveillance weld metal and is the average of three data points [0.424 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.406 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.33 (WCAP-8233) copper and 0.084 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.085 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.17 (WCAP-8233) nickel]. These values are treated as one data point in the calculation of the best estimate average for the inter. to lower shell circ. weld shown above. Originally the 0.424 / 0.406 and 0.084 / 0.085 values were reported as single points, 0.41 - 0.42 and 0.08 (Per WCAP-10340, Rev. 1^(d)), but it is actually made up of two data points. Sample TW58 from capsule T was broken into two samples, TW58a and TW58b, thus providing the two data points.
- (c) From NRC Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (RVID) and ultimately from Rotterdam Weld Certifications.
- (d) Circumferential Weld Seam W05 was fabricated with weld wire type SMIT 40, Heat # 25295, Flux type SMIT 89, lot # 2275. The surveillance weld was fabricated with weld wire type SMIT 40, Heat # 25295, Flux type SMIT 89, lot # 1103 and is representative of the intermediate to lower shell circumferential weld.
- (e) The surveillance weld and the three Rotterdam tests are averaged together for the Best Estimate of the Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam.

EPY	0°	15°	30°	45°
10.03	0.205	0.321	0.409	0.637
20	0.387	0.596	0.761	1.18
32	0.605	0.928	1.19	1.84
48	0.896	1.37	1.75	2.72

Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	115.6	1.029	40	119.0	34	193
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	95	1.029	73	97.8	34	205
	Position 2.1	105.9	1.029	73	109.0	34	216
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 1.1	161.3	1.029	-40	166.0	56	182
	Position 2.1	135.0	1.029	-40	138.9	56	155

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) $ART = \text{Initial } RT_{NDT} + \Delta RT_{NDT} + \text{Margin } (^{\circ}\text{F})$
- (3) $\Delta RT_{NDT} = CF * FF$
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_A^2)^{1/2}$

Table 5-6
Sequoyah Unit 1 Calculation of the ART Values for the 3/4T Location @ 32 EFY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)	FF	$IRT_{NDT}^{(1)}$ ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)	$\Delta RT_{NDT}^{(3)}$ ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)	ART ⁽²⁾ ($^{\circ}\text{F}$)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	115.6	0.747	40	86.4	34	160
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	95	0.747	73	71.0	34	178
	Position 2.1	105.9	0.747	73	79.1	34	186
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 1.1	161.3	0.747	-40	120.5	56	137
	Position 2.1	135.0	0.747	-40	100.8	56	117

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) $ART = \text{Initial } RT_{NDT} + \Delta RT_{NDT} + \text{Margin } (^{\circ}\text{F})$
- (3) $\Delta RT_{NDT} = CF * FF$
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_A^2)^{1/2}$

Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	193	160
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	205	178
	Position 2.1	216	186
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	182	137
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	155	117

Table 5-8
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 1 Bellline Region Materials at 32 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.84	1.167	115.6	134.9	34	40	209
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.84	1.167	95.0	110.9	34	73	218
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Using S/C Data)	1.84	1.167	105.9	123.6	34	73	231
Circumferential Weld Metal	1.84	1.167	161.3	188.2	56	-40	204
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	1.84	1.167	135.0	157.5	56	-40	174

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
- (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF * FF$

2. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50, Appendix H, *Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
3. ASTM E208, *Standard Test Method for Conducting Drop-Weight Test to Determine Nil Ductility Transition Temperature of Ferritic Steels*, in ASTM Standards, Section 3, American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA.
4. Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Appendix G, *Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure*
5. ASTM E185-82, Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Section 12, Volume 12.02, *Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels*.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, *Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1988.
7. WCAP-15224, *Analysis of Capsule Y From the Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program*, T.J. Laubham, et. al., Dated June 1999.
8. CVGRAPH, Hyperbolic Tangent Curve-Fitting Program, Version 4.1, developed by ATI Consulting, March 1999.
9. WCAP-10340, Revision 1, "Analysis of Capsule T from the Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program", S.E. Yanichko, et. al., February 1984.
10. WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2, "Methodology used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves", J.D. Andrachek, et. al., January 1996.
11. WCAP-15293, Revision 1, "Sequoyah Unit 1 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation", J.H. Ledger, April 2001.
12. Westinghouse Letter to TVA, TVA-93-105, "Cold Overpressure Mitigation System Code Case and Delta-P Calculation", May 19, 1993.
13. Calculation SQN-IC-014, "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation for Cold Overpressure Protection System."
14. ASME Code Case N-640, "Alternative Reference Fracture Toughness for Development of P-T Limit Curves for Section XI, Division 1", February 26, 1999.

design, details and dimensions.
Letter No. N10004
Date: June 06, 2002
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SOEP (N) BY D. L. Lundy

Tennessee Valley Authority
Sequoyah Unit 2

Pressure Temperature Limits Report
Revision 3, May 2002

PROJECT Sequoyah DISCIPLINE N
CONTRACT 91NNP-86305B UNIT 2
DESC. RCS Pressure-Temperature Limit Report
DWG/DOC NO. PTLR-2
SHEET - OF - REV. 03
DATE 06/06/02 ECN/DCN - FILE N2N-048

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This report affects TS 3.4.9.1, RCS Pressure/Temperature Limits (P/T) Limits. All TS requirements associated with Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) are contained in TS 3.4.12, RCS Overpressure Protection System.

2.0 RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits

The limits for TS 3.4.9.1 are presented in the subsection which follows and were developed using the NRC approved methodologies specified in TS 6.9.1.15 with exception of ASME Code Case N-640^[11] (Use of K_k), WCAP-15315^[12] (Elimination of the Flange Requirement), 1996 Version of Appendix G^[4] and the revised fluences^[7]. The operability requirements associated with LTOPS are specified in TS LCO 3.4.12 and were determined to adequately protect the RCS against brittle fracture in the event of an LTOP Transient in accordance with the methodology specified in TS 6.9.1.15.

2.1 RCS Pressure/Temperature (P/T) Limits (LCO - 3.4.9.1)

2.1.1 The minimum boltup temperature is 50°F

2.1.2 The RCS temperature rate-of-change limits are:

- a. A maximum heatup rate of 100°F in any one hour period.
- b. A maximum cooldown rate of 100°F in any one hour period.
- c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to 10°F in any one hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

2.1.3 The RCD P/T limits for heatup, cooldown, inservice hydrostatic and leak testing, and criticality are specified by Figures 2-1 and 2-2.

3.0 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LCO 3.4.12)

The lift setpoints for the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are presented in the subsection which follows. These lift setpoints have been developed using the NRC-approved methodologies specified in Specification 3.4.12.

reactor midplane/beltline or for instrument inaccuracies. The pressure difference between the pressurizer transmitter and the reactor vessel midplane/beltline with four reactor coolant pumps in operation is 68.3 psi (Ref. 13).

Note: These setpoints include allowance for the 50°F thermal transport effect for heat injection transients. A demonstrated accuracy calculation (Reference 14) has been performed to confirm that the setpoints will maintain the system pressure within the established limits when the pressure difference between the pressure transmitter and reactor midplane and maximum temperature/pressure instrument uncertainties are applied to the setpoints.

3.2 Arming Temperature

The LIOPS arming temperature is based upon the methodology defined in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Technical Specifications Administrative Controls Section 6.9.1.15. The arming temperature shall be $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$.

4.0 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties. The removal schedule is provided in Table 4-1. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 3-1.

The pressure vessel steel surveillance program (WCAP-8513⁽¹⁾) is in compliance with Appendix H to 10 CFR 50, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements"⁽²⁾. The material test requirements and the acceptance standard utilize the reference nil-ductility temperature RT_{NDT} , which is determined in accordance with ASTM E208⁽³⁾. The empirical relationship between RT_{NDT} and the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel steel is developed in accordance with Code Case N-640 of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure"⁽⁴⁾. The surveillance capsule removal schedule meets the requirements of ASTM E185-82⁽⁵⁾. The removal schedule is provided in Table 4-1.

Table 5-2 shows calculations of the surveillance material chemistry factors using surveillance capsule data. Note that in the calculation of the surveillance weld chemistry factor, the ratio procedure from Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 was followed. The ratio in question is equal to 0.93.

Table 5-3 provides the required Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel toughness data.

Table 5-4 provides a summary of the fluence values used in the generation of the heatup and cooldown limit curves and the PTS evaluation.

Table 5-5 and 5-6 show the calculation of the 1/4T and 3/4T adjusted reference temperature at 32 EFPY for each beltline material in the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. The limiting beltline material was the intermediate shell 05.

Table 5-7 provides a summary of the adjusted reference temperature (ART) values of the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel beltline materials at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations for 32 EFPY.

Table 5-8 provides RT_{PTS} values for Sequoyah Unit 2 at 32 EFPY.





Figure 2-1 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFY (w/ Margins for Instrumentation Error of 10°F and 60 psig) (Plotted Data provided on Table 2-1)



3/AT, 115°F

Figure 2-2 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations (Cooldown Rates up to 100°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EEPY (w/ Margins for Instrumentation Error of 10°F and 60 psig) (Plotted Data provided on Table 2-2)

T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	214	0	186	2000
50	591	214	607	203	2485
55	595	214	614		
60	601	214	622		
65	607	214	675		
70	614	214	678		
75	622	214	685		
105	675	214	695		
110	678	214	708		
115	685	214	725		
120	695	214	745		
125	708	214	768		
130	725	214	795		
135	745	214	825		
140	768	214	860		
145	795	214	898		
150	825	214	942		
155	860	214	990		
160	898	215	1043		
165	942	220	1103		
170	990	225	1168		
175	1043	230	1241		
180	1103	235	1322		
185	1168	240	1411		
190	1241	245	1510		
195	1322	250	1602		
200	1411	255	1697		
205	1510	260	1801		
210	1602	265	1916		
215	1697	270	2043		
220	1801	275	2183		
225	1916	280	2338		
230	2043				
235	2183				
240	2338				

Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	591	50	552	50	503	50	461	50	366
55	595	55	554	55	508	55	466	55	372
60	601	60	558	60	514	60	470	60	380
65	607	65	564	65	521	65	478	65	389
70	614	70	572	70	529	70	486	70	399
75	622	75	580	75	538	75	496	75	410
80	630	80	589	80	548	80	506	80	423
85	640	85	599	85	559	85	518	85	437
90	650	90	610	90	571	90	531	90	453
95	661	95	623	95	584	95	546	95	470
100	674	100	636	100	599	100	562	100	490
105	688	105	652	105	616	105	580	105	512
110	703	110	668	110	634	110	600	110	536
115	720	115	687	115	654	115	622	115	563
120	739	120	707	120	676	120	647	120	593
125	760	125	730	125	701	125	674	125	626
130	783	130	755	130	729	130	704	130	663
135	809	135	783	135	759	135	738	135	704
140	837	140	814	140	793	140	775	140	749
145	868	145	848	145	831	145	816	145	800
150	902	150	885	150	872	150	862	150	856
155	940	155	927	155	918	155	913	155	918
160	982	160	973	160	968	160	969		
165	1028	165	1024	165	1025				
170	1080								
175	1136								
180	1199								
185	1268								
190	1344								
195	1429								
200	1522								
205	1625								
210	1739								
215	1865								
220	2004								
225	2158								
230	2328								

	Setpoint (psig)	Setpoint (psig)
50	510	485
100	580	555
135	640	610
174	745	682
200	745	685
250	745	685
278	745	685
400	745	685
450	2350	2350

Sequoyah Unit 2 LTOPs Selected Setpoints




Figure 3-1: Sequoyah Unit 2 LTOP Selected Setpoints (Plotted Data provided on Table 3-1)

T	40°	3.33	1.04	2.61×10^{18} (c)
U	140°	3.40	2.93	6.92×10^{18} (c)
X	220°	3.39	5.36	1.22×10^{19} (c)
Y	320°	3.35	10.54	2.14×10^{19} (c,d)
S	4°	1.09	Standby	(e)
V	176°	1.09	Standby	(e)
W	184°	1.09	Standby	(e)
Z	356°	1.09	Standby	(e)

Notes:

- (a) Updated in Capsule Y dosimetry analysis (WCAP-15320⁽⁷⁾).
- (b) Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) from plant startup.
- (c) Plant specific evaluation.
- (d) This fluence is not less than once or greater than twice the peak end of license (32 EFPY) fluence
- (e) Capsules S, V, W and Z will reach a fluence of 2.71×10^{19} ($E > 1.0$ MeV), the 48 EFPY peak vessel fluence at approximately 44 EFPY.

Material	Capsule	Fluence ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²)	30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shift		Upper Shelf Energy Decrease	
			Predicted (°F) ^(a)	Measured (°F) ^(b)	Predicted (%) ^(a)	Measured (%) ^(c)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Tangential)	T	0.261	60.33	63.65	17	12
	U	0.692	85.22	79.31	21	16
	X	1.22	100.23	85.7	23	8
	Y	2.14	114.67	134.12	26	22
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Axial)	T	0.261	60.33	48.73	17	7
	U	0.692	85.22	66.06	21	9
	X	1.22	100.23	110.04	23	2
	Y	2.14	114.67	89.21	26	22
Weld Metal	T	0.261	43.12	74.56	20	2
	U	0.692	60.91	130.38	25	6
	X	1.22	71.63	44.22	29	35
	Y	2.14	81.96	86.91	33	3
HAZ Metal	T	0.261	--	24.58	--	2
	U	0.692	--	64.03	--	14
	X	1.22	--	28.29	--	19
	Y	2.14	--	50.32	--	39

Notes:

- (a) Based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology using the mean weight percent values of copper and nickel of the surveillance material.
- (b) Calculated using measured Charpy data plotted using CVGRAPH, Version 4.1^[5].
- (c) Values are based on the definition of upper shelf energy given in ASTM E185-82.

Material	Capsule	Capsule f''	FF'''	$\Delta RT_{NDT}'''$	$FF * \Delta RT_{NDT}$	FF
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Tangential)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	63.7	40.45	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	79.3	71.13	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	85.7	90.41	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	134.1	161.86	1.457
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Axial)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	48.7	30.92	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	66.1	59.29	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	110.0	116.05	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	89.2	107.66	1.457
	SUM:				677.77°F	7.556
	$CF_{05} = \sum(FF * RT_{NDT}) + \sum(FF^2) = (677.77) + (7.556) = 89.7°F$					
Surveillance Weld Material ^(d)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	69.4 (74.6)	44.07	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	121.3 (130.4)	108.81	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	41.1 (44.2)	43.36	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	80.8 (86.9)	97.53	1.457
	SUM:				293.77°F	3.778
	$CF_{Surv. Weld} = \sum(FF * RT_{NDT}) + \sum(FF^2) = (293.77°F) + (3.778) = 77.8°F$					

Notes:

- (a) f = Calculated fluence from capsule Y dosimetry analysis results⁽⁷⁾, ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm², $E > 1.0$ MeV).
- (b) FF = fluence factor = $f^{(0.28 - 0.1 * \log f)}$
- (c) ΔRT_{NDT} values are the measured 30 ft-lb shift values taken from App. B of Ref. 7, rounded to one decimal point.
- (d) The surveillance weld metal ΔRT_{NDT} values have been adjusted by a ratio factor of 0.93.

(Heat # 981334 / 781416)			
Vessel Flange (Heat # 980893 / 780931)	---	---	-22°F
Intermediate Shell 05 (Heat # 288757 / 981057)	0.13	0.76	10°F
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Heat # 990469 / 293323)	0.14	0.76	22°F
Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam ^(b)	0.12	0.11	4°F
Surveillance Weld ^(b)	0.13	0.11	---

Notes:

- (a) The Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) Circumferential Weld Seam was fabricated with weld wire type SMT 89, Heat # 4278, Flux type SMT 89, lot # 1211 and is representative of the intermediate to lower shell circumferential weld.

