



September 4, 2002
RC-02-0152

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)
DOCKET NO. 50/395
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12
TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

In compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix E(V), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority, transmits one controlled copy of EPP-001, Revision 24, Change F, "Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan".

The effectiveness of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan is not decreased by the change to this procedure.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Michelle Bedenbaugh at (803) 345-4427.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Melvin N. Browne', written over a horizontal line.

Melvin N. Browne

MBB/MNB/mb
Attachment

c: L. A. Reyes (With 2 Attachments)

ec: (Without Attachment)
NRC Resident Inspector
RTS (0-L-99-0354)
File (810.10-2, RR 6000)
DMS (RC-02-0152)

A045

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-001

ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
EMERGENCY PLAN

REVISION 24

SAFETY RELATED

Harry J. Ogrium
DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR

12/12/96
DATE

S.H.A. Bunc
APPROVAL AUTHORITY

12/17/96
DATE

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	P	2-26-97		E	P	12/25/01	
B	P	03-03-98		F	P	08/30/02	
C	P	11/25/98					
D	P	11-16-01					

INFORMATION USE

Procedure may Be Performed From Memory.
User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139
ATTACHMENT II
PAGE 1 OF 3
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 8-13-02 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG. F COMM.# 002
 TITLE: Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROCEDURE _____ REVISION _____ SAFETY RELATED
 CHANGE: PERMANENT QUALITY RELATED _____
 RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____ NON-SAFETY RELATED _____

ii. DESCRIPTION:

SEE REVISION SUMMARY

REASON FOR CHANGE:
SEE REVISION SUMMARY
CM Counts CM Counts
Original Sign and PRINT Name

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)

REQUIRED REVIEWS							Other Reviews	
<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QRRS	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE						<input type="checkbox"/> 50.59		

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES:
Nicole John, 8/13/02
 Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:
 QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE _____ QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____
 TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES _____ NO

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO _____

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES NO _____

IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES NO _____

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES NO _____

COMMENTS RESOLVED: Nicole John, 8/21/02
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?
 C. YES NO _____
 NL&OE Date
 N. YES _____ NO _____
 RESP. MGR Date

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (if Applicable):
NA
 QA Concurrence Date

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:
Nicole John, 8/30/02
 Training Completed Date
Nicole John, 8/30/02
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence Date

x. PSRC REVIEW:
 A. REVIEWED BY:
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____
 COMMENTS: YES _____ NO _____

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:
 Responsible Manager _____ Date _____
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____

SAP-139
Attachment II
Revision Summary
EPP-001, Revision 24, Change F

Description: Step 1.2, added SAP-630.

Reason for Change: A PCAP was added to Attachment III. SAP-139 requires that SAP-630 be listed in the Scope section if it applies.

Description: Section 2.9, Changed title of SAP-1131 from **Electronic Processing of Condition Evaluation Reports** to **Corrective Action Program**.

Reason for Change: To reflect new title of procedure.

Description: Added Section 2.11 **SCP-113 Two Person Rule**

Reason for Change: To reflect new procedure.

Description: Attachment III, page 1, Changed first paragraph into a Note.

Reason for Change: To highlight this statement to show its importance.

Description: Attachment III, pages 6 and 9, Changed telephone number.

Reason for Change: New telephone switch necessitates different dialing protocol.

Description: Attachment III, page 8 added section entitled, **Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat**.

Reason for Change: To meet requirements specified in Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures Order (Security Order) issued 2/25/02.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139
ATTACHMENT II
PAGE 1 OF 3
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE 11-29-01 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG. E COMM.# _____
 TITLE Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROCEDURE _____ REVISION _____ SAFETY RELATED
 CHANGE PERMANENT QUALITY RELATED _____
 RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____ NON-SAFETY RELATED _____

ii. DESCRIPTION:
See attached

REASON FOR CHANGE:
See attached

R. Schwartz / R.J. Schwartz
Originator - Sign and PRINT Name

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)

<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHS
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMNSS
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE						<input type="checkbox"/> 75A.59		

Other Reviews:
 CHS
 GMNSS

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES.

John Kelly 12-5-01
Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE _____ QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____
 TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES _____ NO
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO _____
 TRAINING REQUIRED? YES NO _____
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO
 P/CAP AFFECTED? YES _____ NO
 COMMENTS RESOLVED: CMC 12/19-01
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? N/A / _____ Date _____
 NL&OE N/A / _____ Date _____
 RESP. MGR _____ Date _____

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (If Applicable)
N/A / _____ Date _____
 QA Concurrence _____ Date _____

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:
N/A / _____ Date _____
 Training Completed _____ Date _____
John Kelly 12-25-01
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence Date

x. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: _____ Date _____
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____
 COMMENTS: YES _____ NO _____

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: _____ Date _____
 Responsible Manager _____ Date _____
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change E
Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change
Page 1 of 2**

Description: Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a "Major Steam Line Break with Greater Than 50 Gallons per Minute Primary-to-Secondary Leakage and Indication of Fuel Damage": Changed "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

Description: Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for a "Loss of Two of Three Fission Product Barriers with Potential Loss of the Third Barrier": Changed "Laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

Description: Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Notification of Unusual Event for a "Fuel Damage Indication": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

Description: Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Alert Detection Method for a "Possible Fuel Damage": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

Description: Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a "Degraded Core with Possible Loss of Coolable Geometry": Changed "RM-L1 High Range off scale ($>10^6$ cpm) with laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range off scale ($>10^6$ cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change E
Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change
Page 2 of 2**

Description: Attachment II, Page 7 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for "Transient Requiring Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip Which Results in Core Damage or Additional Failure of Core Cooling and Makeup Systems Which Could Lead to Core Melt": Changed "RM-L1 alarm, with laboratory analysis dose equivalent I-131 activity concentration $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ ".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

Description: Attachment III: Made various changes to the format and the wording of some sections. Format changes include providing lines next to each step for place keeping.

