

OUTLINE FOR PHONE CALLS WITH LICENSEES FOR:

DAVIS-BESSE, H.B. ROBINSON, NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 & SURRY UNIT 2

Purpose of Call: To provide licensees with initial feedback on staff review of their response to Bulletin 2001-01, and indicate the need for licensees to re-think and possibly revise their responses

Staff Review of the Bulletin Responses

- Focused on plants with cracking or leakage history and high susceptibility rankings
- Assessment of whether the response demonstrates reasonable assurance of the structural integrity of their vessel head penetration nozzles

Key Staff Acceptance Screening Criteria - Acceptability of response based on

- Past inspection method and timing
- Future inspection plans, including inspection method and timing

Evaluation of the Response for Their Plant

- Past inspection does not provide reasonable assurance of nozzle integrity -- not a qualified visual inspection of 100% of nozzles
- Timing of next inspection is not adequate -- there isn't reasonable assurance of nozzle integrity prior to the next inspection
- Questions regarding ability to qualify visual examination for the plant

Licensee Should Reconsider

- Acceleration of inspection plans in accordance with the Bulletin (e.g., by the end of 2001)
- A more meaningful examination if the plant-specific qualification of their visual examination method is not possible

Items to be documented by FENOC in their commitment letter regarding Davis-Besse continuing to operate until February 16, 2002.

1. Commitment to shutdown by February 16, 2002 to perform VHP Nozzle Inspections
2. Commitment to implement compensatory measures & schedule for implementation
 - Operating at a lower RCS hot leg temperature to reduce the head temperature effects on crack initiation and growth (598°F vs. 605°F)
 - Maximizing the availability of the plant's redundant critical safety systems until shutdown
 - Providing increased human factors reliability through additional training and personnel (e.g., dedicated operator - ECCS switchover from injection to recirc.)
3. Commitment to perform inspection of 100% of VHP Nozzles (e.g. qualified visual examination or other NDE technique(s)).
4. Commitment to a future meeting, prior to shutting down on February 16, 2002, to discuss their inspection plans (e.g., scope, method, etc...)
5. Commitment to characterize any identified flaws through destructive examination.