EPY	0°	15°	30°	45°
10.54	0.211	0.336	0.426	0.637
20	0.38	0.60	0.773	1.16
32	0.593	0.934	1.21	1.82
48	0.878	1.38	1.80	2.71

Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	95	1.027	10	97.6	34	142
	Position 2.1	89.7	1.027	10	92.1	34	136
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	104	1.027	-22	106.8	34	119
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	63	1.027	-4	64.7	56	117
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	77.8	1.027	-4	79.9	56	132

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
- (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_s^2)^{1/2}$

Table 5-6
Sequoyah Unit 2 Calculation of the ART Values for the 3/4T Location @ 32 EFY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF (°F)	FF	IRT _{NDT} ⁽¹⁾ (°F)	ΔRT _{NDT} ⁽³⁾ (°F)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ (°F)	ART ⁽²⁾ (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	95	0.745	10	70.8	34	115
	Position 2.1	89.7	0.745	10	66.8	34	111
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	104	0.745	-22	77.5	34	90
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	63	0.745	-4	46.9	56	99
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	77.8	0.745	-4	58.0	56	110

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
- (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_s^2)^{1/2}$

Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	142	115
	Position 2.1	136	111
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	119	90
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	117	99
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	132	110

Table 5-8
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 2 Beltline Region Materials at 32 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.82	1.164	95	110.6	34	10	155
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Using S/C Data)	1.82	1.164	89.7	104.4	34	10	148
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.82	1.164	104	121.1	34	-22	133
Circumferential Weld Metal	1.82	1.164	63	73.3	56	-4	125
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	1.82	1.164	77.8	90.6	56	-4	143

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
- (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF \cdot FF$

2. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50, Appendix H, *Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
3. ~~ASTM E208~~, *Standard Test Method for Conducting Drop-Weight Test to Determine Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature of Ferritic Steels*, in ASTM Standards, Section 3, American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA.
4. Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Appendix G, *Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure*
5. ASTM E185-82, Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Section 12, Volume 12.02, *Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels*.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, *Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1988.
7. WCAP-15320, *Analysis of Capsule Y From the Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program*, T.J. Laubham, et. al., Dated November 1999.
8. CVGRAPH, Hyperbolic Tangent Curve-Fitting Program, Version 4.1, developed by ATI Consulting, March 1999.
9. WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2, "Methodology used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves", J.D. Andrachek, et. al., January 1996.
10. WCAP-15321, Revision 1, "Sequoyah Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation", J.H. Ledger, et.al., April 2001.
11. ASME Code Case N-640, "Alternative Reference Fracture Toughness for Development of P-T Limit Curves for Section XI, Division 1", February 26, 1999.
12. WCAP-15315, "Reactor Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements Evaluation For Operating PWR and BWR Plants", W. Bamford, et.al., October 1999.
13. Westinghouse Letter to TVA, TVA-93-105, "Cold Overpressure Mitigation System Code Case and Delta-P Calculation", May 19, 1993.
14. Calculation SQN-IC-014, *Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation for Cold Overpressure Protection System*.

ENCLOSURE 5

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNITS 1 AND 2

TOPICAL REPORTS

WCAP-15293, Revision 1 (Unit 1)
WCAP-15321, Revision 1 (Unit 2)

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3



**Sequoyah Unit 1
Heatup and Cooldown
Limit Curves for Normal
Operation and PTLR
Support Documentation**

WCAP-15293
Revision 1



Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

05173758

WCAP-15293, Revision 1


**Sequoyah Unit 1
Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves
for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation**

J. H. Ledger

April 2001

Prepared by the Westinghouse Electric Company LLC
for the Tennessee Valley Authority

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PREFACE

This report has been technically reviewed and verified by:

T. J. Laubham



Revision 1:

An error was detected in the "OPERLIM" Computer Program that Westinghouse uses to generate pressure-temperature (PT) limit curves. This error potentially effects the heatup curves when the 1996 Appendix G Methodology is used in generating the PT curves. It has been determined that WCAP-15293 Rev. 0 was impacted by this error. Thus, this revision provides corrected curves from WCAP-15293 Rev. 0.

Note that only the 60°F/hr heatup curves were affected by this error. The 100°F/hr heatup and all cooldown curves were not affected by the computer error and thus remain valid.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides the methodology and results of the generation of heatup and cooldown pressure temperature limit curves for normal operation of the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. In addition, Pressure Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) support information, such as LTOPS Setpoint, PTS, EOL USE and Withdrawal Schedule, is documented herein in Appendices. The PT curves were generated based on the latest available reactor vessel information (Capsule Y analysis, WCAP-15224^[7] and the latest Pressure-Temperature (P-T) Limit Curves from WCAP-12970^[13]). The Sequoyah Unit 1 heatup and cooldown pressure-temperature limit curves have been updated based on the use of the ASME Code Case N-640^[3], which allows the use of the K_{1c} methodology, and a justification to lower the reactor vessel flange temperature requirement (Reference WCAP-15315^[18]).

1 INTRODUCTION

Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the adjusted RT_{NDT} (reference nil-ductility temperature) corresponding to the limiting beltline region material of the reactor vessel. The adjusted RT_{NDT} of the limiting material in the core region of the reactor vessel is determined by using the unirradiated reactor vessel material fracture toughness properties, estimating the radiation-induced ΔRT_{NDT} , and adding a margin. The unirradiated RT_{NDT} is designated as the higher of either the drop weight nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) or the temperature at which the material exhibits at least 50 ft-lb of impact energy and 35-mil lateral expansion (normal to the major working direction) minus 60°F.

RT_{NDT} increases as the material is exposed to fast-neutron radiation. Therefore, to find the most limiting RT_{NDT} at any time period in the reactor's life, ΔRT_{NDT} due to the radiation exposure associated with that time period must be added to the unirradiated RT_{NDT} (IRT_{NDT}). The extent of the shift in RT_{NDT} is enhanced by certain chemical elements (such as copper and nickel) present in reactor vessel steels. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published a method for predicting radiation embrittlement in Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials."^[1] Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, is used for the calculation of Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) values ($IRT_{NDT} + \Delta RT_{NDT} + \text{margins for uncertainties}$) at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations, where T is the thickness of the vessel at the beltline region measured from the clad/base metal interface.

The heatup and cooldown curves documented in this report were generated using the most limiting ART values and the NRC approved methodology documented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2^[2], "Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves" with exception of the following: 1) The fluence values used in this report are calculated fluence values, not the best estimate fluence values (See Appendix B). 2) The K_{Ic} critical stress intensities are used in place of the K_{Ia} critical stress intensities. This methodology is taken from approved ASME Code Case N-640^[3]. 3) The reactor vessel flange temperature requirement has been reduced. Justification has been provided in WCAP-15315^[18]. 4) The 1996 Version of Appendix G to Section XI^[4] will be used rather than the 1989 version.

2 FRACTURE TOUGHNESS PROPERTIES

The fracture-toughness properties of the ferritic material in the reactor coolant pressure boundary are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan^[5]. The beltline material properties of the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel is presented in Table 1.

Best estimate copper (Cu) and nickel (Ni) weight percent values used to calculate chemistry factors (CF) in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, are provided in Table 3. Additionally, surveillance capsule data is available for four capsules (Capsules T, U, X and Y) already removed from the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. This surveillance capsule data was also used to calculate CF values per Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. These CF values are presented in Table 2 and 3.

The NRC Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 methodology used to develop the heatup and cooldown curves documented in this report is the same as that documented in WCAP-14040, Revision 2.

TABLE 1
Reactor Vessel Beltline Material Unirradiated Toughness Properties

Material Description	Cu (%)	Ni(%)	Initial RT _{NDT} ^(a)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Heat # 980807/281489)	0.15	0.86	40°F
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Heat # 980919/281587)	0.13	0.76	73°F
Surveillance Weld ^(b, d, e) ⇒	0.387	0.11	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.30	---	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.25	---	---
Rotterdam Test ^(c, e) ⇒	0.46	---	---
Best Estimate of the Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam W05 ^(d, e)	0.35	0.11	-40°F

Notes:

- (a) The Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) These copper and nickel values are best estimate values for only the surveillance weld metal and is the average of three data points [0.424 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.406 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.33 (WCAP-8233) copper and 0.084 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.085 (WCAP-10340, Rev.1), 0.17 (WCAP-8233) nickel.]. These values are treated as one data point in the calculation of the best estimate average for the inter. to lower shell circ. weld shown above. Originally the 0.424 / 0.406 and 0.084 / 0.085 values were reported as single points, 0.41 - 0.42 and 0.08 (Per WCAP-10340, Rev. 1⁽⁶⁾), but it is actually made up of two data points. Sample TW58 from capsule T was broken into two samples, TW58a and TW58b, thus providing the two data points.
- (c) From NRC Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (RVID) and ultimately from Rotterdam Weld Certifications.
- (d) Circumferential Weld Seam W05 was fabricated with weld wire type SMIT 40, Heat # 25295, Flux type SMIT 89, lot # 2275. The surveillance weld was fabricated with weld wire type SMIT 40, Heat # 25295, Flux type SMIT 89, lot # 1103 and is representative of the intermediate to lower shell circumferential weld.
- (e) The surveillance weld and the three Rotterdam tests are averaged together for the Best Estimate of the Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam.

The chemistry factors were calculated using Regulatory Guide 1.99 Revision 2, Positions 1.1 and 2.1. Position 1.1 uses the Tables from the Reg. Guide along with the best estimate copper and nickel weight percents. Position 2.1 uses the surveillance capsule data from all capsules withdrawn to date. The fluence values used to determine the CFs in Table 2 are the calculated fluence values at the surveillance capsule locations. Hence, the calculated fluence values were used for all cases.

The measured ΔRT_{NDT} values for the weld data were adjusted using the ratio procedure given in Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. All fluence values were obtained from the recent Sequoyah Unit 1 capsule analysis⁽⁷⁾ which calculated the fluences using the ENDF/B-VI scattering cross-section data set. The fluence values used are also documented in Appendix C of this report.

TABLE 2
Calculation of Chemistry Factors using Sequoyah Unit 1 Surveillance Capsule Data

Material	Capsule	Capsule f ^(a)	FF ^(b)	ΔRT _{NDT} ^(c)	FF*ΔRT _{NDT}	FF ²
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Tangential)	T	2.61E+18	0.63	67.52°F	42.54°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	109.7°F	103.12°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	145.12°F	156.73°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	129.87°F	157.14°F	1.47
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Axial)	T	2.61E+18	0.63	50.59°F	31.87°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	67.59°F	63.53°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	103.34°F	111.61°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	133.35°F	161.35°F	1.47
	SUM:				827.89°F	7.82
CF ₀₄ = Σ(FF * RT _{NDT}) ÷ Σ(FF ²) = (827.89) ÷ (7.82) = 105.9°F						
Surveillance Weld Material ^(d)	T	2.61E+18	0.63	115.0°F	72.5°F	0.40
	U	7.96E+18	0.94	130.4°F	122.6°F	0.88
	X	1.32E+19	1.08	143.1°F	154.5°F	1.16
	Y	2.19E+19	1.21	147.4°F	178.4°F	1.47
	SUM:				528.0°F	3.91
CF _{Surv. Weld} = Σ(FF * RT _{NDT}) ÷ Σ(FF ²) = (528.0°F) ÷ (3.91) = 135.0°F						

Notes:

- (a) f = Calculated fluence from capsule Y dosimetry analysis results ⁽⁷⁾, ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm², E > 1.0 MeV).
- (b) FF = fluence factor = $f^{(0.28 - 0.1 \log f)}$.
- (c) ΔRT_{NDT} values are the measured 30 ft-lb shift values taken from App. B of Ref. 7, rounded to one decimal point.
- (d) The surveillance weld metal ΔRT_{NDT} values have been adjusted by a ratio factor of 0.90.

TABLE 3
Summary of the Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Beltline Material Chemistry Factors

Material	Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 Position 1.1 CF's	Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 Position 2.1 CF's
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	115.6°F	---
Lower Shell Forging 04	95°F	105.9°F
Circumferential Weld W05 (Heat # 25295)	161.3°F	135.0°F
Surveillance Weld Metal (Heat # 25295)	178.7°F	---

3 CRITERIA FOR ALLOWABLE PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIPS

3.1 Overall Approach

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor, K_I , for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor, K_{Ic} , for the metal temperature at that time. K_{Ic} is obtained from the reference fracture toughness curve, defined in Code Case N-640, "Alternative Reference Fracture Toughness for Development of PT Limit Curves for Section XI"^(3 & 4) of the ASME Appendix G to Section XI. The K_{Ic} curve is given by the following equation:

$$K_{Ic} = 33.2 + 20.734 * e^{[0.02(T - RT_{NDT})]} \quad (1)$$

where,

K_{Ic} = reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature T and the metal reference nil-ductility temperature RT_{NDT}

This K_{Ic} curve is based on the lower bound of static critical K_I values measured as a function of temperature on specimens of SA-533 Grade B Class 1, SA-508-1, SA-508-2, SA-508-3 steel.

3.2 Methodology for Pressure-Temperature Limit Curve Development

The governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C * K_{Im} + K_{It} < K_{Ic} \quad (2)$$

where,

K_{Im} = stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress

K_{It} = stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients

K_{Ic} = function of temperature relative to the RT_{NDT} of the material

C = 2.0 for Level A and Level B service limits

C = 1.5 for hydrostatic and leak test conditions during which the reactor core is not critical

For membrane tension, the corresponding K_I for the postulated defect is:

$$K_{Im} = M_m \times (pR_i / t) \quad (3)$$

where, M_m for an inside surface flaw is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} M_m &= 1.85 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} < 2, \\ M_m &= 0.926\sqrt{t} \text{ for } 2 \leq \sqrt{t} \leq 3.464, \\ M_m &= 3.21 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} > 3.464 \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, M_m for an outside surface flaw is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} M_m &= 1.77 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} < 2, \\ M_m &= 0.893\sqrt{t} \text{ for } 2 \leq \sqrt{t} \leq 3.464, \\ M_m &= 3.09 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} > 3.464 \end{aligned}$$

and p = internal pressure, R_i = vessel inner radius, and t = vessel wall thickness.

For bending stress, the corresponding K_I for the postulated defect is:

$$K_{Ib} = M_b * \text{Maximum Stress, where } M_b \text{ is two-thirds of } M_m$$

The maximum K_I produced by radial thermal gradient for the postulated inside surface defect of G-2120 is $K_{It} = 0.953 \times 10^{-3} \times CR \times t^{2.5}$, where CR is the cooldown rate in $^{\circ}F/hr.$, or for a postulated outside surface defect, $K_{It} = 0.753 \times 10^{-3} \times HU \times t^{2.5}$, where HU is the heatup rate in $^{\circ}F/hr.$

The through-wall temperature difference associated with the maximum thermal K_I can be determined from Fig. G-2214-1. The temperature at any radial distance from the vessel surface can be determined from Fig. G-2214-2 for the maximum thermal K_I .

- (a) The maximum thermal K_I relationship and the temperature relationship in Fig. G-2214-1 are applicable only for the conditions given in G-2214.3(a)(1) and (2).
- (b) Alternatively, the K_I for radial thermal gradient can be calculated for any thermal stress distribution and at any specified time during cooldown for a $1/4$ -thickness inside surface defect using the relationship:

$$K_{It} = (1.0359C_0 + 0.6322C_1 + 0.4753C_2 + 0.3855C_3) * \sqrt{\pi a} \quad (4)$$

or similarly, K_{IT} during heatup for a $1/4$ -thickness outside surface defect using the relationship:

$$K_{IT} = (1.043C_0 + 0.630C_1 + 0.481C_2 + 0.401C_3) * \sqrt{\pi a} \quad (5)$$

where the coefficients C_0 , C_1 , C_2 and C_3 are determined from the thermal stress distribution at any specified time during the heatup or cooldown using the form:

$$\sigma(x) = C_0 + C_1(x/a) + C_2(x/a)^2 + C_3(x/a)^3 \quad (6)$$

and x is a variable that represents the radial distance from the appropriate (i.e., inside or outside) surface to any point on the crack front and a is the maximum crack depth.

Note, that equations 3, 4 and 5 were implemented in the OPERLIM computer code, which is the program used to generate the pressure-temperature (P-T) limit curves. No other changes were made to the OPERLIM computer code with regard to P-T calculation methodology. Therefore, the P-T curve methodology is unchanged from that described in WCAP-14040, "Methodology used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves"^[2] Section 2.6 (equations 2.6.2-4 and 2.6.3-1) with the exceptions just described above.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient, K_{Ic} is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of a postulated flaw at the $1/4T$ and $3/4T$ location, the appropriate value for RT_{NDT} , and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from the temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding (thermal) stress intensity factors, K_{It} , for the reference flaw are computed. From Equation 2, the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the reference flaw of Appendix G to the ASME Code is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on the measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the $1/4T$ vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel inner diameter. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that, at any given reactor coolant temperature, the ΔT (temperature) developed during cooldown results in a higher value of K_{Ic} at the $1/4T$ location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist so that the increase in K_{Ic} exceeds K_{It} , the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location and, therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and ensures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the wall. The heatup results in compressive stresses at the inside surface that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the K_{Ic} for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the K_{Ic} for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist so that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and lower K_{Ic} values do not offset each other, and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to ensure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of the pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T flaw located at the 1/4T location from the outside surface is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and therefore tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These thermal stresses are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time (or coolant temperature) along the heatup ramp. Since the thermal stresses at the outside are tensile and increase with increasing heatup rates, each heatup rate must be analyzed on an individual basis.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced by constructing a composite curve based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration. The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist wherein, over the course of the heatup ramp, the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside, and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

3.3 Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G addresses the metal temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions. This rule states that the metal temperature of the closure flange regions must exceed the material unirradiated RT_{NDT} by at least 120°F for normal operation when the pressure exceeds 20 percent of the preservice hydrostatic test pressure (3107 psi), which is 621 psig for Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. However, per WCAP-15315, "Reactor Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements Evaluation For Operating PWR and BWR Plants"⁽¹⁸⁾, this requirement is no longer necessary when using the methodology of Code Case N-640⁽³⁾. Hence, Sequoyah Unit 1 heatup and cooldown limit curves will be generated without flange requirements included.