Reason for the Change: Feedback from users to make the attachment more usable and to provide clarification.

Description: Attachment III: Removed the provision for certain TSC duty personnel to report to the TSC instead of the EOF during a security emergency. The entire ERO duty will now be instructed to report to the EOF in the event of a security emergency.

Reason for the Change: This action simplifies and clarifies the response instructions. The EOF provides a safe staging area away from the plant site. TSC and OSC personnel can be directed to respond to the plant site from the EOF as necessary and as conditions permit.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

SAP-139
ATTACHMENT II
PAGE 1 OF 3
REVISION 20

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 11-12-01 PROC.# EPP-001 REV.# 24 CHG D COMM.# _____
 TITLE: Activation and implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROCEDURE _____ REVISION _____ SAFETY RELATED
 CHANGE PERMANENT QUALITY RELATED _____
 RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____ NON-SAFETY RELATED _____

ii. DESCRIPTION: ① Added a SCOPE statement to section 1.0. ② Changed Attachment III, consideration for a Security Emergency.

REASON FOR CHANGE: ① To comply with SAP-139. ② To meet the intent of NRC information Advisory 1A-01-1, dated 11-6-01.

R. J. Schwartz
 Originator - Sign and PRINT Name

iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)

<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS	<input type="checkbox"/> MNPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPLE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMES	<input type="checkbox"/> CWPS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISEG	<input type="checkbox"/> NOET	<input type="checkbox"/> QC	Other Reviews: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMNSS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SA 11-12-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> J. Warieck Ko
<input type="checkbox"/> MDE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNT	<input type="checkbox"/> MPSE	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO	<input type="checkbox"/> DE	<input type="checkbox"/> MNTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TOR	
<input type="checkbox"/> MHPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P	<input type="checkbox"/> MSPD	<input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS	<input type="checkbox"/> FFD	<input type="checkbox"/> MQS	<input type="checkbox"/> NTET	<input type="checkbox"/> RC	
<input type="checkbox"/> MMPR	<input type="checkbox"/> MPO	<input type="checkbox"/> SAS	<input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS	<input type="checkbox"/> MPR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS	<input type="checkbox"/> RE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MMS	<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS	<input type="checkbox"/> QA	<input type="checkbox"/> CHS	<input type="checkbox"/> ISD	<input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE	<input type="checkbox"/> PSE	<input type="checkbox"/> TU	
<input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE						<input type="checkbox"/> 50.59		

iv. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES:

John Kelly 11/12/01
 Discipline Supervisor Date

v. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE _____ QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____
 TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____

vi. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES ___ NO 11/12/01
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES ___ NO ___
 TRAINING REQUIRED? YES NO ___
 IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES ___ NO
 P/CAP AFFECTED? YES ___ NO
 COMMENTS RESOLVED: John Kelly 11/16/01
 Discipline Supervisor Date

vii. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?

C. YES ___ NO N/A Date _____
 N. YES ___ NO N/A Date _____
 RESP. MGR. _____ Date _____

viii. FINAL QA REVIEW (if Applicable)

N/A Date _____
 QA Concurrence _____ Date _____

ix. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

N/A Date _____
 Training Completed _____ Date _____
John Kelly 11/16/01
 Procedure Approval/Concurrence Date

x. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY:
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____
 COMMENTS. YES ___ NO ___

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED.

Responsible Manager _____ Date _____
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
COPY NO. 157

SAP-139
 ATTACHMENT IV
 PAGE 1 OF 3
 REVISION 18

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

I. DATE: <u>10-19-87</u> PROC.#: <u>EPP-001</u> REV.#: <u>24</u> CHG.: <u>C</u> COMM.#: <u>No/001</u>	
TITLE: <u>Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan</u>	
NEW PROC <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SAFETY RELATED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
REVISION <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input type="checkbox"/> FROM _____ TO _____	QUALITY RELATED <input type="checkbox"/> NON-SAFETY RELATED <input type="checkbox"/>
II. DESCRIPTION: <u>See addendum to this PDF-A</u>	
REASON FOR CHANGE: <u>See addendum to this PDF-A</u>	
<u>R. J. Schwartz</u> Originator / Sign/Print	
III. WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGE/NEW PROCEDURE:	
	*YES NO N/A
1. Result in significant increased personnel radiation exposure? (ALARA review)	_____ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____
2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment?	_____ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____
3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan?	_____ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____
4. Degrade the safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency of Training and Qualification Plans?	_____ _____ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
* If any question 1 through 4 is answered "YES", refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.	
REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: <input type="checkbox"/> MOPS <input type="checkbox"/> MHPS <input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO <input type="checkbox"/> QA <input type="checkbox"/> TU <input type="checkbox"/> ISD <input type="checkbox"/> MMS <input type="checkbox"/> MDE <input type="checkbox"/> GMES <input type="checkbox"/> QC <input type="checkbox"/> CHS <input type="checkbox"/> RC <input type="checkbox"/> MQS <input type="checkbox"/> MNT <input type="checkbox"/> GMNS <input type="checkbox"/> SAS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CR <input type="checkbox"/> MPSE <input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE <input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD <input type="checkbox"/> MNTS <input type="checkbox"/> PSE <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> MCHS <input type="checkbox"/> MNPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS <input type="checkbox"/> DE <input type="checkbox"/> _____	REQUESTED REVIEWS: <u>GMNS</u> <u>QA</u> <u>10/20/88</u> Discipline Supervisor Date
IV. 10CFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> REQUIRED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXEMPT <input type="checkbox"/> PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: <u>10CFR50.59</u>	
V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL: QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE _____ QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____ TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____ SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____	
VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAINING REQUIRED? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO _____ IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO _____ P/CAP AFFECTED? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO _____ COMMENTS RESOLVED: <u>[Signature]</u> 11/17/88 Discipline Supervisor Date	VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? C. YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> <u>[Signature]</u> 11/17/88 N. YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> <u>[Signature]</u> 11/17/88 RESP. MGR Date
	VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (As Applicable) QA Concurrence _____ Date _____ N/A
	IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY: <u>[Signature]</u> for S. Byrne, 11/25/88 Training Completed Date <u>[Signature]</u> for S. Byrne, 11/25/88 Procedure Approval/Concurrence Date
X. PSRC REVIEW: A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____ COMMENTS: YES _____ NO _____	B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: Responsible Manager _____ Date _____ PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to PDF-A, Section II
Description and Reason for Changes
Page 1 of 2**

Change Description:

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1122 to SAP-1131.