4 CALCULATION OF ADJUSTED REFERENCE TEMPERATURE

From Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, the adjusted reference temperature (ART) for each material in the beltline region is given by the following expression:

$$\text{ART} = \text{Initial RT}_{\text{NDT}} + \Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}} + \text{Margin} \quad (7)$$

Initial RT_{NDT} is the reference temperature for the unirradiated material as defined in paragraph NB-2331 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code^[8]. If measured values of initial RT_{NDT} for the material in question are not available, generic mean values for that class of material may be used if there are sufficient test results to establish a mean and standard deviation for the class.

$\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ is the mean value of the adjustment in reference temperature caused by irradiation and should be calculated as follows:

$$\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}} = \text{CF} * f^{(0.28 - 0.10 \log f)} \quad (8)$$

To calculate $\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ at any depth (e.g., at 1/4T or 3/4T), the following formula must first be used to attenuate the fluence at the specific depth.

$$f_{(\text{depth } x)} = f_{\text{surface}} * e^{(-0.24x)} \quad (9)$$

where x inches (vessel beltline thickness is 8.45 inches) is the depth into the vessel wall measured from the vessel clad/base metal interface. The resultant fluence is then placed in Equation 8 to calculate the $\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ at the specific depth.

The Westinghouse Radiation Engineering and Analysis Group evaluated the vessel fluence projections as a part of WCAP-15224 and are also presented in a condensed version in Table 4 of this report. The evaluation used the ENDF/B-VI scattering cross-section data set. This is consistent with methods presented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, "Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves"^[2]. Table 4 contains the calculated vessel surface fluences values at various azimuthal locations and Tables 5 and 6 contains the 1/4T and 3/4T calculated fluences and fluence factors, per the Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, used to calculate the ART values for all beltline materials in the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. Additionally, the surveillance capsule fluence values are presented in Table 7.

TABLE 4
Neutron Fluence Projections at Key Locations on the Reactor Vessel Clad/Base Metal Interface
(10^{19} n/cm², E > 1.0 MeV)

EFPY	Azimuthal Location			
	0°	15°	30°	45°
10.03	0.205	0.321	0.409	0.637
20	0.387	0.596	0.761	1.18
32	0.605	0.928	1.19	1.84
48	0.896	1.37	1.75	2.72

TABLE 5
Summary of the Vessel Surface, 1/4T and 3/4T Fluence Values
used for the Generation of the 32 EFPY Heatup/Cooldown Curves

Material	Surface	1/4 T ^(a)	3/4 T ^(a)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.84×10^{19}	1.11×10^{19}	4.02×10^{18}
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.84×10^{19}	1.11×10^{19}	4.02×10^{18}
Circumferential Weld Seam W05 (Heat 25295)	1.84×10^{18}	1.11×10^{19}	4.02×10^{17}

Note:

(a) $1/4T$ and $3/4T = F_{(Surface)} * e^{(-0.24*x)}$, where x is the depth into the vessel wall (i.e. $8.45*0.25$ or 0.75)

TABLE 6
Summary of the Calculated Fluence Factors used for the Generation of the 32 EFPY
Heatup and Cooldown Curves

EFPY	1/4T FF	3/4T FF
32	1.029	0.747

TABLE 7
Integrated Neutron Exposure of the Sequoyah Unit 1 Surveillance Capsules Tested To Date

Capsule	Fluence
T	$2.61 \times 10^{18} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
U	$7.96 \times 10^{18} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
X	$1.32 \times 10^{19} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
Y	$2.19 \times 10^{19} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$

Margin is calculated as, $M = 2 \sqrt{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\Delta^2}$. The standard deviation for the initial RT_{NDT} margin term, is σ_i 0°F when the initial RT_{NDT} is a measured value, and 17°F when a generic value is available. The standard deviation for the ΔRT_{NDT} margin term, σ_Δ , is 17°F for plates or forgings, and 8.5°F for plates or forgings when surveillance data is used. For welds, σ_Δ is equal to 28°F when surveillance capsule data is not used, and is 14°F (half the value) when credible surveillance capsule data is used. σ_Δ need not exceed 0.5 times the mean value of ΔRT_{NDT} .

Based on the surveillance program credibility evaluation presented in Appendix D to WCAP-15224, the Sequoyah Unit 1 surveillance program data is non-credible. In addition, following the guidance provided by the NRC in recent industry meeting, Table Chemistry Factor for the lower shell forging 04 was determined to be non-conservative. Hence, the adjusted reference temperature (ART) must be calculated using Position 2.1 along with the full margin term. Both Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, Position 1.1 and 2.1 have been shown herein. Contained in Tables 8 and 9 are the calculations of the 32 EFPY ART values used for generation of the heatup and cooldown curves.

TABLE 8
Calculation of the ART Values for the 1/4T Location @ 32 EFPY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF (°F)	FF	IRT _{NDT} ⁽¹⁾ (°F)	ΔRT _{NDT} ⁽³⁾ (°F)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ (°F)	ART ⁽²⁾ (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	115.6	1.029	40	119.0	34	193
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	95	1.029	73	97.8	34	205
	Position 2.1	105.9	1.029	73	109.0	34	216
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 1.1	161.3	1.029	-40	166.0	56	182
	Position 2.1	135.0	1.029	-40	138.9	56	155

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
- (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\Delta^2)^{1/2}$

TABLE 9
Calculation of the ART Values for the 3/4T Location @ 32 EFPY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF (°F)	FF	IRT _{NDT} ⁽¹⁾ (°F)	ΔRT _{NDT} ⁽³⁾ (°F)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ (°F)	ART ⁽²⁾ (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	115.6	0.747	40	86.4	34	160
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	95	0.747	73	71.0	34	178
	Position 2.1	105.9	0.747	73	79.1	34	186
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 1.1	161.3	0.747	-40	120.5	56	137
	Position 2.1	135.0	0.747	-40	100.8	56	117

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
- (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
- (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
- (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\Delta^2)^{1/2}$

The lower shell forging 04 is the limiting beltline material for the 1/4T and 3/4T case (See Tables 8 and 9). Contained in Table 10 is a summary of the limiting ARTs to be used in the generation of the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel heatup and cooldown curves.

TABLE 10
Summary of the Limiting ART Values Used in the
Generation of the Sequoyah Unit 1 Heatup/Cooldown Curves

EFPY	1/4T Limiting ART	3/4T Limiting ART
32	216°F	186°F

5 HEATUP AND COOLDOWN PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE LIMIT CURVES

Pressure-temperature limit curves for normal heatup and cooldown of the primary reactor coolant system have been calculated for the pressure and temperature in the reactor vessel beltline region using the methods discussed in Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of this report. This approved methodology is also presented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2 with exception to those items discussed in Section 1 of this report.

Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5 present the heatup curves with (10°F and 60 psig) and without margins for possible instrumentation errors using heatup rates of 60 and 100°F/hr applicable for the first 32 EFPY. Figures 3 and 6 present the cooldown curves with (10°F and 60 psig) and without margins for possible instrumentation errors using cooldown rates of 0, 20, 40, 60 and 100°F/hr applicable for 32 EFPY. Allowable combinations of temperature and pressure for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown in Figures 1 through 6. This is in addition to other criteria which must be met before the reactor is made critical, as discussed below in the following paragraphs.

The reactor must not be made critical until pressure-temperature combinations are to the right of the criticality limit line shown in Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5. The straight-line portion of the criticality limit is at the minimum permissible temperature for the 2485 psig inservice hydrostatic test as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The governing equation for the hydrostatic test is defined in Code Case N-640^[3] (approved in February 1999) as follows:

$$1.5 K_{lm} < K_{lc}$$

where,

K_{lm} is the stress intensity factor covered by membrane (pressure) stress,

$$K_{lc} = 33.2 + 20.734 e^{[0.02(T - RT_{NDT})]},$$

T is the minimum permissible metal temperature, and

RT_{NDT} is the metal reference nil-ductility temperature.

The criticality limit curve specifies pressure-temperature limits for core operation to provide additional margin during actual power production as specified in Reference 10. The pressure-temperature limits for core operation (except for low power physics tests) are that the reactor vessel must be at a temperature equal to or higher than the minimum temperature required for the inservice hydrostatic test, and at least 40°F higher than the minimum permissible temperature in the corresponding pressure-temperature curve for heatup and cooldown calculated as described in Section 3.0 of this report. For the heatup and cooldown curves without margins for instrumentation errors, the minimum temperature for the in service hydrostatic leak tests for the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel at 32 EFPY is 277°F. The vertical line drawn from these points on the pressure-temperature curve, intersecting a curve 40°F higher than the pressure-temperature limit curve, constitutes the limit for core operation for the reactor vessel.

Figures 1 through 6 define all of the above limits for ensuring prevention of nonductile failure for the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. The data points used for the heatup and cooldown pressure-temperature limit curves shown in Figures 1 through 6 are presented in Tables 11 and 14.

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 216°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 186°F




FIGURE 1 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins for Instrumentation Errors)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 216°F
 $\frac{3}{4}T$, 186°F




FIGURE 2 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 100°F/hr)
 Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins for Instrumentation Errors)

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04
LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: 1/4T, 216°F
 3/4T, 186°F




Figure 3 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations (Cooldown Rates up to 100°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins for Instrumentation Errors)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 216°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 186°F




FIGURE 4 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (With Margins for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 216°F
 $\frac{3}{4}T$, 186°F




FIGURE 5 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 100°F/hr)
 Applicable for the First 32 EFY (With Margins for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: LOWER SHELL FORGING 04

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFY: 1/4T, 216°F

3/4T, 186°F




Figure 6 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations (Cooldown Rates up to 100°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (With Margins for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

TABLE 11
32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
(without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Heatup Curves								
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T P
50	0	277	0	50	0	277	0	260 2000
50	585	277	585	50	537	277	537	277 2485
55	585	277	585	55	537	277	537	
60	585	277	586	60	537	277	538	
65	585	277	588	65	537	277	538	
70	585	277	591	70	537	277	540	
75	585	277	596	75	537	277	543	
80	585	277	602	80	537	277	547	
85	585	277	609	85	537	277	553	
90	585	277	617	90	537	277	560	
95	585	277	626	95	537	277	568	
100	585	277	637	100	537	277	577	
105	585	277	649	105	537	277	588	
110	585	277	663	110	537	277	601	
115	585	277	678	115	537	277	615	
120	586	277	695	120	537	277	631	
125	588	277	714	125	537	277	649	
130	591	277	735	130	537	277	669	
135	596	277	758	135	537	277	691	
140	602	277	784	140	537	277	716	
145	609	277	812	145	538	277	744	
150	617	277	844	150	540	277	774	
155	626	277	879	155	543	277	808	
160	637	277	918	160	547	280	846	
165	649	277	960	165	553	285	888	
170	663	277	1008	170	560	290	934	
175	678	277	1060	175	568	295	985	
180	695	280	1117	180	577	300	1041	
185	714	285	1181	185	588	305	1104	
190	735	290	1251	190	601	310	1172	
195	758	295	1329	195	615	315	1248	
200	784	300	1414	200	631	320	1332	
205	812	305	1509	205	649	325	1424	
210	844	310	1591	210	669	330	1526	
215	879	315	1677	215	691	335	1638	
220	918	320	1772	220	716	340	1762	
225	960	325	1877	225	744	345	1898	
230	1008	330	1993	230	774	350	2048	
235	1060	335	2120	235	808	355	2214	
240	1117	340	2261	240	846	360	2397	
245	1181	345	2417	245	888			
250	1251			250	934			

TABLE 11 (Continued)
 32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
 (without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Heatup Curves									
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
255	1329			255	985				
260	1414			260	1041				
265	1509			265	1104				
270	1591			270	1172				
275	1677			275	1248				
280	1772			280	1332				
285	1877			285	1424				
290	1993			290	1526				
295	2120			295	1638				
300	2261			300	1762				
305	2417			305	1898				
				310	2048				
				315	2214				
				320	2397				

TABLE 12
32 EFY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
(without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Cooldown Curves									
Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	615	50	567	50	519	50	470	50	367
55	616	55	569	55	520	55	471	55	368
60	618	60	570	60	522	60	472	60	369
65	620	65	572	65	524	65	474	65	371
70	621	70	574	70	525	70	476	70	373
75	624	75	576	75	528	75	478	75	375
80	626	80	578	80	530	80	480	80	378
85	629	85	581	85	533	85	483	85	381
90	631	90	584	90	536	90	486	90	385
95	635	95	587	95	539	95	490	95	389
100	638	100	591	100	543	100	494	100	393
105	642	105	595	105	547	105	498	105	398
110	646	110	600	110	552	110	503	110	404
115	651	115	605	115	557	115	509	115	411
120	656	120	610	120	563	120	516	120	418
125	662	125	616	125	570	125	523	125	427
130	668	130	623	130	577	130	531	130	436
135	676	135	631	135	585	135	539	135	447
140	683	140	639	140	594	140	549	140	459
145	692	145	648	145	604	145	560	145	472
150	702	150	659	150	616	150	572	150	487
155	712	155	670	155	628	155	586	155	503
160	724	160	683	160	642	160	601	160	521
165	737	165	697	165	657	165	618	165	542
170	751	170	712	170	674	170	637	170	565
175	767	175	729	175	693	175	657	175	590
180	784	180	748	180	714	180	680	180	618
185	803	185	769	185	737	185	706	185	650
190	824	190	793	190	762	190	734	190	684
195	848	195	819	195	791	195	765	195	723
200	874	200	847	200	822	200	800	200	766

TABLE 12 - (Continued)
 32 EPFY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
 (without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Cooldown Curves									
Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
205	903	205	879	205	857	205	839	205	814
210	934	210	913	210	896	210	881	210	866
215	969	215	952	215	938	215	929	215	925
220	1008	220	995	220	985	220	981	220	990
225	1051	225	1042	225	1038	225	1039		
230	1098	230	1094	230	1096				
235	1150								
240	1208								
245	1272								
250	1343								
255	1420								
260	1507								
265	1602								
270	1707								
275	1823								
280	1952								
285	2094								
290	2251								
295	2424								

TABLE 13
32 EFY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
(with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Heatup Curves								
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T P
50	0	288	0	50	0	288	0	272 2000
50	525	288	525	50	477	288	477	288 2485
55	525	288	525	55	477	288	477	
60	525	288	525	60	477	288	477	
65	525	288	525	65	477	288	477	
70	525	288	526	70	477	288	478	
75	525	288	528	75	477	288	478	
80	525	288	531	80	477	288	480	
85	525	288	531	85	477	288	483	
90	525	288	536	90	477	288	487	
95	525	288	542	95	477	288	493	
100	525	288	549	100	477	288	500	
105	525	288	557	105	477	288	508	
110	525	288	566	110	477	288	517	
115	525	288	577	115	477	288	528	
120	525	288	589	120	477	288	541	
125	525	288	603	125	477	288	541	
130	526	288	618	130	477	288	555	
135	528	288	635	135	477	288	571	
140	531	288	654	140	477	288	589	
145	536	288	675	145	477	288	609	
150	542	288	698	150	477	288	631	
155	549	288	724	155	478	288	656	
160	557	288	752	160	480	288	684	
165	566	288	784	165	483	288	714	
170	577	288	819	170	487	288	748	
175	589	288	858	175	493	290	786	
180	603	288	900	180	500	295	828	
185	618	288	948	185	508	300	874	
190	635	288	1000	190	517	305	925	
195	654	290	1057	195	528	310	981	
200	675	295	1121	200	541	315	1044	
205	698	300	1191	205	555	320	1112	
210	724	305	1269	210	571	325	1188	
215	752	310	1354	215	589	330	1272	
220	784	315	1449	220	609	335	1364	
225	819	320	1531	225	631	340	1466	
230	858	325	1617	230	656	345	1578	
235	900	330	1712	235	684	350	1702	
240	948	335	1817	240	714	355	1838	
245	1000	340	1933	245	748	360	1988	
250	1057	345	2060	250	786	365	2154	

TABLE 13 (Continued)
 32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
 (with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Heatup Curves							
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
255	1121	350	2201	255	828	370	2337
260	1191	355	2357	260	874		
265	1269			265	925		
270	1354			270	981		
275	1449			275	1044		
280	1531			280	1112		
285	1617			285	1188		
290	1712			290	1272		
295	1817			295	1364		
300	1933			300	1466		
305	2060			305	1578		
310	2201			310	1702		
315	2357			315	1838		
				320	1988		
				325	2154		
				330	2337		

TABLE 14
32 EFPY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
(with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Cooldown Curves									
Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	552	50	503	50	457	50	408	50	305
55	553	55	505	55	458	55	409	55	306
60	555	60	507	60	459	60	410	60	307
65	556	65	509	65	460	65	411	65	308
70	558	70	510	70	462	70	412	70	309
75	560	75	512	75	464	75	414	75	311
80	561	80	514	80	465	80	416	80	313
85	564	85	516	85	468	85	418	85	315
90	566	90	518	90	470	90	420	90	318
95	569	95	521	95	473	95	423	95	321
100	571	100	524	100	476	100	426	100	325
105	575	105	527	105	479	105	430	105	329
110	578	110	531	110	483	110	434	110	333
115	582	115	535	115	487	115	438	115	338
120	586	120	540	120	492	120	443	120	344
125	591	125	545	125	497	125	449	125	351
130	596	130	550	130	503	130	456	130	358
135	602	135	556	135	510	135	463	135	367
140	608	140	563	140	517	140	471	140	376
145	616	145	571	145	525	145	479	145	387
150	623	150	579	150	534	150	489	150	399
155	632	155	588	155	544	155	500	155	412
160	642	160	599	160	556	160	512	160	427
165	652	165	610	165	568	165	526	165	443
170	664	170	623	170	582	170	541	170	461
175	677	175	637	175	597	175	558	175	482
180	691	180	652	180	614	180	577	180	505
185	707	185	669	185	633	185	597	185	530
190	724	190	688	190	654	190	620	190	558
195	743	195	709	195	677	195	646	195	590
200	764	200	733	200	702	200	674	200	624
205	788	205	759	205	731	205	705	205	663
210	814	210	787	210	762	210	740	210	706
215	843	215	819	215	797	215	779	215	754

TABLE 14 - (Continued)
 32 EFPY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
 (with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Cooldown Curves									
Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
220	874	220	853	220	836	220	821	220	806
225	909	225	892	225	878	225	869	225	865
230	948	230	935	230	925	230	921	230	930
235	991	235	982	235	978	235	979		
240	1038	240	1034	240	1036				
245	1090								
250	1148								
255	1212								
260	1283								
265	1360								
270	1447								
275	1542								
280	1647								
285	1763								
290	1892								
295	2034								
300	2191								
305	2364								

6 REFERENCES

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10. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., Federal Register, Volume 60, No. 243, dated December 19, 1995.
11. WCAP-7924-A, "Basis for Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves," W. S. Hazelton, et al., April 1975.
12. Calc. No. 92-016, "WOG USE Program - Onset of Upper Shelf Energy Calculations", J. M. Chicots, dated 11/12/92. File # WOG-108/4-18 (MUHP-5080).
13. WCAP-12970, "Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation Sequoyah Unit 1", J.M. Chicots, et. al., Dated June, 1991.
14. Westinghouse Letter TVA-91-242

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15. Westinghouse Letter TVA-91-243
 16. TVA letter No. N9664, "TASK N99-017 - Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limit Report Development - N2N-048," W. M. Justice, August 17, 1999.
 17. TVA letter No. N9667, "TASK N99-017 - Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limit Report Development - N2N-048," W. M. Justice, August 20, 1999.
 18. WCAP-15315, "Reactor Vessel Closure Head / Vessel Flange Requirements Evaluation for Operating PWR and BWR Plants", W. Bamford, et. al, October 1999.
 19. Westinghouse Letter TVA-93-105.

APPENDIX A

LTOPS SETPOINTS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Westinghouse has been requested to develop Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) setpoints for Sequoyah Unit 1, for a vessel exposure of 32 EFPY. The LTOPS setpoints for the Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, were last revised by Westinghouse in June of 1991 using pressure-temperature limits supplied by Tennessee Valley Authority for a vessel exposure of 16 EFPY. The results of this analysis were reported via References 14 and 15. The June 1991 analysis was based on the September 1989 analysis which addressed: Eagle-21 implementation and Appendix G limits based on Regulatory Guide 1.99. This Section documents the development of new Sequoyah Unit 1 COMS setpoints for 32 EFPY.

The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) is designed to provide the capability, during relatively low temperatures Reactor Coolant System (RCS) operation (typically less than 350°F), to protect the reactor vessel from being exposed to conditions of fast propagating brittle fracture. The LTOPS is provided in addition to the administrative controls, to prevent overpressure transients and as a supplement to the RCS overpressure mitigation function of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) relief valves. LTOPS consists of pressurizer PORVs and actuation logic from the wide range pressure channels. Once the system is enabled, no operator action is involved for the LTOPS to perform its intended pressure mitigation function.

LTOPS setpoints are conservatively selected to prevent exceeding the pressure/temperature limits established by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G requirements.

Two specific transients have been defined as the design basis for LTOPS. Each of these transient scenarios assume that the RCS is in a water-solid condition and that the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The first transient consists of a heat injection scenario in which a reactor coolant pump in a single loop is started with the RCS temperature as much as 50°F lower than the steam generator secondary side temperature and the RHRS has been inadvertently isolated. This results in a sudden heat input to the RCS from the steam generators, creating an increasing pressure transient. The second transient has been defined as a mass injection scenario into the RCS caused by the simultaneous isolation of the RHRS, isolation of letdown and failure of the normal charging flow controls to the full flow condition. The resulting mass injection/letdown mismatch causes an increasing pressure transient.

1.2 LTOPS SETPOINT DETERMINATION

Westinghouse has developed new LTOPS setpoints for Sequoyah Unit 1, based on a vessel exposure of 32 EFPY using the methodology established in WCAP-14040 (Ref. 2). This methodology maximizes the available operating margin for setpoint selection while maintaining an appropriate level of protection in support of reactor vessel integrity. Note, Appendix G pressure limit relaxation allowed by ASME Code Case N-514 was not applied.

Plant design characteristics are unchanged (i.e., heat injection and mass injection transients characteristics and related plant responses have not been altered). Therefore, a complete reanalysis is not required. The new LTOPS setpoints were developed using results of the previous heat and mass injection transient analyses.

1.2.1 Pressure Limits Selection

The function of the LTOPS is to protect the reactor vessel from fast propagating brittle fracture. This has been implemented by choosing LTOPS setpoints, which prevent exceeding the limits prescribed by the applicable pressure/temperature characteristic for the specific reactor vessel material in accordance with rules given in Appendix G to 10CFR50. The LTOPS design basis takes credit for the fact that overpressure events most likely occur during isothermal conditions in the RCS. Therefore, it is appropriate to utilize the steady-state Appendix G limit. The Sequoyah Unit 1, 10CFR50 Appendix G curve for 32 EFPY is shown by Figure A-1. This curve sets the nominal upper limit on the pressure which should not be exceeded during RCS increasing pressure transients based on reactor vessel material properties.

When a relief valve is actuated to mitigate an increasing pressure transient, the system pressure then decreases, as the relief valve releases coolant, until a reset pressure is reached where the valve is signaled to close. Note that the pressure continues to decrease below the reset pressure as the valve re-closes. The nominal lower limit on the pressure during the transient is typically established based solely on an operational consideration for the RCP #1 seal to maintain a nominal differential pressure across the seal faces for proper film-riding performance. The RCP #1 seal limit is shown in Figure 1.

The nominal upper limit (based on the minimum of the steady-state 10CFR50 Appendix G requirement) and the nominal lower limit (based on RCP #1 seal performance criteria) create a pressure range from which the setpoints for both PORVs may be selected.

1.2.2 Mass Input Consideration

For a particular mass input transient to the RCS, the relief valve will be signaled to open at a specific pressure setpoint. However, there will be a pressure overshoot during the delay time before the valve starts to move and during the time the valve is moving to the full open position. This overshoot is dependent on the dynamics of the system and the input parameters, and results in a maximum system pressure somewhat higher than the set pressure. Similarly there will be a pressure undershoot, while the valve is relieving, both due to the reset pressure being below the setpoint and to the delay in stroking the valve closed.

The previous Sequoyah analyses of multiple mass input cases were used to determine the relationship between setpressures and resulting overshoots/undershoots.

1.2.3 Heat Input Consideration

The heat input case is done similarly to the mass input case except that the locus of transient pressure values versus selected setpoints may be determined for several values of the initial RCS temperature. This heat input evaluation provides a range of acceptable setpoints dependent on the reactor coolant temperature, whereas the mass input case is limited to the most restrictive low temperature condition only (i.e., the mass injection transient is not sensitive to temperature).

The previous Sequoyah analyses of multiple heat input cases were used to determine the relationship between setpressures and resulting overshoots/undershoots.

1.2.4 Final Setpoint Selection

Appendix G limits described in Section 1.2.1, were conservatively adjusted accounting for the pressure difference (ΔP) between the wide range pressure transmitter and the reactor vessel limiting beltline region of 68.3 psi for 4 RCPs in operation (See Reference 19).

The results of the analyses described in Section 1.2.2 & 1.2.3, and the adjusted Appendix G limit were used to define the maximum allowable setpoints for which the overpressure will not exceed the pressure limit applicable at a specific reactor vessel temperature. The maximum allowable setpoints are shown in Figure A-1.

Per Ref. 17, Sequoyah Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation SQN-IC014 establishes the instrument loop inaccuracy of the Sequoyah temperature and pressure instrument channels associated with the LTOPS. Previously, the LTOPS setpoints have been provided to TVA without application of instrument uncertainties. The TVA calculation quantified the instrument channel uncertainties, applied them to the nominal Westinghouse setpoints and evaluated the result against the safety limits established by the 10CFR50, Appendix G steady state heatup curve. The TVA demonstrated accuracy calculation will be revised to reflect the LTOPS setpoints calculated by Westinghouse under the subject task. As such, it is not necessary for Westinghouse to include instrument uncertainties in the nominal LTOPS setpoint calculation. Note, the heat injection results were adjusted to include 50°F thermal transport effect (difference in temperature between the RCS and steam generator at transient initiation).

The maximum allowable setpoints, adjusted to produce a smoother curve and reduced to nine data points, becomes the setpoints for PORV#2. A setpoint at a minimum temperature of 50°F was selected, as requested by TVA (Ref. 16). Each of the two PORVs may have a different pressure setpoint such that only one valve will open at a time and mitigate the transient (i.e., staggered setpoints). The second valve operates only if the first fails to open on command. This design supports a single failure assumption as well as minimizing the potential for both PORVs to open simultaneously, a condition which may create excessive pressure undershoot and challenge the RCP #1 seal performance criteria. The PORV#1 setpoints were selected by adjusting the setpoint PORV#2 in relationship to the overshoots discussed in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. The selected setpoints for PORV #1 and PORV #2 are shown in Table A-1 and Figure A-2. These setpoints were evaluated using the undershoots discussed in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 to ensure that they protect against the RCP # 1 seal limit.

In summary, the selection of the setpoints for LTOPS considered the use of nominal upper and lower pressure limits. The upper limits are specified by the minimum of the steady-state cooldown curve as calculated in accordance with Appendix G to 10CFR50 (adjusted to account for four RCPs in operation). The lower pressure extreme is specified by the reactor coolant pump #1 seal minimum differential pressure performance criteria. The selected setpoints, shown in Table A-1

and Figure A-2, provide protection against Appendix G, and RCP #1 seal limit violations. Note, these setpoints do not address instrumentation uncertainties.

1.3 ARMING AND ENABLE TEMPERATURES FOR LTOPS

The LTOPS arming temperature is traditionally based on the temperature corresponding to when Appendix G pressure equals 2500 psia. Based on this methodology the LTOPS arming temperature for Sequoyah conservatively continues to be 350°F.

The enable temperature is the temperature below which the LTOPS system is required to be operable, based on vessel materials concerns. ASME Code Case N-514 requires the LTOPS to be in operation at coolant temperatures less than 200°F or at coolant temperatures less than a temperature corresponding to a reactor vessel metal temperature less than $RT_{NDT} + 50^{\circ}\text{F}$, whichever is greater. RT_{NDT} is the highest Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) for the limiting belt-line material at a distance one fourth of the vessel section thickness from the vessel inside surface (i.e., clad/base metal interface), as determined by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The minimum required enable temperature for the Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel is 295°F at 32 EFPY of operation.

Table A-1
Selected Setpoints, Sequoyah Unit 1

Trcs (Deg.F)	PORV#2 Setpoint (psig)	PORV#1 Setpoint (psig)
50	490	465
100	500	475
135	540	510
175	575	540
200	610	570
250	745	685
280	745	685
405	745	685
450	2350	2350




Figure A-1: Sequoyah Unit 1 LTOPS Setpoint Selection




Figure A-2 - Sequoyah Unit 1 LTOPS Selected Setpoints

APPENDIX B
PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (PTS) RESULTS

PTS Calculations:

The PTS Rule requires that for each pressurized water nuclear power reactor for which an operating license has been issued, the licensee shall have projected values of RT_{PTS} , accepted by the NRC, for each reactor vessel beltline material for the EOL fluence of the material. This assessment must specify the basis for the projected value of RT_{PTS} for each vessel beltline material, including the assumptions regarding core loading patterns, and must specify the copper and nickel contents and the fluence value used in the calculation. This assessment must be updated whenever there is a significant change in projected values of RT_{PTS} , or upon request for a change in the expiration date for operation of the facility. (Changes to RT_{PTS} values are considered significant if either the previous value or the current value, or both values, exceed the screening criterion prior to the expiration of the operating license, including any renewed term, if applicable, for the plant.

To verify that RT_{NDT} , for each vessel beltline material is a bounding value for the specific reactor vessel, licensees shall consider plant-specific information that could affect the level of embrittlement. This information includes but is not limited to the reactor vessel operating temperature and any related surveillance program results. (Surveillance program results mean any data that demonstrates the embrittlement trends for the limiting beltline material, including but not limited to data from test reactors or from surveillance programs at other plants with or without surveillance program integrated per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H.)

Calculations:

Tables B-1 and B-2 contain the results of the calculations for each of the beltline region materials in the Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel. Per TVA, the EOL is 32 EFPY and the Life Extension EOL is 48 EFPY.

TABLE B-1
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 1 Beltline Region Materials at 32 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.84	1.167	115.6	134.9	34	40	209
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.84	1.167	95.0	110.9	34	73	218
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Using S/C Data)	1.84	1.167	105.9	123.6	34	73	231
Circumferential Weld Metal	1.84	1.167	161.3	188.2	56	-40	204
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	1.84	1.167	135.0	157.5	56	-40	174

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
 (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
 (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF * FF$

TABLE B-2
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 1 Beltline Region Materials at 48 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	2.72	1.267	115.6	146.5	34	40	221
Lower Shell Forging 04	2.72	1.267	95.0	120.4	34	73	227
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Using S/C Data)	2.72	1.267	105.9	134.2	34	73	241
Circumferential Weld Metal	2.72	1.267	161.3	204.4	56	-40	220
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	2.72	1.267	135.0	171.0	56	-40	187

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
 (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
 (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF * FF$

All of the beltline materials in the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel are below the screening criteria values of 270°F and 300°F at 32 and 48 EFY.

APPENDIX C
CALCULATED FLUENCE DATA

The best estimate exposure of the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel presented in WCAP-15224^[7] was developed using a combination of absolute plant specific transport calculations and all available plant specific measurement data. The evaluation is consistent with the methodology accepted by the NRC and documented in WCAP-14040-NP-A^[2].

Combining this measurement data base with the plant-specific calculations, the best estimate vessel exposure is obtained from the following relationship:

$$\Phi_{Best\ Est.} = K \Phi_{Calc.}$$

where:

- $\Phi_{Best\ Est.}$ = The best estimate fast neutron exposure at the location of interest.
- K = The plant specific best estimate/calculation (BE/C) bias factor derived from the surveillance capsule dosimetry data.
- $\Phi_{Calc.}$ = The absolute calculated fast neutron exposure at the location of interest.

For Sequoyah Unit 1, the derived plant specific bias factors were 1.14, 1.14, 1.14 for $\Phi(E > 1.0\text{ MeV})$, $\Phi(E > 0.1\text{ MeV})$, and dpa, respectively. Bias factors of this magnitude developed with BUGLE-96 are within expected tolerances for fluence calculated using the ENDF/B-VI based cross-section library.

Table C-1 presents the reactor vessel fast neutron ($E > 1.0\text{ MeV}$) exposure projections using the absolute plant specific calculations. Table C-2 presents the calculated and measured fluences at the capsules.