Reason for Change:

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

Change Description:

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #C01.

Reason for Change:

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

Description:

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #N01.

Reason for Change:

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

Description:

Attachment II Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

Reason for Change:

Revision 24 has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to PDF-A, Section II
Description and Reason for Changes
Page 2 of 2**

Description:

Attachment II Page 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance".

Reason for Change:

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

Description:

Attachment II Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

Reason for Change:

Correct typographical error.

Description:

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

Reason for Change:

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IED/ED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation
Page 1 of 5**

Change Description:

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1122 to SAP-1131.

Reason for Change:

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change does not affect sections in 10CFR50.47(b) or 10CFR50 Appendix E. This change is administrative in nature. Procedures for evaluation of events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

Change Description:

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #C01.

Reason for Change:

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E IV.C. This change provides guidance to the user for the actions to take for undeclared and misclassified events as described in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73, Rev 1, section 3.1.1, Immediate Notification Requirements. This section of the NUREG states that when such a condition is discovered that a one hour report to the NRC is appropriate and that emergency declaration and termination is unnecessary. At annual training for State and local governments conducted on 9/3/98 this issue was discussed and authorizing representatives of the State and the four Risk Counties stated that they also want to be notified within one hour of when such an event is discovered.

Unclassified and misclassified events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation
Page 2 of 5**

Description:

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #N01.

Reason for Change:

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E IV.C. EWSS Inoperability is no longer used as a detection method for emergency classification. This detection method was removed from the EALs in a prior revision to this procedure and to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This revision to the Plan was approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

Description:

Attachment II Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

Reason for Change:

Revision 24 Change B has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation:

These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). The Alert level is entered as a result of safety system degradation. This condition indicates a failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a first line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS integrity. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded, rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded, is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. For some transients, the timing of the manual reactor trip would not be critical and fuel damage could be avoided. For other events, fuel damage could occur that would warrant the increased monitoring that would occur for an

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation
Page 3 of 5**

Alert. Failure of the manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if entry into EOP-13.0 is required due to failure of both the automatic and manual reactor trip functions (both switches). Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to the loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Again, timing and the type of event that required the reactor trip initially are important factors on the expected damage. But to simplify the classification scheme, entry into EOP-13.0 indicates some time may pass before reactor power is low enough to prevent fuel damage.

The General Emergency EAL 431 detection method was not changed. The General Emergency classification is more closely related to the loss of fission product barriers. This event assumes continued power generation and demonstrated evidence of fuel damage or the loss of functions needed to support core cooling which could lead to core melt. With respect to critical safety functions, this event would represent a severe challenge to both "Subcriticality" and "Core Cooling".

The above changes match the intent of the Initiating Conditions of these EALs and reduce the possibility for misclassification. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation
Page 4 of 5**

Description:

Attachment II Page 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance":

Reason for Change:

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation

These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). These changes help to insure appropriate actions are taken in a Security event and enhance emergency response. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

Description:

Attachment II Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

Reason for Change:

Correct typographical error.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change corrects a typographical error and is administrative in nature. Therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

**EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
Revision 24, Change C
Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation
Page 5 of 5**

Description:

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

Reason for Change:

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IED/ED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

10CFR50.54.q Evaluation

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change does not alter the Emergency Action Level scheme. This change simplifies the emergency declaration process by removing a restrictive and inappropriate statement about using EIS to declare an emergency. EIS is not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan, therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
COPY NO. 157