Table C-1
Azimuthal Variations Of The Neutron Exposure Projections
On The Reactor Vessel Clad/Base Metal Interface At Core Midplane

Calculated

	0°	15°	30°	45° ^{a)}
10.03 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	2.05E+18	3.21E+18	4.09E+18	6.37E+18
E>0.1 MeV	4.07E+18	6.41E+18	8.41E+18	1.34E+19
dpa	2.60E-03	4.06E-03	5.22E-03	8.08E-03
20 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	3.87E+18	5.96E+18	7.61E+18	1.18E+19
E>0.1 MeV	8.68E+18	1.34E+19	1.76E+19	2.80E+19
dpa	5.55E-03	8.48E-03	1.09E-02	1.69E-02
32 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	6.05E+18	9.28E+18	1.19E+19	1.84E+19
E>0.1 MeV	1.42E+19	2.18E+19	2.86E+19	4.56E+19
dpa	9.09E-03	1.38E-02	1.78E-02	2.76E-02
48 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	8.96E+18	1.37E+19	1.75E+19	2.72E+19
E>0.1 MeV	2.16E+19	3.30E+19	4.33E+19	6.91E+19
dpa	1.38E-02	2.09E-02	2.69E-02	4.18E-02

Note:

a) Maximum neutron exposure projection

Table C-2
Comparison Of Calculated And Best Estimate Integrated Neutron
Exposure Of Sequoyah Unit 1 Surveillance Capsules T, U, X, and Y

CAPSULE T

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.61E+18	2.89E+18	1.10
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	8.74E+18	9.62E+18	1.10
dpa	4.34E-03	4.80E-03	1.11

CAPSULE U

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	7.96E+18	9.69E+18	1.22
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.66E+19	3.16E+19	1.19
dpa	1.32E-02	1.59E-02	1.21

CAPSULE X

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	1.32E+19	1.50E+19	1.14
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	4.42E+19	5.09E+19	1.15
dpa	2.20E-02	2.51E-02	1.15

CAPSULE Y

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.19E+19	2.43E+19	1.11
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	7.31E+19	8.15E+19	1.12
dpa	3.63E-02	4.05E-02	1.12

AVERAGE BE/C RATIOS

	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	1.14
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	1.14
dpa	1.14

APPENDIX D

UPDATED SURVEILLANCE MATERIAL 30 FT-LB TRANSITION
TEMPERATURE SHIFTS AND UPPER SHELF ENERGY DECREASES

TABLE D-1
Measured 30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shifts of all Available Surveillance Data

Material	Capsule	Fluence ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²)	30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shift		Upper Shelf Energy Decrease	
			Predicted (°F) ^(a)	Measured (°F) ^(b)	Predicted (%) ^(a)	Measured (%) ^(c)
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Tangential)	T	0.261	59.85	67.52	16	16
	U	0.796	89.3	109.7	20.5	21
	X	1.32	102.6	145.12	23	8
	Y	2.19	114.95	129.87	26.5	23
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Axial)	T	0.261	59.85	50.59	16	0
	U	0.796	89.3	67.59	20.5	19
	X	1.32	102.6	103.34	23	22
	Y	2.19	114.95	133.35	26.5	19
Weld Metal	T	0.261	111.13	127.79	35	30
	U	0.796	165.82	144.92	42	26
	X	1.32	190.51	159.02	45	21
	Y	2.19	213.44	163.8	48	28
HAZ Metal	T	0.261	--	45.48	--	20
	U	0.796	--	78.94	--	26
	X	1.32	--	95.89	--	3
	Y	2.19	--	73.3	--	10

Notes:

- (a) Based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology using the mean weight percent values of copper and nickel of the surveillance material.
- (b) Calculated using measured Charpy data plotted using CVGRAPH, Version 4.1 (Reference 9)
- (c) Values are based on the definition of upper shelf energy given in ASTM E185-82.

APPENDIX E

REACTOR VESSEL BELTLINE MATERIAL PROJECTED END OF LICENSE
UPPER SHELF ENERGY VALUES

TABLE E-1
Predicted End-of-License (32 EFPY) USE Calculations for all the Beltline Region Materials

Material	Weight % of Cu	1/4T EOL Fluence (10^{19} n/cm ²)	Unirradiated USE ^(a) (ft-lb)	Projected USE Decrease (%)	Projected EOL USE (ft-lb)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	0.15	1.11	79	24	60
Lower Shell Forging 04 Using S/C Data	0.13	1.11	72	22	56
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam W05 Using S/C Data	0.35	1.11	113	42	66

Notes:

- (a) These values were obtained from Reference 12.

APPENDIX F
UPDATED SURVEILLANCE CAPSULE REMOVAL SCHEDULE

The following surveillance capsule removal schedule meets the requirements of ASTM E185-82 and is recommended for future capsules to be removed from the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel. This recommended removal schedule is applicable to 32 EFPY of operation.

Table 7-1 Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule				
Capsule	Location	Lead Factor ^(a)	Removal Time (EFPY) ^(b)	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV) ^(c)
T	40°	3.39	1.03	2.61 x 10 ¹⁸ (c)
U	140°	3.47	3.00	7.96 x 10 ¹⁸ (c)
X	220°	3.47	5.27	1.32 x 10 ¹⁹ (c)
Y	320°	3.43	10.03	2.19 x 10 ¹⁹ (c,d)
S	4°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)
V	176°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)
W	184°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)
Z	356°	1.08	Standby	(d,e)

Notes:

- (a) Updated in Capsule Y dosimetry analysis (Reference 7).
- (b) Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) from plant startup.
- (c) Plant specific evaluation.
- (d) This fluence is not less than once or greater than twice the peak end of license (32 EFPY) fluence
- (e) Capsules S, V, W and Z will reach a fluence of 2.74×10^{19} (E > 1.0 MeV), the 48 EFPY peak vessel fluence at approximately 44 EFPY, respectively.

APPENDIX G
ENABLE TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS

Enable Temperature Calculation:

ASME Code Case N-514 requires the low temperature overpressure (LTOP or COMS) system to be in operation at coolant temperatures less than 200°F or at coolant temperatures less than a temperature corresponding to a reactor vessel metal temperature less than $RT_{NDT} + 50^\circ\text{F}$, whichever is greater. RT_{NDT} is the highest adjusted reference temperature (ART) for the limiting beltline material at a distance one fourth of the vessel section thickness from the vessel inside surface (ie. clad/base metal interface), as determined by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.

32 EFPY

The highest calculated 1/4T ART for the Sequoyah Unit 1 reactor vessel beltline region at 32 EFPY is 216°F.

From the OPERLIM computer code output for the Sequoyah Unit 1 32 EFPY P-T limit curves without margins (Configuration # 1389796830, *operlim.film* File) the maximum ΔT_{metal} is:

Cooldown Rate (Steady-State Cooldown):
 $\max (\Delta T_{metal})$ at 1/4T = 0°F

Heatup Rate of 100°F/Hr:
 $\max (\Delta T_{metal})$ at 1/4T = 28.924°F

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Enable Temperature (ENBT)} &= RT_{NDT} + 50 + \max (\Delta T_{metal}), ^\circ\text{F} \\ &= (216 + 50 + 28.924) ^\circ\text{F} \\ &= 294.924^\circ\text{F}\end{aligned}$$

The minimum required enable temperature for the Sequoyah Unit 1 Reactor Vessel is 295°F at 32 EFPY of operation.

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WCAP-15321, Revision 1


**Sequoyah Unit 2
Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves
for Normal Operation and PTLR Support
Documentation**

J. H. Ledger

April 2001

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Sequoyah Unit 2 Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation and PTLR Support Documentation

WCAP-15321
Revision 1



Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

PREFACE

This report has been technically reviewed and verified by:

T. J. Laubham



Revision 1:

An error was detected in the "OPERLIM" Computer Program that Westinghouse uses to generate pressure-temperature (PT) limit curves. This error potentially effects the heatup curves when the 1996 Appendix G Methodology is used in generating the PT curves. It has been determined that WCAP-15321 Rev. 0 was impacted by this error. Thus, this revision provides corrected curves from WCAP-15321 Rev. 0.

Note that only the 60°F/hr heatup curves were affected by this error. The 100°F/hr heatup and all cooldown curves were not affected by the computer error and thus remain valid.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides the methodology and results of the generation of heatup and cooldown pressure temperature limit curves for normal operation of the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. In addition, Pressure Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) support information, such as LTOPS Setpoint, PTS, EOL USE and Withdrawal Schedule, is documented herein under the Appendices. The PT curves were generated based on the latest available reactor vessel information (Capsule Y analysis, WCAP-15321^[7] and the latest Pressure-Temperature (P-T) Limit Curves from WCAP-12971^[13]). The Sequoyah Unit 2 heatup and cooldown pressure-temperature limit curves have been updated based on the use of the ASME Code Case N-640^[3], which allows the use of the K_{1c} methodology, and the elimination of the reactor vessel flange temperature requirement (Ref, WCAP-15315^[6]).

1 INTRODUCTION

Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the adjusted RT_{NDT} (reference nil-ductility temperature) corresponding to the limiting beltline region material of the reactor vessel. The adjusted RT_{NDT} of the limiting material in the core region of the reactor vessel is determined by using the unirradiated reactor vessel material fracture toughness properties, estimating the radiation-induced ΔRT_{NDT} , and adding a margin. The unirradiated RT_{NDT} is designated as the higher of either the drop weight nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT) or the temperature at which the material exhibits at least 50 ft-lb of impact energy and 35-mil lateral expansion (normal to the major working direction) minus 60°F.

RT_{NDT} increases as the material is exposed to fast-neutron radiation. Therefore, to find the most limiting RT_{NDT} at any time period in the reactor's life, ΔRT_{NDT} due to the radiation exposure associated with that time period must be added to the unirradiated RT_{NDT} (IRT_{NDT}). The extent of the shift in RT_{NDT} is enhanced by certain chemical elements (such as copper and nickel) present in reactor vessel steels. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published a method for predicting radiation embrittlement in Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials."^[1] Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, is used for the calculation of Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) values ($IRT_{NDT} + \Delta RT_{NDT} + \text{margins for uncertainties}$) at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations, where T is the thickness of the vessel at the beltline region measured from the clad/base metal interface.

The heatup and cooldown curves documented in this report were generated using the most limiting ART values and the NRC approved methodology documented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2^[2], "Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves" with exception of the following: 1) The fluence values used in this report are calculated fluence values, not the best estimate fluence values (See Appendix B). 2) The K_{Ic} critical stress intensities are used in place of the K_{Is} critical stress intensities. This methodology is taken from approved ASME Code Case N-640^[3]. 3) The reactor vessel flange temperature requirement has been eliminated. Justification has been provided in WCAP-15315^[6]. 4) The 1996 Version of Appendix G to Section XI^[4] will be used rather than the 1989 version.

2 FRACTURE TOUGHNESS PROPERTIES

The fracture-toughness properties of the ferritic materials in the reactor coolant pressure boundary are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan^[5]. The beltline material properties of the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel is presented in Table 1.

Best estimate copper (Cu) and nickel (Ni) weight percent values used to calculate chemistry factors (CF) in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, are provided in Table 1. Additionally, surveillance capsule data is available for four capsules (Capsules T, U, X and Y) already removed from the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. This surveillance capsule data was also used to calculate CF values per Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 in Table 2. These CF values are summarized in Table 3.

The Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 methodology used to develop the heatup and cooldown curves documented in this report is the same as that documented in WCAP-14040, Revision 2.

TABLE 1
Reactor Vessel Beltline Material Unirradiated Toughness Properties

Material Description	Cu (%)	Ni(%)	Initial RT _{NDT} ^(a)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Heat #288757 / 981057)	0.13	0.76	10°F
Lower Shell Forging 04 (Heat # 990469 / 293323)	0.14	0.76	-22°F
Intermediate to Lower Shell Forging Circumferential Weld Seam ^(b)	0.12	0.11	-4°F
Surveillance Weld ^(b)	0.13	0.11	---

Notes:

- (a) The Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
- (b) Circumferential Weld Seam was fabricated with weld wire type SMIT 89, Heat # 4278, Flux type SMIT 89, lot # 1211 and is representative of the intermediate to lower shell circumferential weld.

The chemistry factors were calculated using Regulatory Guide 1.99 Revision 2, Positions 1.1 and 2.1. Position 1.1 uses the Tables from the Reg. Guide along with the best estimate copper and nickel weight percents. Position 2.1 uses the surveillance capsule data from all capsules withdrawn to date. The fluence values used to determine the CFs in Table 2 are the calculated fluence values at the surveillance capsule locations. Hence, the calculated fluence values were used for all cases.

The measured ΔRT_{NDT} values for the weld data were adjusted using the ratio procedure given in Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. All fluence values were obtained from the recent Sequoyah Unit 2 capsule analysis^[7] which calculated the fluences using the ENDF/B-VI scattering cross-section data set. The fluence values used are also documented in Appendix C of this report.

TABLE 2
Calculation of Chemistry Factors using Sequoyah Unit 2 Surveillance Capsule Data

Material	Capsule	Capsule $f^{(a)}$	$FF^{(b)}$	$\Delta RT_{NDT}^{(c)}$	$FF * \Delta RT_{NDT}$	FF^2
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Tangential)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	63.7	40.45	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	79.3	71.13	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	85.7	90.41	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	134.1	161.86	1.457
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Axial)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	48.7	30.92	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	66.1	59.29	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	110.0	116.05	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	89.2	107.66	1.457
	SUM:				677.77°F	7.556
	$CF_{os} = \sum(FF * RT_{NDT}) \div \sum(FF^2) = (677.77) \div (7.556) = 89.7^\circ F$					
Surveillance Weld Material ^(d)	T	2.61E+18	0.635	69.4 (74.6)	44.07	0.403
	U	6.92E+18	0.897	121.3 (130.4)	108.81	0.805
	X	1.22E+19	1.055	41.1 (44.2)	43.36	1.113
	Y	2.14E+19	1.207	80.8 (86.9)	97.53	1.457
	SUM:				293.77°F	3.778
	$CF_{Surv. Weld} = \sum(FF * RT_{NDT}) \div \sum(FF^2) = (293.77^\circ F) \div (3.778) = 77.8^\circ F$					

Notes:

- (a) f = Calculated fluence from capsule Y dosimetry analysis results⁽⁷⁾, ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm², $E > 1.0$ MeV).
- (b) FF = fluence factor = $f^{(0.28 - 0.1 \cdot \log f)}$.
- (c) ΔRT_{NDT} values are the measured 30 ft-lb shift values taken from App. B of Ref. 7, rounded to one decimal point.
- (d) The surveillance weld metal ΔRT_{NDT} values have been adjusted by a ratio factor of 0.93.

TABLE 3
Summary of the Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Beltline Material Chemistry Factors

Material	Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 Position 1.1 CF's	Reg. Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 Position 2.1 CF's
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	95°F	89.7°F
Lower Shell Forging 04	104°F	---
Circumferential Weld W05 (Heat # 4278)	63°F	77.8°F
Surveillance Weld Metal (Heat # 4278)	67.9°F	---

3 CRITERIA FOR ALLOWABLE PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIPS

3.1 Overall Approach

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor, K_I , for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor, K_{Ic} , for the metal temperature at that time. K_{Ic} is obtained from the reference fracture toughness curve, defined in Code Case N-640, "Alternative Reference Fracture Toughness for Development of PT Limit Curves for Section XI"^[3 & 4] of the ASME Appendix G to Section XI. The K_{Ic} curve is given by the following equation:

$$K_{Ic} = 33.2 + 20.734 * e^{(0.02(T - RT_{NDT}))} \quad (1)$$

where,

K_{Ic} = reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature T and the metal reference nil-ductility temperature RT_{NDT}

This K_{Ic} curve is based on the lower bound of static critical K_I values measured as a function of temperature on specimens of SA-533 Grade B Class1, SA-508-1, SA-508-2, SA-508-3 steel.

3.2 Methodology for Pressure-Temperature Limit Curve Development

The governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C * K_{Im} + K_{It} < K_{Ic} \quad (2)$$

where,

K_{Im} = stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress
 K_{It} = stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients
 K_{Ic} = function of temperature relative to the RT_{NDT} of the material
 C = 2.0 for Level A and Level B service limits
 C = 1.5 for hydrostatic and leak test conditions during which the reactor core is not critical

For membrane tension, the corresponding K_I for the postulated defect is:

$$K_{Im} = M_m \times (pR_i / t) \quad (3)$$

where, M_m for an inside surface flaw is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} M_m &= 1.85 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} < 2, \\ M_m &= 0.926\sqrt{t} \text{ for } 2 \leq \sqrt{t} \leq 3.464, \\ M_m &= 3.21 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} > 3.464 \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, M_m for an outside surface flaw is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} M_m &= 1.77 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} < 2, \\ M_m &= 0.893\sqrt{t} \text{ for } 2 \leq \sqrt{t} \leq 3.464, \\ M_m &= 3.09 \text{ for } \sqrt{t} > 3.464 \end{aligned}$$

and p = internal pressure, R_i = vessel inner radius, and t = vessel wall thickness.

For bending stress, the corresponding K_I for the postulated defect is:

$$K_{Ib} = M_b \times \text{Maximum Stress, where } M_b \text{ is two-thirds of } M_m$$

The maximum K_I produced by radial thermal gradient for the postulated inside surface defect of G-2120 is $K_{It} = 0.953 \times 10^{-3} \times CR \times t^{2.5}$, where CR is the cooldown rate in $^{\circ}\text{F/hr.}$, or for a postulated outside surface defect, $K_{It} = 0.753 \times 10^{-3} \times HU \times t^{2.5}$, where HU is the heatup rate in $^{\circ}\text{F/hr.}$

The through-wall temperature difference associated with the maximum thermal K_I can be determined from Fig. G-2214-1. The temperature at any radial distance from the vessel surface can be determined from Fig. G-2214-2 for the maximum thermal K_I .