SAP-139
 ATTACHMENT IV
 PAGE 1 OF 3
 REVISION 18

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

I. DATE: <u>1-26-98</u> PROC.# <u>EPP-221</u> REV.# <u>24</u> CHG. <u>B</u> COMM.# _____ TITLE: <u>ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN</u>																
NEW PROC _____ CHANGE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REVISION _____ RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____	SAFETY RELATED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QUALITY RELATED _____ NON-SAFETY RELATED _____															
II. DESCRIPTION: <u>DELETE REF. 2.9 STEP 4.3 DELETE REFERENCE TO ERONS, ATT. 1 page 2 of 2 DELETE 11.E and REVISE NEW 11.E, ATT 11 page 1, REVISE INITIATING CONDITION FOR NUC (SEE ATTACHED SUMMARY) and 16</u> REASON FOR CHANGE: <u>(SEE ATTACHED SUMMARY)</u>																
_____ CM Counts <small>Originator Sign/Print</small>																
III. WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGE/NEW PROCEDURE:																
1. Result in significant increased personnel radiation exposure? (ALARA review) 2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment? 3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan? 4. Degrade the safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency of Training and Qualification Plans?	<table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">*YES</td> <td style="text-align: center;">NO</td> <td style="text-align: center;">N/A</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> <td style="text-align: center;">X</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> <td style="text-align: center;">_____</td> </tr> </table>	*YES	NO	N/A	_____	X	_____	_____	X	_____	_____	X	X	_____	_____	_____
*YES	NO	N/A														
_____	X	_____														
_____	X	_____														
_____	X	X														
_____	_____	_____														
* If any question 1 through 4 is answered "YES", refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.																
REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT:																
<input type="checkbox"/> MOPS <input type="checkbox"/> MHPS <input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO <input type="checkbox"/> QA <input type="checkbox"/> TU <input type="checkbox"/> ISD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GMASS <input type="checkbox"/> MMS <input type="checkbox"/> MDE <input type="checkbox"/> GMES <input type="checkbox"/> QC <input type="checkbox"/> CHS <input type="checkbox"/> RC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QA <input type="checkbox"/> MQS <input type="checkbox"/> MNT <input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS <input type="checkbox"/> SFADC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RIS <input type="checkbox"/> MSCE <input type="checkbox"/> MNL&OE <input type="checkbox"/> GMSPD <input type="checkbox"/> MNTS <input type="checkbox"/> SCE <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> MCHS <input type="checkbox"/> MNPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS <input type="checkbox"/> DE <input type="checkbox"/> _____	REQUESTED REVIEWS <u>_____</u> <u>_____</u> Discipline Supervisor Date <u>1/27/98</u>															
IV. 10CFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION <input type="checkbox"/> REQUIRED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXEMPT <input type="checkbox"/> PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: <u>10CFR50.54(a)</u>																
V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL: QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE _____ <u>NA</u> QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____ TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____ SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____																
VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAINING REQUIRED? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO _____ P/CAP AFFECTED? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMENTS RESOLVED: <u>_____</u> <u>13-2-98</u> <small>Discipline Supervisor Date</small>	VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? C. YES _____ NO <u>NA</u> _____ / _____ Date N. YES _____ NO _____ / _____ Date <small>RESP. MGR.</small>															
	VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (As Applicable) <u>NA</u> _____ / _____ Date <small>QA Concurrence</small>															
	IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY: <u>NA</u> _____ / _____ Date <small>Training Completed</small> <u>_____</u> <u>13/3/98</u> Date <small>Procedure Approval/Concurrence</small>															
X. PSRC REVIEW: A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____ COMMENTS. YES _____ NO _____	B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: Responsible Manager _____ Date _____ PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____															

**EPP-001
REVISION 24, CHANGE B
SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

- A. Reference 2.9, EPP-025, "Use of the ERON System" was deleted. The ERON System is no longer in use. The ERON System was used only for recording results of radio-pager drills and has been replaced by another system. It was not used for communicating with the Emergency Response Organization or offsite agencies. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.
- B. Step 4.3 was revised to remove all reference to the ERON System. (See A. above for justification.)
- C. Attachment I, page 2 of 2, item 11. E was deleted. This item described an Initiating Condition that is being revised to delete the referenced condition. The new 11. E was revised to better reflect the condition described in the referenced Initiating Condition. (See E. below for justification.)
- D. Attachment II, page 1 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.
- E. Attachment II, page 16 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

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SAP-139 ATTACHMENT IV PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 17

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

I. DATE: 2-3-97 PROC. # EPP-001 REV. # 24 CHG. A COMM. # _____
 TITLE: Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

NEW PROC _____ CHANGE PERMANENT SAFETY RELATED
 REVISION _____ RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____ QUALITY RELATED _____
 NON-SAFETY RELATED _____

II. DESCRIPTION: Add Note 4.4 and Attachment III

REASON FOR CHANGE: To provide guidance to the IED/ED during Security-related emergencies

CM Cont. 2/3/97
 Originator Sign/Print

III. WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGE/NEW PROCEDURE:

	* YES	NO	N/A
1. Result in significant increased personnel radiation exposure? (ALARA review)	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan?	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
4. Degrade the safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency or Training and Qualification Plans?	_____	_____	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

* If any question 1 through 4 is answered "YES", refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.

REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: OR (RS) CHS GMNPO
 NL&OE HPS GMES
 OPS MNTS SCE GMINPS
 QA NPS DE _____
 QC TU _____

REQUESTED REVIEWS: GMNPS

[Signature] 12-6-97
 Discipline Supervisor Date

IV. 10CFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION

REQUIRED EXEMPT PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: 10CFR50.59(a)

[Signature]
 Discipline supervisor concurrence

V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE NA QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____
 TELECON BY _____ TELECON BY _____
 SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____

VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES _____ NO

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES NO _____

IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES NO _____

P/CAP AFFECTED? YES _____ NO

COMMENTS RESOLVED: [Signature] 12/25/97
 Discipline Supervisor Date

TRAINING COMPLETED: [Signature] 12-25-97
 Discipline Supervisor Date

VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE?

C. YES _____ NO NA _____ 1 _____ Date
 NL&OE

N. YES _____ NO _____ 1 _____ Date
 RESP. MGR.

VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (As Applicable)

[Signature] 12/26/97
 QA Concurrence Date

IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

[Signature] 12/16/97
 Approval/Concurrence Date

X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____
 COMMENTS: YES _____ NO _____

B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED: Responsible Manager _____ Date _____
 PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	
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2.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>	1	
3.0 <u>DEFINITIONS</u>	1	
4.0 <u>CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES</u>	3	
5.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u>	4	
6.0 <u>RECORDS</u>	5	Chg C
7.0 <u>REVISION SUMMARY</u>	5	Chg A

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment I - Emergency Action Level Cross Reference Guide

Attachment II - Emergency Action Levels

Attachment III - Considerations for a Security Emergency

Chg
A

1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.
- 1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q., 10CFR50 Appendix B and SAP-630. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

Chg
D & F

2.0 REFERENCES

- 2.1 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".
- 2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.
- 2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.
- 2.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.
- 2.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.
- 2.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.
- 2.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.
- 2.9 SAP-1131, Corrective Action Program.
- 2.10 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.
- 2.11 SCP-113, Two Person Rule

Chg B,
C and F

Chg
C | Chg
F

3.0 DEFINITIONS

- 3.1 Definitions
 - 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - Off normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

- 3.1.2 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
- 3.1.3 Site Area Emergency - Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
- 3.1.4 General Emergency - Events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

Chg C

3.2 Abbreviations

- 3.2.1 EAL - Emergency Action Level
- 3.2.2 NUE - Notification of Unusual Event
- 3.2.3 IED - Interim Emergency Director
- 3.2.4 ED - Emergency Director
- 3.2.5 EPP - Emergency Plan Procedure
- 3.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure
- 3.2.7 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent
- 3.2.8 CDE- Committed Dose Equivalent

4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

- 4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

NOTE 4.2

The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the IED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

- 4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable EAL. The Detection Methods are intended to be a guide for the proper classification of an emergency. The judgment of the IED/ED may take precedence in determining if the Initiating Condition has been met or exceeded.