- The maximum thermal K_I relationship and the temperature relationship in Fig. G-2214-1 are applicable only for the conditions given in G-2214.3(a)(1) and (2).
- Alternatively, the K_I for radial thermal gradient can be calculated for any thermal stress distribution and at any specified time during cooldown for a $1/4$ -thickness inside surface defect using the relationship:

$$K_{It} = (1.0359C_0 + 0.6322C_1 + 0.4753C_2 + 0.3855C_3) * \sqrt{\pi a} \quad (4)$$

or similarly, K_{IT} during heatup for a $1/4$ -thickness outside surface defect using the relationship:

$$K_{IT} = (1.043C_0 + 0.630C_1 + 0.481C_2 + 0.401C_3) * \sqrt{\pi a} \quad (5)$$

where the coefficients C_0 , C_1 , C_2 and C_3 are determined from the thermal stress distribution at any specified time during the heatup or cooldown using the form:

$$\sigma(x) = C_0 + C_1(x/a) + C_2(x/a)^2 + C_3(x/a)^3 \quad (6)$$

and x is a variable that represents the radial distance from the appropriate (i.e., inside or outside) surface to any point on the crack front and a is the maximum crack depth.

Note, that equations 3, 4 and 5 were implemented in the OPERLIM computer code, which is the program used to generate the pressure-temperature (P-T) limit curves. No other changes were made to the OPERLIM computer code with regard to P-T calculation methodology. Therefore, the P-T curve methodology is unchanged from that described in WCAP-14040, "Methodology used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves"^[2] Section 2.6 (equations 2.6.2-4 and 2.6.3-1) with the exceptions just described above.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient, K_{Ic} is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of a postulated flaw at the $1/4T$ and $3/4T$ location, the appropriate value for RT_{NDT} , and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from the temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding (thermal) stress intensity factors, K_{It} , for the reference flaw are computed. From Equation 2, the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the reference flaw of Appendix G to the ASME Code is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on the measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the $1/4T$ vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel inner diameter. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that, at any given reactor coolant temperature, the ΔT (temperature) developed during cooldown results in a higher value of K_{Ic} at the $1/4T$ location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist so that the increase in K_{Ic} exceeds K_{It} , the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location and, therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and ensures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the wall. The heatup results in compressive stresses at the inside surface that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the K_{Ic} for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the K_{Ic} for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist so that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and lower K_{Ic} values do not offset each other, and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to ensure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of the pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T flaw located at the 1/4T location from the outside surface is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and therefore tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These thermal stresses are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time (or coolant temperature) along the heatup ramp. Since the thermal stresses at the outside are tensile and increase with increasing heatup rates, each heatup rate must be analyzed on an individual basis.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced by constructing a composite curve based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration. The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist wherein, over the course of the heatup ramp, the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside, and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

3.3 Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G addresses the metal temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions. This rule states that the metal temperature of the closure flange regions must exceed the material unirradiated RT_{NDT} by at least 120°F for normal operation when the pressure exceeds 20 percent of the preservice hydrostatic test pressure (3107 psi), which is 621 psig for Sequoyah Unit 2. However, per WCAP-15315, "Reactor Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements Evaluation For Operating PWR and BWR Plants"^[6], this requirement is no longer necessary when using the methodology of Code Case N-640^[8]. Hence, Sequoyah Unit 2 heatup and cooldown limit curves will be generated without flange requirements included.

4 CALCULATION OF ADJUSTED REFERENCE TEMPERATURE

From Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, the adjusted reference temperature (ART) for each material in the beltline region is given by the following expression:

$$\text{ART} = \text{Initial RT}_{\text{NDT}} + \Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}} + \text{Margin} \quad (7)$$

Initial RT_{NDT} is the reference temperature for the unirradiated material as defined in paragraph NB-2331 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code^[8]. If measured values of initial RT_{NDT} for the material in question are not available, generic mean values for that class of material may be used if there are sufficient test results to establish a mean and standard deviation for the class.

$\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ is the mean value of the adjustment in reference temperature caused by irradiation and should be calculated as follows:

$$\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}} = \text{CF} * f^{(0.28 - 0.10 \log f)} \quad (8)$$

To calculate $\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ at any depth (e.g., at 1/4T or 3/4T), the following formula must first be used to attenuate the fluence at the specific depth.

$$f_{(\text{depth } x)} = f_{\text{surface}} * e^{(-0.24x)} \quad (9)$$

where x inches (vessel beltline thickness is 8.45 inches) is the depth into the vessel wall measured from the vessel clad/base metal interface. The resultant fluence is then placed in Equation 8 to calculate the $\Delta\text{RT}_{\text{NDT}}$ at the specific depth.

The Westinghouse Radiation Engineering and Analysis Group evaluated the vessel fluence projections as a part of WCAP-15320^[7] and are also presented in a condensed version in Table 4 of this report. The evaluation used the ENDF/B-VI scattering cross-section data set. This is consistent with methods presented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, "Methodology Used to Develop Cold Overpressure Mitigating System Setpoints and RCS Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves"^[2]. Table 4 contains the calculated vessel surface fluences values at various azimuthal locations and Tables 5 and 6 contains the 1/4T and 3/4T calculated fluences and fluence factors, per the Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, used to calculate the ART values for all beltline materials in the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. Additionally, the surveillance capsule fluence values are presented in Table 7.

TABLE 4
Neutron Fluence Projections at Key Locations on the Reactor Vessel Clad/Base Metal Interface
(10^{19} n/cm², E > 1.0 MeV)

EFPY	Azimuthal Location			
	0°	15°	30°	45°
10.54	0.211	0.336	0.426	0.637
20	0.38	0.60	0.773	1.16
32	0.593	0.934	1.21	1.82
48	0.878	1.38	1.80	2.71

TABLE 5
Summary of the Vessel Surface, 1/4T and 3/4T Fluence Values
used for the Generation of the 32 EFPY Heatup/Cooldown Curves

Material	Surface	1/4 T ^(a)	3/4 T ^(a)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.82×10^{19}	1.10×10^{19}	3.98×10^{18}
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.82×10^{19}	1.10×10^{19}	3.98×10^{18}
Circumferential Weld Seam (Heat 4278)	1.82×10^{18}	1.10×10^{19}	3.98×10^{18}

Note:

(a) $1/4T$ and $3/4T = F_{(Surface)} * e^{(-0.24*x)}$, where x is the depth into the vessel wall (i.e. $8.45*0.25$ or 0.75)

TABLE 6
Summary of the Calculated Fluence Factors used for the Generation of the 32 EFPY
Heatup and Cooldown Curves

EFPY	1/4T FF	3/4T FF
32	1.027	0.745

TABLE 7
Integrated Neutron Exposure of the Sequoyah Unit 2 Surveillance Capsules Tested To Date

Capsule	Fluence
T	$2.61 \times 10^{18} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
U	$6.92 \times 10^{18} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
X	$1.22 \times 10^{19} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$
Y	$2.14 \times 10^{19} \text{ n/cm}^2, (E > 1.0 \text{ MeV})$

Margin is calculated as, $M = 2 \sqrt{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_\Delta^2}$. The standard deviation for the initial RT_{NDT} margin term, is σ_i 0°F when the initial RT_{NDT} is a measured value, and 17°F when a generic value is available. The standard deviation for the ΔRT_{NDT} margin term, σ_Δ , is 17°F for plates or forgings, and 8.5°F for plates or forgings when surveillance data is used. For welds, σ_Δ is equal to 28°F when surveillance capsule data is not used, and is 14°F (half the value) when credible surveillance capsule data is used. σ_Δ need not exceed 0.5 times the mean value of ΔRT_{NDT} .

Based on the surveillance program credibility evaluation presented in Appendix D to WCAP-15320, the Sequoyah Unit 2 surveillance program data is non-credible. In addition, following the guidance provided by the NRC in recent industry meeting, Table Chemistry Factor for the intermediate shell forging 05 was determined to be conservative. Hence, the adjusted reference temperature (ART) must be calculated using Position 1.1 along with the full margin term. Both Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, Position 1.1 and 2.1 have been shown herein for completeness. Contained in Tables 8 and 9 are the calculations of the 32 EFPY ART values used for generation of the heatup and cooldown curves.

TABLE 8
Calculation of the ART Values for the 1/4T Location @ 32 EFPY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF (°F)	FF	IRT _{NDT} ⁽¹⁾ (°F)	ΔRT _{NDT} ⁽³⁾ (°F)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ (°F)	ART ⁽²⁾ (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	95	1.027	10	97.6	34	142
	Position 2.1	89.7	1.027	10	92.1	34	136
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	104	1.027	-22	106.8	34	119
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	63	1.027	-4	64.7	56	117
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	77.8	1.027	-4	79.9	56	132

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
 (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
 (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
 (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_A^2)^{1/2}$

TABLE 9
Calculation of the ART Values for the 3/4T Location @ 32 EFPY

Material	RG 1.99 R2 Method	CF (°F)	FF	IRT _{NDT} ⁽¹⁾ (°F)	ΔRT _{NDT} ⁽³⁾ (°F)	Margin ⁽⁴⁾ (°F)	ART ⁽²⁾ (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	Position 1.1	95	0.745	10	70.8	34	115
	Position 2.1	89.7	0.745	10	66.8	34	111
Lower Shell Forging 04	Position 1.1	104	0.745	-22	77.5	34	90
Intermediate to Lower Shell	Position 1.1	63	0.745	-4	46.9	56	99
Circumferential Weld Seam	Position 2.1	77.8	0.745	-4	58.0	56	110

Notes:

- (1) Initial RT_{NDT} values measured values.
 (2) ART = Initial RT_{NDT} + ΔRT_{NDT} + Margin (°F)
 (3) ΔRT_{NDT} = CF * FF
 (4) $M = 2 * (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_A^2)^{1/2}$

The intermediate shell forging 05 is the limiting beltline material for the 1/4T and 3/4T case (See Tables 8 and 9). Contained in Table 10 is a summary of the limiting ARTs to be used in the generation of the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel heatup and cooldown curves.

TABLE 10
Summary of the Limiting ART Values Used in the
Generation of the Sequoyah Unit 2 Heatup/Cooldown Curves

EFPY	1/4T Limiting ART	3/4T Limiting ART
32	142°F	115°F

5 HEATUP AND COOLDOWN PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE LIMIT CURVES

Pressure-temperature limit curves for normal heatup and cooldown of the primary reactor coolant system have been calculated for the pressure and temperature in the reactor vessel beltline region using the methods discussed in Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of this report. This approved methodology is also presented in WCAP-14040-NP-A, Revision 2 with exception to those items discussed in Section 1 of this report.

Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5 present the heatup curves with (10°F and 60 psig) and without margins for possible instrumentation errors using heatup rates of 60 and 100°F/hr applicable for the first 32 EFPY. Figures 3 and 6 presents the cooldown curves with (10°F and 60 psig) and without margins for possible instrumentation errors using cooldown rates of 0, 20, 40, 60 and 100°F/hr applicable for 32 EFPY. Allowable combinations of temperature and pressure for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown in Figures 1 through 6. This is in addition to other criteria which must be met before the reactor is made critical, as discussed below in the following paragraphs.

The reactor must not be made critical until pressure-temperature combinations are to the right of the criticality limit line shown in Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5. The straight-line portion of the criticality limit is at the minimum permissible temperature for the 2485 psig inservice hydrostatic test as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The governing equation for the hydrostatic test is defined in Code Case N-640⁽³⁾ (approved in February 1999) as follows:

$$1.5 K_{Im} < K_{Ic}$$

where,

K_{Im} is the stress intensity factor covered by membrane (pressure) stress,

$$K_{Ic} = 33.2 + 20.734 e^{[0.02(T - RT_{NDT})]},$$

T is the minimum permissible metal temperature, and

RT_{NDT} is the metal reference nil-ductility temperature.

The criticality limit curve specifies pressure-temperature limits for core operation to provide additional margin during actual power production as specified in Reference 10. The pressure-temperature limits for core operation (except for low power physics tests) are that the reactor vessel must be at a temperature equal to or higher than the minimum temperature required for the inservice hydrostatic test, and at least 40°F higher than the minimum permissible temperature in the corresponding pressure-temperature curve for heatup and cooldown calculated as described in Section 3.0 of this report. For the heatup and cooldown curves without margins for instrumentation errors, the minimum temperature for the in service hydrostatic leak tests for the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel at 32 EFPY is 214°F. The vertical line drawn from these points on the pressure-temperature curve, intersecting a curve 40°F higher than the pressure-temperature limit curve, constitutes the limit for core operation for the reactor vessel.

Figures 1 through 6 define all of the above limits for ensuring prevention of nonductile failure for the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. The data points used for the heatup and cooldown pressure-temperature limit curves shown in Figures 1 through 6 are presented in Tables 11 through 14.

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: INTERMEDIATE SHELL FORGING 05

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 142°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 115°F




FIGURE 1 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins for Instrumentation Errors)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: INTERMEDIATE SHELL FORGING 05

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 142°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 115°F




FIGURE 2 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 100°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins of for Instrumentation Errors)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: INTERMEDIATE SHELL FORGING 05

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 142°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 115°F




FIGURE 4 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 60°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (With Margins for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60
psig)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: INTERMEDIATE SHELL FORGING 05

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: $\frac{1}{4}T$, 142°F

$\frac{3}{4}T$, 115°F




FIGURE 5 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations (Heatup Rate of 100°F/hr)
Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (With Margins of for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

LIMITING MATERIAL: INTERMEDIATE SHELL FORGING 05

LIMITING ART VALUES AT 32 EFPY: 1/4T, 142°F
3/4T, 115°F




Figure 6 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitations (Cooldown Rates up to 100°F/hr) Applicable for the First 32 EFPY (Without Margins for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

TABLE 11
32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
(without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Heatup Curves								
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T P
50	0	203	0	50	0	203	0	186 2000
50	661	203	735	50	661	203	706	203 2485
55	667	203	738	55	667	203	707	
60	674	203	745	60	674	203	708	
65	682	203	755	65	682	203	713	
70	690	203	768	70	690	203	721	
75	700	203	785	75	700	203	731	
80	710	203	805	80	706	203	745	
85	721	203	828	85	706	203	761	
90	734	203	855	90	706	203	780	
95	735	203	885	95	706	203	803	
100	738	203	920	100	706	203	829	
105	745	203	958	105	706	203	858	
110	755	203	1002	110	706	205	892	
115	768	203	1050	115	708	210	929	
120	785	205	1103	120	713	215	971	
125	805	210	1163	125	721	220	1019	
130	828	215	1228	130	731	225	1071	
135	855	220	1301	135	745	230	1129	
140	885	225	1382	140	761	235	1194	
145	920	230	1471	145	780	240	1266	
150	958	235	1570	150	803	245	1346	
155	1002	240	1662	155	829	250	1434	
160	1050	245	1757	160	858	255	1531	
165	1103	250	1861	165	892	260	1639	
170	1163	255	1976	170	929	265	1758	
175	1228	260	2103	175	971	270	1889	
180	1301	265	2243	180	1019	275	2034	
185	1382	270	2398	185	1071	280	2194	
190	1471			190	1129	285	2371	
195	1570			195	1194			
200	1662			200	1266			
205	1757			205	1346			

TABLE 11 (Continued)
 32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
 (without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Heatup Curves									
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
210	1861			210	1434				
215	1976			215	1531				
220	2103			220	1639				
225	2243			225	1758				
230	2398			230	1889				
				235	2034				
				240	2194				
				245	2371				

TABLE 12
32 EFPY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
(without Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors)

Cooldown Curves							
Steady State		20F		40F		60F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	661	50	618	50	574	50	530
55	667	55	624	55	581	55	538
60	674	60	632	60	589	60	546
65	682	65	640	65	598	65	556
70	690	70	649	70	608	70	566
75	700	75	659	75	619	75	578
80	710	80	670	80	631	80	591
85	721	85	683	85	644	85	606
90	734	90	696	90	659	90	622
95	748	95	712	95	676	95	640
100	763	100	728	100	694	100	660
105	780	105	747	105	714	105	682
110	799	110	767	110	736	110	707
115	820	115	790	115	761	115	734
120	843	120	815	120	789	120	764
125	869	125	843	125	819	125	798
130	897	130	874	130	853	130	835
135	928	135	908	135	891	135	876
140	962	140	945	140	932	140	922
145	1000	145	987	145	978	145	973
150	1042	150	1033	150	1028	150	1029
155	1088	155	1084	155	1085		
160	1140						
165	1196						
170	1259						
175	1328						
180	1404						
185	1489						
190	1582						
195	1685						
200	1799						
205	1925						
210	2064						
215	2218						
220	2388						