- 4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is the Emergency Information System (EIS) Emergency Type Code.

Chg.
B

NOTE 4.4

When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. See Attachment III for additional guidance.

Chg.
A

- 4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).

- 4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

5.0 PROCEDURE

- 5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.

NOTE 5.2

When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

- 5.2 The IED/ED shall:
- A. Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate initiating condition and turn to the referenced page in Attachment II.
 - B. Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each emergency condition.
 - C. Declare the appropriate emergency classification. Perform additional actions in accordance with the EOPs and the appropriate EPPs.

Notification of Unusual Event	-	EPP-001.1
Alert	-	EPP-001.2
Site Area Emergency	-	EPP-001.3
General Emergency	-	EPP-001.4

5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events

- C01→ A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists, the IED/ED shall insure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

Chg
C

Chg
C

6.0 RECORDS

- 6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

7.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 7.1 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 4.3.
7.2 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 5.2.C.
7.3 Incorporate Change A.
7.4 Addition of SAP-1122.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment II.

<u>INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC</u>	<u>REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT II</u>
1. Reactor Coolant System	
A. Reactor Coolant Leakage	1
B. Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)	1
C. Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat	2
D. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	4
E. Primary to Secondary Leakage	3, 4
F. Major Steam Line Break with Primary to Secondary Leak	4
2. Secondary System	
A. Major Steam Line Break	4
B. Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat	2
C. Secondary System Depressurization	5
D. Loss of Feedwater and Condensate System	5
E. Failure of Emergency Feedwater System	5, 8
F. Turbine-Generator Rotating Component Failure	5
3. Fuel	
A. Fuel Damage	1, 2, 4, 6, 7
B. Fuel Handling Accident	6
C. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	4
D. Loss of Coolable Geometry	1, 2, 6
4. Engineered Safety Feature	
A. Failure of the Reactor Protection System	7
B. Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip	7
5. Station Power	
A. Loss of Offsite Power	3, 8
B. Loss of Onsite AC Power	8
C. Loss of Onsite DC Power	8
6. Containment	
A. Loss of Containment Integrity	4
7. Radiological Effluents	
A. Liquid or Gaseous Effluent Exceeds Technical Specification	9, 10
B. High Radiation Levels	9
C. Radiation Levels Detected/Projected at the Exclusion Area Boundary	9, 10

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment II

<u>INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC</u>	<u>REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT II</u>
8. Fire	
A. Fire Lasting More Than 15 Minutes	11
B. Fire Effecting Safety Trains, Systems or Functions	11
9. Security	
A. Security Threats, Attempted Entry or Sabotage	12
10. Natural Phenomenon	
A. Natural Events Onsite or Near Site (Earthquake, Tornado, or Hurricane)	13
B. Other Hazards Onsite or Near Site (Aircraft Crash, Train Derailment, Explosion or Toxic/Flammable Gas Release)	14
11. Other	
A. Emergency Director Discretion Based On Other Plant Conditions	15
B. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits	15
C. Loss of Function for Plant Cold or Hot Shutdown	16
D. Control Room Evacuation	16
E. Loss of Communications Capability	16
F. Loss of RHR	1, 17

Chg.
B

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (101) RCS LEAKAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2: (Only applicable in Modes 1 through 4)</p> <p>1. Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (201) REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control Tank.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (301) KNOWN LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 7) <u>OR</u> 8:</p> <p>1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip, 2. Pressurizer low pressure safety Injection signal, 3. Reactor Building pressure >1.5 psig, 4. Reactor Building sump level above zero, 5. RBCU Drain Flow High, 6. RM-A2, RM-G7, RM-G18 high alarm, 7. Reactor Building temperature >120°F.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>8. Pressurizer Relief Tank conditions above normal (for PORV <u>OR</u> Safety Valve LOCA's)</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (401) SMALL OR LARGE LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO PERFORM, LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Items 1 - 7 <u>OR</u> 8 under Site Area Emergency and EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>1. Indications that safety Injection and RHR pumps are not running (no AMPS).</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Flow indication for safety Injection and RHR pumps reading zero</p>

Chg
 B

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (102) FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve opens and then fails to reseat as indicated by EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</p> <p>1. Valid open indication of Pressurizer Relief OR Safety Valve OR valid Acoustical Monitor indication.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Visual OR audible indication at vent stacks of open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from affected Steam Generator.</p>			<p>INITIATING CONDITION (402) SMALL LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 5):</p> <p>1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RHR flow indicators show zero flow for greater than 30 minutes after shift to RHR,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. RCS temperature rising,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>5. Reactor Building Spray and Reactor Building Cooling Units fail to function.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (103) EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE LIMIT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Exceeds T.S. 3 4 6 2 Limits*</p> <p>1. >1 gpm Total for > 4 hours. 2. > 500 gpd any one Steam Generator for > 4 hours.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (202) RAPID GROSS FAILURE OF ONE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 5):</p> <p>1. Pressurizer low pressure alarm <u>AND</u> reactor trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Pressurizer low level alarm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RM-A9, G19A, G-19B, <u>QB</u> G19C valid high alarm supported by laboratory analysis,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>5. Loss of 115 KV <u>AND</u> 230 KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (203) RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (e.g., SEVERAL HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY- TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Entry into EOP-4 0</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (302) RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (SEVERAL HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO- SECONDARY LEAK RATE) WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. Entry into EOP-4 0,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Loss of 115KV and 230KV Emergency Safeguards Power Potential Lights,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. Lifting of Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves or Safety Valves.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (204) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. All of the following rapidly decreasing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tavg b. PZR pressure c. PZR level, <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. High alarms on either RM-L3, L10, <u>OR</u> A9,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. For break inside RB: High-1RB pressure <u>AND</u> safety injection actuation. <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. For break outside RB: safety injection actuation due to steamline ΔP or low steamline pressure 	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (303) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE <u>AND</u> INDICATION OF FUEL DAMAGE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> All of the following (1 - 4):</p> <p>1. All of the following rapidly decreasing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tavg b. PZR pressure c. PZR level, <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. High alarms on RM-A9 and laboratory analysis of secondary coolant activity supporting 50 gpm leakage,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. For break inside RB: High-1 RB pressure <u>AND</u> safety injection actuation <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. For break outside RB: safety injection actuation due to steamline ΔP or low steamline pressure. Refer to Loss of 2 of 3 FP Barriers (Possible General Emergency). 	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (403) LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (e.g., LOSS OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> <u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3.</p> <p>1. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ <u>AND</u> LOCA in progress <u>AND</u> Reactor Building pressure ≥ 30 psig for at least 2 minutes</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ <u>AND</u> breach of containment integrity and <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification allowable. <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. RCS pressure ≥ 2335 psig. <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. LOCA <u>AND</u> breach of containment integrity and <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant. <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. Core Exit temperature $\geq 700^\circ$

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 SECONDARY SYSTEM

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (104) RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Rapid decrease in S/G pressure resulting in a safety injection actuation.</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (105) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY (TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turbine Trip, <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Observation of Failure of EITHER a OR b. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a Turbine Rotating Assembly. <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. Generator Rotating Assembly. 	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY (TURBINE -GENERATOR FAILURE CAUSING CASING PENETRATION)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Turbine Trip, <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Observation of penetration of the turbine casing 		<p>INITIATING CONDITION (411) TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPLE HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM) FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RCS to maintain core cooling, <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. Steam Generator wide range levels less than 15% In two or more steam generators. <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RCS to maintain core cooling, <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> b. RCS Pressure > 2335 psig due to loss of heat sink.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
FUEL

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (106) FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$. Chg E</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (221) POSSIBLE FUEL DAMAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$. Chg E</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (222) FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u></p> <p>1. a. In the Reactor Building: Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, RM-G17A, 17B high alarm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. In the Fuel Handling Building: Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 high alarm, <u>OR</u> RM-G8 high alarm.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (321) DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF COOLABLE GEOMETRY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range off scale ($>10^6 \text{ cpm}$) with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$, Chg E</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Core Exit Temperatures $\geq 700^\circ\text{F}$,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. No indication of forced or natural circulation</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (322) MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR BUILDING OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. a. In the Reactor Building: Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly <u>OR</u> water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, G17A, G17B high alarms.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. In the Fuel Handling Building: Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly <u>OR</u> water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 or RM-G8 high alarm</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (231)</u> FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> An automatic reactor trip fails when required,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>A manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch <u>is successful.</u></p>	<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (331)</u> TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL DAMAGE EVIDENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1</p>	<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (431)</u> TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</p> <p>1. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm.}$</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Flow indicators on safety injection system <u>AND</u> RHR systems show zero flow with safety injection initiated</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Status lights show safety injection system <u>AND</u> RHR pumps not running with safety injection initiated.</p>