TABLE 13
32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
(with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Heatup Curves								
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical		Leak Test Limit
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T P
50	0	214	0	50	0	214	0	198 2000
50	591	214	607	50	591	214	607	214 2485
55	595	214	614	55	595	214	614	
60	601	214	622	60	601	214	622	
65	607	214	675	65	607	214	657	
70	614	214	678	70	614	214	650	
75	622	214	685	75	622	214	647	
80	630	214	695	80	630	214	646	
85	640	214	708	85	640	214	648	
90	650	214	725	90	646	214	653	
95	661	214	745	95	646	214	661	
100	674	214	768	100	646	214	671	
105	675	214	795	105	646	214	685	
110	678	214	825	110	646	214	701	
115	685	214	860	115	646	214	720	
120	695	214	898	120	646	214	743	
125	708	214	942	125	648	214	769	
130	725	214	990	130	653	214	798	
135	745	215	1043	135	661	215	832	
140	768	220	1103	140	671	220	869	
145	795	225	1168	145	685	225	911	
150	825	230	1241	150	701	230	959	
155	860	235	1322	155	720	235	1011	
160	898	240	1411	160	743	240	1069	
165	942	245	1510	165	769	245	1134	
170	990	250	1602	170	798	250	1206	
175	1043	255	1697	175	832	255	1286	
180	1103	260	1801	180	869	260	1374	
185	1168	265	1916	185	911	265	1471	
190	1241	270	2043	190	959	270	1579	
195	1322	275	2183	195	1011	275	1698	
200	1411	280	2338	200	1069	280	1829	
205	1510			205	1134	285	1974	
210	1602			210	1206	290	2134	
215	1697			215	1286	295	2311	
220	1801			220	1374			

TABLE 13 (Continued)
 32 EFPY Heatup Curve Data Points Using 1996 App.G
 (with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Heatup Curves							
60 Heatup		60 Limit Critical		100 Heatup		100 Limit Critical	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
225	1916			225	1471		
230	2043			230	1579		
235	2183			235	1698		
240	2338			240	1829		
				245	1974		
				250	2134		
				255	2311		

TABLE 14
32 EFPY Cooldown Curve Data Points Using 1996 App. G
(with Uncertainties for Instrumentation Errors of 10°F and 60 psig)

Cooldown Curves									
Steady State		20F		40F		60F		100F	
T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P	T	P
50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0
50	591	50	552	50	503	50	461	50	366
55	595	55	554	55	508	55	466	55	372
60	601	60	558	60	514	60	470	60	380
65	607	65	564	65	521	65	478	65	389
70	614	70	572	70	529	70	486	70	399
75	622	75	580	75	538	75	496	75	410
80	630	80	589	80	548	80	506	80	423
85	640	85	599	85	559	85	518	85	437
90	650	90	610	90	571	90	531	90	453
95	661	95	623	95	584	95	546	95	470
100	674	100	636	100	599	100	562	100	490
105	688	105	652	105	616	105	580	105	512
110	703	110	668	110	634	110	600	110	536
115	720	115	687	115	654	115	622	115	563
120	739	120	707	120	676	120	647	120	593
125	760	125	730	125	701	125	674	125	626
130	783	130	755	130	729	130	704	130	663
135	809	135	783	135	759	135	738	135	704
140	837	140	814	140	793	140	775	140	749
145	868	145	848	145	831	145	816	145	800
150	902	150	885	150	872	150	862	150	856
155	940	155	927	155	918	155	913	155	918
160	982	160	973	160	968	160	969		
165	1028	165	1024	165	1025				
170	1080								
175	1136								
180	1199								
185	1268								
190	1344								
195	1429								
200	1522								
205	1625								
210	1739								
215	1865								
220	2004								
225	2158								
230	2328								

6 REFERENCES

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5. "Fracture Toughness Requirements", Branch Technical Position MTEB 5-2, Chapter 5.3.2 in Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, NUREG-0800, 1981.
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12. Calc. No. 92-016, "WOG USE Program - Onset of Upper Shelf Energy Calculations", J. M. Chicots, dated 11/12/92. File # WOG-108/4-18 (MUHP-5080).
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14. Westinghouse Letter TVA-91-242

15. Westinghouse Letter TVA-91-243
16. TVA letter Number N9664, "TASK N99-017 - Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limit Report Development - N2N-048," W. M. Justice, August 17, 1999.
17. TVA letter Number N9667, "TASK N99-017 - Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limit Report Development - N2N-048," W. M. Justice, August 20, 1999.
18. Westinghouse Letter TVA-93-105.

APPENDIX A

LTOPS SETPOINTS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Westinghouse has been requested to develop Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) setpoints for Sequoyah Unit 2, for a vessel exposure of 32 EFPY. The LTOPS setpoints for the Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, were last revised by Westinghouse in June of 1991 using pressure-temperature limits supplied by Tennessee Valley Authority for a vessel exposure of 16 EFPY. The results of this analysis were reported via References 14 and 15. The June 1991 analysis was based on the September 1989 analysis which addressed: Eagle-21 implementation and Appendix G limits based on Regulatory Guide 1.99. This Section documents the development of new Sequoyah Unit 2 COMS setpoints for 32 EFPY.

The Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) is designed to provide the capability, during relatively low temperatures Reactor Coolant System (RCS) operation (typically less than 350°F), to protect the reactor vessel from being exposed to conditions of fast propagating brittle fracture. The LTOPS is provided in addition to the administrative controls, to prevent overpressure transients and as a supplement to the RCS overpressure mitigation function of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) relief valves. LTOP consists of pressurizer PORVs and actuation logic from the wide range pressure channels. Once the system is enabled, no operator action is involved for the LTOPS to perform its intended pressure mitigation function.

LTOPS setpoints are conservatively selected to prevent exceeding the pressure/temperature limits established by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G requirements.

Two specific transients have been defined as the design basis for LTOPS. Each of these transient scenarios assume that the RCS is in a water-solid condition and that the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The first transient consists of a heat injection scenario in which a reactor coolant pump in a single loop is started with the RCS temperature as much as 50°F lower than the steam generator secondary side temperature and the RHRS has been inadvertently isolated. This results in a sudden heat input to the RCS from the steam generators, creating an increasing pressure transient. The second transient has been defined as a mass injection scenario into the RCS caused by the simultaneous isolation of the RHRS, isolation of letdown and failure of the normal charging flow controls to the full flow condition. The resulting mass injection/letdown mismatch causes an increasing pressure transient.

1.2 LTOPS SETPOINT DETERMINATION

Westinghouse has developed new LTOPS setpoints for Sequoyah Unit 2, based on a vessel exposure of 32 EFPY using the methodology established in WCAP-14040 (Ref. 2). This methodology maximizes the available operating margin for setpoint selection while maintaining an appropriate level of protection in support of reactor vessel integrity. Note, Appendix G pressure limit relaxation allowed by ASME Code Case N-514 was not applied.

Plant design characteristics are unchanged (i.e., heat injection and mass injection transients characteristics and related plant responses have not been altered). Therefore, a complete reanalysis is not required. The new LTOPS setpoints were developed using results of the previous heat and mass injection transient analyses.

1.2.1 Pressure Limits Selection

The function of the LTOPS is to protect the reactor vessel from fast propagating brittle fracture. This has been implemented by choosing LTOPS setpoints, which prevent exceeding the limits prescribed by the applicable pressure/temperature characteristic for the specific reactor vessel material in accordance with rules given in Appendix G to 10CFR50. The LTOPS design basis takes credit for the fact that overpressure events most likely occur during isothermal conditions in the RCS. Therefore, it is appropriate to utilize the steady-state Appendix G limit. The Sequoyah Unit 2, 10CFR50 Appendix G curve for 32 EFPY is shown by Figure A-1. This curve sets the nominal upper limit on the pressure which should not be exceeded during RCS increasing pressure transients based on reactor vessel material properties.

When a relief valve is actuated to mitigate an increasing pressure transient, the system pressure then decreases, as the relief valve releases coolant, until a reset pressure is reached where the valve is signaled to close. Note that the pressure continues to decrease below the reset pressure as the valve re-closes. The nominal lower limit on the pressure during the transient is typically established based solely on an operational consideration for the RCP #1 seal to maintain a nominal differential pressure across the seal faces for proper film-riding performance. The RCP #1 seal limit is shown in Figure A-1.

The nominal upper limit (based on the minimum of the steady-state 10CFR50 Appendix G requirement) and the nominal lower limit (based on RCP #1 seal performance criteria) create a pressure range from which the setpoints for both PORVs may be selected.

1.2.2 Mass Input Consideration

For a particular mass input transient to the RCS, the relief valve will be signaled to open at a specific pressure setpoint. However, there will be a pressure overshoot during the delay time before the valve starts to move and during the time the valve is moving to the full open position. This overshoot is dependent on the dynamics of the system and the input parameters, and results in a maximum system pressure somewhat higher than the set pressure. Similarly there will be a

pressure undershoot, while the valve is relieving, both due to the reset pressure being below the setpoint and to the delay in stroking the valve closed.

The previous Sequoyah analyses of multiple mass input cases were used to determine the relationship between setpressures and resulting overshoots/undershoots.

1.2.3 Heat Input Consideration

The heat input case is done similarly to the mass input case except that the locus of transient pressure values versus selected setpoints may be determined for several values of the initial RCS temperature. This heat input evaluation provides a range of acceptable setpoints dependent on the reactor coolant temperature, whereas the mass input case is limited to the most restrictive low temperature condition only (i.e., the mass injection transient is not sensitive to temperature).

The previous Sequoyah analyses of multiple heat input cases were used to determine the relationship between setpressures and resulting overshoots/undershoots.

1.2.4 Final Setpoint Selection

Appendix G limits described in Section 1.2.1, were conservatively adjusted accounting for the pressure difference (ΔP) between the wide range pressure transmitter and the reactor vessel limiting beltline region of 68.3 psi for 4 RCPs in operation (See Reference 18).

The results of the analyses described in Section 1.2.2 & 1.2.3, and the adjusted Appendix G limit were used to define the maximum allowable setpoints for which the overpressure will not exceed the pressure limit applicable at a specific reactor vessel temperature. The maximum allowable setpoints are shown in Figure A-1.

Per Ref. 17, Sequoyah Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation SQN-IC014 establishes the instrument loop inaccuracy of the Sequoyah temperature and pressure instrument channels associated with the LTOPS. Previously, the LTOPS setpoints have been provided to TVA without application of instrument uncertainties. The TVA calculation quantified the instrument channel uncertainties, applied them to the nominal Westinghouse setpoints and evaluated the result against the safety limits established by the 10CFR50, Appendix G steady state heatup curve. The TVA demonstrated accuracy calculation will be revised to reflect the LTOPS setpoints calculated by Westinghouse under the subject task. As such, it is not necessary for Westinghouse to include instrument uncertainties in the nominal LTOPS setpoint calculation. Note, the heat injection results were adjusted to include 50°F thermal transport effect (difference in temperature between the RCS and steam generator at transient initiation).

The maximum allowable setpoints, adjusted to produce a smoother curve and reduced to nine data points, becomes the setpoints for PORV#2. A setpoint at a minimum temperature of 50°F was selected, as requested by TVA (Ref. 16). Each of the two PORVs may have a different pressure setpoint such that only one valve will open at a time and mitigate the transient (i.e., staggered

setpoints). The second valve operates only if the first fails to open on command. This design supports a single failure assumption as well as minimizing the potential for both PORVs to open simultaneously, a condition which may create excessive pressure undershoot and challenge the RCP #1 seal performance criteria. The PORV#1 setpoints were selected by adjusting the setpoint PORV#2 in relationship to the overshoots discussed in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. The selected setpoints for PORV #1 and PORV #2 are shown in Table A-1 and Figure A-2. These setpoints were evaluated using the undershoots discussed in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 to ensure that they protect against the RCP #1 seal limit.

In summary, the selection of the setpoints for LTOPS considered the use of nominal upper and lower pressure limits. The upper limits are specified by the minimum of the steady-state cooldown curve as calculated in accordance with Appendix G to 10CFR50 (adjusted to account for four RCPs in operation). The lower pressure extreme is specified by the reactor coolant pump #1 seal minimum differential pressure performance criteria. The selected setpoints, shown in Table A-1 and Figure A-2, provide protection against Appendix G and RCP #1 seal limit violations. Note, these setpoints do not address instrumentation uncertainties.

1.3 ARMING AND ENABLE TEMPERATURES FOR LTOPS

The LTOPS arming temperature is traditionally based on the temperature corresponding to when Appendix G pressure equals 2500 psia. Based on this methodology the LTOPS arming temperature for Sequoyah conservatively continues to be 350°F.

The enable temperature is the temperature below which the LTOPS system is required to be operable, based on vessel materials concerns. ASME Code Case N-514 requires the LTOPS to be in operation at coolant temperatures less than 200°F or at coolant temperatures less than a temperature corresponding to a reactor vessel metal temperature less than $RT_{NDT} + 50^{\circ}\text{F}$, whichever is greater. RT_{NDT} is the highest Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) for the limiting belt-line material at a distance one fourth of the vessel section thickness from the vessel inside surface (i.e., clad/base metal interface), as determined by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. The minimum required enable temperature for the Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel is 225°F at 32 EFPY of operation.

Table A-1
Selected Setpoints, Sequoyah Unit 2

Trcs (Deg.F)	PORV#2 Setpoint (psig)	PORV#1 Setpoint (psig)
50	510	485
100	580	555
135	640	610
174	745	682
200	745	685
250	745	685
278	745	685
400	745	685
450	2350	2350




Figure A-1 Sequoyah Unit 2 LTOPS Setpoint Selection




Figure A-2 - Sequoyah Unit 2 LTOPS Selected Setpoints

APPENDIX B
PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (PTS) RESULTS

PTS Calculations:

The PTS Rule requires that for each pressurized water nuclear power reactor for which an operating license has been issued, the licensee shall have projected values of RT_{PTS} , accepted by the NRC, for each reactor vessel beltline material for the EOL fluence of the material. This assessment must specify the basis for the projected value of RT_{PTS} for each vessel beltline material, including the assumptions regarding core loading patterns, and must specify the copper and nickel contents and the fluence value used in the calculation. This assessment must be updated whenever there is a significant change in projected values of RT_{PTS} , or upon request for a change in the expiration date for operation of the facility. (Changes to RT_{PTS} values are considered significant if either the previous value or the current value, or both values, exceed the screening criterion prior to the expiration of the operating license, including any renewed term, if applicable, for the plant.

To verify that RT_{NDT} , for each vessel beltline material is a bounding value for the specific reactor vessel, licensees shall consider plant-specific information that could affect the level of embrittlement. This information includes but is not limited to the reactor vessel operating temperature and any related surveillance program results. (Surveillance program results mean any data that demonstrates the embrittlement trends for the limiting beltline material, including but not limited to data from test reactors or from surveillance programs at other plants with or without surveillance program integrated per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H.)

Calculations:

Tables B-1 and B-2 contain the results of the calculations for each of the beltline region materials in the Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel. Per TVA, the EOL is 32 EFPY and the Life Extension EOL is 48 EFPY.

TABLE B-1
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 2 Beltline Region Materials at 32 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	1.82	1.164	95	110.6	34	10	155
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Using S/C Data)	1.82	1.164	89.7	104.4	34	10	148
Lower Shell Forging 04	1.82	1.164	104	121.1	34	-22	133
Circumferential Weld Metal	1.82	1.164	63	73.3	56	-4	125
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	1.82	1.164	77.8	90.6	56	-4	143

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
 (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
 (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF * FF$

TABLE B-2
RT_{PTS} Calculations for Sequoyah Unit 2 Beltline Region Materials at 48 EFPY

Material	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV)	FF	CF (°F)	$\Delta RT_{PTS}^{(c)}$ (°F)	Margin (°F)	RT _{NDT(U)} ^(a) (°F)	RT _{PTS} ^(b) (°F)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05	2.71	1.266	95	120.3	34	10	164
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Using S/C Data)	2.71	1.266	89.7	113.6	34	10	158
Lower Shell Forging 04	2.71	1.266	104	131.7	34	-22	144
Circumferential Weld Metal	2.71	1.266	63	79.8	56	-4	132
Circumferential Weld Metal (Using S/C Data)	2.71	1.266	77.8	98.5	56	-4	151

Notes:

- (a) Initial RT_{NDT} values are measured values
 (b) $RT_{PTS} = RT_{NDT(U)} + \Delta RT_{PTS} + \text{Margin (°F)}$
 (c) $\Delta RT_{PTS} = CF * FF$

All of the beltline materials in the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel are below the screening criteria values of 270°F and 300°F at 32 and 48 EFPY.

APPENDIX C
CALCULATED FLUENCE DATA

The best estimate exposure of the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel presented in WCAP-15320^[7] was developed using a combination of absolute plant specific transport calculations and all available plant specific measurement data. The evaluation is consistent with the methodology accepted by the NRC and documented in WCAP-14040-NP-A^[2].

Combining this measurement data base with the plant-specific calculations, the best estimate vessel exposure is obtained from the following relationship:

$$\Phi_{Best\ Est.} = K \Phi_{Calc.}$$

where:

$\Phi_{Best\ Est.}$ = The best estimate fast neutron exposure at the location of interest.

K = The plant specific best estimate/calculation (BE/C) bias factor derived from the surveillance capsule dosimetry data.

$\Phi_{Calc.}$ = The absolute calculated fast neutron exposure at the location of interest.

For Sequoyah Unit 2, the derived plant specific bias factors were 0.93, 0.98, 0.96 for $\Phi(E > 1.0\text{ MeV})$, $\Phi(E > 0.1\text{ MeV})$, and dpa, respectively. Bias factors of this magnitude developed with BUGLE-96 are within expected tolerances for fluence calculated using the ENDF/B-VI based cross-section library.