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 STATION POWER

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (107) TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>In Modes 1-6, <u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3:</p> <p>1 Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Both Diesel Generator inoperable for > 1 hour.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (241) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN 5 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2:</p> <p>1. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions.</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (242) LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. 480 V ESF Channel A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3 DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (341) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2.</p> <p>1. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF Potential Lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded or undervoltage conditions</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (342) LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. 480V ESF Channel A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (441) FAILURE OF OFFSITE AND ONSITE POWER ALONG WITH TOTAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER MAKEUP CAPABILITY.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 3):</p> <p>1. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p>a. Loss of 115KV <u>AND</u> 230KV ESF potential lights.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded voltage or undervoltage conditions,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3 <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b</p> <p>a. Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump fails to start <u>AND</u> is inoperable for one hour.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Core Exit temperatures $\geq 700^{\circ}$ F.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (108) GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE RATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 1 HOUR (APPENDIX B TABLE II, COLUMN 1 10CFR20)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</u></p> <p>1. RM-A3 (Gas) increases > 1×10^5 cpm above bkgd in any 1 hour. <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. RM-A3 (Iodine) increases > 8×10^4 cpm above bkgd in any 1 hour. <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 4 times the high alarm setpoint for more than 1 hour. <u>OR</u></p> <p>4. RM-A4 (Iodine) in valid high alarm for more than 1 hour.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (261) SUSTAINED HIGH RADIATION LEVELS OR HIGH AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WHICH INDICATES A SEVERE DEGRADATION IN THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (e.g., INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 1000 IN DIRECT RADIATION READINGS)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. Unexpected valid RMG readings as follows:</p> <p>a. RM-G2-4, 8-13, or 16; greater than 2.5 R/hr <u>OR</u></p> <p>b) RM-G7, 17A, 17B, or 18 greater than 100 R/hr <u>OR</u></p> <p>c) RM-G1; greater than 1 R/hr.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Unexpected plant area iodine or particulate airborne concentration greater than 1000 DAC (as per 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table 1).</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (361) PROJECTED DOSE GREATER THAN 50 MILLIREM TEDE (WHOLE BODY)</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>GREATER THAN 250 MILLIREM CDE (THYROID) AT OR BEYOND THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Non-routine release(s) cause an alarm of RM-A3, A4, A13, A14, or RM-G19 (or detection by other means) warrant an offsite dose assessment and the results indicate projections exceeding the above doses at or beyond the exclusion area boundary.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (461) EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM TEDE (WHOLE BODY)</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>5 REM CDE (THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. Radiation Monitor levels exceed those specified for Site Area Emergency, <u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Calculation on Dose Assessment Forms indicates levels exceeding 1 Rem TEDE (whole body) or 5 Rem CDE (thyroid) at the exclusion area boundary using radiation monitor readings and effluent stream flow rates (measured or assumed) for actual meteorological conditions; or using field measurements.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (109) LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES (APPENDIX B TABLE II COLUMN 2 10CFR20)</p> <p><u>Detection Method</u></p> <p>Any of the following liquid effluent monitors in valid High Alarm for longer than 15 min. <u>AND</u> isolation valve(s) fail to close:</p> <p>RM-L5 <u>OR</u> RM-L7 <u>OR</u> RM-L9.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (262) RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method</u></p> <p>Any of the following valid radiation monitor readings for longer than 15 minutes:</p> <p>1. RM-A3 (Gas) is off scale high. <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. RM-A3 (Iodine) is off scale high <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 times high alarm setpoint <u>OR</u></p> <p>4. RM-A4 (Iodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint. <u>OR</u></p> <p>5. RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint <u>AND</u> isolation valve(s) fail to close</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (362) DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION MONITOR (RMG) READINGS AND/OR OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. Reactor Building leak rate results in calculated dose rate at exclusion area boundary greater than 50 mrem/hr whole body for 0.5 hr, or 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 min. <u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure dose rates greater than 50 mrem/hr for 0.5 hr, or greater than 500 mrem/hr for 2 min. (beta + gamma) at one mile or greater from the plant. <u>OR</u></p> <p>3. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure thyroid dose rates (equivalent I-131 concentrations) greater than <u>EITHER</u> a or b:</p> <p>a. 250 mrem/hr (1.3x10⁷ µCi/cc) for 0.5 hr. <u>OR</u></p> <p>b. 2500 mrem/hr (1.3x10⁶ µCi/cc) for 2 min. at one mile or greater from the plant.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
FIRE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (110) FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>1 Observation.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>2. Fire Detection Device alarm with confirming observation</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (271) FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEMS.</p> <p><u>Detection Method.</u></p> <p>Observation of fire that could affect one or more safety systems.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (371) FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR FUNCTIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method.</u></p> <p>Observation of major fire that defeats both trains of a safety system or function.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
SECURITY

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (111) SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method</u></p> <p>Report to the Control Room by Security or observer.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (281) ONGOING SEVERE SECURITY THREAT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Security safeguards contingency event which results in adversaries commandeering an area of the plant, but not impacting shutdown capability.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (381) SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT</p> <p><u>Detection Method.</u></p> <p>Physical attack on the Plant involving imminent occupancy of <u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u>:</p> <p>1. Control Room</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (481) SECURITY THREAT RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Physical attack on the Plant has resulted in occupation of <u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u>:</p> <p>1. Control Room.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 NATURAL PHENOMENON

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (112) NATURAL EVENTS: 1. EARTHQUAKE 2. TORNADO ONSITE 3. HURRICANE NEAR SITE</p> <p><u>Detectlon Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake Seismic Recording System Start Indication and confirmation of a seismic event thru observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For Tornado Observation of event in Exclusion Area.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. For Hurricane: Sustained winds in excess of 50 mph due to a hurricane as measured by onsite meteorological instrumentation or the National Weather Service</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (291) SEVERE NATURAL EVENT NEAR SITE: 1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE 2/3 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 2. TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY 3. SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE exceeded (one or more yellow lights lit) and confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For Tornado: Observation of the event within the Protected Area or Switchyard</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>3. For Hurricane: Sustained winds in excess of 75 mph due to a hurricane as measured by onsite meteorological Instrumentation or the National Weather Service.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (391) SEVERE NATURAL PHENOMENON BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN: 1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 2. SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>1. For Earthquake Observation of the event (felt or heard) lasting >2 seconds and <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE exceeded.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE exceeded (one or more red lights lit).</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. For sustained winds in excess of 100 mph onsite: As measured by onsite meteorological Instrumentation or the National Weather Service.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 MANMADE PHENOMENON

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (113)</u> OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH 2. ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT 3. ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED ACTIVITIES) 4. NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT THREATENS PERSONNEL <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For Aircraft Crash. Observation of event OR 2. For Train Derailment: Observation of event. OR 3. For Onsite Explosion: Observation of explosion or warning from offsite. OR 4. For Onsite Toxic or Flammable Gas Release: Observation of release or warning from offsite 	<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (292)</u> OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY 2. MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE 3. KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO PLANT STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT 4. ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN CONCENTRATION WHICH EXCEED THE LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For Aircraft Crash: Observation of aircraft crash into Plant structures. OR 2. For Missile Impact. Observation of missile impacts on Plant structures or components. OR 3. For Onsite Explosion: Observation of damage by explosion. OR 4. For Onsite Toxic or Flammable Gas Release: Observation or warning from outside the Plant; detection of gasses (using portable instrumentation) which exist in concentrations which exceed the limits of flammability or toxicity. 	<p><u>INITIATING CONDITION (392)</u> OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL STRUCTURES, 2. MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT ON FACILITY RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE TO SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT 3. ENTRY OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INTO VITAL AREA WHICH INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF PLANT SAFETY <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aircraft crash causing damage OR fire in: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Reactor Building; OR b) Control Room; OR c) Auxiliary Building; OR d) Fuel Handling Building; OR e) DG Building; OR f) Intermediate Building; OR g) SW Intake Structures. OR 2. For Missile or Explosion Impact: Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (see specific Initiating Condition for this situation) OR 3. Entry of toxic or flammable gases into: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Control Room; OR b) Cable spreading rooms; OR c) Reactor Building; OR d) Switchgear room; OR e) Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms; OR f) Emergency Diesel Generator rooms; (as detected by portable instrumentation AND which renders a train of a safety related system inoperable) 	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 OTHER

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (114) INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (293) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY PERSONNEL ON STANDBY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by ICD/ED.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (393) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC WARNING</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by IED/ED.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (493) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by IED/ED.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS
 OTHER

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NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (115) UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>1. Loss of all onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. (Internal telephone system, Gal-Tronics system and radio system)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>2. Loss of all offsite communications capability. Internal telephone system, Bell lines, Fiberoptic links, radio system (When extraordinary means must be used to make communications.)</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (294) LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>1. RHR system not functional in Modes 1-4,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere.</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITIONS (295) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (394) LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT HOT SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 - 4):</p> <p>1. Inability to establish charging pump injection,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Inability to establish Emergency Feedwater Flow,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. RHR System not functional (applicable to Modes, 1, 2, and 3 only),</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>4. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (395) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN 15 MINUTES.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

NOTE

Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

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The Security Team Leader will notify the Control Room of a security emergency. A security emergency may be classified as an **Intrusion** or a **Site-Specific Credible Threat**. See the following considerations for each of these situations. Lines to the left of the considerations are for place keeping and are optional.

Intrusion:

CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel within the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- 1. Immediately direct an Operator to install the "Ultra Dogs" on the two card reader doors that lead into the Control Room area.
- 2. Make the following plant announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel. (Repeat announcement once.)

- 3. DO NOT sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- 4. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- 5. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

— 6. If the ERO is needed, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

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— a) Dialogics Communicator:

— 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.

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— 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: **“This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign”**. Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

— 3) **“To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options”**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions”.

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **“You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue”**. Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- 6) **“To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #”**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or

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- b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.
- 7. The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.
- 8. Evacuate Non-essential personnel when it is safe to do so.
- 9. During normal working hours, consider utilizing personnel responding to the EOF to assist in making notifications.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Site-Specific Credible Threat:

CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel inside or outside the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- 1. Declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), at a minimum, based on Security Threat, EAL #111. A higher initial classification could be made based on the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences.
- 2. Implement the Radiation Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures. State and local governments should be notified as required. Do not activate the Early Warning Siren System unless directed by the government agencies, per our procedures.
- 3. TSC/OSC staffing and other personnel decisions are made based on the nature of the threat and the timing of the threat. These decisions are independent of the NOUE activities.

Evacuate plant personnel if the information about the threat indicates that time is available. The ERO Duty Team is directed to report to the EOF or Backup EOF as described below. The EOF or Backup EOF is used as a staging area for TSC and OSC personnel. The IED may contact the EOF or Backup EOF to direct specific TSC and OSC personnel to come to the plant site, as necessary. The TSC and OSC should not be fully manned until the threat is resolved.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- 4. Make one of the following plant announcements:

TAKE COVER:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel.

OR

• **EVACUATE:**

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All non-essential and off-duty ERO personnel evacuate the site. All Duty ERO personnel report to the EOF. (Provide the exit route, if appropriate. See Page 11)

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- Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- Repeat the Plant Announcement.
- 5. The Duty Emergency Director should evaluate assuming emergency duties from the IED without a staffed and activated TSC. The Duty Emergency Director should only assume emergency duties from the IED if the Duty Emergency Director is located in the TSC.
- 6. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- 7. Reactor and plant operational decisions should be as directed by Management.
- 8. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

— a) Dialogics Communicator:

- 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.
- 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows. **“This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign”**. Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.
- 3) **“To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options”**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

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Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions”.

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- _____ 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **“You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue”**. Press 1 if no supplemental instructions, such as access routes to the EOF, are needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- _____ 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- _____ 6) **“To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #”**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or

- _____ b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.
- _____ 9. Notify Security of the intended routes and direct them to ensure gates are open, as appropriate.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat:

NOTE

Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

- ___ 1. Make the following announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel **except** Operations and Security evacuate the Protected Area. Assemble in the parking lot and await further instructions.
- ___ 2. Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- ___ 3. Repeat the Plant Announcement.
- CO2 ► ___ 4. In close coordination with the Security Team Leader implement the actions in SCP-113, Two Person Rule.
- ___ 5. Establish communications with the MDS and Security management.
- ___ 6. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.
- ___ 7. If the ERO is needed during normal working hours, management will assemble teams in the parking lot and provide direction as to facility manning and activation.
- ___ 8. If the ERO is needed after working hours, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. Contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- ___ a) Dialogics Communicator:
- ___ 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.
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- ___ 3) **“To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options”**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions”.

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

“The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **“You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue”**. Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
 - 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
 - 6) **“To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #”**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.
- Or
- b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.
 - 9) The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Access/Exit Routes:

As dictated by the events, select one of the below Basic Routes and the closest open bridge(s) to access/exit the plant and the EOF.

Three Basic Routes:

- 1. Normal Route via Highway 215.
- 2. Northern Route via the dirt road over the Fairfield Pumped Storage dam.
- 3. Southern Route via the dirt road from the south end of the plant access road to Parr.

Bridges Across the Broad River:

- 1. Pinner Bridge, Highway 213.
- 2. Highway 34 Bridge; located near the junction of Highway 34 and Highway 215, in the northern section of the 10-mile EPZ.
- 3. I-20 Bridge, located in Columbia, west of the junction of I-20 and Monticello Rd. (Highway 215).