Table C-1 presents the reactor vessel fast neutron ($E > 1.0\text{ MeV}$) exposure projections using the absolute plant specific calculations. Table C-2 presents the calculated and measured fluences at the capsules.

Table C-1
Azimuthal Variations Of The Neutron Exposure Projections
On The Reactor Vessel Clad/Base Metal Interface At Core Midplane

Calculated

	0°	15°	30°	45° ^{a)}
10.54 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	2.11E+18	3.36E+18	4.26E+18	6.37E+18
E>0.1 MeV	5.37E+18	8.50E+18	1.11E+19	1.70E+19
dpa	3.43E-03	5.39E-03	6.88E-03	1.03E-02
20 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	3.80E+18	6.00E+18	7.73E+18	1.16E+19
E>0.1 MeV	9.65E+18	1.52E+19	2.01E+19	3.10E+19
dpa	6.16E-03	9.61E-03	1.25E-02	1.88E-02
32 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	5.93E+18	9.34E+18	1.21E+19	1.82E+19
E>0.1 MeV	1.51E+19	2.36E+19	3.16E+19	4.88E+19
dpa	9.63E-03	1.50E-02	1.96E-02	2.95E-02
48 EFPY				
E>1.0 MeV	8.78E+18	1.38E+19	1.80E+19	2.71E+19
E>0.1 MeV	2.23E+19	3.49E+19	4.68E+19	7.24E+19
dpa	1.42E-02	2.21E-02	2.91E-02	4.38E-02

Note:

a) Maximum neutron exposure projection

Table C-2
Comparison Of Calculated And Best Estimate Integrated Neutron
Exposure Of Sequoyah Unit 2 Surveillance Capsules T, U, X, and Y

CAPSULE T

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.61E+18	2.57E+18	0.98
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	8.74E+18	8.98E+18	1.03
dpa	4.34E-03	4.36E-03	1.01

CAPSULE U

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	6.92E+18	6.03E+18	0.87
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.31E+19	2.11E+19	0.91
dpa	1.15E-02	1.03E-02	0.90

CAPSULE X

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	1.22E+19	1.04E+19	0.85
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	4.09E+19	3.63E+19	0.89
dpa	2.03E-02	1.77E-02	0.87

CAPSULE Y

	Calculated	Best Estimate	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	2.14E+19	2.18E+19	1.02
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	7.14E+19	7.72E+19	1.08
dpa	3.54E-02	3.70E-02	1.05

AVERAGE BE/C RATIOS

	BE/C
$\Phi(E > 1.0 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	0.93
$\Phi(E > 0.1 \text{ MeV}) \text{ [n/cm}^2\text{]}$	0.98
dpa	0.96

APPENDIX D

UPDATED SURVEILLANCE MATERIAL 30 FT-LB TRANSITION
TEMPERATURE SHIFTS AND UPPER SHELF ENERGY DECREASES

TABLE D-1
Measured 30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shifts of all Available Surveillance Data

Material	Capsule	Fluence ($\times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²)	30 ft-lb Transition Temperature Shift		Upper Shelf Energy Decrease	
			Predicted (°F) ^(a)	Measured (°F) ^(a)	Predicted (%) ^(a)	Measured (%) ^(c)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Tangential)	T	0.261	60.33	63.65	17	12
	U	0.692	85.22	79.31	21	16
	X	1.22	100.23	85.7	23	8
	Y	2.14	114.67	134.12	26	22
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 (Axial)	T	0.261	60.33	48.73	17	7
	U	0.692	85.22	66.06	21	9
	X	1.22	100.23	110.04	23	2
	Y	2.14	114.67	89.21	26	22
Weld Metal	T	0.261	43.12	74.56	20	2
	U	0.692	60.91	130.38	25	6
	X	1.22	71.63	44.22	29	35
	Y	2.14	81.96	86.91	33	3
HAZ Metal	T	0.261	--	24.58	--	2
	U	0.692	--	64.03	--	14
	X	1.22	--	28.29	--	19
	Y	2.14	--	50.32	--	39

Notes:

- (a) Based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, methodology using the mean weight percent values of copper and nickel of the surveillance material.
- (b) Calculated using measured Charpy data plotted using CVGRAPH, Version 4.1 (Reference 9)
- (c) Values are based on the definition of upper shelf energy given in ASTM E185-82.

APPENDIX E

REACTOR VESSEL BELTLINE MATERIAL PROJECTED END OF LICENSE
UPPER SHELF ENERGY VALUES

TABLE E-1
Predicted End-of-License (32 EFPY) USE Calculations for all the Beltline Region Materials

Material	Weight % of Cu	1/4T EOL Fluence (10^{19} n/cm ²)	Unirradiated USE ^(a) (ft-lb)	Projected USE Decrease (%)	Projected EOL USE (ft-lb)
Intermediate Shell Forging 05 Using S/C Data	0.13	1.10	93	18.5	76
Lower Shell Forging 04	0.14	1.10	100	23	77
Intermediate to Lower Shell Circumferential Weld Seam Using S/C Data	0.12	1.10	102	35	66

Notes:

(a) These values were obtained from Reference 12.

APPENDIX F
UPDATED SURVEILLANCE CAPSULE REMOVAL SCHEDULE

The following surveillance capsule removal schedule meets the requirements of ASTM E185-82 and is recommended for future capsules to be removed from the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. This recommended removal schedule is applicable to 32 EFPY of operation.

Table F-1 Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule

Capsule	Location	Lead Factor ^(a)	Removal Time (EFPY) ^(b)	Fluence (n/cm ² , E>1.0 MeV) ^(c)
T	40°	3.33	1.04	2.61 x 10 ¹⁸ (c)
U	140°	3.40	2.93	6.92 x 10 ¹⁸ (c)
X	220°	3.39	5.36	1.22 x 10 ¹⁹ (c)
Y	320°	3.35	10.54	2.14 x 10 ¹⁹ (c,d)
S	4°	1.09	Standby	(d,e)
V	176°	1.09	Standby	(d,e)
W	184°	1.09	Standby	(d,e)
Z	356°	1.09	Standby	(d,e)

Notes:

- (a) Updated in Capsule Y dosimetry analysis (Reference 7).
- (b) Effective Full Power Years (EFPY) from plant startup.
- (c) Plant specific evaluation.
- (d) This fluence is not less than once or greater than twice the peak end of license (32 EFPY) fluence
- (e) Capsules S, V, W and Z will reach a fluence of 2.71×10^{19} (E > 1.0 MeV), the 48 EFPY peak vessel fluence at approximately 44 EFPY, respectively. If vessel fluence data is needed at the EOL for Life Extension, it is recommended that one or more of the Standby Capsules be moved to a higher flux location within the next few cycles of operation.

APPENDIX G
ENABLE TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS

Enable Temperature Calculation:

ASME Code Case N-514 requires the low temperature overpressure (LTOP or COMS) system to be in operation at coolant temperatures less than 200°F or at coolant temperatures less than a temperature corresponding to a reactor vessel metal temperature less than $RT_{NDT} + 50^{\circ}\text{F}$, whichever is greater. RT_{NDT} is the highest adjusted reference temperature (ART) for the limiting beltline material at a distance one fourth of the vessel section thickness from the vessel inside surface (ie. clad/base metal interface), as determined by Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.

32 EFPY

The highest calculated 1/4T ART for the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel beltline region at 32 EFPY is 142°F.

From the OPERLIM computer code output for the Sequoyah Unit 2 32 EFPY P-T limit curves without margins (Configuration # 1676409813, *operlim.film* File) the maximum ΔT_{metal} is:

Cooldown Rate (Steady-State Cooldown):

max (ΔT_{metal}) at 1/4T = 0°F

Heatup Rate of 100°F/Hr:

max (ΔT_{metal}) at 1/4T = 28.924°F

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Enable Temperature (ENBT)} &= RT_{NDT} + 50 + \max (\Delta T_{\text{metal}}), ^{\circ}\text{F} \\ &= (142 + 50 + 28.924) ^{\circ}\text{F} \\ &= 220.924^{\circ}\text{F}\end{aligned}$$

The minimum required enable temperature for the Sequoyah Unit 2 Reactor Vessel is 225°F at 32 EFPY of operation.

ENCLOSURE 6

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2

JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTION ALLOWING USE OF AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS (ASME) CODE CASE N-640

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," TVA is requesting an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60, "Acceptance criteria for fracture prevention measures for lightwater nuclear power reactors for normal operation." The exemption would permit the use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section XI Code Case N-640, "Alternative Requirement Fracture Toughness for Development of P-T Limit Curves for ASME Section XI, Division 1," in lieu of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, paragraph IV.A.2.b. The proposed exemption meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.12 as discussed below.

10 CFR 50.12(a) Requirements

10 CFR 50.12 states that the Commission may grant an exemption from requirements contained in 10 CFR 50 provided that the following is met:

1. The requested exemption is authorized by law.

No law exists which precludes the activities covered by this exemption request. 10 CFR 50.60(b) allows the use of alternatives to 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, when an exemption is granted by the Commission under 10 CFR 50.12.

2. The requested exemption does not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.

Revised P-T limit curves were developed for Sequoyah Units 1 and 2. The revised P-T limits use the K_{Ic} fracture toughness curve shown on ASME XI, Appendix A, Figure A-4200-1, in lieu of the K_{Ia} fracture toughness curve of ASME XI, Appendix G, Figure G-2210-1, as the lower bound for fracture toughness. The other margins involved with the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G process of determining P-T limit curves remain unchanged.

Use of the K_{Ic} curve in determining the lower bound fracture toughness in the development of P-T operating limits curve reduces the excess conservatism in the current Appendix G approach, the application of which could, in fact, reduce overall plant safety. The K_{Ic} curve models the slow heat-up

and cooldown process of a reactor pressure vessel. Use of this approach is justified given the initial conservatism built into the K_{Ia} curve when the curve was codified in 1974. The initial conservatism was deemed necessary due to limited knowledge of reactor pressure vessel material fracture toughness. Since 1974, additional knowledge has been gained about the fracture toughness of reactor pressure vessel materials and their fracture response to applied loads. The additional knowledge demonstrates the lower bound fracture toughness provided by the K_{Ia} curve is well beyond the margin of safety required to protect against potential reactor pressure vessel failure. The lower bound K_{Ic} fracture toughness provides an adequate margin of safety to protect against potential reactor pressure vessel failure and does not present an undue risk to public health and safety.

P-T limit curves that are based on the K_{Ic} fracture toughness limits enhance overall plant safety by opening the pressure-temperature operating window. Two primary safety benefits would be realized with no decrease to the margin of safety.

- Challenges to the operators would be reduced since the requirements for maintaining high vessel temperature during pressure testing would be lessened.
 - Enhanced personnel safety would result because of the lower temperatures which would exist during the conduct of inspections in primary containment.
3. The requested exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

The subject of this exemption does not affect national defense or security issues. The common defense and security are not impacted by approval of this exemption request.

4. Special circumstances are present which necessitate the request for an exemption to the regulations of 10 CFR 50.60.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), NRC will consider granting an exemption to the regulations if special circumstances are present. This requested exemption meets the special circumstances of the following paragraphs of 10 CFR 50.12:

- (a)(2)(ii) - demonstrates the underlying purpose of the regulation will continue to be achieved;
- (a)(2)(iii) - would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significant if the regulation is enforced and;

- (a)(2)(v) - will provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulation and the licensee has made good faith efforts to comply with the regulation.

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii): ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G, provides procedures for determining allowable loading on the reactor pressure vessel and is approved for that purpose by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. Application of these procedures in the determination of P-T operating and test curves satisfy the underlying requirement that:

- The reactor coolant pressure boundary be operated in a regime having sufficient margin to ensure, when stressed, the reactor pressure vessel boundary behaves in a non-brittle manner, and the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture is minimized, and
- P-T operating and test limit curves provide adequate margin in consideration of uncertainties in determining the effects of irradiation on material properties.

The requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G, were conservatively developed based on the level of knowledge existing in 1974 concerning reactor pressure vessel materials and the estimated effects of operation. Since 1974, the level of experience and knowledge about these topics has increased. This increased experience and knowledge permits relaxation of ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G, requirements via application of ASME Code Case N-640, while maintaining the underlying purpose of the ASME B&PV Code and the NRC regulations to ensure an acceptable margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii): The reactor pressure vessel pressure-temperature operating window is defined by the P-T limit curves developed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G requirements. Continued operation of Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 with these P-T limit curves without the relief provided by ASME Code Case N-640 would unnecessarily restrict the P-T operating window. This restriction challenges the operations staff during required pressure tests. The operator must maintain a high temperature within a limited operating window. In addition, the higher temperatures result in greater physical stress on the inspection personnel working in the vicinity of the piping.

This constitutes an unnecessary burden that can be alleviated by the application of ASME Code Case N-640 in the development of the proposed P-T limit curves. Implementation of the proposed P-T limit curves, as allowed by ASME Code Case N-640, does not reduce the margin of safety below acceptable limits.

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v): The requested exemption provides only temporary relief from the applicable regulation. TVA has made a

good faith effort to comply with the regulation. TVA requests the exemption be granted until such time that the NRC generically approves the application of ASME Code Case N-640 for use by the nuclear industry.

Conclusion for Exemption Acceptability:

Compliance with the specified requirement of 10 CFR 50.60 would result in hardship and unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. TVA's proposed application of ASME Code Case N-640 for SQN Units 1 and 2 allows a reduction in the lower bound fracture toughness used in ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G, in the determination of reactor coolant system P-T limits. The proposed alternative is acceptable because the ASME code case maintains the relative margin of safety commensurate with that which existed at the time ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Appendix G, was approved in 1974. Therefore, application of ASME Code Case N-640 for Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 will ensure an acceptable margin of safety and does not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.

ENCLOSURE 7

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2

JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTION ALLOWING USE OF WCAP-15315

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," TVA is requesting an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.60, "Acceptance criteria for fracture prevention measures for lightwater nuclear power reactors for normal operation." The exemption would permit the use of WCAP-15313, "Reactor Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange Requirements Evaluation for Operating PWR and BWR Plants," in lieu of the methodology required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, footnote 2 to Table 1. The WCAP demonstrates that the flange region is tolerant of assumed flaws in excess of 1/4 thickness at room temperature. In addition, since there is no known degradation mechanism for this region and the fatigue usage in this region is less than 0.1, it is concluded that flaws are unlikely to initiate in this region. Accordingly, justification exists for eliminating the reactor vessel head/flange region when determining the pressure-temperature (P-T) limits for the reactor vessel. The proposed exemption meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.12 as discussed below.

10 CFR 50.12(a) Requirements

10 CFR 50.12 states that the Commission may grant an exemption from requirements contained in 10 CFR 50 provided that the following is met:

1. The requested exemption is authorized by law.

No law exists which precludes the activities covered by this exemption request. 10 CFR 50.60(b) allows the use of alternatives to 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, when an exemption is granted by the Commission under 10 CFR 50.12.

2. The requested exemption does not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.

The revised P-T curve limits being proposed for Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 rely on methodology described in WCAP-15313. The WCAP uses a lower stress intensity factor, K_{IC} instead of K_{Ia} , which results in higher allowable pressures. The 10 CFR 50, Appendix G addresses the metal temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions. The regulation states that the metal temperature of the closure flange regions must exceed the material unirradiated RT_{NDT} by at least 120 degrees Fahrenheit ($^{\circ}F$) for normal operation when the pressure

exceeds 20 percent of the preservice hydrostatic test pressure. Implementing the K_{IC} stress intensity factor without eliminating the flange requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, would place a restricted operating window in the temperature range associated with the flange/closure head (i.e., flange $RT_{NDT} + 120^{\circ}F$). In accordance with WCAP-15315, the K_{IC} toughness has been shown to provide significant margin between the applied stress intensity factor and the fracture toughness of the flange/closure head. The conclusion of the WCAP analysis is the integrity of the closure head/flange is not a concern for safe plant operation and testing. Accordingly, the Sequoyah P-T limit curves are generated without flange requirements included.

3. The requested exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

The subject of this exemption does not affect national defense or security issues. The common defense and security are not impacted by approval of this exemption request.

4. Special circumstances are present which necessitate the request for an exemption to the regulations of 10 CFR 50.60.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), NRC will consider granting an exemption to the regulations if special circumstances are present. This requested exemption meets the special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) that states:

"Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule;"

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.60 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix G is to protect the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The results of the methods used in WCAP-15315 determined that significant margin exists between the applied stress intensity factor and the fracture toughness at virtually all crack depths when using the K_{IC} toughness, which has been adopted by Section XI for developing Pressure-Temperature Limit Curves. Another objective of the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix G is to assure that fracture margins are maintained to protect against service induced cracking due to environmental effects. Since the governing flaw is on the outside surface (the inside is in compression) where there are no environmental effects, there is even greater assurance of fracture margin. Therefore, it can be concluded that the integrity of the closure head/flange region is not a concern for SQN using the K_{IC} toughness. In addition, there are no known mechanisms of degradation for this region, other than fatigue. The calculated design fatigue usage for this region is less than